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  • Unreported Judgment

Reynolds v Criscon Pty Ltd

 

[2019] QDC 252

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Reynolds v Criscon Pty Ltd [2019] QDC 252

PARTIES:

STEVEN JOHN REYNOLDS

(applicant)

v

CRISCON PTY LTD (ACN 107 701 655)

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

3488/18

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

13 December 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

15 November 2019

JUDGE:

Farr SC DCJ

ORDER:

  1. Appeal allowed.
  2. Substitute a fine of $625,000 for the fine of $405,000 imposed in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane on 4 September 2018.
  3. Otherwise affirm sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane on 4 September 2018.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY INADEQUATE – where the respondent pleaded guilty to two offences of breaching s 32 of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) – where the appellant appeals pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) on the ground that the penalty imposed was inadequate both as to the fine and the non-recording of convictions – whether the sentence imposed was inadequate.

COUNSEL:

MJ Copley QC for the appellant
No representation for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Office of the Work Health Safety Prosecutor for the appellant
No representation for the respondent

  1. [1]
    The respondent pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court, Brisbane on 4 September 2018 to two offences of breaching s. 32 of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld).  It was ordered to pay a fine of $405,000 as well as professional costs of $3,179.20.  No convictions were recorded. 
  1. [2]
    The appellant now appeals pursuant to s. 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) against the sentence imposed on the ground that the penalty imposed was inadequate both as to the amount of the fine and the non recording of convictions. 
  1. [3]
    It should be noted that on the morning that this appeal was heard the court was advised that the respondent had resolved on 26 August 2019 by way of a Special Resolution[1], that it be wound up and that a liquidator be appointed. That liquidator advised the court that the respondent would not be represented at the appeal hearing and that the respondent, for that reason, neither consents to nor opposes the orders sought by the appellant.
  1. [4]
    The respondent had however, through its previous legal representation, filed an outline of submissions. Council for the appellant agreed that it would be appropriate for the court to take those submissions into account when deciding the appeal.

Nature of appeal

  1. [5]
    An appeal under s. 222 is by way of rehearing on the evidence given in the proceeding before the Magistrates Court[2] unless the District Court gives leave to adduce new evidence.[3]  The appellant does not seek leave to adduce new evidence. 
  1. [6]
    As the imposition of proper sentence orders involves the exercise of judicial discretion, an appellant must demonstrate error in the exercise of the discretion if the appeal is to succeed.[4]

The charges

  1. [7]
    The first charge is:

On 30 September 2016 at Ascot in the said State in the Central Division of the Brisbane Magistrates Courts District appointed under the Justices Act 1886 Criscon Pty Ltd (ACN 107 701 655), being a person who had a health and safety duty under section 20(2) of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (the Act), failed to comply with that duty contrary to section 32 of the Act and the failure exposed individuals, namely Ashley Pengana Morris and Humberto Ferreira Leite, to a risk of death or serious injury. 

  1. [8]
    The second charge is:

On 6 October 2016 at Ascot in the said State in the Central Division of the Brisbane Magistrates Courts District appointed under the Justices Act 1886 Criscon Pty Ltd (ACN 107 701 655), being a person who had a health and safety duty under section 20(2) of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (the Act), failed to comply with that duty contrary to section 32 of the Act and the failure exposed individuals, namely Ashley Pengana Morris and Humberto Ferreira Leite, to a risk of death or serious injury. 

Relevant statutory provisions

  1. [9]
    The following provisions of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (taken from the Reprint as at 1 March 2017) are relevant:

3 Object

  1. The main object of this Act is to provide for a balanced and nationally consistent framework to secure the health and safety of workers and workplaces by—
  1. protecting workers and other persons against harm to their health, safety and welfare through the elimination or minimisation of risks arising from work or from particular types of substances or plant; and

  1. In furthering subsection (1)(a), regard must be had to the principle that workers and other persons should be given the highest level of protection against harm to their health, safety and welfare from hazards and risks arising from work or from particular types of substances or plant as is reasonably practicable.

