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  • Unreported Judgment

Walsh v Iker

 

[2019] QDC 225

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Walsh & Anor v Iker & Ors [2019] QDC 225

PARTIES:

MICHAEL ROBERT WALSH (First Plaintiff) and

SUSAN WALSH (Second Plaintiff)

V

EDWARD ALEXANDER IKER (First Defendant) and

JO-ANNE IKER (Second Defendant) and

EUNEEKE CATTLE COMPANY PTY LTD

ACN 112 009 097 (Third Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

D29/17

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Mackay

DELIVERED ON:

12 November 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

11 October 2019

JUDGE:

Farr SC DCJ

ORDER:

The application is dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – FORMATION OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS – CONTRACT IMPLIED FROM CONDUCT OF PARTIES – where the Third Defendant was joined to the proceedings by consent – where the identity of the recipient of the loan is contested – where the terms of repayment of the principal loan amount and accrued interest are contested – where there is no direct evidence of any oral contract – whether Summary Judgment can be made against the Third Defendant.

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – FORMATION OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS – CONTRACT IMPLIED FROM CONDUCT OF PARTIES – where the Plaintiffs seek an order striking out the whole of the Third Defendant’s Amended Defence pursuant to Rule 171 of the UCPR – where the Third Defendant’s Amended Defence application is based on the assertion that in the absence of agreement as to the time at which a loan would be repaid, at law a loan is payable on demand – whether the Amended Defence discloses a reasonable defence.

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – FORMATION OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS – CONTRACT IMPLIED FROM CONDUCT OF PARTIES – where the Plaintiffs seek further, or in the alternative, to strike out the set-off pleaded in the Further Amended Defence of the First and Second Defendants – where the Plaintiff concedes that the Second Defendant may have availability of a set-off against the Second Defendant – whether it would be appropriate to order the strike-out of the set-off raised in the defence of the Third Defendant.

COUNSEL:

M.T de Waard for the Applicants/Plaintiffs

S.B Whitten for the Defendants/Respondents

SOLICITORS:

Macrossan & Amiet Solicitors for the Applicants/Plaintiffs

Kelly Legal for the Defendants/Respondents

Introduction

  1. [1]
    This is the Plaintiffs interlocutory application seeking:
  1. summary judgment pursuant to Rule 292 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Qld) 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”) as against the Third Defendant;
  2. further or in the alternative, pursuant to Rule 171 of the UCPR, that either the whole of the Amended Defence of the Third Defendant, or just paragraphs 16 – 25 be struck out;
  3. further or in the alternative, pursuant to Rule 171 of the UCPR, the set-off pleaded in the further Amended Defence of the First and Second Defendants be struck out; and
  4. costs against the First, Second and Third Defendants.
  1. [2]
    The Defendants submit that the Plaintiffs application should be dismissed with costs.

