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MKN v LAQ

 

[2020] QCA 49

 

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

 

CITATION:

MKN v LAQ [2020] QCA 49

PARTIES:

MKN
(applicant)
v
LAQ
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 9609 of 2019

QCATA No 163 of 2017

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Extension of Time

Application for Leave Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act

ORIGINATING COURT:

Queensland Civil and Administrative Appeal Tribunal at Brisbane – unreported, 30 May 2018 (Member Olding)

DELIVERED ON:

20 March 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 February 2020

JUDGES:

Mullins JA and Lyons SJA and Boddice J

ORDERS:

  1. Application to extend time to apply for leave to appeal is refused.
  2. The sum of $17,530.30 paid into court by the applicant together with accretions be paid to the respondent.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – STATUTORY APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES TO COURTS – where applicant seeks an extension of time pursuant to r 748 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) and for leave to appeal from a final decision of the appeal tribunal of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) pursuant to s 150 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act) – where s 150(3)(a) of the QCAT Act provides that an appeal may be made “only on a question of law” – whether the applicant’s proposed grounds of appeal are pure questions of law – whether the Court of Appeal lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the proposed appeal

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 150, s 151(2)(b), s 152(2), s 152(4)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 748

Pivovarova v Michelsen [2019] QCA 256, applied

Robertson & Anor v Airstrike Industrial Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 104, applied

COUNSEL:

The applicant appeared on her own behalf

The respondent appeared on his own behalf

SOLICITORS:

The applicant appeared on her own behalf

The respondent appeared on his own behalf

  1. [1]
    MULLINS JA:  I agree with Lyons SJA.
  2. [2]
    LYONS SJA:

This application

  1. [3]
    This is an application to extend time pursuant to r 748 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) and for leave to appeal to this court from a final decision of the appeal tribunal of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) pursuant to s 150 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act).
  2. [4]
    There are some difficulties with the current applications with the most obvious being that the application for leave to appeal is brought out of time given that the reasons for the appeal tribunal decision which is appealed from were given on 30 May 2018 and received by the applicant’s solicitors on 12 June 2018.  As this application was filed on 9 September 2019 the application is some 15 months out of time.
  3. [5]
    A further difficulty which the applicant faces are the requirements of s 150 of the QCAT Act which provides that an appeal may be brought from an appeal tribunal of QCAT only on a question of law and only if the party has obtained the court’s leave.  Necessarily any such application for leave would involve an examination of the prospects of success should leave be granted.

