Loading...
Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

Eumundi Group Hotels Pty Ltd v Valuer-General

 

[2020] QLC 37

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

PARTIES:

Eumundi Group Hotels Pty Ltd v Valuer-General [2020] QLC 37

Eumundi Group Hotels Pty Ltd

ACN 893 413 454
(appellant)

 

v

Valuer-General

(respondent)

FILE NO:

LVA269-18

DIVISION:

General Division

PROCEEDING:

Appeal under s 155 of the Land Valuation Act 2010 against objection decision

DELIVERED ON:

13 November 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARD ON:

HEARD AT:

24, 25, 26 June 2020 & 10 September 2020

Brisbane

MEMBER:

WA Isdale

ORDER:

  1. Appeal LVA269-18 is allowed.
  1. The valuation as at 1 October 2017 of Lot 5 on RP196821, Property ID 444294 having an area of 8,944 m2 and located at 161 Cotlew Street, Ashmore is Four Million and Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($4,500,000).

CATCHWORDS

REAL PROPERTY – VALUATION OF LAND – OBJECTIONS AND APPEALS – QUEENSLAND – where appellant objects to valuation – where the site value is the basis of valuation – where there was agreement between the parties the appeal should be allowed – where the Court was asked to decide the correct valuation – whether assumptions made by the quantity surveyors are assumed facts – whether the appellant’s valuer could rely on the quantity surveying evidence without investigating the actual site conditions – where the sales relied on by the appellant’s expert valuer were further removed in time from the date of valuation than the sales relied by the respondent’s expert valuer – where the respondent’s expert valuer defined the highest and best use of the site with greater particularity than the appellant’s expert valuer.

Land Valuation Act 2010, ch 4

Finlayson & Anor v Valuer-General (2013) 74 QLCR 101, cited

Valuer-General v Body Corporate for the Tennyson Reach Community Title Scheme 39925 [2018] QLAC 7, cited

NR and PG Tow v Valuer-General (1978) 5 QLRC 378, cited

Hans and Else Grahn v Valuer-General (1992-93) 14 QLCR 327, cited

PH Clough v Valuer-General (1981-82) 8 QLCR 70, cited

Fairfax v Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2005] QLC 11, cited

Appeals against determinations of Valuer-General – Shire of Kolan (1977) 4 QLCR 206, cited

Macarthur Central Shopping Centre Pty Ltd as TTE v Valuer-General (No. 2) (2016) 37 QLCR 443, cited

Sentinel Homemaker 2 Pty Ltd as T’te v Valuer-General [2018] QLC 47, cited

APPEARANCES:

DD Purcell, instructed by Colin Biggers and Paisley Lawyers for the appellant.

JP Hastie, instructed by the Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy, In-House Legal.

Background

  1. [1]
    The respondent carried out a routine valuation of this land as at 1 October 2017. The basis of the valuation is its site value, a term defined by the Land Valuation Act 2010 (“the Act”).[1]
  2. [2]
    The Land has an area of 8,944m2 and is described as lot 5 on RP196821. It has the property ID 444294 and is located at 161 Cotlew Street, Ashmore.
  3. [3]
    The respondent valued the site at $3,800,000 as at 1 October 2017.
  4. [4]
    The appellant objected to this valuation and the objection process took place. The decision on objection was that the valuation remained, unchanged, at $3,800,000.
  5. [5]
    The appellant exercised its appeal rights under s 155 of the Act to institute the present appeal to this Court.
  6. [6]
    The appellant’s estimate of value in the notice of appeal was $2,800,000.
  7. [7]
    The Court case-managed the appeal and the valuer for each party contributed to the joint valuers’ expert report.
  8. [8]
    The valuer for the appellant, Mr Ladewig, came to the opinion that the site value was $3,000,000.
  9. [9]
    The respondent’s valuer, Mr Bale, concluded that the site value was $4,500,000.
  10. [10]
    At the hearing, the respondent accepted the $3,800,000 valuation was incorrect.
  11. [11]
    The nature of the appeal is set out in s 169 of the Act. The hearing is limited to the grounds of the appeal, which is by way of a rehearing.
  12. [12]
    The onus is on the appellant to prove its case.[2]

The two-step process

  1. [13]
    The structure of the appeal process is that the Court must first determine whether or not the totality of the evidence before it shows that the decision on objection is in error. If so, the onus of proof is discharged. That is the first step. If so, the Court will proceed under s 170 (b) of the Act to change the valuation so that it is correct.[3] This is the second step.
  2. [14]
    The parties agreed that, since the respondent conceded that the decision on objection was incorrect, the first step requirement had been met and the Court was required to proceed with the second step.

Resolving the dispute

  1. [15]
    Both parties proceeded on the basis that the Court should resolve the dispute; that is, find the correct value as required by s 170(b), by preferring the opinion of one of the valuers over the other.

The Court’s approach

  1. [16]
    The Land Court is not an inquisitorial body. It must consider the evidence which the parties put before it in the exercise of their choice as to how they present their respective cases.[4]
  2. [17]
    The Court is bound by the decisions of the Land Appeal Court. That Court said, in NR and PG Tow v Valuer-General, that:

“Courts of the highest authority have laid down the best test of value is to be found in the sales of comparable properties, preferably unimproved, on the open market round about the relevant date of valuation and between prudent and willing, but not over-anxious parties.”[5]

  1. [18]
    In Hans and Else Grahn v Valuer-General, the Land Appeal Court considered the previous Act. The Court’s comments in that case are equally applicable to the matters considered under the current Act. The Court said:

“The decision of the High Court of Australia in Brisbane City Council v The Valuer-General ((1978) 140 CLR 141, 5 QLCR 283) and the decisions of the Land Appeal Court in cases such as WM and TJ Fischer v The Valuer-General ((1983) 9 QLCR 44) and R and MM Barnwell v The Valuer-General ((1989 13 QLCR 13) are authority for the following propositions:

(a) It is desirable that valuations made for the purposes of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 of comparable lands should bear proper relativity, one to the other, so long as the valuations are soundly based. It is, however, untenable to adopt a value for one parcel on relativity with another which has no sound basis (R and MM Barnwell v The Valuer-General (1989) 13 QLCR 13, at p. 16 and cases cited in it).

(b) The best basis for assessment of unimproved value is the use of sales of vacant or lightly improved parcels of land (WM and TJ Fisher v The Valuer-General (1983) 9 QLCR 44, at p. 46; R and MM Barnwell v The Valuer-General (1989) 13 QLCR 13, at p. 17).