Background

  1. [3]
    The First and Second Plaintiffs (the Plaintiffs) filed a Claim and Statement of Claim against the First and Second Defendants (the Defendants) on 3 May 2017, claiming $392,000.00 for “monies due and owing pursuant to a loan contract”, as well as “unliquidated damages being interest payments of $5,250.00 per month”.
  1. [4]
    The Plaintiffs’ claim was based on the allegation that the Plaintiffs and the Defendants “entered into a written loan contract dated 27 May 2013”. Express terms of the loan contract were alleged to include:
  1. interest was payable by the Defendants at the rate of 1.5 per cent per month or part thereof payable on the sixth day of each calendar month;[1]
  2. the loan contract was to remain in place until such time as the loan amount was paid back in full.[2]
  1. [5]
    Time was not expressed to be of the essence, and no consequences for late payments were pleaded as being expressed or implied.
  1. [6]
    Instead, it was alleged that it was an implied term that the principal amount of $350,000.00 was “payable upon demand”[3], and that demand had been made on 19 October 2016 which had not been complied with, allegedly entitling the Plaintiffs to the relief of damages against the Defendants. 
  1. [7]
    On 1 September 2017, the First and Second Defendants filed a Notice of Intention to Defend and Defence. The essence of the First and Second Defendants Defence is that the Plaintiffs did not agree to loan the First and Second Defendants the loan monies, but instead agreed to loan Euneeke Cattle Company Pty Ltd ACN 112 009 097 the loan monies.[4]
  1. [8]
    The Defendants denied the implication of any term for payment upon demand as alleged.[5]
  1. [9]
    By their Reply filed 10 October 2017, the Plaintiffs were clear in asserting that they held the Defendants and not Euneeke Cattle Company liable for the loan and interest claimed. The Plaintiffs:
  1. denied they agreed to loan the principal sum to Euneeke;[6]
  2. alleged again that the loan was provided to the Defendants “as natural persons”; [7]
  3. denied the “loan contract” document was between the Plaintiffs and Euneeke, but rather it was executed by the Defendants “as natural persons” and not on behalf of Euneeke;[8] and
  4. denied the Defendants were not a party to the loan contract and that they were not obligated by contract or law to make any payments to the Plaintiffs, again alleging that the loan was to the Defendants “as natural persons”, and denied that the Plaintiffs executed the Loan Contract as directors of Euneeke.[9]
  1. [10]
    Despite the Plaintiffs’ position set out in those pleadings, by application filed 16 July 2018 the Plaintiffs sought to join Euneeke as a defendant. The affidavit of Caitlin Roberts filed in support of that application stated that:
  1. at the time of filing the Claim and Statement of Claim the Plaintiffs “elected” to not name Euneeke as a defendant as the loan contract referred to the Defendants and was signed by the Defendants; and
  2. upon receipt of the Defence, the Plaintiffs consider it “desirable, just and convenient” that Euneeke be joined as a defendant.
  1. [11]
    I note though that Ms Roberts said nothing of the fact that, in their Reply, the Plaintiffs denied the Defence allegations that the loan was with Euneeke. Nor did she mention that the ‘Loan Contract’ document expressly refers to a loan to Euneeke.
  1. [12]
    On 2 August 2018, the court ordered by consent that Euneeke be joined to the proceeding as the Third Defendant.
  1. [13]
    On 6 August 2018, the Plaintiffs amended their claim (“the Amended Claim”) and Statement of Claim so as to join the Third Defendant. The Amended Statement of Claim pleaded that between 14 June 2013 and 8 September 2016, the Defendants made 41 interest payments under the loan.[10]
  1. [14]
    On 5 September 2018, the Third Defendant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend and Defence. Importantly, the Third Defendant:
  1. denied the loan monies were lent to the First and Second Defendant but admitted they were lent to the Third Defendant;[11]
  2. does not respond to whether the loan repayments were made but instead denies the relevant paragraph pleading the repayments on the basis that they deny the way in which the Loan Contract is defined in the pleading;[12] and
  3. pleads a (“set-off”) on the basis that the Second Plaintiff and the Second Defendant were co-guarantors under an unrelated Loan Agreement and as such that the Second Defendant has an equitable right to contribution from the Second Plaintiff.[13]
  1. [15]
    On 6 September 2018, the First and Second Defendants filed an Amended Defence which:
  1. admits that the Plaintiffs agreed to loan the monies to the Third Defendant;
  2. does not respond to whether the loan repayments were made but instead denies the relevant paragraph pleading the repayments on the basis that they deny the way in which the Loan Contract is defined in the pleading;[14] and
  3. pleads the same set-off.[15]
  1. [16]
    On 7 June 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a further Amended Statement of Claim (“the Amended Statement of Claim”). It pleads:
  1. the loan monies were lent to either the First and Second Defendants or, in the alternative, the Third Defendant;[16]
  2. the material terms of the Loan Contract were that the Plaintiffs would lend to the Defendants the loan amount on 1 May 2013, interest was at a rate of 1.5 per cent payable per month on the sixth day of each calendar month and the Loan Contract was to remain in place until such time as the loan amount was paid back in full;[17]
  3. alternatively, it was implied at a matter of law that the loan amount together with any interest accrued thereon was payable on demand from the Plaintiffs;[18]
  4. on 6 May 2013 the loan amount was deposited by the Plaintiffs;[19]
  5. between 14 June 2013 and 8 September 2016 the Defendants made interest repayments of $5,250.00 each month;[20]
  6. in breach of the Loan Contract, the Defendants failed to make interest payments on 6 October 2016 and 6 November 2016;[21]
  7. Letters of Demand demanding payment were sent to the Defendants and no payment was received from them;[22] and
  8. the Defendants under the Loan Contract are indebted to the Plaintiffs in the amount of $392,000.00 being interest repayments from October 2016 to May 2017 together with the principal sum, and are also indebted in the amount of $5,250.00 since then until judgment.[23]
  1. [17]
    On 12 July 2019, the First and Second Defendants filed a Further Amended Defence, which:
  1. denies the First and Second Defendants were loaned money and now changes is admission that the Third Defendant was loaned money to a non-admission;[24]
  2. denies the loan repayments were made on the basis that no money was lent to the First and Second Defendants;[25] and
  3. maintains the allegations relating to the set-off.[26]
  1. [18]
    On 12 July 2019, the Third Defendant also filed an Amended Defence which:
  1. does not admit that it was loaned the money (such non-admission is based only on not knowing what date the money was agreed to be loaned);[27]
  2. seems to concede that the Plaintiffs did transfer (it) the loan money;[28]
  3. does not admit that the money was transferred to it;[29]
  4. denies that it made the repayments on the basis that Mr Richmond was not its agent, that it does not admit the money was transferred to it on a particular day;[30]
  5. admits that it has not made payment upon the demand;[31] and
  6. maintains the allegations relating to the set-off.[32]