The history of hearings in QCAT

  1. [6]
    On 16 August 2016, the applicant, MKN, brought applications in QCAT for the removal of her brother, the respondent LAQ, as attorney for their mother and the appointment of a guardian and an administrator.  That application alleged misconduct in the respondent’s role as attorney for personal and financial matters pursuant to an enduring power of attorney dated 13 March 2014.
  2. [7]
    On 9 November 2016, after a lengthy oral hearing, Member Joachim dismissed the application, finding that there was no evidence that the respondent had acted inappropriately in his capacity as attorney.  In coming to his decision, Member Joachim relied on a report by the Public Guardian dated 4 November 2016.  The report was issued after the office had commenced an extensive investigation on 26 July 2016 following allegations that NL’s interests were not being adequately protected by the respondent in his capacity as her attorney.
  3. [8]
    The report found that the respondent had no case to answer.[1]  In his ex tempore reasons, Member Joachim noted that the Public Guardian’s Report had found no evidence that the respondent was, in any way, breaching his duties as attorney in relation to financial matters.  He also noted that at the outset of the hearing, he had informed the applicant that “given the results of the Public Guardian’s report, and given that the onus was on her to demonstrate that the [respondent] had not acted appropriately, that she would have a difficult task convincing [him] that the [respondent] should be substituted by way of the appointment of a guardian or administrator”.[2]
  4. [9]
    On 18 November 2016, the respondent filed an application in QCAT seeking his costs incurred in responding to the applicant’s guardianship and administration applications.
  5. [10]
    On 16 January 2017, the respondent filed applications seeking that he be appointed as guardian and administrator in respect of NL, and seeking further directions from the Tribunal.
  6. [11]
    On 23 March 2017, the respondent’s applications for further orders and directions, as well as his application for costs were dealt with by Member Joachim of QCAT.  Member Joachim noted that as NL had passed away on 21 March 2017 that made the respondent’s application for further orders and directions unnecessary.  He proceeded however with an oral hearing of the respondent’s costs application.  As the applicant had elected not to attend he relied on her written submissions and reserved his decision.
  7. [12]
    On 20 April 2017, Member Joachim published his reasons for the 23 March 2017 decision.  He again noted that the Public Guardian had carried out a comprehensive investigation which had resulted in the finding that the respondent had no case to answer.[3]  In coming to his decision on costs he took into account the submissions by the respondent that he had been required to spend an inordinate amount of time and expense defending the allegations which had necessitated the engagement of solicitors.[4]  He was also “required to undergo a forensic task in providing all documentation as well as supporting evidence in order to substantiate that all of his actions and responsibilities, for both personal and financial matters were in the best interests of his mother”.[5]
  8. [13]
    Member Joachim also referred to the respondent’s submission that his sister had made approaches to the Queensland Police Service alleging that he was abusing their mother, which were subsequently found to be baseless.[6]  The applicant continued with the application but essentially offered no evidence at the hearing.  Ultimately after a detailed examination of the submissions, noting the applicant’s submission that it was not in the interests of justice to award costs and that it would be setting a precedent which would deter lay persons from using QCAT,[7] Member Joachim concluded the application was vexatious in that it “was brought to substantially annoy and be oppressive to” the respondent,[8] and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed.[9]
  9. [14]
    On 22 May 2017, the applicant filed an application in QCAT seeking:
    1. (a)
      leave to appeal the original decision of Member Joachim;
    2. (b)
      that Member Joachim’s decision of 20 April 2017 be set aside; and
    3. (c)
      that the respondent’s costs application filed 18 November 2016 be dismissed.
  10. [15]
    On 23 May 2018, Member Olding of QCAT heard the applicant’s application for leave to appeal Member Joachim’s original decision and Member Joachim’s order that she pay the respondent’s costs.  Member Olding reserved his decision.
  11. [16]
    On 30 May 2018, Member Olding published his reasons for decision, and refused the applicant’s application for leave to appeal.
  12. [17]
    He found that that application did not raise a reasonably arguable case of error and that even if there was an error in Member Joachim’s approach, it was not clear that any such error led to an injustice.[10]  He also noted that the applicant had brought and continued the application based on allegations against the respondent but failed to adduce any substantive evidence to support the allegations, such that he could see no substantial injustice in requiring the applicant, rather than the respondent, to bear the respondent’s costs of responding to the allegations.
  13. [18]
    On 4 December 2018, the applicant filed an application for miscellaneous matters in QCAT, alleging that the respondent had used their mother’s money to pay his costs of the proceedings.
  14. [19]
    On 13 August 2019, Member Endicott dismissed that application and in her reasons, stated that the costs decision of 23 March 2017 constituted the final order in the proceedings.
  15. [20]
    In respect of that costs decision of 23 March 2017, the respondent then commenced enforcement proceedings in the Magistrates Court.
  16. [21]
    On 9 September 2019, the applicant filed an application in this court seeking an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal, leave to appeal and a stay of Member Joachim’s costs order.
  17. [22]
    On 25 September 2019, Sofronoff P granted a stay of the order of enforcement of costs upon the applicant’s undertaking that she would pay $17,530.30 into court.
  18. [23]
    On 21 October 2019, the respondent filed an application in this court seeking that:
    1. (a)
      the applicant’s Court of Appeal application be stayed pending the outcome of his application;
    2. (b)
      the applicant’s application for extension of time to apply for leave to appeal be struck out;
    3. (c)
      the applicant’s application for leave to appeal be struck out;
    4. (d)
      President Sofronoff’s order of 25 September 2019 be vacated and that he be paid directly from the court forthwith;
    5. (e)
      the applicant be labelled vexatious; and
    6. (f)
      any other order the court deems fit.
  19. [24]
    On 29 October 2019, Philippides JA ordered that the respondent’s strike out application be adjourned to 7 February 2020 to be heard at the same time as the applicant’s substantive application.

