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Wilkins v Council of the City of Gold Coast

 

[2020] QIRC 172

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Wilkins v Council of the City of Gold Coast [2020] QIRC 172

PARTIES: 

Wilkins, Gary George

(Applicant)

v

Council of the City of Gold Coast

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

B/2020/49

PROCEEDING:

Application for an order to stop bullying

DELIVERED ON:

1 October 2020

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

Merrell DP

On the papers

ORDER:

  1. The Respondent's application, to dismiss the Applicant's application pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, is dismissed.
  1. The Applicant's application be mentioned on a date to be fixed.

INDUSTRIAL LAW - application for an order to stop bullying - application the subject of conciliation - conciliation did not result in resolution of application - Applicant not at work since 8 May 2020 - whether application should be dismissed because further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest within the meaning of s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 - consideration of the nature of the powers of the Commission pursuant to s 275(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 - Applicant's application not dismissed - Applicant's application to be mentioned on a date to be fixed

LEGISLATION:

Fair Work Act 2009, s 789FF(1)

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 272, s 273, s 274, s 275, s 451, s 539 and s 541

Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, r 8, r 9, r 10, r 11, r 12, r 13, r 14 and r 15

CASES:

Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney General) [2019] ICQ 18; (2019) 291 IR 171

Obatoki v Malle Track Health and Community Services [2015] FWCFB 1661; (2015) 249 IR 135

South Eastern Sydney Local Health District v Lal [2019] FWCFB 1475; (2019) 285 IR 355

APPEARANCES:

Mr T. Spence of Counsel instructed Ms L. Carlson of Industrial Relations & Employment Solutions Australia for the Applicant

Ashurst for the Respondent

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Mr Gary Wilkins is employed by the Council of the City of the Gold Coast in the position of Supervisor, Plumbing and Drainage Equipment.  On 7 July 2020, Mr Wilkins filed an application, pursuant to s 273 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the Act') for an order to stop bullying ('Mr Wilkins' application').  Mr Wilkins contends that he has been the subject of workplace bullying, within the meaning of ch 7 of the Act, by his immediate supervisor and other Council employees.  By the Schedule to his application, Mr Wilkins seeks an order preventing him from being bullied in the workplace.
  1. [2]
    Mr Wilkins has not been in the workplace since 8 May 2020, despite being directed to attend a work meeting on 16 June 2020, and remains subject to a direction by the Council not to attend work and to take personal leave until such time as he is deemed fit to return to work, without any restrictions, by a suitably qualified medical specialist.
  1. [3]
    Despite the assistance provided to the parties by Industrial Commissioner McLennan by way of conciliation, they have been unable to resolve Mr Wilkins' application by agreement. The matter was then referred to me for hearing and determination.
  1. [4]
    At a mention of Mr Wilkins' application on 13 August 2020, I raised with the parties the question of whether I had the power, pursuant to s 275 of the Act, to make an order of the kind sought by Mr Wilkins when, presently, he is not at work.  I subsequently made directions that the parties file and serve written submissions about that question and that I would determine the question on the papers. 
  1. [5]
    The parties have filed and served written submissions as directed.
  1. [6]
    In summary, Mr Wilkins submits that despite his present absence from the workplace, the Commission has the power to hear his application and make the orders sought by him, including an order that the Council allows Mr Wilkins to return to work in his substantive position.
  1. [7]
    The Council submits that the Commission should make an order, pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Act, to dismiss Mr Wilkins' application because further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest '… given that the Applicant is not in the workplace and there is no more than a speculative risk of bullying.'  No formal application has been made by the Council for an order pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Act.  Mr Wilkins was given the opportunity to make submissions in reply to the Council's submissions.  No such submissions were filed.  In those circumstances, and for the sake of expediency, I proceed on the basis that, by its submissions, the Council makes such an application and, in that regard, pursuant to s 539(k) of the Act, I waive compliance with the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011.[1]
  1. [8]
    The issue that I have to determine is whether I should dismiss Mr Wilkins' application because further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest given that, presently, Mr Wilkins is not in the workplace.
  1. [9]
    For the reasons that follow:
  • the Council's application to dismiss Mr Wilkins' application is dismissed; and
  • I will mention Mr Wilkins' application on a date to be fixed.