Law relating to summary judgment

  1. [19]
    The law applicable to summary judgment applications is well-settled in Queensland. Rule 292 of the UCPR requires the plaintiff to satisfy the court that the defendant has:
  1. no real prospect of successfully defending all or part of the plaintiff’s claim; and
  2. there is no need for a trial of the claim or a part of the claim.
  1. [20]
    The Court of Appeal established the principles governing summary judgment in Queensland in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo.[33]  In that case, it was determined that Rule 292 should be applied using its clear and unambiguous wording.[34]  The rule must also “be applied in the context of the over-riding purpose of the UCPR to facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the matter in dispute”.[35]
  1. [21]
    Although the onus is on the plaintiff to prove its claim, once a prima facie case has been made out the evidentiary onus shifts to the defendant.[36]
  1. [22]
    In Agar v Hyde,[37] Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ spoke of the caution which a court should exercise before dealing summarily with a proceeding:

Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes.  The test to applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.[38]

The plaintiffs’ submission re the application for summary judgment

  1. [23]
    The Plaintiffs have submitted that this matter involves a simple Loan Contract, and, insofar as it relates to the Third Defendant, the Third Defendant:
  1. denies that the First and Second Defendants entered into any Loan Contract with the plaintiffs;[39]
  2. does not deny the terms of the Loan Contract;[40]
  3. does not deny receiving the loan money or that it was transferred to it;[41] and
  4. does not deny that it has refused or failed to make the repayments.[42]
  1. [24]
    The Plaintiffs further submit that the only basis for the Third Defendant’s defence appears to be that the Third Defendant does not accept the applicant’s assertion that a Mr Richmond was acting as the Third Defendant’s agent when he verbally requested the loan from the applicants. It is submitted that whether Mr Richmond was acting as agent or not is irrelevant. The Plaintiffs submit that the evidence establishes that the money was transferred into the Third Defendant’s bank account and that the Third Defendant began making the monthly interest payments at the agreed rate. The Plaintiffs also rely on a written document dated 27 May 2013 entitled “Loan Contract” and signed by each of the First and Second Defendants in which the terms and conditions of the loan are stated:
  1. funds distributed on 6 May 2013 - $350,000.00;
  2. interest payable at 1.5 per cent per month; and
  3. the arrangement will continue on a monthly basis until the loan is paid back in full.[43]
  1. [25]
    The Plaintiffs submit that in such circumstances the Third Defendant has no prospect of successfully defending the claim and there is no need for a trial.