32 Failure to comply with health and safety duty—category 2

A person commits a category 2 offence if—

  1. the person has a health and safety duty; and
  2. the person fails to comply with that duty; and
  3. the failure exposes an individual to a risk of death or serious injury or illness.

Maximum penalty—

  1. for an offence committed by an individual, other than as a person conducting a business or undertaking or as an officer of a person conducting a business or undertaking—1,500 penalty units; or
  2. for an offence committed by an individual as a person conducting a business or undertaking or as an officer of a person conducting a business or undertaking—3,000 penalty units; or
  3. for an offence committed by a body corporate—15,000 penalty units.

Note—

See also the note to section 31(1).

20 Duty of persons conducting businesses or undertakings involving management or control of workplaces

  1. In this section, person with management or control of a workplace means a person conducting a business or undertaking to the extent that the business or undertaking involves the management or control, in whole or in part, of the workplace but does not include—
  1. the occupier of a residence, unless the residence is occupied for the purposes of, or as part of, the conduct of a business or undertaking; or
  2. a prescribed person.
  1. The person with management or control of a workplace must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the workplace, the means of entering and exiting the workplace and anything arising from the workplace are without risks to the health and safety of any person.”

18 What is reasonably practicable in ensuring health and safety

In this Act, reasonably practicable, in relation to a duty to ensure health and safety, means that which is, or was at a particular time, reasonably able to be done in relation to ensuring health and safety, taking into account and weighing up all relevant matters including—

  1. the likelihood of the hazard or the risk concerned occurring; and
  2. the degree of harm that might result from the hazard or the risk; and
  3. what the person concerned knows, or ought reasonably to know, about—
  1. the hazard or the risk; and
  2. ways of eliminating or minimising the risk; and
  1. the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or minimise the risk; and
  2. after assessing the extent of the risk and the available ways of eliminating or minimising the risk, the cost associated with available ways of eliminating or minimising the risk, including whether the cost is grossly disproportionate to the risk.”
  1. [10]
    A category 2 offence must be heard and determined in a summary way (Work Health and Safety Act s. 230(1)(AA).

Relevant factual circumstances

  1. [11]
    The respondent was the principal contractor at a construction site at the Eagle Farm Racecourse. As the principal contractor the respondent had management and control of the workplace and thus the duty imposed by s 20(2).

Charge 1

  1. [12]
    On 30 September 2016 a Mr D’Alessandro was engaged by the respondent to carry out the construction of a below ground foul water tank. Mr Morris and Mr Leite were working under D’Alessandro’s direction. A crane and crane operator were required to lower precast concrete panels into the pit that had been dug for tank number one. While each panel was being lowered into the pit the two workers were in the pit. Four panels, which were necessary to form the sides of the square shaped tank, were lowered successively by the crane. The two workers in the pit had to assist to place and position each panel and to put packing under the lower edge of each panel. The method of work adopted by D’Alessandro also involved the panels being braced to another adjacent panel rather than them each being laterally restrained.
  1. [13]
    The method of work adopted created a risk of death or serious injury to the workers in the pit because a panel could fall and/or come into contact with another panel and cause it to fall and the workers would have been unlikely to be able to avoid being caught under a falling panel.

The way that D’Alessandro braced the panels was structurally inadequate and there was no avenue of escape for the workers in the pit if a panel fell, either once placed or when being lowered prior to placement.  The method of work adopted by D’Alessandro did not comply with the Safe Work Method Statement he had provided to the respondent and the method of work he had provided to the respondent and the method of work he adopted did not comply with the Tilt-up and Pre-cast Construction Code of Practice 2003.  The method of work adopted by the crane driver did not comply with the Safe Work Method Statement provided by his employer to the respondent and the crane driver did not comply with the Mobile Crane Code of Practice 2006.

