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  • Unreported Judgment

Re: Ipswich City Council

 

[2020] QIRC 194

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Re: Ipswich City Council [2020] QIRC 194

PARTIES:

Ipswich City Council

(Applicant)

CASE NO:

AD/2020/62

PROCEEDING:

Application

DELIVERED ON:

17 November 2020

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

Merrell DP

On the papers

ORDERS:

  1. The Ipswich City Council is exempt from the operation of s 14, s 15, s 124 and s 127 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 in relation to the attribute in s 7(a) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991.
  1. The exemption applies only in respect of actions or omissions in relation to the advertising and recruitment of Waste Truck Drivers to be employed by the Ipswich City Council for a training program to obtain a Heavy Rigid Licence.
  1. The exemption shall apply to the Ipswich City Council for a period of three years from the date of these orders.

CATCHWORDS:

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND -DISCRIMINATION - exemptions - sex discrimination - application to grant exemption under s113(1) of the AntiDiscrimination Act 1991 so the Applicant can recruit only female waste truck drivers - exercise of discretion

HUMAN RIGHTS - whether Queensland Industrial Relations Commission acts in an administrative capacity, within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 2019, when deciding to grant exemption - whether granting of the exemption sought affects a human right within the meaning of s 15(5) of the Human Rights Act 2019 - whether decision to grant exemption is compatible with human rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act2019 - purposive interpretation of s 113(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 in a way that is compatible with human rights - application granted

LEGISLATION:

Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s 14A

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, s 7(a), s 14, s15, s 104, s 105, s 113, s 124, s 127 and s174B

Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 4, s 8, s 32 and s 38

Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic), s 83

Human Rights Act 2019, s 5, s 7, s 8, s 9, s 13, s 15, s 48 and s 58

Industrial Relations Act 1999, ch 6 and s 334

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 429, s 447 and s544

CASES:

Anglo Coal (Moranbah North management) Pty Ltd & Anor [2018] QIRC 052

Commonwealth v Grunseit [1943] HCA 47; (1943) 67 CLR 58

Exemption application re Boeing Australia Holdings Pty Ltd and Ors [2003] QADT 21

Exemption application re: Palmpoint Pty Ltd [2006] QADT 12

Lifestyle Communities Ltd (No 3) [2009] VCAT 1869

PJB v Melbourne Health and Anor (Patrick's case') [2011] VSC 327; (2011) 39 VR 373

R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 93 ALJR 1106

Re: Anglo Coal (Grosvenor Management) Pty Ltd & Ors [2016] QCAT 160

Re Cram; Ex parte Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd [1987] HCA 29; (1987) 163 CLR 140

Re: Kalwun Development Corporation Ltd [2019] QIRC 141

Re Kracke and Mental Health Review Board [2009] VCAT 646; (2009) 29 VAR 1

Re The Women's Community Aid Association (Qld) Limited [2011] QCAT 593

State of Queensland v Together Queensland [2012] QCA 353; [2014] 1 Qd R 257

Sundale Limited [2019] QCAT 83

The Australian Institute for Progress Ltd v the Electoral Commission of Queensland & Ors [2020] QSC 54

Introduction

  1. [1]
    By application filed on 25 June 2020, the Ipswich City Council seeks an exemption, pursuant to s 113(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 ('the Act'), from the operation of certain provisions of the Act for the purposes of being able to advertise to employ only female waste truck drivers for a training program. The determination of the Council's application requires a consideration of the Act and the relevant provisions of the Human Rights Act 2019 ('the HRA').

  1. [2]
    Pursuant to s 113(2) of the Act, before deciding an application, the Commission must give the Human Rights Commissioner ('the HRC') a copy of the application and a copy of the material filed in support of the application and must have regard to any submission made by the HRC on the application, including a submission on the process for considering the application.

  1. [3]
    On 13 July 2020, I caused a copy of the Council's application and its supporting submissions to be forwarded to the HRC. By submissions dated 20 August 2020, the HRC submitted, amongst other things, that given the Council had not addressed all issues relevant to granting an exemption, the Council should be given an opportunity to provide further submissions addressing all relevant criteria, including human rights considerations under the HRA.

  1. [4]
    By directions order dated 21 August 2020, I gave the Council a further opportunity to file any further written submissions and material addressing any matters raised by the HRC. The Council filed further submissions on 9September 2020.

  1. [5]
    The question for my determination is whether, pursuant to s 113(1) of the Act, I should grant the exemption sought.

  1. [6]
    In my view, for the reasons that follow, the exemption sought by the Council should be granted.

The Council's application for exemption

  1. [7]
    The Council is the local government authority for the City of Ipswich. The Council's Resource Recovery section currently employs approximately 50 full-time waste truck drivers, most of whom are male.

  1. [8]
    The Council applies for an exemption from 'Chapter 2 Section IV'[1] of the Act for a period of three years[2] so it can '… advertise for only female truck drivers for a training program.'[3]

  1. [9]
    I infer from the Council's application that the provisions of the Act from which exemption is sought by the Council is ch 2, pt 4, div 2, sub-div 1, namely 'Prohibitions in work and workrelated areas' which relevantly encompasses s 14 and s 15 of the Act. Although not referred to in its application, for the exemption, if granted, to achieve the outcome sought by the Council, it would also have to be exempt from the operation of s 124 of the Act ('Unnecessary information') and s127 of the Act ('Discriminatory advertisements').[4]

  1. [10]
    In the application, the Council states:

...

  1. ICC is seeking to proactively encourage more female applicants for waste driver roles, to become more representative of the community that we serve, and to encourage workplace diversity.
  2. Truck driving has long been a male dominated industry where it can be difficult to attract and retain female drivers.
  3. ICC is seeking an exemption to EEO requirements in order to undertake an affirmative action recruitment plan to target only female drivers. ICC is further seeking to address identified barriers to female drivers by linking this with a training program whereby successful female applicants are supported to obtain their HR licence while employed as a trainee driver, rather than the usual pre-requisite of already holding a HR licence.
  4. Australian male dominated industries have demonstrated that female drivers tend to have less driving related incidents, and less serious WH&S matters relating to driving incidents. ICC is seeking to continually improve safety for its employees and the community that it services.
  5. On occasion ICC's Resource Recovery section has employed a small number of individual female truck drivers. The aim of this exemption application is to develop a cohort of female drivers who can provide further support to each other, as well as other targeted supports and culture change programs that will be implemented by Council. This measure is designed to improve both attraction and retention rates for female drivers.
  6. Females are well under-represented in the industry, making it difficult to find and encourage women with specific waste/resource recovery driving experience. Council is expanding its job criteria and training opportunities to include transferable skills and experience, from any industry.