Third Defendants’ submissions re the summary judgment application

  1. [26]
    The Third Defendant submits that two issues arise due to the variety of claims made by the applicants:
  1. who is liable for the repayment of the loan?; and
  2. what are the terms for repayment of the principal loan amount and accrued interest?
  1. [27]
    The Third Defendant submits that any implied term will depend on a consideration of the objective intention of the parties by a proper construction of the oral contract. It is further submitted that before Summary Judgment could be ordered, there must be a finding that at law there was an implied term that the capital and interest was payable upon demand. The Plaintiffs agree with this submission.
  1. [28]
    The Third Defendant submits that such an implication is not open on the evidence, because such an implication is not necessary in the sense that, if it were not implied, the enjoyment of the rights conferred by the contract would or could be rendered nugatory or worthless.[44]
  1. [29]
    The Third Defendant submits that there is nothing in the evidence of Mrs Walsh to indicate whether there was any information available to all parties at the time of the loan contract which could give rise to an implication that the loan was made payable upon demand.
  1. [30]
    It is further submitted that there is no evidence from Mrs Walsh from which it could be inferred that there was any concern at all over payment upon demand. It is submitted that the monies may have been loaned on the expectation of the Plaintiffs that it could be off-set against any debt owed arising from the facts pleaded in the Defendants set-off case, which involved a debt to Suncorp guaranteed by the Second Plaintiff on 29 April 2012.
  1. [31]
    The Third Defendant submits that even without cross-examination of Mrs Walsh, a number of notable difficulties arise from such evidence, namely:
  1. there was no conversation with any of the Defendants about the loan or its terms;
  2. there was apparently no mention of Euneeke during the Plaintiffs’ conversation with Mr Richmond;
  3. there was no mention of terms to the Defendants;
  4. there was no mention of the implied terms alleged;
  5. no evidence is given in support by Mr Richmond.
  1. [32]
    In summary, the Third Defendant submits that there is no part of the Plaintiff’s evidence in support of its pleaded alternative cases that there was an agreement with Euneeke, let alone an agreement to repay on demand or on the terms pleaded.
  1. [33]
    The Third Defendant submits that with the benefit of further interlocutory steps such as disclosure, then a trial, and cross-examination of the Plaintiffs, further difficulties with the Plaintiffs case may arise. It is submitted that it also may become clear precisely which, if any terms for repayment were agreed upon, and whether the terms alleged to be implied should in fact or in law be implied.
  1. [34]
    The Third Defendant previously admitted that the Plaintiffs agreed to loan the monies to the Third Defendant but has denied the agreement terms as pleaded or sought to be implied. It is submitted that merely admitting an agreement to loan monies does not contain any admission of an obligation to repay on demand. It is further submitted that the contents of the document entitled “Loan Contract” are inadmissible to work out the meaning of the oral contract.

Consideration

  1. [35]
    The fact that the Plaintiffs did not appear to know which party they loaned the money to is an obvious hurdle for them to overcome on an application for Summary Judgment. More importantly, there is no direct evidence of any oral contract between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. The court is asked to infer its existence. Whilst such an inference may well be open, particularly given the Third Defendant’s pleadings, the conclusion that there was an implied term of payment on demand could only be arrived at upon consideration of the objective or subjective intentions of the parties.
  1. [36]
    There is nothing in the evidence of Mrs Walsh to indicate whether there was any information available to the parties at the time of the Loan Contract which could give rise to an implication that the loan was payable upon demand.
  1. [37]
    Similarly, as the Second Defendant has submitted, the money may have been loaned on the expectation of the Plaintiffs that it could be off-set, either in whole or in part, against any debt arising from the facts pleaded in the Defendants set-off case.
  1. [38]
    The Third Defendant’s case is that it did not agree to the oral contract alleged with the terms, particularly the implied terms alleged. When that fact is considered together with the Plaintiffs’ continuing claim against the First and Second Defendants, all in the context of Mrs Walsh’s evidence that the money was loaned to the First and Second Defendants, then the inappropriateness of an order for Summary Judgment is quite apparent.
  1. [39]
    The applicant relies heavily on the document curiously entitled “Loan Contract”, which only came into existence three weeks after the money was loaned. The Third Defendant submits that, at its highest, that document can only be used to support the claim that there was a loan of the loan amount and an agreement for the payment of interest until the loan is paid in full.
  1. [40]
    In my view, the disagreement as to the utility of that document, in and of itself, is such that Summary Judgment is inappropriate.
  1. [41]
    Ultimately, for these reasons I do not have a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of this matter if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way and I am not satisfied that the Third Defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending all or part of the Plaintiffs claim and that there is no need for a trial.