  1. [14]
    The respondent accepted that it failed in the ways set out below to comply with its health and safety duty and accepted its failures exposed the workers to a risk of death or serious injury:
  1. (a)
    The respondent failed to conduct an adequate risk assessment in accordance with both of the above mentioned codes and in accordance with the How to Manage Work Health and Safety Risks Code of Practice 2011;
  2. (b)
    The respondent failed to comply with its risk management obligations under its Work Health and Safety Management Plan by failing to identify panels as a foreseeable hazard that might give rise to a risk and failing to perform a risk assessment of the panels;
  3. (c)
    The respondent failed to provide a work environment that was safe and without risks so far as was reasonable in accordance with its Plan because:
  1. (i)
    it failed to ensure work methods met or exceeded the standards required in the abovementioned codes of practice;
  2. (ii)
    it failed to ensure D’Alessandro’s entity complied with its safe work methods statement which required bracing of panels in accordance with AS3850-2003 Tilt-up Concrete Construction;
  3. (iii)
    it failed to ensure the crane company complied with its safe work methods statement which required that when panels were being moved no one should be under them or in the shadows of them;
  4. (iv)
    it failed to stop work in the pit until there was compliance with the safe work methods statements;
  5. (v)
    it failed to prevent the workers from working in the pit whilst the panels were being placed into it;
  6. (vi)
    it failed to ensure that the workers were not working in the pit until the panels were braced in a way that minimised the risk of them falling;
  7. (vii)
    it failed to instruct the workers about safe work procedures in accordance with its plan;
  8. (viii)
    it failed to ensure compliance with safe work method statements by not conducting spot checks and audits. 
  1. (d)
    The respondent failed to implement measures to minimise the risk of death or serious injury such as:
  1. (i)
    enforcing procedures set out in safe work methods statements;
  2. (ii)
    enforcing requirements that two braces per panel be used, that lateral restraints be used at the bottom edges of panels, obtaining drawings for the panels erection and bracing, obtaining design certification for the bracing, using a work method that ensured workers were not where they could be struck by falling panels and not establishing an exclusion zone;
  3. (iii)
    requiring the use of engineering controls, including adequate bracing and concrete blocks to reduce fall risks;
  4. (iv)
    training all involved in the content of the safe work methods statements. 

Charge 2

  1. [15]
    On 6 October 2016 D’Alessandro was engaged in the construction of another below ground failed water tank (tank 2). Tank 2 was to be constructed in a pit adjacent to tank 1. Mr Morris and Ms Leite were working under his direction. The same crane and crane operator were required to lower pre-cast concrete panels into the pit. These panels weighed about 10 tonne each. While each panel was lowered into the pit the workers were in the pit. Their task was to assist the positioning of each panel and to put packing underneath each panel. The method of work adopted by D’Alessandro also involved the panels being braced to another adjacent panel rather than each being laterally restrained. Such bracing was structurally inadequate.
  1. [16]
    The method of work adopted created a risk of death or serious injury to the workers in the pit because a panel could fall and/or come into contact with another panel and cause it to fall and the workers would have been unlikely to be able to avoid being caught under a falling panel.
  1. [17]
    The risk of death or serious injury was realised on this day when, as the last panel was being lowered into the pit by the crane, two other panels fell, one after the other, and crushed and killed Mr Morris and Mr Leite.
  1. [18]
    The respondent failed in the same ways as it had failed on 30 September 2016 to comply with its health and safety duty and these failures exposed workers to a risk of death or serious injury, the former of which was realised.