The relevant legislative provisions

The Act

  1. [11]
    The Commission has the power to grant exemptions in relation to work-related matters.[5]

  1. [12]
    Section 113(1) of the Act relevantly provides that on application by a person, the Commission may grant an exemption to the person from the operation of a specified provision of the Act. Section 113 of the Act goes on to relevantly provide that:

  1. (6)
    An exemption-
  1. (a)
    may be granted subject to such terms as the tribunal provides; and
  1. (b)
    may be granted so that it applies only in such circumstances, or in connection with such activities, as the tribunal determines; and
  1. (c)
    is to be granted for a specified period of not more than 5 years.
  1. (7)
    An exemption under subsection (1) may be renewed for further periods of not more than 5years, on application by the person or people to whom, or in respect of whom, the exemption was granted.

  1. [13]
    Prior to the operation of the HRA, the considerations taken into account to ensure that exemptions were only granted in appropriate circumstances, were:

  • whether the exemption is necessary;

  • whether there are any non-discriminatory ways of achieving the objects or purposes for which the exemption is sought;

  • whether the exemption is in the community interest;

  • whether any other persons or bodies, other than the applicant, support the application;

  • whether it is reasonable and appropriate to grant the exemption; and

  • the effect of not granting the exemption.[6]

The Human Rights Act 2019

  1. [14]
    The HRC submits that while the Commission has discretion to grant an exemption from the operation of a specified provision of the Act, it also now has obligations under the HRA.

Obligations when acting in an administrative capacity

  1. [15]
    Section 58 of the HRA relevantly provides:

58 Conduct of public entities

  1. (1)
    It is unlawful for a public entity-
  1. (a)
    to act or make a decision in a way that is not compatible with human rights; or
  1. (b)
    in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a human right relevant to the decision.
  1. (2)
    Subsection (1) does not apply to a public entity if the entity could not reasonably have acted differently or made a different decision because of a statutory provision, a law of the Commonwealth or another State or otherwise under law.

Example-

A public entity is acting to give effect to a statutory provision that is not compatible with human rights.

  1. (5)
    For subsection (1)(b), giving proper consideration to a human right in making a decision includes, but is not limited to-
  1. (a)
    identifying the human rights that may be affected by the decision; and
  1. (b)
    considering whether the decision would be compatible with human rights.
  1. (6)
    To remove any doubt, it is declared that-
  1. (a)
    an act or decision of a public entity is not invalid merely because, by doing the act or making the decision, the entity contravenes subsection (1); and
  1. (b)
    a person does not commit an offence against this Act or another Act merely because the person acts or makes a decision in contravention of subsection (1).

  1. [16]
    Sections 9(1) and 9(2) of the HRA relevantly define 'public entity'. Section 9(4) provides that a public entity does not include '… a court or tribunal, except when acting in an administrative capacity.'[7]

In what capacity is the Commission acting when it determines an exemption application?

  1. [17]
    The HRA is based on a model of human rights legislation that is broadly consistent with the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) ('the Victorian Charter') and the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).[8]

  1. [18]
    Section 38(1) of the Victorian Charter provides that subject to that section, '… it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with a human right or, in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right.' Section 4(1)(j) of the Victorian Charter provides that a court or tribunal is not a public authority '… except when it is acting in an administrative capacity.'

  1. [19]
    Section 4(1)(j) of the Victorian Charter has been considered by the Supreme Court of Victoria[9] which has held that:

  • it is necessary to determine the capacity in which the court or tribunal is acting when exercising the particular power;

  • it is a legislative function to create new rules of law having general application while it is an administrative function to apply such rules to particular cases and it is a judicial function to make binding determinations of existing legal right;

  • it is an administrative function to exercise discretionary authority to make orders creating new rights and obligations, especially on the basis of policy considerations;

  • history, precedent and legal tradition operate to characterise certain powers as plainly judicial, including the determination of criminal guilt and actions in contract and tort and, generally, actions for the enforcement of existing legal rights;

  • making a binding and authoritative determination of legal rights and duties according to existing legal principles is judicial; but, as a necessary incident of acting in an administrative capacity, courts and tribunals can also make final decisions between contending parties in ways that affect their legal rights and duties; and

  • certain powers may be administrative or judicial in character, depending on whether it is a court or tribunal which is exercising the power, and its purpose; and the mechanism for enforcing the decision, determination or order may be a guide in borderline cases.[10]

  1. [20]
    Section 83(1)(a) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) ('the EOAct') relevantly conferred discretion upon the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal ('VCAT') to grant an exemption from any of the provisions of that Act in relation to a person or class of people or an activity or class of activities. VCAT held that power was plainly not judicial in nature,[11] was not legislative, in that it did not involve the creation or formulation of new rules of law having general application,[12] and involved the exercise of a power that was administrative in nature in the public law sense.[13] Consequently, VCAT held that:

  • its powers under the EO Act to hear complaints and to make orders, even if those powers were judicial, did not alter the administrative nature of the power to grant an exemption under s 83 of the EO Act;[14] and

  • when exercising discretion in s 83 of the EO Act, it was wholly bound by the Victorian Charter, was specifically bound by the obligation under s 38(1) of the Victorian Charter to act compatibly with it, and, having regard to s 38(2) of the Victorian Charter, it was unlawful for VCAT to act incompatibly with human rights or to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right.[15]

  1. [21]
    The HRC submits, by referring to the decision of the VCAT in Lifestyle Communities Ltd (No 3) (Anti-Discrimination)[16] ('Lifestyle Communities') - that the exercise of a power to grant an exemption by that Tribunal pursuant to s 83(1) of the EO Act was administrative in nature - that this Commission, in granting an exemption pursuant to s113(1) of the Act '…is acting in an administrative capacity' and that accordingly the Commission is obliged, under s 58 of the HRA, to give proper consideration to human rights when making decisions, and to act and make decisions in a way that is compatible with human rights.