(e) Whilst maintenance of correct relativity is of considerable importance for rating valuations, the use of the principle of relativity should not be preferred to the exclusion of relevant (even if not ideal) sales evidence (WM and TJ Fischer v The Valuer General (1983) 9 QLCR 44, at p. 46).

(f) If possible, the Valuer-General should obtain uniformity between different blocks in the same land category or type, but should do so (preferably by reference to sales of comparable land) by correcting inaccuracies rather than by making an inaccurate assessment in order to secure uniform error (R and MM Barnwell v The Valuer-General (1989) 13 QLCR 13, at pp. 16-17 and cases cited in it).”[6]

  1. [19]
    The words of the Land Appeal Court at (b) above, are particularly apposite in the present case. The sales of vacant or lightly improved sales of comparable parcels of land will be likely to allow the most reliable comparisons to be made. The Land Appeal Court made this very clear in PH Clough v Valuer-General where it said:

“It has been judicially laid down many times and in many jurisdictions that in ascertaining unimproved value, sales of unimproved land of comparable quality, situation, etc., to the subject parcel, if they are available, are to be preferred as the best guide for arriving at the unimproved value. The reason is obvious. In applying such sales there is no room for error in analyzing the value of improvements.

Because there is less room for difference of opinion as to the value of the various items of improvement and comparison is thus simpler, it has been held that highly improved sales should be avoided in preference to sales comprising a lesser degree of improvement.

In Tooheys’ case and Jowett’s case the method of ascertaining the improved value of the subject property and deducting the value of the improvements therefrom was adversely criticized. Whilst in some cases it may be appropriate to adopt the method, it seems to us that in the majority of cases it introduces additional items to value each of which can be the subject of a difference of opinion and thus increase not only the work load of the valuer and the Courts but also the difficulties and uncertainties of arriving at a reasonable correct unimproved value.”[7]

  1. [20]
    Assuming that comparable sales are available, sales evidence will provide a reliable basis of comparison. The sales are required to meet a test, known as the Spencer test.
  2. [21]
    As the learned President said in Fairfax v Department of Natural Resources and Mines:

“The principles for determination of the "market value" of land were established by the High Court in Spencer v The Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418. In that case, the High Court found that the value of land is determined by the price that a willing but not overanxious buyer would pay to a willing but not over-anxious seller, both of whom are aware of all the circumstances which might affect the value of the land, either advantageously or prejudicially, including its situation, character, quality, proximity to conveniences or inconveniences, its surrounding facilities, the then present demand for land and the likelihood of a rise or fall in the value of the property. (See Griffith CJ at 432 and Isaacs J at 441).

It has been well established that the unimproved value of land is ascertained by reference to prices that have been paid for similar parcels of land. In Waterhouse v The Valuer General (1927) 8 LGR (NSW) 137 at 139, Pike J said that:

"Land in my opinion differs in no way from any other commodity. It certainly is more difficult to ascertain the market value of it but - as with other commodities - the best way to ascertain the market value is by finding what lands comparable to the subject land were bringing in the market on the relevant date - and that is evidenced by sales."”[8]

  1. [22]
    What is required to determine value is a hypothetical sale where the parties to it each have perfect knowledge of everything affecting the land’s value. When using sales of other land for comparison the need to make allowance for improvements provides scope for error. The more adjustment made, the larger the potential for error.
  2. [23]
    An illustration is found in the decision of the learned President in a case concerning the value of lands used for sugar cane production. The President said:

“One of the few items in any way common to the cases presented by the parties respectively for my consideration is the approach of the valuers to their task of ascertaining unimproved value. Both have applied sales which, in their respective opinions, embrace properties comparable to the selected properties. Their choice of sales varies, but in the absence of sales of unimproved land they have of necessity had to undertake the analysis of sales of improved properties.

The difficulty of analysing sales of improved properties, especially highly improved properties, has often been the subject of judicial comment. When there are many and varied improvements including as in the subject cases, crops, cane stools and multifarious items of plant, the possibility of error or mis-description leading to the adoption by the analysing valuer of an unreal market value for any particular item is increased and such errors or misdescriptions compound to adversely affect accuracy of the ultimate analysed land value derivable from the sale in question. The ascertainment of the correct age and state of maintenance or condition of an improvement or item of plant at sale date, the care and time taken by the valuer in arriving at its fair replacement cost at the relevant date and the fairness of the rate of depreciation applied or the “spot on” second hand market value allotted, are all factors affecting the reasonableness of the result and afford a fruitful ground for skilled counsel in cross-examination.”[9]

  1. [24]
    The difficulty was also noted by the learned President more recently. The President said:

“It is well established that analysis of comparable sales, preferably of vacant or lightly improved land, is the preferred method for determining market value. The comparable sales method necessarily involves some element of subjective judgment in comparing the comparable sale to the subject site. The greater the differences between the properties, the greater the reliance on evaluative judgment and the less confidence the Court can have in inferences drawn from the analysis.”[10] (citations omitted)

The grounds of appeal

  1. [25]
    The grounds of appeal serve to frame the dispute. They are:
  1. The site value as assessed is not supported by property sales and is excessive having regard to comparable property sales.
  2. The site value does not reflect the physical and legal characteristics of the land and/or constraints on the use of the land.
  3. The assessed site value does not achieve or preserve uniformity of value between the assessed site value and the valuations of other comparable parcels.
  4. The Valuer-General’s valuation:
  1. is excessive;
  2. is not supported by sales evidence;
  3. is based on fundamentally erroneous methodology; and
  4. fails to take account of other factors which ought to be taken account of, including but not limited to those factors identified in Ground 2 and 4.

Conduct of the appeal

  1. [26]
    The evidence was heard over three days. It was conveniently grouped into quantity-surveying evidence and valuation evidence. The valuers provided a joint expert report, exhibit 7 and gave their evidence concurrently. Quantity surveying reports obtained by the respondent from Mr Malcom Davidson, now deceased, of Turner and Townsend, became exhibits 1 and 2.
  2. [27]
    A joint expert report from the quantity surveyors was provided by Mr Michael Gilligan of Rider Levett Bucknall and Mr David Liddle of Turner and Townsend. This became exhibit 3.
  3. [28]
    The quantity surveyors also gave their evidence concurrently.