Submissions

  1. [19]
    The appellant has submitted that the fine imposed was inadequate either because the magistrate failed to take into account all material considerations, namely all the particularised failings or that the quantum in and of itself was manifestly inadequate.
  1. [20]
    Dealing with the first of those submissions, the appellant submits that the failings of the respondent that the magistrate did have regard to were:
  1. (a)
    That the respondent had not made its two health and safety nominees aware of their appointments as health and safety officers;[5] 
  2. (b)
    The respondent tolerated defective bracing[6] and did not identify these deficiencies;[7]
  3. (c)
    The absence of an escape route;[8]
  4. (d)
    No planning for below ground level work;[9] and
  5. (e)
    Not checking whether the subcontractor had complied with the codes of practice, in particular, whether he had prepared a safe work methods statement and a failure to order compliance with it.[10] 
  1. [21]
    The appellant submits that the magistrate therefore did not take into account the respondent’s failure to adhere to its own work health and safety management plan beyond the failure to make its two health and safety nominees aware of their appointment as health and safety officers. It is submitted that the magistrate therefore failed to take into account the following failings of the respondent in adhering to its plan:
  1. (a)
    Failure to stop construction work on each tank until there was compliance with Safe Work Method Statements;[11]
  2. (b)
    Failure to stop the workers from being present in both pits whilst were being lowered;[12] and
  3. (c)
    Failure to ensure workers were not in both pits until panels were braced/restrained to minimise as far as reasonably possible the risk of panels falling.[13] 
  1. [22]
    It is also submitted that the magistrate did not take into account the following failures of the respondent in implementing control measures:
  1. (a)
    Not obtaining drawings for the erection of the panels as required by the code of practice and ensuring compliance therewith;[14] 
  2. (b)
    Not obtaining drawings for the bracing of panels as required by the code of practice and ensuring compliance therewith;[15] and
  3. (c)
    Obtaining design certification for the bracing as required by the code of practice.[16] 
  1. [23]
    It is submitted that had the magistrate been mindful of these matters then she would have “properly understood the extent of the respondent’s failure to comply with its health and safety duty”.
  1. [24]
    I note however that there was no controversy at sentence about the failings of the respondent because they were agreed in writing. The learned magistrate said at the very outset of her sentencing remarks, “I am assisted by the agreed statement of facts”.[17]  I infer from that statement that her Honour had regard to the matters contained in the agreed statement of facts.[18]  The fact that a sentencing judge or magistrate does not refer to a particular sentencing consideration in his or her reasons for sentence does not, of itself, mean that the discretion has miscarried.[19]  A sentencing officer is not obliged to specifically advert to every matter he or she has considered in composing a sentence.  That is particularly so when the issues are not in contest, as was the case here.  The learned magistrate’s remarks, albeit brief, nevertheless demonstrated that she had a proper appreciation of the failing of the respondent. 
  1. [25]
    I am not satisfied that she failed to take into account all material considerations.

Manifest inadequacy

  1. [26]
    Manifest inadequacy, like manifest excess is a conclusion from a result that is so plainly wrong that there must have been an error of principle even where the nature of that error is not identifiable. An intermediate appellate court must be “driven to conclude that there must have been some misapplication of principle”.[20] 
  1. [27]
    The appellant submits that the inadequacy of the fine imposed is illustrated when this case is compared with other cases where offenders have been sentenced for a breach of s. 32 of the Act where there was a fatality. In SafeWork NSW v Ceerose Pty Ltd,[21] a fine of $300,000 was imposed on a company which pleaded guilty to failing to comply with a s. 19 duty pursuant to s. 32 of the Act.  The New South Wales Act is in similar terms to the Queensland Act in that regard.  The company was a principal contractor at the site.  It had a previous conviction for a work place safety offence.  Only one death occurred.  Another entity, which was also prosecuted for the same offence arising out of the same incident, but which had no prior convictions, was fined the sum of $225,000.[22] 
  1. [28]
    In WorkCover v Visy Paper Pty Ltd,[23] a fine of $412,500 was imposed on a company which pleaded guilty to the offence.  In that matter there was only one fatality and the company had prior work safety convictions. 
  1. [29]
    In Williamson v VH & MG Imports Pty Ltd,[24] Dearden DCJ had regard to the last mentioned case in concluding that fines of up to $400,000 were within range for a single offence against s. 32 of the Act where one death was involved. 
  1. [30]
    As the High Court stated in Dinsdale v The Queen:[25]