  1. [22]
    In the alternative, the HRC submits that if the Commission determines it is acting in a judicial capacity, it needs to consider the human rights that apply to the function of granting an exemption and that the Council's application engages the rights set out in s15 of the HRA, in particular, '… the right to equality and to equal protection of the law without and against discrimination.'

  1. [23]
    The Council made no submissions about this issue.

  1. [24]
    The Commission is established as a court of record in Queensland.[17] The Constitution of Queensland Act 2001 does not contain any constitutional principle of separation of powers.[18] Thus, the Commission, for example, exercises judicial power when, under s544(1)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, it enforces its own decisions[19] and exercises power that is administrative in nature (with executive and legislative aspects) when it certifies agreements made under ch 4 of Industrial Relations Act 2016.[20]

  1. [25]
    The determination of existing rights and liabilities has been accepted as the defining characteristic of the judicial function.[21] Put another way, the exercise of judicial power is giving a binding and authoritative determination between different parties as to their legal rights and duties according to existing legal principles.[22] On the other hand, the general distinction between legislation and the execution of legislation is that legislation determines the content of a law as a rule of conduct or a declaration as to power, right or duty, whereas executive authority applies the law in particular cases.[23] The exercise of statutory power, neither legislative nor judicial in character, is most likely administrative in character, it being a category of power applicable to executive or governmental decision-making generally.[24]

  1. [26]
    Section 447(1)(p) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 provides that the Commission's functions include any other function conferred on the Commission under that Act or any other Act. Section 174B of the Act provides:

174B Functions of industrial relations commission

The industrial relations commission has the following functions—

  1. (a)
    in relation to complaints about contraventions of this Act that are referred, or to be referred, to the commission under this Act—
  1. (i)
    to make orders under section144 before the complaints are referred to the tribunal; and
  1. (ii)
    to review decisions of the commissioner under section169 about lapsing of the complaints; and
  1. (iii)
    to enforce agreements for resolution of the complaints by conciliation; and
  1. (iv)
    to hear and decide the complaints;
  1. (b)
    to grant exemptions from this Act in relation to work-related matters;[25]
  1. (c)
    to provide opinions about the application of this Act in relation to work-related matters;
  1. (d)
    any other function conferred on the commission by this Act;
  1. (e)
    to take any other action incidental or conducive to the discharge of a function mentioned in paragraphs(a) to (d).

  1. [27]
    Some the functions conferred on the Commission by s 174B clearly involve the exercise of judicial power. For example, the power to hear and decide complaints of unlawful discrimination made under the Act involves the making of a binding and authoritative determination between different parties as to their legal rights and duties according to existing legal principles.

  1. [28]
    By contrast, the function of granting an exemption from the Act in relation to workrelated matters does not involve the exercise of judicial power because it does not involve making a binding and authoritative determination between different parties as to their existing legal rights and liabilities. Furthermore, the granting of an exemption in relation to work-related matters does not involve the exercise of legislative power because it does not involve a determination of the content of a law as a rule of conduct and does not involve making a declaration as to power, right or duty.

  1. [29]
    For these reasons, the determination of whether or not to grant an exemption under s113(1) of the Act involves the Commission acting in an administrative capacity, in that it involves the exercise of power of applying the law in a particular case.

  1. [30]
    Consequently, in determining whether or not to grant the exemption sought by the Council, the Commission must observe the relevant provisions of s 58 of the HRA.

Interpreting statutory provisions

  1. [31]
    Section 48 of the HRA is contained in pt 3, div 3 of that Act and provides:

48Interpretation

  1. (1)
    All statutory provisions must, to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights.
  1. (2)
    If a statutory provision can not be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights, the provision must, to the extent possible that is consistent with its purpose, be interpreted in a way that is most compatible with human rights.
  1. (3)
    International law and the judgments of domestic, foreign and international courts and tribunals relevant to a human right may be considered in interpreting a statutory provision.
  1. (4)
    This section does not affect the validity of-
  1. (a)
    an Act or provision of an Act that is not compatible with human rights; or
  1. (b)
    a statutory instrument or provision of a statutory instrument that is the not compatible with human rights and is empowered to be so by the Act under which it is made.
  1. (5)
    This section does not apply to a statutory provision the subject of an override declaration that is in force.

  1. [32]
    Section 5(2)(a) of the HRA provides that the HRA applies to a court or tribunal, to the extent the court or tribunal has functions, under pt 2and pt 3, div 3 of the HRA.[26]

  1. [33]
    The HRC submits that:

  • s 48 of the HRA requires that all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights, to the extent possible that is consistent with the purpose of the statutory provision;

  • by virtue of s 5 of the HRA, s 48 applies to courts and tribunals in all its capacities and functions; and

  • as a consequence, the Commission must interpret section 113(1) of the Act, so far as is possible to do so, compatibly with human rights.

  1. [34]
    The Council made no specific submissions on this issue.

  1. [35]
    In my view, the combined effect of s 5(2)(a) and s 48 of the HRA means that the Commission, in interpreting s 113 of the Act, must comply with s 48 of the HRA, and specifically, in the particular circumstances of the Council's application, s 48(1) and s48(2) of the HRA.[27]

The application of s 58 of the HRA

  1. [36]
    For the reasons given earlier, s 58 of HRA applies to the Commission in deciding whether or not to grant an exemption pursuant to s 113(1) of the Act. This is because the Commission, in determining whether or not to grant such an exemption, is acting in an administrative capacity.