The issues

  1. [29]
    The parties each expressed their list of issues in dispute somewhat differently. This is not indicative of any difference in their understanding of the case but only of their robustly individual choice of words.
  2. [30]
    For the appellant, it was put that there are three primary issues:
    1. the selection of the comparable sales evidence;
    2. the analysis of that evidence;
    3. the application of that evidence, including the adjustments to be made with respect to the market and the characteristics of the sales.[11]
  3. [31]
    On behalf of the respondent, it was submitted that the three critical issues are:
  1. the competing valuation methodologies used by the valuers;
  2. the identification of the highest and best use of the land;
  3. the selection of sales to be used for comparison.[12]

The quantity surveying evidence

  1. [32]
    Before considering the valuation evidence, it is necessary to examine the quantity-surveying evidence since it was used in arriving at a value of the land. In order to understand the quantity-surveying evidence, it is useful to have an appreciation of the subject land.

The land

  1. [33]
    The land – the site – is nearly rectangular with a slightly truncated south-west corner.[13] It has 120 metres of frontage to Currumburra Road and around 70 metres to Cotlew street, both major four lane roads.[14] It has main road exposure and unrestricted site access.[15]

The improvements

  1. [34]
    It is improved with a tavern and associated facilities for the sale of alcoholic beverages.[16]

The brief to the quantity surveyors

  1. [35]
    The quantity surveyors were instructed to prepare a joint report. Relevantly, their instructions were:
    1. “The quantity surveying experts are instructed to prepare a report in relation to the hypothetical site works and other development works to be considered at 161 Cotlew Street, Ashmore …
    2. The purpose of the exercise to be undertaken by the quantity surveyors is:
    1. (a)
      to create a benched, near level, developed site upon which a parking area containing the same number of carparks as currently exist on the Subject Property could be constructed (including boundary retention works to the Cotlew Street and Currumburra Road boundaries of the Subject Property); and
    2. (b)
      to ensure that the Subject Property is similar and consistent with the comparable sales sites contained in the Valuer-General's quantity surveyor's report filed on 3 June 2019.”[17]
  2. [36]
    After consulting with the valuers, the quantity surveyors were asked to consider three alternative site development scenarios in their report. They are:
  1. bringing a part of the subject site to a flat and level condition;[18]
  2. bringing the whole site to a flat and level condition;[19]
  3. bringing the whole site to a split-level flat platform.[20]
  1. [37]
    In order to prepare their report, the quantity surveyors were instructed to make a number of assumptions. The number is 17. These are set out in their report as follows:

“The quantity surveyors are instructed to assume that:

  1. the highest and best use of the Subject Property is the current use of the Subject Property (ie for retail);
  2. the proposed works would be allowed by the Gold Coast City Council;
  3. works required to connect services to the Subject Property will be necessary consistent with the analysis of the comparable sales sites contained in the Valuer-General's quantity surveyor's report filed on 3 June 2019 (including, for example, 406 Ashmore Road, Benowa; 6-16 Logandowns Drive and 14-16 Nestor Drive, Meadowbrook; 1 Marina Quays, Hope Island, 383 Southport-Nerang Road, Molendinar and 74-76 Hillview Parade, Ashmore);
  4. to the extent that cutting and filling is required, those works will be cut to fill and cut to spoil earthworks consistent with the analysis of the comparable sales sites contained in the Valuer-General's quantity surveyor's report filed on 3 June 2019 (including, for example, 406 Ashmore Road, Benowa and 74-76 Hillview Parade, Ashmore);
  5. travelators and lifts required for the split platforms levels to the Subject Property will be consistent with the analysis of the comparable sales sites contained in the Valuer-General's quantity surveyor's report filed on 3 June 2019 (including, for example, 1 Marina Quays, Hope Island, and 2 Norris Street, Pacific Pines);
  6. driveway crossovers to Cotlew Street and Currumburra Road will be required to be consistent with the analysis of the comparable sales sites contained in the Valuer-General's quantity surveyor's report filed on 3 June 2019 (including, for example, 6-16 Logandowns Drive and 14-16 Nestor Drive, Meadowbrook; 1 Marina Quays, Hope Island, 383 Southport-Nerang Road, Molendinar; 74-76 Hillview Parade, Ashmore and 2 Norris Street, Pacific Pines);
  7. an allowance for appropriate preliminaries, margin, contingency and professional fees should be made consistent with the analysis of the comparable sales sites contained in the Valuer-General's quantity surveyor's report filed on 3 June 2019 (including, for example, 406 Ashmore Road, Benowa; 6-16 Logandowns Drive and 14-16 Nestor Drive, Meadowbrook; 383 Southport-Nerang Road, Molendinar; 74-76 Hillview Parade, Ashmore and 2 Norris Street, Pacific Pines);
  8. the costs identified should be escalated/de-escalated as appropriate to the date of valuation (being 1 October 2017);
  9. where excavation is required, that no excavation in rock will be required and no allowance for excavation in rock is required;
  10. no allowance is required to be made for demolition of the existing improvements (as a consequence of the exercise required by the Land Valuation Act 2010 (Qld), the existing improvements are taken not to have been constructed);
  11. no allowance is required for clearing of the Subject Property;
  12. the initial RLs are the existing surface levels of the Subject Property;
  13. there is no requirement to consider setback issues;
  14. any retaining walls should be consistent with the retaining walls allowed for in the analysis of the comparable sales sites contained in the Valuer-General's quantity surveyor's report filed on 3 June 2019 (including, for example, 2 Norris Street, Pacific Pines and 1 Marina Quays, Hope Island);
  15. subject to paragraph 5(m)[sic – 9(n)], there is no restriction on the types and appearance of any retaining wall necessary;
  16. no retaining walls require special engineering to deal with site specific conditions or adjacent properties; and
  17. the new levels do not create any stormwater issues.”[21]
  1. [38]
    Assumptions (b), (i), (m) and (q) command attention. The contours of this site are such that the existing improvements are located between 2 and 4 metres below the level of the roads to which the land has frontage.
  2. [39]
    Of the three scenarios considered, number one was less about cut to fill and more about creating a car park area.[22] The balanced cut-to-fill concept, which was used, describes using machinery to move earth within the site in order to cut where necessary and use that earth to fill where needed in order to achieve useful levels.[23]
  3. [40]
    Asked about the assumptions made in relation to the cut-to-fill exercise, the following exchange occurred:

“MR HASTIE: Now, in terms of specifically focussing on that balance cut to fill exercise, you obviously then costed the undertaking of that exercise. Can you tell the court whether there were any assumptions involved in the costing of that exercise.

MR LIDDLE: In terms of the specific cut to fill exercise?

MR HASTIE: Yes, specifically about that, yes.

MR LIDDLE: Okay. There were a number of assumptions. One - the first ground which we just described is to try and establish a balance on the site to keep the economics as good as possible because obviously when you cut to fill and don't have to remove or import, that is the most economic solution. So it was the first assumption that it would be balanced. The second was the retaining walls that are created by cutting the site or filling the site should be no more than four metres high, being of course another very economic height as a maximum. And the third probably most crucial assumption is that we can reuse the soil that we cut in a fill situation which sometimes it could be contaminations or rock that can't be reused, but in this scenario we assume that we could reuse all of the soil that we cut to fill.