The Amended Application

  1. [25]
    At the hearing of this matter on 7 February 2020, the applicant was granted leave to file an Amended Application.
  2. [26]
    Pursuant to that Amended Application, the applicant seeks the following orders:
    1. (a)
      Extension of time to apply for leave to appeal later than 28 days after the relevant day, pursuant to s 151(2)(b) of the QCAT Act;
    2. (b)
      Leave to appeal, pursuant to s 150(1) of the QCAT Act;
    3. (c)
      A stay of the order for costs pending determination of the application for extension of time for leave to appeal and leave to appeal pursuant to ss 152(2) and (4) of the QCAT Act; or that the court allow the applicant to pay the costs ordered to be paid to the respondent of $17,530.30 into court pending determination of the applications for leave to appeal and appeal; and
    4. (d)
      Orders or directions as the court deems fit.

Extension of time to apply for leave to appeal

  1. [27]
    In her Amended Outline of Argument the applicant argued that she had received the decision the subject of her foreshadowed appeal (namely, that of Member Olding handed down on 30 May 2018) on 12 June 2018 and that was the relevant date in relation to the appeal period.  I accept that that was the date the decision was received by Ashurst, who were acting on her behalf at the time.  Accordingly the 28 day appeal period commenced on that day.[11]
  2. [28]
    The applicant outlined her circumstances as at that date, which she submitted explained her delay in filing a Notice of Appeal and supported a finding that there was a reasonable excuse for that delay.  In particular she argued that she had been mid-way through cancer treatment and that the “debilitating effects of the malady and treatments meant the effort and work required as a self-represented litigant was insurmountable”.[12]  The applicant also submitted that although she had qualified for pro bono assistance in QCAT, the resources offered by LawRight were withdrawn when Member Olding’s decision was handed down and she could not afford to pay legal fees herself.
  3. [29]
    The applicant also argued that QCAT had not finalised all applications relating to the respondent’s costs of the originating guardianship case until 13 August 2019 and submitted that “this was the main reason for delay in applying to the Court of Appeal”.[13]  She stated that she had expected that the costs claimed by the respondent in his November 2016 application would be “substantially reduced by costs assessment and/or by the appellant having opportunity to identify duplication and overlap of costs in other matters in which the respondent instructed his solicitor against the appellant” and also “by isolating which (if any) costs were paid by the respondent himself and which were paid by the parties’ mother or her Estate”.
  4. [30]
    The applicant made further submissions that her expectation was maintained after viewing affidavit material filed by the respondent in a District Court family provision matter and as a consequence of which she filed an application in QCAT on 4 December 2018 seeking full and frank disclosure in relation to the costs matter.  That application was dismissed on 13 August 2019.  She submitted however that she maintained the expectation that QCAT was the appropriate forum, and that if the disclosure had been provided, the costs she had been ordered to pay “would be reduced sufficient to mitigate the substantial injustice to the appellant of having to pay costs in her circumstances which was reason for the delay”.[14]
  5. [31]
    The applicant’s outline concluded with the submission that she had no evidence which indicated that the respondent had personally paid any or all of the costs or that he suffers prejudice by delay.  She argued that any prejudice suffered would be minimised by her payment of costs into court in accordance with the order of Sofronoff P of 25 September 2019.

The grounds of appeal

  1. [32]
    Accordingly the applicant seeks leave to appeal against the whole of Member Olding’s decision of 30 May 2018 on the basis that there are four errors of law in Member Olding’s decision:
    1. (a)
      Member Olding in his reasons at [27]–[30] misconstrued, did not appreciate, and did not adequately deal with the applicant’s submissions in relation to the evidence from two advocates in relation to the issues of capacity which she argued corroborated the genuineness of her original application;
    2. (b)
      Member Olding failed, by reference to the transcript of the hearing on 9 November 2016, to scrutinise the finding that the applicant continued or persisted with allegations of financial impropriety;
    3. (c)
      Member Olding erred in finding that the Application for Leave to Appeal did not raise reasonably arguable errors of law; and
    4. (d)
      Member Olding erred, in his reasons at [50] and [51], in failing to consider how allowing the decision at first instance to stand might cause the applicant substantial injustice.

Should the Application for Extension of time be granted?