Manifest inadequacy of sentence, like manifest excess, is a conclusion.  A sentence is, or is not, unreasonable or plainly unjust; inadequacy or excess is, or is not, plainly apparent.  It is a conclusion which does not depend upon attribution of identified specific error in the reasoning of the sentencing judge and which frequently does not admit of amplification except by stating the respect in which the sentence is inadequate or excessive.  It may be inadequate or excessive because the wrong type of sentence has been imposed (for example, custodial rather than non-custodial) or because the sentence imposed is manifestly too long or too short.  But to identify the type of error amounts to no more than a statement of the conclusion that has been reached.  It is not a statement of reasons for arriving at the conclusion.  A Court of Criminal Appeal is not obliged to employ any particular verbal formula so long as the substance of its conclusions and its reasons is made plain. The degree of elaboration that is appropriate or possible will vary from case to case.

  1. [31]
    As was noted in R v Major; ex-parte A-G (Qld):[26]

…the court will be astute to enforce the stringency of this test.  As the High Court has emphasised:

The discretion in which the law commits to sentencing judges is of vital importance in the administration of our system of criminal justice.’”[27]

  1. [32]
    In Director of Public Prosecutions v Bright the Victorian Court of Appeal described the very high hurdle created for a finding of manifest inadequacy in a Crown appeal:[28]

The inadequacy of the sentence must be ‘clear and egregious’, the sentence being so disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime as to shock the public conscience and ‘undermine public confidence in the administration of the courts to play their part in deterring the commission of crimes’.

  1. [33]
    In Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland,[29] the High Court confirmed that the right of appeal in Queensland “should be exercised sparingly by the Attorney-General and not merely for the purpose of having a ‘second bight at the cherry’.”
  1. [34]
    Notwithstanding the above, given the nature of the fines imposed in other cases, all of which involved only a single event and the death of only one person, it is my view that the fine imposed in this case is so disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending conduct that it would undermine public confidence in the ability of the court to play its part in deterring similar offending conduct.
  1. [35]
    The fact that this matter involves two separate yet identical events, separated by a period of only six days, is a distinguishing feature of significance. Additionally, the nature of the work carried out on 30 September was so inherently and obviously dangerous that the failures of the respondent are almost incomprehensible. Furthermore, this is a matter where the risk for the unfortunate men in the pit, was in reality, only one of death, given the weight of the pre-fabricated concrete panels and the absence of an escape route.
  1. [36]
    The respondent argued in the court below that its culpability was diminished because it placed reliance on the sub-contractor D’Alessandro and his related company Construction Building Technologies (CBT), who were engaged to construct the two pits. It was submitted that it was necessary to understand the failings of D’Alessandro and CTB to properly assess the extent of the respondent’s failure to comply with its health and safety duties. In other words, the respondent submits that such information is relevant to the determination of the respondent’s culpability. That submission however does not assist the respondent. The fact that D’Alessandro may have been criminally negligent in the carrying out of his duties does nothing other than highlight the significance of the respondent’s woefully inadequate regard to its health and safety duties. That it should occur twice is not only extraordinary but is demonstrative of culpability of the highest order. If the respondent had paid even the slightest heed to its health and safety duties Messrs Morris and Leite would still be alive. The respondent’s failings significantly contributed to their deaths.
  1. [37]
    That there were two deaths is a further distinguishing feature of significance between this matter and other previously decided cases.
  1. [38]
    The maximum penalty for each charge is 15,000 penalty units (which equates to $1.5M – Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 s. 5(1)(d).  In imposing sentence, s. 9(2)(c) of the Penalties and Sentences Act requires the court to have regard to the nature of the offence and how serious it was, including any physical harm done to a victim.  An offence against s. 32 carries a higher maximum penalty than an offence against s. 33 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act (where the maximum penalty for a body corporate is 5,000 penalty units which equates to $500,000.00) because it seeks to punish an offender whose failure exposes a worker to a risk of death or serious injury or illness.  The respondent’s failure in this matter was extraordinarily serious because it continued over two days (in fact it continued over a period in excess of six days given the pre-construction work which had to take place on site prior to the panels being lowered into the pits) and the risks that should have been readily apparent on 30 September 2016 were not remedied after the work was undertaken on that day.  It was in this context that the risk of death, which should have been patently obvious to all concerned, was realized on 6 October 2016.
  1. [39]
    I note that the learned magistrate did take into account all relevant mitigatory circumstances such as:
  1. (a)
    The respondent having taken significant remedial steps;[30]
  2. (b)
    The financial and reputational damage that the respondent has suffered as a result of these incidents;[31]
  3. (c)
    The respondent’s good corporate status;[32]
  4. (d)
    The respondent’s genuine remorse;[33] and
  5. (e)
    The respondent’s entry of early pleas of guilty.[34]
  1. [40]
    Notwithstanding these mitigating features, in my view the penalty imposed was inadequate in all the circumstances and plainly so.
  1. [41]
    The comparable cases however do not support the appellant’s submissions that the appropriate range is $750,000 to $1,000,000. That the event on 30 September did not result in any loss of life is relevant to the issue even if that outcome was the result of sheer good fortune.
  1. [42]
    The predominant consideration on sentence for a matter such as this must of course be one of general deterrence, although the court’s recognition of the community’s denunciation of such an inadequate approach to health and safety duties is also of significance.
  1. [43]
    To properly recognise the gross failings of the respondent in complying with its health and safety duties in relation to the activity undertaken on 30 September, whilst acknowledging that no death or injury was occasioned to any person that day, a fine of $125,000.00 would have been appropriate, after taking into account all mitigatory considerations. For the activity undertaken on 6 October though, a fine of at least $500,000.00 would be appropriate, again taking into account all mitigatory considerations.