MR GILLIGAN: And I agree with those comments.

MR HASTIE: Thank you. Now, just fixing on that final assumption you have identified about the ability to reuse the soil, it's the case, isn't it, that neither of you have any actual knowledge of the soil conditions on the site.

MR LIDDLE: Correct.

MR GILLIGAN: That's correct.

MR HASTIE: So that's an assumption which you have both made. I am not asking you to give any figures in relation to this, just simply a yes or no answer, but if that assumption was incorrect, would the costings that you have arrived at in your report still be reliable and accurate?”[24]

After resolution of an objection, the question was answered:

“MR HASTIE: Gentlemen, just to remind you of the question I asked before you were asked to step outside, the question was you both agreed that you have made an assumption that the soil on the subject site is capable of being reused as part of the balance cut to fill exercise and my question was, and I will put it to you again, if that assumption about the reusability of that soil was incorrect, would the costings that you have arrived at in your report still be the same?

MR LIDDLE: Based on the - maintaining the same reduced level and the same platform level, if there was unsuitable material, there would be extra costs to deal with the unsuitable material.

MR GILLIGAN: And to bring in replacement imported material to achieve the same levels.”[25]

  1. [41]
    The quantity-surveying experts agreed that the “probably most crucial assumption” was that all the soil that is cut would be able to be used for fill. This requires that there was no contamination or rock. There was no actual knowledge of the soil conditions. If the assumption proved to be incorrect, there would be extra costs. The evidence did not illuminate what the extent of the extra costs might be since, naturally, without soil testing, there was no proper basis upon which an estimate could be made.
  2. [42]
    As has been made clear by the Land Appeal Court, neither it nor the Land Court “…may assume the role of an investigating Tribunal…”[26] The Court must work with the material that the parties chose to put before it. It will evaluate that material in order to appreciate its usefulness, or otherwise.
  3. [43]
    Part of that process is ascertaining whether it has been established that the facts, on which the opinion of an expert is based, form a proper foundation for it.[27]

Usefulness of the opinions of the quantity surveyors

  1. [44]
    The assumptions which the quantity surveyors were directed to make are in effect assumed facts. As has been seen, there are many. The “most crucial” assumption is one which, if not correct, would result in an unknown level of extra costs.
  2. [45]
    The assumptions made result in the cost assessment relating to the subject site being thereby changed to a cost assessment relating to a hypothetical, assumed, site. Although the soil conditions and, no doubt, other matters where there were assumptions made such as setback issues,[28] could have been investigated and uncertainty reduced or removed, the parties chose not to do that. That is their choice. The result however is inseparable from that choice.
  3. [46]
    Section 170(b) requires the Land Court to “correctly make the valuation under the Act.” This is not a valuation of a theoretical parcel of land but a real one.
  4. [47]
    The agreement, explicit or tacit, of the parties to make it impossible for the cost assessor to know whether the “most crucial” assumption is valid, was no doubt arrived at for what were seen as good reasons, perhaps to save costs and time. However, it cannot do anything to relieve the Court from considering that the assumptions amount to facts not established where what has to be valued is a real site and not an imaginary one with some agreed characteristics.
  5. [48]
    For these reasons, the opinions expressed by the expert quantity surveyors are not at all likely to be of assistance to the Court for present purposes, using the evidence before it to “correctly” value the actual site.

The valuation evidence

  1. [49]
    There is one other body of expert evidence before the Court, that of the valuers, who have given their opinions of the value of this site.
  2. [50]
    At a high level, there is agreement between the valuers in respect to the methodology which they applied. They stated:

“The valuation methodology adopted in assessing the site value of the subject property is by direct comparison on a $rate/m² of site area with vacant and lightly improved sales, in fee simple and accounting for any encumbrances.”[29]

  1. [51]
    This conceals more than it reveals. It is followed by many pages dealing with their disagreements.

Mr Ladewig’s approach

  1. [52]
    The approaches of the valuers differed. The methods employed can be understood, and contrasted, by reference to some passages in the transcript:

“MR HASTIE:   Gentlemen, I want to turn now to the next topic on the agenda, which is the issue of valuation methodology.  And I'll put this question to you both, but it seems apparent to me that you've both taken a fundamentally different approach in relation to the way you've valued the site in relation to site works and improvements.  And I want to start, if I can, with you, Mr Ladewig, by trying to fairly summarise your approach and you can tell me if you disagree.  But I'd suggest to you that the approach you've taken effectively has three limbs to it:  first, you've made allowances for the cost of undertaking the necessary site works that were in the mind of the purchaser for each of the sales you've relied upon. 

MR LADEWIG:   For each of the sales, in the mind of the purchaser, yes, when that's not available to [indistinct] report. 

MR HASTIE:   Exactly.  Thank you.

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.

MR HASTIE:   That's the first step in the process.  The second step in the process is you've sought to hypothetically build up the subject property using the site works identified by the quantity surveyors as part of scenario 3.

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.

MR HASTIE:   And then, finally, you've deducted the cost of the site improvements identified by the quantity surveyors as part of scenario 3 from the value that you've otherwise determined by applying the sales to the subject to arrive at an opinion about its present value.

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.

MR HASTIE:   And that's   is that a fair summary of the way in which you've gone about valuing the subject site? 

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.” [30]

“MR HASTIE:   I'd suggest to you that Mr Bale's approach involves, firstly, taking the subject in its notionally vacant but site improved state and then, secondly, valuing that site on the basis of sales without making any adjustments for site works required to those sales, except to the extent that they're not required on the subject.

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.

MR HASTIE:   You agree with that?  

MR LADEWIG:   Yes. 

MR HASTIE:   Okay.  I just wanted to ensure we're on the same page before we embarked on this discussion.  Now, you'd surely agree with me that the approach which you've taken necessarily involves the making of many more adjustments than the approach taken by Mr Bale.  That's a fair characterisation, isn't it? 

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.”[31]

  1. [53]
    Mr Ladewig was questioned in relation to the number of adjustments necessitated by his method:

“MR HASTIE:   And as a general proposition you'd agree with me, wouldn't you, that it's desirable to keep the number of adjustments you make in deriving the value of a site to a minimum? 

MR LADEWIG:   No.

MR HASTIE:   So you don't accept as a matter of valuation principle that, as a general proposition, it's desirable to keep the number of adjustments that you need to make to a minimum?  You don't accept that that's a   

MR LADEWIG:   As a general proposition, yes, but overall no.