Further background

Mr Wilkins' allegations of workplace bullying

  1. [10]
    Mr Wilkins commenced employment with the Council in November 2009. In or around 2014, Mr Wilkins was appointed to his present position.
  1. [11]
    In his affidavit sworn on 1 July 2020, Mr Wilkins alleges that he has been the subject of workplace bullying by his supervisor and others since 2018.  As best as I can make out, from that evidence and from Mr Wilkins' submissions, the alleged workplace bullying consists of:
  • a workplace bullying complaint being progressed against him in the absence of evidence;[2]
  • a further frivolous allegation of workplace bullying being made against him concerning a USB device ('the USB allegation');[3]
  • a conflict of interest allegation being made against him which was substantiated ('the conflict of interest finding');[4]
  • the undermining, ignoring and contradiction of him in the workplace by his supervisor;[5]
  • advice provided to Mr Wilkins by Mr Michael Moran, Manager City Development, that he (Mr Moran) had held concerns regarding Mr Wilkins' behaviour for some time;[6]
  • the failure by the Council to change his reporting line despite medical evidence provided by Mr Wilkins supporting such a change;[7]
  • changes made by Mr Wilkins' supervisor about Mr Wilkins' role during his absence from work, namely:
  • that Mr Wilkins had a different computer assigned to him and that he was to be responsible for what is referred to as the DART program;[8]
  • structural and reporting line changes within his team, role changes within his team, the commencement of disciplinary action against members of his team and pandemic measures put in place in his team;[9] and
  • a failure by Mr Wilkins' supervisor to supply Mr Wilkins with the information he needed to perform his role;[10]
  • the failure of Mr Wilkins' supervisor to greet Mr Wilkins following his return to work in the two week period from 27 April 2020;[11]
  • the direction given by the Council to Mr Wilkins, on 16 June 2020, as confirmed in correspondence dated 17 June 2020, that he not attend work and access personal leave;[12] and
  • an excessive workload.[13]

The reason why Mr Wilkins is not presently in the workplace

  1. [12]
    Between 25 November 2019 and 27 April 2020, Mr Wilkins was on approved sick leave before returning to work.
  1. [13]
    Mr Wilkins' evidence is that on 8 May 2020, correspondence was sent to the Council detailing Mr Wilkins' supervisor's '… refusal to give me pertinent information and other matters.'[14]
  1. [14]
    Following that, by letter dated 8 May 2020 from Mr Moran, Mr Wilkins was directed not to attend his normal workplace, effective immediately, until further notice and until the Council was provided with a report from a medical specialist in relation to Mr Wilkins' ability to maintain his same reporting line within his workplace structure.  Mr Wilkins was also directed to attend an independent medical examination on 15 May 2020 with Dr Donald Grant, Consultant Psychiatrist.[15]  Mr Wilkins complied with the direction. Dr Grant, by report dated 26 May 2020, said, amongst other things, that while Mr Wilkins was fit to carry out his duties, it was extremely problematic to expect him to work in his nominal role including reporting to his pre-injury supervisor.[16]
  1. [15]
    Mr Wilkins was then directed to attend a meeting at work, on 16 June 2020, with Mr Moran and Mr Greg Newman, HR representative of the Council.  During that meeting, Mr Wilkins informed the Council representatives that he was ready, willing and able to return to work.  Mr Wilkins' evidence is that the Council representatives:
  • declared that he (Mr Wilkins) was unable to continue in his role due to issues he had raised and because his supervisor was entitled to his (the supervisor's) position;
  • stated that he (Mr Wilkins) was unable to meet the inherent requirements of his role and placed him on leave at his expense; and
  • stated they would investigate redeployment opportunities, but that none were available at the time.[17]
  1. [16]
    By letter dated 17 June 2020 from Mr Moran, Mr Wilkins was advised that he was not permitted to attend work and was required to take personal leave until he was deemed fit to return to work, without any restrictions, by a suitably qualified medical specialist.[18]

The relevant provisions of the Act

  1. [17]
    Chapter 7 of the Act deals with employees bullied in the workplace.  Section 272 defines when an employee is bullied in the workplace.  Section 273 provides that an employee, who reasonably believes the employee has been bullied in the workplace, may apply to the Commission for an order under s 275.  Section 274 provides that the Commission must start to deal with an application under s 273 within 14 days after the application is made.
  1. [18]
    Section 275 of the Act relevantly provides:

275 Commission may make orders to stop bullying

  1. (1)
    This section applies if-
  1. (a)
     an employee has made an application under section 273; and
  1. (b)
     the commission is satisfied that-
  1. (i)
     the employee has been bullied in the workplace; and
  1. (ii)
     there is a risk that the employee will continue to be bullied in the workplace.
  1. (2)
     The commission may make any order it considers appropriate (other than an order requiring payment of a pecuniary amount) to prevent the employee from being bullied in the workplace.
  1. [19]
    Section 275(1)(b)(ii) of the Act was considered by the Industrial Court of Queensland in Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney General) ('Campbell').[19] In that case, the Commission made an order, pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Act, to dismiss an application made under s 273 of the Act.  The reason that order was made was because at the time the bullying application was made, the applicant was not at work and was the subject of a workers' compensation medical certificate stating she had no capacity for work for a further five months.[20]
  1. [20]
    On appeal, one of the questions was whether, having regard to s 275(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, the Commission is required to consider risk to an employee at the time the Commission is hearing the application or at the time the employee returns to the workplace.[21]
  1. [21]
    In this regard, the Court held:

At what time is the risk calculated?

[46]  The notion of risk connotes exposure to the chance of injury or loss - it contemplates the possibility of a future occurrence. That said, “risk must also be real and not simply conceptual.”

[47]  When considering risk to an absent employee at the time the Commission is hearing a s 273 application the Commission can, in appropriate circumstances, consider what will occur when the employee returns to the workplace. The distinction relied on by the appellant is artificial.

[48]  If an employee who has been bullied is temporarily absent from their workplace it may be reasonable to find a risk that, on their imminent return, bullying will continue. Evidence may be tendered to this effect. Nothing in the wording of s 273 of the Act necessarily precludes the Commission from making such a finding if the existence of risk is considered from the time at which the application is made or considered.[22]

Mr Wilkins' submissions

  1. [22]
    Mr Wilkins refers to the decision in Campbell, but submits that the facts in his case can be distinguished from that case, such that the Commission does have power to grant the orders he seeks (as set out in his submissions), because:
  • having regard to Dr Grant's report, he is fit to return to work and he is ready, willing and able to attend work, but that it is the Council who refuses to accept his service;
  • the investigation in relation to the USB allegation and the disciplinary process in relation to the conflict of interest finding will continue upon his return to work;
  • in the period of time he was most recently at work, being 27 April 2020 to 8 May 2020, the behaviour of his immediate supervisor was unreasonable causing him to make a further complaint;
  • Dr Grant's opinion is that requiring him to report to his supervisor would inevitably result in stress, unless strenuous efforts were taken to resolve the situations that were producing the stress; and
  • the Council's conduct in directing him not to attend the workplace supports the contention that it is of the belief that there is a risk to his health.
  1. [23]
    Mr Wilkins then submits that:
  • having regard to the beneficial purpose of ch 7 of the Act, that purpose cannot be achieved if an employee is deprived of the protections provided in that chapter by an employer directing the employee not to attend the workplace as a consequence of the employee alleging bullying conduct, therefore avoiding the Commission's jurisdiction; and
  • in construing the provisions of ch 7 of the Act beneficially, namely, to give the fullest relief which the fair meaning of its language will allow, the Commission has jurisdiction to make the orders sought so as to ensure he can return to the workplace and not be subjected to unreasonable behaviour that creates a risk to his health and safety.