Whether or not to record convictions

  1. [44]
    In determining whether convictions should be recorded the magistrate had regard to the respondent’s remorse, the difficulties that the respondent had encountered since October 2016 in operating in the construction industry as a consequence of the 6 October incident and to the impact that the recording of a conviction might have on the respondent’s future operations.[35]
  1. [45]
    The appellant submits that although these matters were relevant considerations in the exercise of the discretion to record or not record convictions[36] a matter that had to be and which was not considered by the magistrate was the “nature of the offence”.[37]  The appellant submits therefore that the magistrate erred in exercising the discretion because she failed to have regard to a relevant consideration.
  1. [46]
    Counsel for the appellant however quite properly drew to this Court’s attention the fact that counsel for the appellant in the court below made no submissions in relation to the recording of convictions and submitted that it was a matter for the magistrate’s discretion.
  1. [47]
    I am not persuaded that the magistrate failed to take into account the nature of the offence when considering this issue. The sentencing process is, of course, one of “instinctive synthesis”.[38]  The reasons must be read as a whole.  In my view those reasons plainly reveal that the magistrate considered the “nature of the offence”. 
  1. [48]
    On an appeal against sentence, contentions which were not put to the sentencing judge by a prosecutor, should only be allowed in exceptional circumstances which appear to justify that course.[39]
  1. [49]
    As I have said, no oral submissions were made by the prosecutor in the court below as to the recording of convictions. This caused the following exchange between the learned magistrate and the respondent’s counsel:

“Your Honour we’ve made written submissions about the recording of a conviction, and our learned friend, as we understand it from the written outline, says that’s a matter for Your Honour’s discretion.  Does Your Honour need to hear me further on that?

BENCH:  No I don’t think so.”[40]

  1. [50]
    As can be seen from this passage, the attitude of the prosecutor in the court below resulted in counsel for the respondent not making further submissions about the issue.
  1. [51]
    Ultimately, notwithstanding the fact that due to the respondent’s recent entry into voluntary liquidation, some of the reasons for the magistrate’s non-recording of a conviction now appear irrelevant, I am not persuaded that the circumstances are such that I should overturn that part of the magistrate’s decision.
  1. [52]
    Significant mitigatory features were identified in the course of submissions in the court below which would give rise to the exercise of discretion to not record convictions notwithstanding the seriousness of the offending conduct.
  1. [53]
    I am of the view therefore that the decision not to record convictions was within the area of decisional freedom reposed in the magistrate and that the appellant has not demonstrated exceptional circumstances such that I should adopt a different course on this occasion.
  1. [54]
    This decision should not be taken as authority though that in future matters such as this, convictions should not be recorded. My decision has been heavily influenced by the attitude adopted by the appellant’s counsel in the court below. It remains the position that the exercise of discretion must depend on the particular facts and circumstances of individual matters.