MR HASTIE:   Overall hang on a minute.  How can you accept something as a general proposition, but not accept it on an overall basis.

MR LADEWIG:   Sure.  So as a general proposition, adjustments to made for location, size, exposure, access, are all locations necessary when comparing to the subject property.  Adjustments such as site works or non or offsite works used when purchasing an asset are very key in analysing that asset.  So that's what I mean when I say generally yes, but specifically no. 

MR HASTIE:   Well, I'll put it to you this way:  as a general proposition it would be desirable, would it not, if you're valuing as a site, as we are required to here under the Land Valuation Act in its notionally vacant but site improved state, it would be generally desirable, would it not, to find sites that were purchased with a similar level of site improvement.

MR LADEWIG:   Absolutely, yes.

MR HASTIE:   Because that then reduces the need to make adjustments and allowances for the cost of site works.

MR LADEWIG:   Correct.

MR HASTIE:   And it's desirable to avoid that, isn't it, generally speaking? 

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.”[32]

  1. [54]
    Mr Ladewig provided a more detailed explanation of his valuation method in the following exchange with counsel:

“MR HASTIE:   And indeed each time I suggest to you that each time it's necessary to make those adjustments, as you have here, it's necessary for you to bring your own subjective judgment and opinion to bear in the making of each of those adjustments?  That's right, isn't it? 

MR LADEWIG:   Can you be specific about the adjustments you're talking about? 

MR HASTIE:   Well, in terms of the adjustments for site works.  That is, adjusting all of the sales for the site works you've identified either in the mind of the purchaser or the quantity surveyor, or and then, on the other hand, making similar adjustments to that is, with the adoption of scenario 3.  All of the adjustments made both to the sales and to the subject each involve the need for you to bring your own subjective judgment and opinion to bear, doesn't it  or don't they, I should say.

MR LADEWIG:   On the sale properties it's my job to look at the site characteristics as part of my valuation and to identify the costs to bring that sale to a comparative level to the subject property.  I think I've done that for my sales.  Now, in regards to the subject property, which is the second part of your question, I think it is my job as a valuer to look at the cost to bring the subject property to a comparative level to my sales in order to make a proper valuation.  Now, the reason that we do this as valuers because, as you rightly pointed out, not every site is identical.  Sites have different falls.  They have different offsite works.  They have different upgrades that the subject property may or may not have.  So if you can bring the sales to a similar level being flat, retained, similar access and the cost to do that is an important thing when we do the exact same thing to the subject property.  Without doing that, then I am effectively guessing or using a subjective approach to say, "Well, this this site's falls by circa two to three metres, maybe half.  This one has a data (sic) bank here.  They're somewhat comparable," and I'll just make my subjective judgment.  If I have the details and the documentation to form my analysis, I think that's the most effective and objective way to do that.

MR HASTIE:   All right.  Well, I'd suggest to that one of the judgments which you needed to make as part of the methodology you've adopted is to select one of the scenarios identified by the quantity surveyors which you thought was the most appropriate.

MR LADEWIG:   Correct. 

MR HASTIE:   And in your exercise of judgment as a valuer, you've selected scenario 3; that's right? 

MR LADEWIG:   That is right. …”[33]

  1. [55]
    As to why he chose scenario three, Mr Ladewig said:

“MR HASTIE:   And I'd suggest to you that, in seeking to do that, that you've identified the scenario which, in your opinion, beared (sic) the best comparison to the sales evidence you've identified.

MR LADEWIG:   Well, no.  With this is a quite a big it's a big question.

MR HASTIE:   I'm just asking you in the general sense.  That in terms of the process of judgment you went through when selecting which scenario you thought was appropriate, you've sought to select the one which you thought best reflected your sales evidence.

MR LADEWIG:   Well, no, I   

MR HASTIE:   That you were seeking to do.

MR LADEWIG:   Well, no.  My sales evidence is both suspended slab, slab on ground and over a general single level.  The reason I chose scenario 3 is because it was less costly than scenario 2.  If I'd adopted scenario 2, along with Mr Bale, it would have reduced the current value of the subject site.  It would have gone from three mill to, say, 2.9, because there's about a hundred grand difference in the cost to bring it to that level.  So that's why I chosen (sic) scenario 3 in that regard.

MR HASTIE:   Right.  So your evidence is that you didn't select scenario 3 because you thought it best aligned with the sales evidence;  you selected it because it was cheaper.

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.  I don't see any cost difference between, as I said, a 30 per cent, give or take, slab on ground, singlelevel site and a 40 per cent, as we discussed before, give or take, site cover with partly suspended building, with parking underneath.  Now, this is   

MR HASTIE:   Just can I come back bring you back to the question.  I said   

MR LADEWIG:   Yeah.

MR HASTIE:      "Did you select scenario 3 because it best mirrored your sales evidence or did you select scenario 3 because you thought it was the most costeffective of the three scenarios?"

MR LADEWIG:   Both. 

MR LADEWIG:   Yeah.

MR HASTIE:   Both. 

MR HASTIE:   So it was partly because you thought it best reflected your sales evidence? 

MR LADEWIG:   Well, it it's   

MR HASTIE:   Was it partly that?  Yes or no.  It's a simple question.

MR LADEWIG:   As sorry, as I just answered, I don't I didn't see a difference between the the two.  I don't see a difference between my sales and the subject property.  So I I can't answer that yes or no.

MR HASTIE:   All three scenarios are different, aren't they? 

MR LADEWIG:   They are, yes.

MR HASTIE:   And you said when I said to you, "What informed your selection of scenario 3"   

MR LADEWIG:   Yeah.

MR HASTIE:      "which was a matter of judgment on your part," you said that it was informed both by the fact that it was cheaper than the other scenario or the cheaper than scenario 2.

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.

MR HASTIE:   And it best mirrored your sales evidence.

MR LADEWIG:   Both I think both scenarios mirrored my sales evidence the same.

MR HASTIE:   Right.  So the true position, therefore, is that or your evidence is now that, realistically, the choice between scenario 2 or 3 was not informed at all about an attempt to replicate which was on your sales.

MR LADEWIG:   No, that's not true at all.  It it was exactly informed by sales.

MR HASTIE:   Well   

MR LADEWIG:   But it was just more costeffective to do scenario 3 than scenario 2.

MR HASTIE:   That's what I'm asking, Mr Ladewig.

MR LADEWIG:   Sorry, I   

MR HASTIE:   Was the choice between scenario 2 and scenario 3 one solely informed by cost or one informed by cost and an effort to mirror what was on the sales.