Strike-out application

  1. [42]
    The Plaintiffs also seek an order striking out the whole of the Third Defendant’s Amended Defence pursuant to Rule 171 of the UCPR.
  1. [43]
    Rule 171 of the UCPR states:

“(1) This Rule applies if a pleading or part of a pleading:

  1. discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence; or
  2. has a tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding; or
  3. is unnecessary or scandalous; or
  4. is frivolous or vexatious; or
  5. is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
  1. The court, at any stage of the proceeding, may strike out all or part of the pleading and order the costs of the application to be paid by a party calculated on the indemnity basis.”
  1. [44]
    The basis for the Plaintiffs application is that the Third Defendant’s Amended Defence discloses no reasonable defence. However, this application is based on the assertion that in the absence of agreement as to the time at which a loan would be repaid, at law a loan is payable on demand. Yet, for a term to be implied at law it must be necessary to make such an implication.[45]  In the context of terms implied at law, “necessity” refers to the concern of the courts that, unless such a term is implied, the enjoyment of the rights conferred by the contract would or could be rendered nugatory, worthless or seriously undermined.[46]  Whether that is the position in this matter I am unable to say, and therefore, I am not persuaded that the Third Defendants’ Amended Defence discloses no reasonable defence.
  1. [45]
    Further, or in the alternative the Plaintiffs also seek to strike out the set-off raised in the Defence of the Third Defendant and also of the First and Second Defendants.
  1. [46]
    The Plaintiffs submit that the only potential set-off arises by way of the Second Plaintiff and the Second Defendant being co-guarantors under an unrelated loan agreement and therefore the Second Defendant has an equitable right to contribution from the Second Plaintiff.
  1. [47]
    It follows, so it is submitted, that the set-off therefore does not apply to the Third Defendant nor to the First Defendant nor to the Second Defendant as against the First Plaintiff. It is submitted that because the Loan Contract is pleaded as joint and several liability, any alleged set-off can only apply as against the Second Defendant’s liability to the Second Plaintiff only.
  1. [48]
    The Defendants have submitted that the Plaintiffs may have had the potential liability of the Second Plaintiff as a go-guarantor in mind when loaning Euneeke the monies, so as to off-set the principal and interest against any such liability from a contribution claim by the Defendants. It is submitted that it would be premature to make any decision on the set-off at this stage as the evidence is inadequate to determine whether the demand is or is not closely connected to the Plaintiffs claim.
  1. [49]
    The Defendant further submits that as both “claims” involve money claims against similar parties, then there is a sufficiently close connection for the purpose of denying the Plaintiffs relief under UCPR rule 171.
  1. [50]
    Furthermore, as the Plaintiffs claim that each Defendant is jointly and severally liable, then the Defendants submit that they each should be entitled to raise set-off in reduction of that joint liability.