  1. [37]
    Consequently, the Commission must not act to make a decision in a way that is not compatible with human rights and, in making a decision, the Commission must not fail to give proper consideration to a human right relevant to the decision.[28] In giving proper consideration to a human right in making a decision, the Commission must identify the human rights that may be affected by the decision and consider whether the decision would be compatible with human rights.[29]

  1. [38]
    The phrase 'human rights' is defined to mean '… the rights stated in part 2, divisions2 and 3.'[30] Part 2, div 2 of the HRA deals with particular civil and political rights, the first of which is found in s 15 which provides:

15Recognition and equality before the law

  1. (1)
    Every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law.
  1. (2)
    Every person has the right to enjoy the person’s human rights without discrimination.
  1. (3)
    Every person is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination.
  1. (4)
    Every person has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination.
  1. (5)
    Measures taken for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of persons disadvantaged because of discrimination do not constitute discrimination.

  1. [39]
    The phrase 'compatible with human rights' is defined in s 8 of the HRA, namely:

8Meaning of compatible with human rights

An act, decision or statutory provision is compatible with human rights if the act, decision or provision-

  1. (a)
    does not limit a human right; or
  2. (b)
    limits a human right only to the extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in accordance with section13.

  1. [40]
    Section 13 of the HRA provides:

13Human rights may be limited

  1. (1)
    A human right may be subject under law only to reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
  1. (2)
    In deciding whether a limit on a human right is reasonable and justifiable as mentioned in subsection(1), the following factors may be relevant-
  1. (a)
    the nature of the human right;
  1. (b)
    the nature of the purpose of the limitation, including whether it is consistent with a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
  1. (c)
    the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, including whether the limitation helps to achieve the purpose;
  1. (d)
    whether there are any less restrictive and reasonably available ways to achieve the purpose;
  1. (e)
    the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
  1. (f)
    the importance of preserving the human right, taking into account the nature and extent of the limitation on the human right;
  1. (g)
    the balance between the matters mentioned in paragraphs(e) and (f).

The HRC's submissions

  1. [41]
    The HRC submits that:

  • the obligations pursuant to s 58 of the HRA are both substantive and procedural in that the substantive obligation under s 58(1)(a) is to act and make decisions in a way that is compatible with human rights, whereas the procedural obligation in s58(1)(b) is to give proper consideration to human rights that are relevant to the decision;

  • guidance about the meaning of giving proper consideration to a relevant human right in making a decision is provided in s 58(5) of the HRA, by stating that it includes, but is not limited, to:

  • -identifying the human rights that may be affected by the decision; and

  • -considering whether the decision would be compatible with human rights;

  • the standard of consideration required will differ depending on the circumstances, including the identity of the decision-maker and the obligation extends to consideration of how the decision will operate in practice and whether any guidelines designed to ameliorate the effect of a decision are capable of operating effectively, all of which suggests the standard to be adopted by the Commission should be higher than that expected of other public entities such as government departments; and

  • the procedural and substantive limbs of s 58 of the HRA are cumulative, requiring a decisionmaker to give proper consideration to human rights and then make a decision in a way that is compatible with human rights.

  1. [42]
    The HRC then submitted that whether an exemption under s 113 of the Act would engage human rights can be determined by reference to the effect of the exemption if granted; and in the present case, the effect of the exemption sought would be to allow the Council to discriminate on the basis of sex in the pre-work and work areas under the Act.

  1. [43]
    In this regard, the HRC submits that:

  • the Council's application engages the rights to equality and to equal protection of the law without discrimination as provided for in s 15(3) of the HRA;

  • the purpose of s 15(5) of the Act is to promote substantive equality and if the activity, the subject of the exemption sought by the Council, is a special measure within s 15(5), the activity would be human rights compatible, and if it was not a special measure, then the justification test in s 13 of the HRA is to be applied;[31] and

  • the onus of establishing that the activity for which the exemption is sought is a measure within s 15(5) or is justified under s 13, lies with the Council on the balance of probabilities.[32]

  1. [44]
    While the HRC did not make any specific submissions about whether the Council should be taken to have proven that the proposed targeted recruitment of women was a special measure within the meaning of s 15(5) of the HRA or was demonstrably justified under s 13 of the HRA, other than referring, in a very general sense, to the decision of the VCAT in Lifestyle Communities, it submitted that it did not oppose the Council's proposal and that the exemptions for welfare measures and equal opportunity measures contained in s104 and in s 105 of the Act may apply.

The Council's submissions

  1. [45]
    The Council submitted that:

  • it considers the proposed targeted recruitment of women is a welfare measure within the meaning of s 15(5) of the HRA because the targeted recruitment measures are for the purpose of assisting or advancing women disadvantaged because of discrimination and further contended that such measures do not constitute discrimination;

  • women are recognised as being under-represented across the transport industry and, in the specific case of the Council, there were only two female drivers from a cohort of just over 50 drivers;

  • there are often socio-economic barriers faced by women seeking to meet the Heavy Rigid (HR) licence prerequisite and that there are significant costs involved in obtaining a HR licence, including specialised lessons, the time involved for the lessons, as well as the cost of the licence itself;

  • several of the Council's female cleaners and administrative staff have expressed interest in becoming Waste Services Truck Drivers and have cited difficulties in the terms of the time required to obtain a HR licence, as well as the cost involved in lessons and in obtaining such a licence;

  • by reference to the survey results contained in a document entitled Working Women in Transport – A Snapshot The Follow Up ('the WWT survey'),[33] of those that responded to the survey, only 17.5% of those working in the transport industry were women, and of those, only 6.5% were women in driving positions;

  • by reference to a report contained entitled Driving Change: Transport Industry's Gender Equality Gap Revealed ('the Driving Change report'), the transport industry rated as one of the lowest in Australia for gender diversity in that 26.4% of the workforce were women, far lower that the all industry average of 46.9%;[34]

  • given the costs involved in truck driving lessons and licence costs, the Council considers that socio-economic factors present barriers to many women seeking to become truck drivers and in this regard, the Council referred to:

  • the -Australia's Gender Pay Gap Statistic 2020, issued by the Workplace Gender Equality Agency, which advises that Australia's national gender pay gap shows that women were on average paid 14% less than men;

  • -2016 data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics that single female parent families represent 82% of single-parent families, that the over-representation of women as sole parents creates further employment barriers to women entering the workforce as truck drivers because their increased caring responsibilities present challenges to having the time for further training to gain a HR licence, as well as the financial implications of being a single parent family; and

  • the Women Driving Transport Careers initiative of Hanson Australia Pty Ltd, which involved free training provided to trainees to achieve a HR licence, the offer of full-time employment where no previous heavy driving experience was necessary and trainees being supported by mentors (which is similar to the approach proposed by the Council if its application is granted), helped that organisation achieve an almost 300% increase in female participation in its driver group.