MR LADEWIG:   Okay.  Cost.

MR HASTIE:   Cost only? 

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.”[34]

  1. [56]
    This Court must keep in mind the words of the Land Appeal Court in PH Clough v Valuer-General, which were quoted earlier.[35] Mr Ladewig adjusted the sales to bring them to a “comparative level” to the subject property. Then he considered the cost to bring the subject property “to a comparative level to my sales.” Going on to give his reason for this, it relates to sales. It must be observed that once sales are adjusted to improve their comparability to the subject land, it is unnecessary, and a logical impossibility, to adjust the subject land to better compare with sales that have already been adjusted to better compare with it.
  2. [57]
    Mr Ladewig was of the opinion that scenarios 2 and 3 equally mirror his sales evidence. He adopted scenario 3 as it was cheaper. Had he used scenario 2, it would have, in his opinion, reduced the value of the site by about $100,000. As he is of the view that both scenarios equally reflect the sales evidence and has rejected scenario 2 because it would have reduced the site value, it would be helpful if he expressed a view as to which value would be correct, as required to be found by s 170(b) . This did not occur, however.
  3. [58]
    Mr Ladewig was taken to the quantity surveying material. He helped produce the instructions to those experts and was aware of the 17 assumptions that they were instructed to make.[36] He agreed that if any of the assumptions were incorrect, his valuation would be incorrect.[37] He also agreed that there are so many assumptions that the approach taken suffers from some uncertainty.[38] There was no disagreement that the value of the 359m2 drainage easement should be 20% less than the unaffected land.
  4. [59]
    Mr Ladewig’s method has considerable complexity and the resultant scope for error is very significant. The scope is quantified by the step of hypothetically conducting siteworks on the subject land and deducting the estimated costs of that to arrive at the site value.
  5. [60]
    Further difficulty in accepting that this approach could be relied on “to correctly make the valuation”, as s 170(b) of the Act requires, is the choice between scenarios 2 and 3 having been made, as was eventually conceded, wholly on the basis of cost rather than in an effort to mirror the sales. This is a departure from the method claimed to have been applied and must contaminate the conclusion drawn in relation to value.
  6. [61]
    Mr Ladewig proceeded on the basis that if he had adopted scenario 2 it would have reduced the site value from $3 million to “say 2.9, because there’s about a hundred grand difference in the cost to bring it to that level. So this is why I chosen (sic) scenario in that regard.”[39]
  7. [62]
    The choice of scenarios was not made in order to arrive at the correct value, but for an incorrect and irrelevant purpose. This has invalidated the choice. The evidence does not allow the Court to safely attempt to correct this error and deduce a correct value by making a, say, $100,000 adjustment since Mr Ladewig has not given an opinion regarding which scenario will produce a correct value, and such a change as is presently being considered would not be supported by the evidence but would amount to the Court itself giving an opinion.

Conclusion on Mr Ladwig’s valuation approach

  1. [63]
    Mr Ladewig’s opinion of the site value depends on a complex method and is fatally flawed by his criterion for choice of which scenario to apply. The Court could not, for the reasons which have been given, be satisfied that his approach could produce the correct site value.
  2. [64]
    It remains to consider the evidence of Mr Bale, the valuer called by the respondent.

Mr Bale’s approach

  1. [65]
    Mr Bale’s valuation approach was concisely explained in a brief exchange between Mr Ladewig and counsel:

“MR HASTIE:   I'd suggest to you that Mr Bale's approach involves, firstly, taking the subject in its notionally vacant but site improved state and then, secondly, valuing that site on the basis of sales without making any adjustments for site works required to those sales, except to the extent that they're not required on the subject. 

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.

MR HASTIE:   You agree with that? 

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.”[40]

Differences in the valuers’ approaches

  1. [66]
    Land is valued in accordance with its highest and best use. In their joint report, the valuers state:

“Agreed by the Parties

99. Highest and best use is defined by the Australian Property Institute (API) as; “The most probable use of a property which is physically possible, appropriately justified, legally permissible and financially feasible, and which results in the highest value of the property being valued”.

100. Both valuers agree, the highest and best use of the subject is a commercial/retail use in line with the current use, however (sic) not to be limited in scale, density, and / or design.”[41]

  1. [67]
    As Jacobs J said in Adelaide Classic Holidays Pty Ltd v Minister for Water Resources:

“The first task of the valuer is to determine what that use is and then to value the land on that basis.”[42]

  1. [68]
    Mr Ladewig saw a very wide range of retail uses as the same for his purposes. For instance, a bottle shop, a “pub”, a supermarket or a neighbourhood shopping centre were effectively, in his opinion, the same, a retail use.[43] Pressed on this, he maintained that view even while making concessions inconsistent with it. Notably, he conceded that the price to be paid for sites such as this would be informed by a feasibility study of a proposed development.[44] He did not do any such study.[45]
  2. [69]
    He is accordingly unable to determine the highest and best use of the land more clearly than the very broad category of commercial/retail use.
  3. [70]
    This has an obvious consequence in relation to the choice of sales said to be comparable properties. The more closely comparable the sales are to the subject site, the more valid and reliable the valuation opinion is able to be.
  4. [71]
    Mr Bale’s opinion of the highest and best use of the site is demonstrated in this exchange with counsel:

“WITNESS BALE:   The highest and best use that I’ve adopted in agreement with Mr Ladewig was the retail commercial or commercial retail use in line with the existing uses on the site.

MR PURCELL:   And then what utility then, Mr Bale, does your comparison between other hotel tavern type uses have for the subject site?

WITNESS BALE:   I believe it has relevance. 

MR PURCELL:   Well, what relevance does it have?

WITNESS BALE:   It looks to immediately competing taverns and where they’re located in regard to the subject site, it has an already established catchment which it occupies.  And, also, in respect of the utility or the exposure and situation on two arterial roads, that catchment is further expanded by virtue of people coming to and from work that would pass that site and would potentially use its services.

MR PURCELL:   But what is the utility of that assessment in circumstances where he said is useful in circumstances in which that is not the highest and best use of the land as you put it?

WITNESS BALE:   Well, I believe it is the highest and best use of the land.

MR PURCELL:   Okay.  I want to drill down on this Because (sic) that's what I'm trying to get to.  So the tavern drive through facility, which is the retail commercial use, is it the highest and best use of land as you see it?