  1. [33]
    In Robertson & Anor v Airstrike Industrial Pty Ltd[15] the Court of Appeal dealt with a similar application for leave to appeal a decision made in QCAT which was appealed to the appeal tribunal of QCAT and ultimately, an application seeking an extension of time for leave to appeal from the decision of the appeal Tribunal was filed in this court.
  2. [34]
    In considering the issue of “Delay”, his Honour Jackson J noted that the applicants’ delay had been significant as the application was filed almost 17 months after the appeal tribunal’s decision.  The applicant’s ill health had been an issue,[16] and the delay had been contributed to by financial constraints.[17]  His Honour noted that “no doubt litigation is stressful to parties”[18] and that it may be “expected to be more stressful for the unsuccessful party”[19] but that in most cases the courts should not be subjected to explanation and excuse as to the “relative impacts upon one person or another of these stresses, where for one reason or another a conscious decision has been made not to pursue an appeal within time”.[20]
  3. [35]
    His Honour emphasised that in any event, “the courts must also be concerned with the functioning of their own systems”[21] and that where the time limit of 28 days imposed by the QCAT Act and the power to extend apply in a context where there has been a hearing as well as a final decision by an appeal division of QCAT exercising appellate jurisdiction, a further appeal to the Court of Appeal, if leave is granted, constitutes a second appeal.[22]  As such, his Honour emphasised that in such cases, the importance of finality pervades the law,[23] and that without purporting to “fetter the width of the discretionary power to extend time… when the period of extension sought is more than a year, the circumstances must be compelling”.[24]
  4. [36]
    I accept that the applicant’s evidence is that she was in the midst of her cancer treatment and without deciding the matter it might be that some of the submissions she has made may provide some explanation for her delay in filing her Notice of Appeal if that was the sole basis for not filing a notice of appeal for some 15 months.  It would seem clear however from the applicant’s amended outline that the primary reason for her delay in filing her notice of appeal was not her incapacity due to illness but in fact her belief that she would receive a favourable decision at QCAT in respect of the costs issue.  In my view this constitutes a conscious decision for one reason or another not to pursue an appeal to this court within time.
  5. [37]
    It will however be unnecessary to determine whether there has been a satisfactory explanation for her delay if the applicant has failed to raise only “pure” questions of law, as this Court only has jurisdiction to hear applications “only on a question of law” as required by s 150(3)(a) of the QCAT Act.
  6. [38]
    What is the meaning of the term “only on a question of law”?

Jurisdictional Issue

  1. [39]
    This question was recently determined by this Court in Pivovarova v Michelsen[25] where the court considered an application for leave to appeal from a final decision of the appeal tribunal of QCAT under s 150(2)(b) of the QCAT Act.
  2. [40]
    Section 150 of the QCAT Act provides:

150 Party may appeal—decisions of appeal tribunal

  1. (1)
    A person may appeal to the Court of Appeal against a decision of the appeal tribunal to refuse an application for leave to appeal to the appeal tribunal.
  1. (2)
    A party to an appeal under division 1 may appeal to the Court of Appeal against the following decisions of the appeal tribunal in the appeal—
  1. (a)
    a cost-amount decision;
  1. (b)
    the final decision.
  1. (3)
    However, an appeal under subsection (1) or (2) may be made—
  1. (a)
    only on a question of law; and
  1. (b)
    only if the party has obtained the court’s leave to appeal.”
  1. [41]
    In considering the provision Fraser JA (with whom Boddice J agreed)[26] stated:

“In my view s 150(3) of the QCAT Act should be read as if ‘pure’ or ‘only’ does qualify ‘question of law’”[27] and that “an appeal under s 150 is confined to one made on a question of law only”.[28]

  1. [42]
    Both judges agreed with the reasons and order proposed by Crow J.  Justice Crow held, citing a number of authorities, that it “may further be observed that a mixed question of fact and law is not a ‘question of law’”.[29]  In agreeing with Crow J, Fraser JA stated;

“Section 150 is in Division 2, of Part 8 of the QCAT Act, which concerns appeals to the Court of Appeal. It is significant that s 150(3)(a) applies only to appeals against decisions of the QCAT appeal tribunal, which will have considered and refused either an application for leave to appeal (s 150(1)) or an appeal (s 150(2)). That an applicant for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal already has had one opportunity to challenge an adverse decision makes it seem more likely that the legislative intent was to narrowly confine the grounds of such an appeal.”[30]

  1. [43]
    Fraser JA then continued;

[5] Furthermore:

  1. (a)
    Section 149(1), which is also in Division 2, confers a right of appeal against a ‘cost-amount’ decision by QCAT at first instance and s 149(2) confers a right of appeal against another first instance decision by QCAT if it was constituted by a judicial member, in both cases only by leave of the Court of Appeal under s 149(3). Significantly, s 149(3)(a) allows an appeal by leave under s 149(1) only on ‘a question of law’ whereas s 149(3)(b) allows an appeal by leave under s 149(2) also on ‘a question of fact, or a question of mixed law and fact’;
  2. (b)
    In Division 1 of Part 8, which concerns appeals to the QCAT appeal tribunal from certain first instance QCAT decisions, s 142(3)(b) allows certain appeals by leave also ‘on a question of fact, or a question of mixed law and fact’.