My determination

What human rights may be affected by the granting of the exemption?

  1. [46]
    Whether a person's human rights may be affected by the granting of an exemption under s113(1) of the Act can be determined by reference to the effect of the exemption granted.[35]

  1. [47]
    In the present case, the effect of the exemption would be to allow the Council to advertise for and employ only females as waste truck drivers, in a training program, so they can obtain their HR licence whilst employed as trainee drivers.[36] In other words, the effect of the exemption would be to allow the Council to lawfully discriminate on the basis of sex in the pre-work and work areas.

  1. [48]
    As referred to above, the HRC submits that the application made by the Council 'engages' the rights to equality and to equal protection of the law without and against discrimination as set out in s 15 of the HRA. The HRC also submitted that if the granting of the exemption was that measure within the meaning of s 15(5) of the HRA, then that activity would be human rights compatible.

  1. [49]
    VCAT stated that, in respect of the equivalent human right to s 15(5) of HRA, as contained in s 8(4) of the Victorian Charter:[37]

290Treating people equally in substance can require the equal treatment of people who are alike and the unequal treatment of people who are unalike. Therefore, when necessary, it is not discriminatory to take affirmative action to redress the historical or entrenched disadvantage suffered by some people and groups.

291Section 8(4) is a special measures provision expressing the same value of equality in substance which is inherent in the human right to equal protection of the law without and against discrimination. The purpose of s 8(4) is to facilitate taking legitimate action towards achieving substantive equality by compensating for inequality. It protects the interest which persons or groups disadvantaged by discrimination have in benefiting from compensatory measures.

292Under s 8(4), taking measures for the specified compensatory purposes does not constitute discrimination. As the human rights in s 8(3) largely depend on the concept of discrimination, such measures do not limit those rights and do not require justification under s 7(2).

293A special measure attracts s 8(4) if its purpose is remedial in the specified sense. This directs attention to the purpose of the taker of the measure, which they must demonstrate to be genuinely held on the balance of probabilities. A purpose which cannot reasonably and objectively be characterised as remedial in the specified sense does not come within s 8(4).[38]

  1. [50]
    In my view, the human rights contained in s 15(3) and s 15(4) of the HRA would be affected by the granting of the exemption sought by the Council in that it would allow discriminatory activity to take place which would affect a person's entitlement to equal protection of the law without discrimination and a person's right to equal and effective protection against discrimination.

  1. [51]
    However, the human right contained in s 15(5) of the HRA would also be affected by the decision to grant the exemption sought by the Council.

  1. [52]
    If the Council can establish that the human right affected by the granting of its application is the human right contained in s 15(5) of the HRA, then there would be no need to consider whether the granting of an exemption would be reasonable and justified having regard to s 13(2) of the HRA.[39] This is because a measure within the meaning of s 15(5) of the HRA is not discrimination within the meaning of s 15(3) and s 15(4) of the HRA and such a measure does not have to be justified under s 13(2) because there is nothing to justify.[40] The human rights that every person is equal before the law and is entitled to equal protection of the law without discrimination, that every person has a right to equal and effective protection against discrimination, and the human right within the meaning of s 15(5), are consubstantial.[41] The human rights contained in s 15(3) and s15(4) have the same purpose and a measure within the meaning of s 15(5) is the method of achieving the protection.[42]

  1. [53]
    In Lifestyle Communities, it was held that the exemption sought, to exclude people not aged over 50 years from the applicant's accommodation villages, was not a measure within the meaning of s 8(4) of the Victorian Charter. This was because:

  • while it was a legitimate commercial purpose to extend to everybody over 50years of age the same access to the applicant's village accommodation, that did not translate to the purpose of achieving substantive equality;[43]

  • of the absence of positive proof from the applicant of the need for the special measure,[44] including that no serious attempt was made by the applicant to establish how people in the age group from 50-55 years[45] were disadvantaged by discrimination in the necessary sense and how that position was different to, say, people aged 45-50 years;[46] and

  • the demand for a product is an expression of a consumer's purchasing preference and is not necessarily evidence that the consumer is disadvantaged by discrimination in respect of their access to the product.[47]

Would the granting of the exemption sought be a measure within the meaning of s15(5) of the HRA?

  1. [54]
    Section 15(5) of the HRA applies to measures taken for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups disadvantaged because of discrimination. The purpose of the measure must be established by positive proof, the person or groups must be properly identified and the cause of the disadvantage must be discrimination within the meaning of the Act.[48] A measure must be for the purpose of ameliorating disadvantage caused by discrimination and the persons or groups to be assisted or advanced must be suffering disadvantage from that cause.[49]

  1. [55]
    As to whether the measure is one that meets the description contained in s 15(5) of the HRA (namely, one taken for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of persons disadvantaged because of discrimination), VCAT, in respect of the equivalent provision in the Victorian Charter, relevantly held in respect of the requirement for persons to be 'disadvantaged':

270The cardinal values of the Charter and the interests it protects point to what is meant by disadvantage. A person or group of persons is disadvantaged when (by reason of discrimination) they are unable to act with personal autonomy and realise their worth in ways which are important for the maintenance of their inherent dignity as human beings individually, in family and in society.

271A person is so disadvantaged when their normal participation in society and in social and political institutions is impaired. The disadvantage could come from limitations on access to goods or services of all kinds, including accommodation, transport, health and education, or to work on equal terms. It could be due to restrictions on spiritual, cultural or sexual expression and on accessing leisure and sporting facilities. Obviously this is not an exclusive list, and there could not be such a list. Anything which stands in the way of someone living as a dignified human being, as envisaged by the Charter, whether individually or in family and society, could place them in a position or condition of disadvantage.