WITNESS BALE:   That is correct.”[46]

  1. [72]
    Mr Bale’s view of the highest and best use has commonality with Mr Ladewig’s view in relation to it being a retail or commercial use but adds a level of specificity with the words “in line with the existing uses on the site.” The tavern and drive through bottleshop that already occupy the site are identified as the specific highest and best use. Where such precision is possible, it will assist in the valuation task. It is a sub-set of the much broader category from which Mr Ladewig drew comparable sales. The correct choice here is a question of fact for the Court to decide.
  2. [73]
    While Mr Bale’s identification of the highest and best use with some precision is desirable, neither valuer was able to point to any sale of land bought for use as a tavern.

Conclusion on Mr Bale’s valuation approach

  1. [74]
    This leads to a consideration of the sales evidence. Before doing that, however, it may be concluded that Mr Bale’s approach to the identification of the highest and best use is an appropriate one, in accord with principle. There is no reason to reject it. In view of the conclusion that Mr Ladewig’s approach could not produce the correct site value, this conclusion in respect to Mr Bale’s approach will justify proceeding to ascertain the correct value based on it.

The sales evidence

  1. [75]
    Having concluded that Mr Ladewig’s approach cannot be accepted and that Mr Bale’s approach is a correct one, the Court would be able to accept the only the body of soundly based opinion before it and conclude that the site value is that arrived at by Mr Bale.
  2. [76]
    The Court’s task of correctly making the valuation, while not always requiring it, does in a proper case, justify looking further and considering the sales relied on by the valuers in arriving at their opinions in order to ascertain what can be drawn from them and therefore the level of confidence able to be placed in opinions based on them.
  3. [77]
    The date of valuation is 1 October 2017. The date when sales took place will be relevant to their usefulness for comparison purposes, as will whether there was movement in the market between the date of sale and the date of valuation.
  4. [78]
    Mr Bale selected a basket of sales which took place relatively close to the date of valuation. They were proximate to the site, with similar services available. None were bought for the same use as the subject site but all, except for one at 383 Southport-Nerang Road, were bought for uses which could, under the town planning scheme, be carried out on the subject site.
  5. [79]
    There was a common sale, of 24,810m2 at 1 Marina Keys Boulevard, Hope Island, on 23 March 2017. Mr Bale analysed the sale to a site value of $12,395,268 from a sale price of $15,730,000. This is $500 per m2.[47]
  6. [80]
    Mr Ladewig arrived at a site value of $13,664,595. A major factor in the difference in the analysed site value is Mr Ladewig’s opinion that considerably more expensive post-sale site works would be required.[48]
  7. [81]
    Two sales relied on by Mr Ladewig are of concern due to their remoteness in time from the 1 October 2017 valuation date. The sale of 2 Norris Street, Pacific Pines took place on 29 November 2013 about 4 years before the valuation date. This was a sale for a supermarket to be built on the land.
  8. [82]
    The sale at 406 Ashmore Road, Benowa was on 19 December 2012. It was bought for development of a neighbourhood shopping centre. This sale was close to 5 years before the valuation date.
  9. [83]
    Use of these sales would depend on it being shown that the market did not move significantly in the time up to the valuation date.
  10. [84]
    Mr Ladewig was of the opinion that there was no market movement from 2012 to 2016.[49] Mr Bale’s view was that sales evidence shows that there was an increase, particularly since 2016.[50]
  11. [85]
    If these earlier sales are not useful, Mr Ladewig’s valuation would depend unacceptably on the unreliable basis of, effectively, a single sale, rather than a basket of sales that establish a reliable level of value.
  12. [86]
    The absence of market movement was fundamental to Mr Ladewig’s use of these sales upon which he valued the subject site. In Sentinel Homemaker 2 Pty Ltd as T’te v Valuer-General, this Court said:

“To summarise, the sales Mr Ladewig chose were said by him to be comparable because there was one market with stable values in respect of the sort of land he was valuing. Mr Ladewig stated this market was stable throughout the entire period between the earliest sale, in November 2012 and 1 October 2016. According to Mr Ladewig, the market was also showing the same values throughout all of Queensland during that period. This was the fundamental starting platform for his valuation. Mr Ladewig did not perform any comparison studies of paired sales or do anything else which appeared in his valuation to attempt to show the objective existence of this precondition.”[51]

  1. [87]
    In this case, the same shortcoming was repeated. The following exchange occurred:

“MR HASTIE:   No.  I’ll put it to you in this way.  Your thesis is that there has been no market movement for a five-year period in the Gold Coast market for retail and commercial properties.  That’s your thesis, isn’t it?

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.

MR HASTIE:   And I’ve asked you to take the court to where in your report you explain that thesis by reference to the sales.

MR LADEWIG:   Okay.  I don’t.  No.”[52]

  1. [88]
    This is a second basis upon which the Court must find that Mr Ladewig’s valuation is unpersuasive and of no assistance to its task.
  2. [89]
    It is useful to compare three of Mr Bale’s sales:
  • 383 Southport-Nerang Road, Molendinar, sold on 14 July 2016;
  • 285 Nerang Street, Southport, sold on 18 November 2016;
  • 74-76 Hillview Parade, Ashmore, sold on 7 February 2017.[53]

These are within about 15 months of the valuation date. With the exception of 383 Southport-Nerang Road, they were purchased for uses that were permitted on the subject site. There were, as has been mentioned, no sales for the purpose of a tavern. The chosen sales have relative proximity of location to the subject and sale dates proximate in time to the valuation date. Clearly imperfect matches, they are nonetheless comparable.

The common sale

  1. [90]
    As has been referred to already, the valuers disagreed in their analysis of the only common sale, 1 Marina Keys Boulevard, Hope Island. The sale was on 23 March 2017
  2. [91]
    The valuer’s differences are attributed to the information on which they relied. Mr Ladewig relied on an email dated 29 August 2020 from Mr Lennon Lin, on behalf of the purchaser. Mr Bale relied on notes of an interview between Mr Elliot, a senior valuer in the Valuer-General’s office, and Mr Lin, on behalf of the purchaser. The notes are dated 23 May 2017, some two months after the sale.
  3. [92]
    The 2017 notes recorded that Mr Lin had advised that:
  • He did not know the cost of required siteworks.[54]
  • Nothing had been paid for having agreements to lease in place. This is contained in a follow-up note dated 18 August 2017.
  • Also in that note, it is stated that the purchaser did not take the presence of infrastructure credits into account in the purchase price offered.[55]
  1. [93]
    In the 29 August 2019 email, Mr Lennon Lin stated that:
  • Approximately $200,000 for onsite earthworks and another $200,000 for external roadworks was considered by the purchaser.[56]
  • “We would typically allow…say $2-3million for the major tenant AFL” (agreements for lease).[57]
  • “Infrastructure credits of $2,339,153.75…”[58]
  1. [94]
    Mr Bale tried, without success, to resolve the conflicts. Further email contact with Mr Lin was unhelpful.[59]
  2. [95]
    Mr Ladewig relied on the 2019 email, which the Court notes is precise down to the last 75 cents.
  3. [96]
    It would be usual that such conflicts would cause the parties, legally represented as they are, to ensure that both Mr Lin and Mr Elliot were called to give evidence. This did not happen. Neither was there any explanation of why, for instance, it might not have been possible for one or the other to be called to give evidence.
  4. [97]
    There is no safe basis upon which the Court could accept one version or the other of what was attributed to Mr Lin.
  5. [98]
    Some assistance may be gained from the following passage in the transcript:

“MR HASTIE:   So it’s fair to say that if it wasn’t for Mr Lin’s statement from the 29 August 2019 email, your analysis of this sale would have been quite different?