The contrast between the expressions ‘a question of law’ and ‘a question of fact, or question of mixed law and fact’ makes clear the legislative policy to confine the ambit of an appeal for which the Court of Appeal may give leave under s 150 to an appeal on a question of law which does not involve any question of fact or of mixed law and fact of the kind described in ss 149(3)(b) and 142(3)(b). In a similar statutory context, Rothman J held in Bagumya v Kakwano that the expression ‘only on a question of law’ must mean ‘on a question of law alone’.

[6] That s 151(2)(a) of the QCAT Act provides that an application for leave to appeal or an appeal to the Court of Appeal must be made under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”) does not suggest any different view either of the ambit of the appeal or its nature as a strict appeal rather than an appeal by way of rehearing; as to the latter point, the provision in r 765(1) of the UCPR that an appeal to the Court of Appeal under Chapter 18 of the UCPR is an appeal by way of rehearing applies only to an appeal from the Supreme Court constituted by a single judge: UCPR r 745(2).

[7] The legislative policy is reinforced by the statement in s 153(1) of the QCAT Act that s 153 (which confers powers upon the Court of Appeal in deciding appeals) ‘applies to an appeal before the Court of Appeal against a decision of the tribunal on a question of law only’. In that provision the word ‘only’ qualifies ‘a question of law’, whereas s 150(3)(a) allows an appeal to be made ‘only on a question of law’. The latter expression, if considered in isolation from its context, is open to the construction that the only kind of appeal that may be made is an appeal ‘on a question of law’, rather than a construction that the appeal is confined to ‘a question of law only’ (which is a pure question of law). Because s 153 is plainly designed to comprehend an appeal under s 150, the implication is that, consistently with the statutory context already discussed and Rothman J’s conclusion in Bagumya v Kakwano, an appeal under s 150 is confined to one made on a question of law only.

[8] The absence of any factual component in such an appeal is consistent with the contrast between the powers conferred on the Court by s 153 in an appeal on a question of law only and the powers given to the Court by s 154 in an appeal on a question of fact or mixed law and fact. As to the former, s 153(2) provides that in deciding the appeal the Court of Appeal may confirm or amend the decision, set aside the decision and substitute its own decision, set aside the decision and return the matter to QCAT for reconsideration (with or without the hearing of additional evidence and with other directions the Court considers appropriate), or make any other order it considers appropriate. The powers conferred by s 153 upon the Court in an appeal on a question of law only do not include any analogue of the power conferred by s 154(2) in relation to an appeal on a question of fact or a question of mixed law and fact that the appeal proceeds ‘with or without the hearing of additional evidence as decided by the Court of Appeal’. The absence of such a power in an appeal under s 153 is consistent with a legislative intent to confine appeals to the Court of Appeal to pure questions of law.

[9] The powers s 153 confers in an appeal on a question of law only should be given a construction that is consistent with their purpose of aiding in the exercise of the limited nature of the appeal; if, which it is not necessary to decide in this application, the Court of Appeal might itself be able to determine a matter of fact remaining to be determined as a consequence of an appeal being upheld on a question of law only (rather than remitting the matter to the appeal tribunal or to QCAT at first instance), that power may be exercised only by reference to uncontested evidence or primary facts already found by QCAT: see Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice [No 2] and Powell v Queensland University of Technology”.[31]

  1. [44]
    I turn now to a consideration of the grounds raised.  As previously noted the applicant argues that Member Olding in his reasons misconstrued, did not appreciate, and did not adequately deal with the applicant’s submissions.  This is clearly not a pure question of law.  It was also argued that Member Olding failed to scrutinise the finding that the applicant continued or persisted with allegations of financial impropriety.  This is not a pure question of law.  Similarly the remaining grounds do not raise a pure question of law, as they refer to a submission that Member Olding erred in finding that the Application for Leave to Appeal did not raise reasonably arguable errors of law; and that he erred, in his reasons, in failing to consider how allowing the decision at first instance to stand might cause the applicant substantial injustice.  Ultimately, this appeal does not raise any matters of principle or any unresolved issues as to the interpretation of any act of parliament.  It does not raise any “pure” questions of law.
  2. [45]
    Accordingly the application to extend time to apply for leave to appeal must be refused.
  3. [46]
    Given that result, it is unnecessary to consider the respondent’s application to strike out the applicant’s application for an extension of time within which to appeal.
  4. [47]
    In relation to the respondent’s request to have the applicant deemed vexatious, the proper avenue would be to commence separate proceedings in the trial division of the Supreme Court.