Conclusion

  1. [51]
    I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to make the order the Plaintiffs seek at this preliminary stage. In my view, the issue of set-off is a matter best determined by the trial judge upon hearing all relevant evidence. Given that the Plaintiffs concede that the Second Defendant may have the availability of a set-off against the Second Plaintiff, or that such a set-off claim is at least available to the Second Defendant, it seems to me that to allow the First and Third Defendants to maintain such a claim at this stage adds nothing to the length or complexity of the trial or to the issues that will require resolution. By reference to r 162, I am of the view that the contested pleadings:
  • do not have a tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding;
  • are not unnecessary or scandalous;
  • are not frivolous or vexatious; and
  • are not otherwise an abuse of process.
  1. [52]
    It will be a matter for the trial judge to decide if the pleaded set-off reduces the First and/or the Third Defendants joint liability if any is found to exist.
  1. [53]
    Accordingly, I order that the application be dismissed and I will heard the parties as to costs.

Footnotes

[1]  Statement of Claim, [5(b)].

[2]  Statement of Claim, [5(c)].

[3]  Statement of Claim, [6].

[4]  [2(b)] of the Defence.

[5]  Defence, [5].

[6]  Reply, [2].

[7]  Reply, [2].

[8]  Reply, [3].

[9]  Reply, [4].

[10]  Amended Statement of Claim at [6C].

[11]  Defence of the Third Defendant at [3(c)].

[12]  Defence of the Third Defendant at  [6(c)]

[13]  Defence of the Third Defendant at [16] –[ 25].

[14]  Amended Defence of the First and Second Defendant at [6C].

[15]  Amended Defence of the First and Second Defendant at [16]–[24].

[16]  Further Amended Statement of Claim at [3].

[17]  Further Amended Statement of Claim at [5].

[18]  Further Amended Statement of Claim at [6].

[19]  Further Amended Statement of Claim at [6B] and [6BB].

[20]  Further Amended Statement of Claim at [6C].

[21]  Further Amended Statement of Claim at [7] and [10].

[22]  Further Amended Statement of Claim at [8], [9], [11] and [12].

[23]  Further Amended Statement of Claim at [13] and [14].

[24]  Further Amended Defence at [3].

[25]  Further Amended Defence at [6C].

[26]  Further Amended Defence at [16] – [24].

[27]  Amended Defence at [3].

[28]  Amended Defence at [3(b)].

[29]  Amended Defence at [6BB].

[30]  Amended Defence at [6].

[31]  Amended Defence at [9(b)].

[32]  Amended Defence at [16] – [25].

[33]  [2005] QCA 227.

[34]  McMurdo P at [2]; Williams JA at [11] – [17]; Atkinson J at [47].

[35]Colham-Fussell v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] QCA 25 per White JA at [101]; LCR Mining Group Pty Ltd v Ocean Tyres [2011] QCA 105 per White JA at [30].

[36] Elderslie Property Investments No. 2 Pty Ltd v Dunn [2007] QSC 192; Sugiyama Corporation v Boland [2003] QDC 426 at [2].

[37]  (2000) 201 CLR 552.

[38]  At 575 – 576.

[39]  Amended Defence of Third Defendant at [3(b)].

[40]  Amended Defence of Third Defendant at [5].

[41]  Amended Defence of Third Defendant at [6BB].

[42]  Amended Defence of Third Defendant at [12].

[43]  Affidavit of Susan Walsh at Exhibit SW1.

[44] ;Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 450.

[45] Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239; Mears v Safecar Security Ltd [1983] QB 54 at 78; Duke of Westminster v Guild [1985] QB 688; Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 at 104; Wright v TNT Management Pty Ltd (t/as Comet Overnight Transport) (1989) 15 NSWLR 679 at 697; Scally v Southern Health & Social Services Board [1992] 1 AC 294; Devefi Pty Ltd v Mateffy Pearl Nagy Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 225; Star Shipping AS v China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corp (The Star Texas) [1993] 2 Lloyds Rep. 445 at 452; SO Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (Minister for Energy & Minerals) (1995) 183 CLR 10 at 31.

[46] Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 450.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Michael Robert Walsh and Susan Walsh v Edward Alexander Iker, Jo-Anne Iker and Euneeke Cattle Co pty Ltd

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Walsh v Iker

  • MNC:

    [2019] QDC 225

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Farr DCJ

  • Date:

    12 Nov 2019

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.
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