273The persons or groups must be specifically identifiable by reference to the conditions producing the disadvantage. Consistently with the beneficial purpose of taking special measures, a balanced approach is adopted to application of this requirement. It is not necessary for the whole group to be disadvantaged. It is sufficient if “the group as a whole has experienced discrimination” or “the overwhelming majority” are disadvantaged.[50]

Are women, who would be the subject of the exemption sought by the Council, persons who have been disadvantaged within the meaning of s 15(5) of the HRA?

  1. [56]
    The WWT survey, referred to by the Council, was undertaken by Transport Women Australia Limited in response to the numbers of women involved in and participating in the transport industry in Australia.[51] In answer to the survey question of selecting the category that best related to their current position, 44.5% identified with the administration/office areas, while women in driving positions accounted for 6.5% of the responses.[52] The WWT survey relevantly concluded:

Our aim with this question was to establish what our respondents consider to be the challenges they either face themselves, or see in their own sector of the industry.

There were comprehensive answers in relation to challenges that females face overall in this industry with an overwhelming 72.13% saying they have faced or they believe that there are challenges to be faced by women. 16.39% of respondents indicated that they believed there were no challenges with 7.49% citing family/work-life balance/maternity leave or children as being problematic. 3.98% of respondents made no comment. We have categorized the different areas these challenges fall into as follows and included some comments made by respondents below.

  • Discrimination
  • “Being undervalued in comparison to men doing the same job”
  • “Misogyny, discrimination, bullying, lack of respect”
  • “Men with no experience get promoted & trained into their new salary, while women with experience stay in lower ranking positions”
  • “Pay differences, intimidation, undervalued”
  • “Discrimination, lack of respect, cronyism”
  • “Pay less than a male in the same position”
  • “Boys club alive and well, particularly within industry organisations. Females are viewed as suitable to perform admin duties but most certainly not to represent the views of industry or negotiate with government”
  • “Capabilities questioned & not taken seriously”
  • “Males assuming you are the office girl”
  • “Difficulty getting other males to accept if you are in a senior position, and they expect that you will just take the minutes at a high level”
  • “Double standards – male getting angry is acceptable, a female getting angry is emotional”
  • “Great deal of discrimination & a glass ceiling”


  • Capabilities
    • “Understanding different regulations”
    • “Takes a long time for men to realise we are capable”
    • “Lack of interest in giving women operational experience. Keep us confined to the desk”
    • “People skills, especially in family business”

  1. [57]
    Having regard to this evidence, my view is that women who wish to be employed in roles in the transport industry as drivers are disadvantaged within the meaning of s 15(5) of the HRA. This arises due to the limitation they suffer in being stereotyped, namely, being seen as only being able to perform administrative/office roles in the transport industry.

Is the disadvantage because of discrimination?

  1. [58]
    In this regard, VCAT has relevantly held, in the context of an application for an exemption pursuant to s 83(1) of the EO Act:

274As to the disadvantage because of discrimination, this criterion requires the disadvantage to be because of discrimination (within the meaning of the Equal Opportunity Act) and not some other cause.

275The application of these indicia by the tribunal will depend on the nature of the decision it is making and action it is taking. If the decision requires the tribunal to consider whether a measure is a special measure as a matter of fact and merit, as in the conduct of its administration and in the exercise of its administrative jurisdiction, the criteria are applied directly and the tribunal must come to its own view about the matter. That is the case with the exercise of the discretion in s 83(1) of the Equal Opportunity Act to grant an exemption...[53]

  1. [59]
    Having regard to the information contained in the WWT survey, my own view is that the disadvantage expressed by the women in the transport industry who were surveyed, as referred to above, was because of discrimination within the meaning of the Act. I have formed this view because, having regard to the WWT survey and to the Driving Change report, no other cause is identified, other than sex, as being the reason for the disadvantage identified.

  1. [60]
    Furthermore, in my view, the disadvantage is also because of socio-economic barriers faced by women, particularly women who have increased caring responsibilities, in respect of the cost and time required to attain a HR licence so as to be able to enter employment as a truck driver.

  1. [61]
    It seems to me that the information contained in the WWT survey and in the Driving Change report support the view that the stereotyping of women in the transport industry, by being seen as only being able to perform administrative/office roles, constitutes direct discrimination within the meaning of the Act.

  1. [62]
    The exemption sought by the Council is to recruit only female waste truck drivers and to link that recruitment with a training program. The successful female applicants are to be supported to obtain their HR licence while employed as trainee drivers, rather than the usual prerequisite of already holding a HR licence.

  1. [63]
    Having regard to the material contained in the WWT survey and in the Driving Change report as referred to by the Council in its submissions (referred to in paragraph [45]), my view is that women seeking to enter employment as truck drivers are disadvantaged and that such disadvantage is because of discrimination within the meaning of the Act.

  1. [64]
    For all these reasons, my opinion is that the exemption sought by the Council is a measure within the meaning of s 15(5) of the HRA. This is because it is a measure taken for the purpose of assisting or advancing women disadvantaged because of discrimination.

  1. [65]
    As such, it becomes unnecessary to consider s 13 of the HRA.

Would a decision granting the exemption be compatible with human rights?

  1. [66]
    For the reasons given in paragraphs [56] to [64], the granting of the exemption sought by the Council is compatible with human rights. This is because the granting of that exemption does not limit human rights.

The application of s 48 of the HRA

  1. [67]
    Section 48(1) of the HRA does not authorise an interpretation of statutory provisions which is inconsistent with their purpose; rather, the provisions must be interpreted, to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, in a way that is 'compatible with human rights'.[54]

  1. [68]
    In the interpretation of statutory provisions conferring discretion on a decision maker, it has been held, in respect of the equivalent provision in the Victorian Charter,[55] that 'Identifying the scope of the discretion by statutory interpretation which takes human rights into account is essential.'[56]

  1. [69]
    In R v A2,[57] Kiefel CJ and Keane J, in summarising the principles of statutory construction, stated in part:

  1. The method to be applied in construing a statute to ascertain the intended meaning of the words used is well settled. It commences with a consideration of the words of the provision itself, but it does not end there. A literal approach to construction, which requires the courts to obey the ordinary meaning or usage of the words of a provision, even if the result is improbable, has long been eschewed by this Court. It is now accepted that even words having an apparently clear ordinary or grammatical meaning may be ascribed a different legal meaning after the process of construction is complete. This is because consideration of the context for the provision may point to factors that tend against the ordinary usage of the words of the provision.