The Council's submissions

  1. [24]
    The Council submits that having regard to the decision in Campbell, the alleged risk of bullying to Mr Wilkins is entirely speculative because Mr Wilkins is not in the workplace, his last day of work was 8 May 2020, and his bullying application was not filed until almost two months later.
  1. [25]
    The Council further submits that the basis upon which Mr Wilkins seeks to distinguish Campbell from his circumstances should be rejected because:
  • Mr Wilkins has provided conflicting medical evidence, by way of a medical certificate dated 3 April 2020, indicating that his reporting line should be changed;
  • that was followed by a medical certificate, dated 25 April 2020, from a different medical practitioner indicating that Mr Wilkins could return to work with no restrictions;
  • Dr Grant's report indicates '… the Applicant continues to express reservations about working for his current manager and heavily qualifies his readiness to do so, which is not consistent with the Applicant being truly ready, willing and able to return to work'; and
  • it is an inherent requirement of Mr Wilkins' role that he is able to maintain the reporting line to his current manager.
  1. [26]
    The Council concludes by submitting that:
  • while Dr Grant's report may establish a causal link between Mr Wilkins' physical and mental state and how he felt he was being treated at work, it did not establish a causal link between how Mr Wilkins felt and his supervisor's actual interactions with him, such as to establish that his supervisor had bullied him or posed a risk to his health and safety;
  • the only feasible way for the Council to change Mr Wilkins' reporting lines would be to move Mr Wilkins' current coordinator to another position, which is not a reasonable outcome;
  • the provisions in ch 7 '… are not intended to serve as a vehicle for revenge or retaliation, yet this would effectively be the result if the Applicant's Coordinator was required to be moved to another position by the Respondent.'; and
  • Mr Wilkins' application is not necessary or desirable in the public interest given that Mr Wilkins is not in the workplace and there is no more than a speculative risk of bullying which is insufficient to attract the Commission's jurisdiction to make an order.
  1. [27]
    There is no submission by the Council that Mr Wilkins will never return to the workplace.

Mr Wilkins' application should not be dismissed pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) the Act

  1. [28]
    Section 541 of the Act provides:

541 Decisions generally

The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following-

  1. (a)
     make a decision it considers just, and include provision for preventing or settling the industrial dispute or dealing with the industrial matter to which the cause relates, without being restricted to any specific relief claimed by the parties to the cause;
  1. (b)
     dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers-
  1. (i)
     the cause is trivial; or
  1. (ii)
     further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest;
  1. (c)
     order a party to the cause to pay another party the expenses, including witness expenses, it considers appropriate.
  1. [29]
    The value judgment incorporated in s 541(b)(ii) of the Act is a broad one.[23]
  1. [30]
    In my view, this is not a case where I should exercise my discretion to dismiss Mr Wilkins' application, pursuant to s 541(b) of the Act, because further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.
  1. [31]
    There are a number of reasons for this.
  1. [32]
    First, the submission made by the Council that Dr Grant's report indicates that Mr Wilkins continues to express reservations about working for his current manager and heavily qualifies his readiness to do so is, in my opinion, a mischaracterisation Dr Grant's report.
  1. [33]
    Under the heading of 'Current Mental Health Issues', Dr Grant states that Mr Wilkins reported that, in terms of his future, Mr Wilkins enjoyed his job and wanted to return to work free of reprisals and that having to return and to continue to report to his current line manager was a source of difficulty, particularly if reprisals were to continue.[24]
  1. [34]
    Under the heading of 'Assessment', Dr Grant opined that:
  • given the presentation by Mr Wilkins at interview and after taking his history, he (Dr Grant) was unable to make any current psychiatric diagnosis; and
  • Mr Wilkins was clearly a man facing a stressful time in his life, however Mr Wilkins seemed to be coping adequately with that at the moment without him (Mr Wilkins) suffering from a psychiatric disorder.[25]
  1. [35]
    Dr Grant also stated that:
  • Mr Wilkins told him that he now wants to return to work and deal with any situations that remained there;[26]
  • Mr Wilkins disputed all the allegations and observations made about him, as set out in the Council's referral letter to Dr Grant, except that Mr Wilkins stated he might have been seen as being argumentative with his manager, simply because he was disagreeing with the way things were being handled;[27]
  • Mr Wilkins explicitly denied any implications that he was not fit to be in the workplace and stated that he would be able to perform his duties, and do so safely, for himself and others;[28] and
  • he (Dr Grant) was unable to find any evidence of a psychiatric disorder which would dispute Mr Wilkins' assessment of the situation.[29]
  1. [36]
    Dr Grant concluded his report by opining:

In my opinion, Mr Wilkins is fit to carry out his duties.  However, under all the circumstances, to expect him to work in his nominal role including reporting to his pre-injury supervisor, is extremely problematic.  I consider Mr Wilkins would be prepared to make that situation viable if all parties cooperated, and there was mutual respect between them.  These are obviously important human resource matters, which are not in my area of expertise.  I can only comment that putting someone into such a situation will inevitably result in stress, unless strenuous efforts are taken to resolve the situations that are producing the stress.[30]

There is, in my opinion, no significant clinical disorder that will affect Mr Wilkins' ability to complete his role in a safe manner.  However, placing him back into a situation where he is reporting to the same line manager will be inevitably stressful and his employer will need to pay close attention to that issue, and its potential effects on causing a deterioration in Mr Wilkins' future health.[31]