Orders

  1. [48]
    I would order:
    1. The application to extend time to apply for leave to appeal is refused.
    2. The sum of $17,530.30 paid into court by the applicant together with accretions be paid to the respondent.
  2. [49]
    BODDICE J:  I agree with Lyons SJA.

Footnotes

[1]  Reasons of Member Joachim at 3, [4].

[2]  T 1-77 ll 6–10.

[3]  Reasons of Member Joachim at 3, [4].

[4]  Reasons of Member Joachim at 4–5, [14], [17], [19].

[5]  Reasons of Member Joachim at 4, [15].

[6]  Reasons of Member Joachim at 4, [14].

[7]  Reasons of Member Joachim at 10–11, [57].

[8]  Reasons of Member Joachim at 12, [66].

[9]  Reasons of Member Joachim at 12, [67]–[69].

[10]  Reasons of Member Olding at 8, [50].

[11]  The decision of Member Olding is a reviewable decision pursuant to s 17 of the QCAT Act.  Pursuant to s 33(3) of that Act, an application for review of a reviewable decision must be made within 28 days of the relevant day, with relevant day defined in s 33(4)(a) as the day the applicant is notified of the decision.

[12]  Appellant’s Amended Outline of Argument at 1, [1(a)].

[13]  Appellant’s Amended Outline of Argument at 1, [1(c)].

[14]  Appellant’s Amended Outline of Argument at 1, [1(c)].

[15]  [2016] QCA 104 (Robertson).

[16] Robertson at 10, [44].

[17] Robertson at 10, [44].

[18] Robertson at 11, [49].

[19] Robertson at 11, [49].

[20] Robertson at 11, [50].

[21] Robertson at 11, [51].

[22] Robertson at 11, [52].

[23] Robertson at 11, [53] referring to D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1 at 17, [35].

[24] Robertson at 11, [54].

[25]  [2019] QCA 256 (Pivovarova).

[26] Pivovarova at 6, [14].

[27] Pivovarova at 3, [4].

[28] Pivovarova at 4, [7].

[29] Pivovarova at 11, [36].

[30] Pivovarova at 3, [4].

[31] Pivovarova at 3–4, [5]–[9] (citations omitted).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    MKN v LAQ

  • Shortened Case Name:

    MKN v LAQ

  • MNC:

    [2020] QCA 49

  • Court:

    QCA

  • Judge(s):

    Mullins JA, Lyons SJA, Boddice J

  • Date:

    20 Mar 2020

  • White Star Case:

    Yes

Litigation History

Event Citation or File Date Notes
Primary Judgment QCAT (No Citation) 09 Nov 2016 Application by MKN for the removal of her brother, the respondent LAQ, as attorney for their mother and the appointment of a guardian and an administrator; application dismissed: Member Joachim.
Primary Judgment QCAT (No Citation) 20 Apr 2017 Costs judgment; costs order in favour of respondent LAQ: Member Joachim.
Primary Judgment QCATA163/17 (No Citation) 30 May 2018 Application for leave to appeal refused: Member Olding.
Primary Judgment QCAT (No Citation) 13 Aug 2019 MKN's application for miscellaneous matters dismissed on the grounds that Member Joachim's decision on 20 April 2017 constituted the the final orders in the proceeding: Member Endicott.
QCA Interlocutory Judgment Appeal 9609/9 (No Citation) 25 Sep 2019 MKN's application for a stay of the order of enforcement of costs (Member Joachim's decision on 20 April 2017) granted upon the applicant’s undertaking that she would pay $17,530.30 into court: Sofronoff P.
Appeal Determined (QCA) [2020] QCA 49 20 Mar 2020 Application for an extension of time in which to apply for leave to appeal refused; the sum of $17,530.30 paid into court by the applicant together with accretions be paid to the respondent: Mullins JA and Lyons SJA and Boddice J.

Appeal Status

{solid} Appeal Determined (QCA)