  1. Consideration of the context for the provision is undertaken at the first stage of the process of construction. Context is to be understood in its widest sense. It includes surrounding statutory provisions, what may be drawn from other aspects of the statute and the statute as a whole. It extends to the mischief which it may be seen that the statute is intended to remedy. "Mischief" is an old expression. It may be understood to refer to a state of affairs which to date the law has not addressed. It is in that sense a defect in the law which is now sought to be remedied. The mischief may point most clearly to what it is that the statute seeks to achieve.

  1. [70]
    Further, s14A(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 provides that in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation. The noun 'purpose', for an Act, is defined in the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 to include its policy objective.

  1. [71]
    The HRC submits that the principles established by case law for the exercise of the discretion pursuant to s 113(1) of the Act are consistent with the test for compatibility with human rights.

  1. [72]
    The Council made no specific submissions on this issue.

  1. [73]
    Section 113(1) of the Act confers a broad and unfettered discretion upon the Commission to grant an exemption from the operation of a specified provision of the Act.[58]The purpose of s 113is to allow persons the protection and security of a shield against complaints of unlawful discrimination in circumstances where their proposed actions constitute a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, but where they are not inherently inconsistent with the Act.[59]

  1. [74]
    For the reasons given in paragraphs [56] to [64], the granting of the exemption sought by the Council is a measure within the meaning of s 15(5) of the HRA. Because such an exemption is such a measure which, of itself, does not constitute discrimination, then the purposive construction of s 113(1) of the Act is compatible with human rights. This is because the granting of an exemption of the kind sought by the Council does not limit a human right.

  1. [75]
    In my view, having regard to the considerations which have traditionally been taken into account in granting an exemption pursuant to s 113(1) of the Act, this is a case where the exemption sought by the Council should be granted.

Is the exemption necessary?

  1. [76]
    For the reasons given in paragraphs [56] to [64], the exemption is necessary to assist or advance women who have been disadvantaged because of discrimination and who wish to be employed as Waste Truck Drivers.

Are there any non-discriminatory ways of achieving the objects or purposes for which the exemption is sought?

  1. [77]
    The Council has not identified any non-discriminatory ways of achieving the object or purpose for which the exemption is sought.

  1. [78]
    The Driving Change report points to many organisations in Australia which have introduced policies to promote a gender balance in traditionally male dominated industries by including, but not limited to, setting gender balance goals.[60]

  1. [79]
    The Driving Change report also sets out some steps to make tangible diversity improvements including, relevantly:

  • training management and hiring staff on a gender bias;

  • having at least one female manager as part of the interview and on-boarding process;

  • establishing a support group of female employees in the business; and

  • assigning mentors to entry-level female employees.[61]

  1. [80]
    However, it seems to me, having regard to the information contained in the WWT survey and in the Driving Change report, that setting gender balance goals may not remove the disadvantage experienced by women who wish to work in the transport industry in nonadministrative roles. As recommended in the Driving Change report, the first step in making tangible diversity improvements is hiring staff on a gender bias.

  1. [81]
    For these reasons, it is difficult to envision any non-discriminatory ways of achieving the purpose for which the exemption is sought.

Is the exemption in the community interest?

  1. [82]
    The exemption is in the community interest. It is in the interest of the community that women be able to fully participate in any industry as truck drivers. The Driving Change report sets out reasons why diversity in the workplace is a key benefit. They include:

  • companies in the top quartile for gender diversity are 21% more likely to drive financial returns that outperform industry averages;

  • the rise in female employment since 1974 has boosted Australia's economic activity by 22%;

  • encouraging more women to join the workforce will fill roles across all sectors, increasing productivity and meeting consumer demand; and

  • having a diverse range of voices gives businesses a large pool of expertise and makes them better at adapting to change.[62]

Are there any other persons or bodies, other than the Council, supporting the application?

  1. [83]
    The HRC raises no objection to the exemption being granted. The material does not disclose if any other person or body supports or opposes the granting of the exemption.

Is it reasonable and appropriate to grant the exemption?

  1. [84]
    For the reasons given in paragraphs [56] to [64], it is reasonable and appropriate to grant the exemption sought by the Council.

  1. [85]
    The Council and the HRC did not submit that the proposal by the Council - to employ only female Waste Truck Drivers in a training program - would be a welfare measure within the meaning of s 104 of the Act or that it would be an equal opportunity measure within the meaning of s 105 of the Act. There have been cases where applications for exemptions under s 113 of the Act have been dismissed because such applicants would have available to them the general exemption under s 104[63] or under s 105.[64] However, in the absence of any compelling submission, particularly from the HRC, that s105 would amount to a sufficiently certain defence to the Council's proposal, I am of the view that the exemption should be granted.[65]

What is the effect of not granting the exemption?

  1. [86]
    In my view, the failure to grant the exemption would perpetuate the disadvantage suffered by women who wish to work as truck drivers.

The terms of the exemption sought

  1. [87]
    The terms of the exemption sought by the Council are set out in paragraph [8]. Having regard to the purpose for which the exemption is sought, those terms are reasonable.

  1. [88]
    For the reasons I have given earlier, for the exemption sought to meet the purpose of s113(1) of the Act, the exemption should be granted to the Council from the operation of not only s14 and s 15 of the Act, but also s 124 and s 127 of the Act.

Conclusion

  1. [89]
    For the reasons I have given, I am satisfied that I should grant the exemption sought.

Orders

  1. [90]
    I make the following orders:

1.The Ipswich City Council is exempt from the operation of s 14, s 15, s 124 and s 127 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 in relation to the attribute in s 7(a) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991.

2.The exemption applies only in respect of actions or omissions in relation to the advertising and recruitment of Waste Truck Drivers to be employed by the Ipswich City Council for a training program to obtain a Heavy Rigid Licence.