  1. [37]
    True, Mr Wilkins reported to Dr Grant that having to return to work and to continue to report to his current line manager was a source of difficulty, particularly if reprisals were to continue.
  1. [38]
    However, it is incorrect to characterise that reporting by Mr Wilkins to Dr Grant as a heavy qualification, on Mr Wilkins' part, which is inconsistent with Mr Wilkins' submission that he is ready, willing and able to return to work.  Indeed, Dr Grant reports that Mr Wilkins wants to return to work and deal with any situations that remain there.  Dr Grant opines that while it would be stressful for Mr Wilkins to return to work with his supervisor, strenuous efforts should be taken to resolve the situations producing the stress.
  2. [39]
    Dr Grant does not ultimately opine that Mr Wilkins cannot return to work in his position at the Council should his reporting line not change.  Dr Grant's opinion is that the Council would need to pay close attention when Mr Wilkins is placed in a situation where he is reporting to the same line manager. The part of Dr Grant's report upon which the Council relies to exclude Mr Wilkins from the workplace is set out in the third paragraph on page 2 of Mr Moran's letter dated 17 June 2020. However, that part of Dr Grant's report must be read in context and as a part of the report as a whole. That part of Dr Grant's report states:
  1. Based on your diagnosis of Mr Wilkins, and the associated changes in functioning and cognition, do you believe that the restrictions outlined within the letter by Dr Simpson, dated 3 April 2020, are appropriate and reasonable?

I would agree with Dr Simpson that for Mr Wilkins to be expected to return to a workplace where he is continuing to report to the line manager who was central in the matters involving Mr Wilkins, is inappropriate, and not reasonable under all of the circumstances.[32]

  1. [40]
    In that part of his report, Dr Grant is answering the question put to him namely, whether or not he agreed with the restrictions outlined by Dr Simpson in his report dated 3 April 2020.  However, as set out above, later in this report, Dr Grant goes on to give his opinion, following his examination of Mr Wilkins, that Mr Wilkins does not have a current diagnosable psychiatric disorder and that while placing Mr Wilkins back in a situation where he would be reporting to the same line manager would be inevitably stressful, strenuous efforts would need to be taken to resolve the situations producing the stress and the Council would need to pay close attention to that issue.
  1. [41]
    Secondly, the Council submits that the only feasible way for it to change Mr Wilkins' reporting line would be to move Mr Wilkins' supervisor to another position which, it submits, is not a reasonable outcome.  I acknowledge, by Mr Wilkins' submissions, he seeks an order changing the reporting structure so that he reports to another nominated person within the Economy, Planning and Environment Department of the Council.  However, Mr Wilkins does not seek an order that his supervisor be moved out of his (the supervisor's) position.
  1. [42]
    Thirdly, the Council gives no persuasive reasons why the only feasible way for it to change Mr Wilkins' reporting line would be to move his supervisor to another position. The only evidence the Council points to is its letter to Mr Wilkins dated 17 June 2020 in which the Council expressed its own view that part of the inherent requirement of Mr Wilkins' role includes Mr Wilkins '… being able to maintain your reporting line through to the Coordinator, Plumbing and Drainage.'  Such a contention is, in my view, one that would be open to close scrutiny.
  1. [43]
    For these three reasons, Mr Wilkins' situation is materially different to those of the employee in Campbell.
  1. [44]
    Fourthly, there may well be evidence upon which I may, if I am satisfied that Mr Wilkins has been bullied in the workplace and there is a risk that he will continue to be bullied in the workplace, order that Mr Wilkins reports to another nominated person within the Council so as to prevent Mr Wilkins from being bullied in the workplace.  Chapter 7 of the Act was enacted following the December 2015 report of the Industrial Relations Legislative Reform Reference Group which reviewed the industrial relations framework in Queensland.  Recommendation 32 of that Reference Group was that employees be given access to an anti-bullying jurisdiction, through the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, similar to that as provided through the Fair Work Commission ('FWC').[33] It has been observed that orders involving the physical and/or functional separation in the workplace of the complainant of bullying and those said to have engaged in bullying conduct are able to be made under s 789FF(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009[34] which is the equivalent provision to s 275(2) of the Act.  There is no reason why a similar construction should not be given to s 275(2) of the Act.
  1. [45]
    Fifthly, by his submissions, one of the orders Mr Wilkins seeks is an order to allow him '… to return to work in his substantive position.' It seems to me that Mr Wilkins alleges that the direction given to him on 16 June 2020 by Mr Moran and Mr Newman, as confirmed in Mr Moran's correspondence to Mr Wilkins dated 17 June 2020, not to attend work and to take personal leave, amounts to him being bullied in the workplace.
  1. [46]
    Mr Wilkins submits that:
  • by excluding him from the workplace, the Council has recognised that there continues to be a risk to his health if he was required to report to his supervisor and his supervisor's behaviour towards him (Mr Wilkins) does not change; and
  • the Council's conduct in directing him not to attend the workplace is not reasonable management action in that it has the adverse consequences of, amongst other things, him losing remuneration and leave entitlements.
  1. [47]
    The power to make orders conferred on the FWC pursuant to s 789FF(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 is directed to stopping future bullying behaviour.[35] Section 789FF(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 has also been held to confer, upon the FWC, a wide discretion in relation to the types of orders that the FWC can make, which is not limited to stop bullying orders, but can also include orders which have a rational connection to the jurisdiction with the only prohibition being orders for monetary compensation to be payable to an applicant.[36]
  1. [48]
    In the absence of full argument, my preliminary view is that if Mr Wilkins is able to satisfy me that he has been bullied in the workplace, including by way of the direction given to him on 16 June 2020 (and as confirmed by the letter to him dated 17 June 2020) not to attend work and to take personal leave, and that there is a risk he will continue to be bullied in the workplace upon his return, then given the broad power conferred by s 275(2) of the Act, it may be that I would exercise discretion to make orders which may include an order to effect that Mr Wilkins is to return to the workplace.