MR LADEWIG:   Correct.”[60]

  1. [99]
    This permits a conclusion that Mr Ladewig’s analysis of the common sale is thereby made less reliable.
  2. [100]
    The means to resolve the difficulty is suggested in the transcript:

“MR HASTIE:   Because what I’m suggesting to you is that if you’re in a situation where, because of the nature of the information you’ve got from the purchaser, that you can’t be satisfied that it’s reliable, you would then revert to the objective approach of relying upon what the quantity surveyor’s identified as the cost of siteworks?

MR LADEWIG:   Yes, yes.

MR HASTIE:   And that would be – would it not be the – your application or consideration of what Mr Davidson has identified in his report as the cost of siteworks?

MR LADEWIG:   Yes.  There’d be a couple of tweaks to that, as I do generally in regards to mobilisation, but yes, generally, yes, I’d adopt that.”[61]

  1. [101]
    The differences between accepting the advice from Mr Lin, as Mr Ladewig did, and using the quantity surveyors’ figures, as Mr Bale did, appears when their analysis of the common sale is perused.[62]
  2. [102]
    The analysis of the site works is illustrative. It shows:

Mr Bale

Judgment-Image

Mr Ladewig

Judgment-Image[63]

  1. [103]
    Because of this, greater reliance may be placed on the analysis of the common sale by Mr Bale. In the circumstances which the parties have chosen to allow to continue, this is the best that the Court is able to do.
  2. [104]
    The Court accepts the valuation approach and the opinion arrived at by Mr Bale as that is the best evidence before it. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to further examine Mr Bale’s valuation.
  3. [105]
    The conclusion is that the correct valuation of the subject site on 1 October 2017 is $4,500,000.[64]

Orders

  1. Appeal LVA269-18 is allowed.
  2. The valuation as at 1 October 2017 of Lot 5 on RP196821, Property ID 444294 having an area of 8,944m2 and located 161 Cotlew Street, Ashmore is Four Million and Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($4,500,000).

Footnotes

[1] Land Valuation Act 2010 (Qld) 17, 19.

[2] Finlayson & Anor v Valuer-General (2013) 74 QLCR 101.

[3] Valuer-General v Body Corporate for the Tennyson Reach Community Title Scheme 39925 [2018] QLAC 7 [50].

[4] Finlayson & Anor v Valuer-General (2013) 74 QLCR 101 [28].

[5]   (1978) 5 QLRC 378, 381.

[6]   (1992-93) 14 QLCR 327, 328-9.

[7]   (1981-82) 8 QLCR 70, 76.

[8]   [2005] QLC 11, [11-12].

[9] Appeals against determinations of Valuer-General – Shire of Kolan (1977) 4 QLCR 206 at 210-211.

[10] Macarthur Central Shopping Centre Pty Ltd as TTE v Valuer-General (No. 2) (2016) 37 QLCR 443, 446-447.

[11]   Appellants written submissions, 7 September 2020.

[12]   Respondent’s written submissions, 7 September 2020.

[13]   Ex 7, p 15 [50].

[14]   Ibid [51].

[15]   Ibid [52].

[16]   Ibid, p 17 [53-54].

[17]   Ex 3, p 11 [57], [59].

[18]   Ex 3 p 11 [61].

[19]   Ex 3 p 12 [61].

[20]   Ibid.

[21]   Ex 3 p 9-10 [48].

[22]   T 1 – 34 lines 42 to 47.

[23]   T 1-35 lines 11 to 22.

[24]   T 1 – 35 line 36 to T 1-36 line 20.

[25]   T 1 – 41 lines 35 to 46.

[26] J.L. and I. Qualischefski l & Ors v Valuer-General (1979) 6 QLCR 167, 172

[27] Makita v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705, 743-744.

[28]   Assumption (m).

[29]   Ex 7, p 72 [237].

[30]   T 2-60 line 30 to T2-61 line 17.

[31]   T 2-61 line 40 to T2-62 line 8.

[32]   T2 – 62 lines 10 to 46.

[33]   T 2-63 1ines 1 to 42.

[34]   T 2-64 line 5 to T 2-66 line 9.

[35]   1981-82 8 QLCR 70, 76.

[36]   T 2-66 lines 34 to 46.

[37]   T 2-70 line 20 to 23.

[38]   T 2-70 line 35 to 39.

[39]   T 2-64 line 20 to 25.

[40]   T 2-61 l 40 - T2-62 l 1

[41]   Ex 7 p 40.

[42]   (1998) 65 LGRA 410, 415.

[43]   T1-101 lines 15 to 47

[44]   T2 2-38, line 3; T 2-39, line l7.

[45]   T2-41, lines 1 to 18.

[46]   T1-94 lines 5 to 33.

[47]   Ex 7 p 111.

[48]   Ex 7 p 113.

[49]   Ex 7 p 42[124].

[50]   Ex 7 p 42 [125].

[51]   [2018] QLC 47 [19].

[52]   T 3-41 lines 30-39.

[53]   Ex 7, p 51.

[54]   Ex 7 p 127.

[55]   Ex 7 p 129.

[56]   Ex 7 p 130[7].

[57]   Ex 7 p 130 [3].

[58]   Ex 7 p 130 [8].

[59]   Ex 7 p 136-138.

[60]   T 3-76 lines 8 to 11.

[61]   T3-73 line 43 to T3-74 line 8.

[62]   Ex 7 p 117.

[63]   Ibid.

[64]   Ex 7 p 59.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Eumundi Group Hotels Pty Ltd v Valuer-General

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Eumundi Group Hotels Pty Ltd v Valuer-General

  • MNC:

    [2020] QLC 37

  • Court:

    QLC

  • Judge(s):

    WA Isdale

  • Date:

    13 Nov 2020

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.
Help

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.