3.The exemption shall apply to the Ipswich City Council for a period of threeyears from the date of these orders.

Footnotes

[1] The application filed by the Ipswich City Council on 25 June 2020 ('the Council's application'), s 3(a).

[2] The Council's application, s 3(b).

[3] The Council's application, s 3(c).

[4] As in, for example, the orders made in Exemption application re Boeing Australia Holdings Pty Ltd and Ors [2003] QADT 21 ('Boeing') (President Sofronoff QC) and in Re: Kalwun Development Corporation Ltd [2019] QIRC 141, ('Kalwun') (Vice President O'Connor).

[5] Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 s 174B(b).

[6] Boeing (n 4) [12]-[16] (President Sofronoff QC) and Kalwun (n 4) [6] (Vice President O'Connor).

[7] Human Rights Act 2019 s 9(4)(b).

[8] Explanatory Notes, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld) 11.

[9] PJB v Melbourne Health and Anor ('Patrick's case') [2011] VSC 327; (2011) 39 VR 373.

[10] Patrick's case (n 9) [124] (Bell J)

[11] Lifestyle Communities Ltd (No 3) (Anti-Discrimination) [2009] VCAT 1869, [42] ('Lifestyle Communities') (Bell J, President).

[12] Ibid [43].

[13] Ibid [44].

[14] Ibid [45].

[15] Ibid [46].

[16] Lifestyle Communities (n 11) [42]-[45].

[17] Industrial Relations Act 2016 s 429.

[18] State of Queensland v Together Queensland [2012] QCA 353; [2014] 1 Qd R 257 [59] (Holmes, Muir and White JJA).

[19] Ibid [95], concerning the equivalent provision in s 334(1)(b) the Industrial Relations Act 1999.

[20] Ibid [87], concerning the equivalent provisions in ch 6 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999.

[21] Ibid [69].

[22] Re Cram; Ex parte Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd [1987] HCA 29; (1987) 163 CLR 140, 148-149 (MasonCJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ)

[23] Commonwealth v Grunseit [1943] HCA 47; (1943) 67 CLR 58, 82 (Latham CJ).

[24] Re Kracke and Mental Health Review Board [2009] VCAT 646; (2009) 29 VAR 1, [297] (Bell J, President).

[25] The phrase 'work-related matter' is exhaustively defined in the schedule to the Act to mean '… a complaint or other matter relating to, or including, work or the work-related area.' The noun 'work' is given a broad, non‑exhaustive definition in the schedule to the Act including, relevantly, '… work in a relationship of employment (including full-time, part-time, casual, permanent and temporary employment).'

[26] Part 2 of the Human Rights Act 2019 deals with human rights in Queensland. Part 3, div 3 of the Human Rights Act2019 deals with the interpretation of laws.

[27] The same conclusion has been reached in applying the Victorian Charter to the equivalent discretion to grant exemptions contained in s 83(1) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic): Lifestyle Communities (n 11) [75]‑[104].

[28] Human Rights Act 2019 s 58(1).

[29] Human Rights Act 2019 s 58(5).

[30] Human Rights Act 2019 s 7.

[31] Citing Lifestyle Communities (n 11) [310].

[32] Citing Lifestyle Communities ibid [298].

[33] 'Working Women in Transport – A Snapshot The Follow Up' Transport Women Australia Limited (web page, 30October 2020) https://www.transportwomen.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Women-Working-in-Transport-survey-report-sent-to-printer.pdf ('the WWT survey').

[34]Driving Change - A Closer Look at Women in Transport (web page, 30 October 2020) https://www.teletracnavman.com.au/marketing/assets/ebooks/au/women%20in%20transport_rls0719_sm.pdf ('the Driving Change report').

[35] Lifestyle Communities (n 11) [310].

[36] The statement made on behalf of the Council in the Council's application, para. 4.

[37] Section 8 of the Victorian Charter provides:

8 Recognition and equality before the law

  1. (1)Every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law.
  1. (2)Every person has the right to enjoy his or her human rights without discrimination.
  1. (3)Every person is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination and has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination.
  1. (4)Measures taken for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of persons disadvantaged because of discrimination do not constitute discrimination.

[38] Lifestyle Communities (n 11) (footnotes omitted).

[39] Ibid [302].

[40] Lifestyle Communities (n 11) [259].

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid [377].

[44] Ibid [379].

[45] The applicant already had been granted an exemption to provide accommodation at one of its villages exclusively to people over the age of 55 years: Lifestyle Communities (n 11) [9].

[46] Lifestyle Communities (n 11) [384].

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid [375].

[49] Ibid [382].

[50] Lifestyle Communities (n 11) (Footnotes omitted).

[51] WWT survey (n 33) 1.

[52] Ibid 5.

[53] Lifestyle Communities (n 11) (footnotes omitted).

[54] The Australian Institute for Progress Ltd v The Electoral Commission of Queensland & Ors [2020] QSC 54, [117] (Applegarth J).

[55] Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 32(1).

[56] Patrick's case (n 9) [236].

[57] [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 93 ALJR 1106 (citations omitted) (Nettle and Gordon JJ at [148] agreeing).

[58] Kalwan (n 4) [6] (Vice President O'Connor).

[59] Anglo Coal (Moranbah North management) Pty Ltd & Anor [2018] QIRC 052, [9] (Deputy President Swan), citing Exemption application re: Palmpoint Pty Ltd [2006] QADT 12, [20].

[60] The Driving Change report (n 34) 8.

[61] Ibid 9.

[62] The Driving Change report (n 34) 7.

[63] Re The Women's Community Aid Association (Qld) Limited [2011] QCAT 593, [14]-[17] (Senior Member Endicott)

[64] Re: Anglo Coal (Grosvenor Management) Pty Ltd & Ors [2016] QCAT 160 (Senior Member Stilgoe OAM), [32].

[65] Sundale Limited [2019] QCAT 83, [29]-[31] (Member Gordon).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Re: Ipswich City Council

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Re: Ipswich City Council

  • MNC:

    [2020] QIRC 194

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Merrell DP

  • Date:

    17 Nov 2020

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.
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