Conclusion

  1. [49]
    For the reasons given above, I am not satisfied that further proceedings by the Commission, in respect of the Wilkins' application, are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.  The Council's application, that Mr Wilkins' application be dismissed pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Act, is dismissed.
  1. [50]
    Mr Wilkins' application will be mentioned on a date to be fixed.

Orders

  1. [51]
    I make the following orders:
  1. The Respondent's application, to dismiss the Applicant's application pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, is dismissed.
  1. The Applicant's application be mentioned on a date to be fixed.

Footnotes

[1] Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 rr 8-15.

[2] The affidavit of Gary George Wilkins sworn on 1 July 2020 ('Mr Wilkins' affidavit'), paras. 10-13.

[3] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, paras. 32a and 32b.

[4] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, paras. 32c and 33a.

[5] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, para. 32d.

[6] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, para. 33b.

[7] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, paras. 36-38.

[8] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, para. 39a.

[9] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, para. 39b.

[10] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, para. 39b.

[11] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, para. 41.

[12] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, paras. 46-54.

[13] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, paras. 55-66.

[14] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, para. 42.

[15] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 13.

[16] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 14, page 15.

[17] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, paras. 46-54.

[18] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 15.

[19] [2019] ICQ 18; (2019) 291 IR 171 ('Campbell').

[20] Ibid [2]-[6].

[21] Ibid [42].

[22] Footnote omitted.

[23] Campbell (n 19), [32].

[24] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 14, page 9.

[25] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 14, page 12.

[26] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 14, page 12.

[27] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 14, page 13.

[28] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 14, page 13.

[29] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 14, page 12.

[30] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 14, page 15.

[31] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 14, page 16.

[32] Mr Wilkins' affidavit, Exhibit GGW 14, page 14.

[33] Industrial Relations Legislative Reform Reference Group, A Review of the Industrial Relations Framework in Queensland, (Report dated December 2015) 85-87.

[34] South Eastern Sydney Local Health District v Lal [2019] FWCFB 1475; (2019) 285 IR 355, [24] (Vice President Hatcher, Deputy President Sams and Commissioner Hampton.

[35] Ibid [21]-[23].

[36] Obatoki v Malle Track Health and Community Services [2015] FWCFB 1661; (2015) 249 IR 135, [18] (Vice President Catanzariti, Deputy President Smith and Commissioner Blair).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Wilkins v Council of the City of Gold Coast

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Wilkins v Council of the City of Gold Coast

  • MNC:

    [2020] QIRC 172

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Merrell DP

  • Date:

    01 Oct 2020

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.
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