Orders

  1. Appeal granted.
  2. Substitute a fine of $625,000 for the fine of $405,000 imposed in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane on 4 September 2018.
  3. Otherwise affirm sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane on 4 September 2018.

Footnotes

[1]  Corporation Act 2001 (Cth) ss 491; 499; 249A and 1072A(2)(b).

[2]  Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s. 223(1).

[3]  Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s. 223(2).

[4]  Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] 1 Qd R 489 at [4]; Tierney v Commissioner of Police [2011] QCA 327 per Margaret Wilson AJA, at [26].

[5]  Transcript of decision, p 2, ll 7-9. 

[6]  Transcript of decision, p 2, ll 23, 24 and 42. 

[7]  Transcript of decision, p 2, ll 42 and 43. 

[8]  Transcript of decision, p 2, l 25. 

[9]  Transcript of decision, p 2, ll 25 and 26. 

[10]  Transcript of decision, p 2, ll 39-42. 

[11]  Charge 1 particular 31(c)(v), charge 2 particular 30(c)(v). 

[12]  Charge 1 particular 31(c)(vi), charge 2 particular 30(c)(vi). 

[13]  Charge 1 particular 31(c)(vii), charge 2 particular 30(c)(vii). 

[14]  Charge 1 particular 31(d)(ii)(3), charge 2 particular 30(d)(ii)(3).

[15]  Charge 1 particular 31(d)(ii)(4), charge 2 particular 30(d)(ii)(4).

[16]  Charge 1 particular 31(d)(ii)(5), charge 2 particular 30(d)(ii)(5).

[17]  Transcript of decision, p 2, l 3. 

[18]  The Principal Failures were identified in the Statement of Facts at [27] and the respondent’s Key Failures at [37]. 

[19]  Jackson v The Queen [2013] VSCA 14 at [10] per Weinberg JA, with whom Maxwell P agreed.

[20]  R v Phan [2015] HCA 39; (2015) 256 CLR 550, 559 [28]. 

[21]  [2016] NSWDC 184. 

[22]  SafeWork NSW v DSF Constructions Pty Ltd [2016] NSWDC 183. 

[23]  [2015] NSWDC 284. 

[24]  [2017] QDC 56. 

[25]  [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321, 325-6 [6]. 

[26]  [2011] QCA 210.

[27]  At [17].

[28]  [2006] VSCA 147; (2006) 163 A Crim R 538, 542-543.

[29]  (2011) 275 ALR 646; [2011] HCA 10 at [53].

[30]  Transcript of Decision p. 2, ll 35-36.

[31]  Transcript of Decision p. 2, ll 34-36.

[32]  Transcript of Decision p. 2, ll 30-33.

[33]  Transcript of Decision p. 2, ll 34-35.

[34]  Transcript of Decision p. 2, l 36.

[35]  Transcript of Decision p. 3, ll 22-25.

[36]  Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 s. 12(2)(b) and (c).

[37]  Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 s. 12(2)(a).

[38]  Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at 375, [39].

[39]  R v Richardson; ex-parte A-G (Qld) (2007) 175 A Crim R 244 at 250-251, [32] – [34] per Keane JA (as His Honour then was) with whom McMurdo P and Philippides J agreed.

[40]  Transcript of Proceedings, p. 1-13, ll 14-17.

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Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Reynolds v Criscon Pty Ltd

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Reynolds v Criscon Pty Ltd

  • MNC:

    [2019] QDC 252

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Farr DCJ

  • Date:

    13 Dec 2019

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.
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