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YFG Shopping Centres Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General; Shayher Alliance Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General; Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General; Lipoma Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General

 

[2020] QLAC 6

LAND APPEAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

YFG Shopping Centres Pty Ltd as Tte & Anor v Valuer-General; Shayher Alliance Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General; Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General; Lipoma Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General [2020] QLAC 6

PARTIES:

YFG Shopping Centres Pty Ltd as Tte

ABN 56 853 411 699

(appellant)

Trondage Enterprises Pty Ltd

ABN 92 067 120 370

(appellant)

v

Valuer-General

(respondent)

FILE NO:

LAC002-20

Land Court No LVA182-17

PARTIES:

Shayher Alliance Pty Ltd as Tte

ABN 96 113 268 198

(appellant)

v

Valuer-General

(respondent)

FILE NO:

LAC003-20

Land Court No LVA183-17

PARTIES:

Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd as Tte

ABN 70 092 070 766

(appellant)

v

Valuer-General

(respondent)

FILE NO:

LAC004-20

Land Court No LVA211-17

PARTIES:

Lipoma Pty Ltd as Tte

ABN 65 002 203 581

(appellant)

v

Valuer-General

(respondent)

FILE NO:

LAC005-20

Land Court No LVA212-17

DIVISION:

Land Appeal Court of Queensland

PROCEEDING:

Appeal from the Land Court of Queensland

ORIGINATING COURT:

Land Court of Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

15 December 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARD ON:

8 October 2020

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

THE COURT:

Boddice J

Kingham FY, President of the Land Court
McNamara JR, Member of the Land Court

ORDERS:

  1. Each appeal be dismissed.
  1. If the parties wish to make submissions on costs, the parties are to file and serve written submissions, limited to three pages, within seven days of the date hereof.
  1. Absent the filing of any submissions on costs, each appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

REAL PROPERTY – VALUATION OF LAND – OBJECTIONS AND APPEALS – QUEENSLAND – OTHER MATTERS – where each of the appellants own commercial property, in the nature of a shopping centre – where each of the appellants objected to the respondent’s valuation – where the respondent declined the objections on the ground that each valuation was supported by a comparison to similar properties – where the appellants challenged the decision of the respondent in the Land Court – where the appellants appeal the decision of the Land Court on the grounds that the Member erred in adopting an approach of looking for error in advance, without detailed consideration of the valuation evidence; failed to properly consider the valuation evidence; failed to give adequate reasons and denied natural justice – whether there was error on the part of the Member in the application of the applicable test or in failing to properly consider the evidence as a whole

Land Valuation Act 2010 s 170, s 172

Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines v Kent Street Pty Ltd (2009) 171 LGERA 365; [2009] QCA 399, cited

Department of Natural Resources & Mines v Spender [2003] QLAC 86, cited
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22, cited
Ipswich City Council v Wilson (2011) 32 QLCR 357, cited
Players Pty Ltd v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2001] SASC 369, cited

APPEARANCES:

G Beacham QC, with J Byrnes (instructed by Colin Biggers & Paisley) for each of the appellants

D O’Brien QC, with J Hastie for the respondent

  1. [1]
    THE COURT: YFG Shopping Centres Pty Ltd as TTE & Trondage Enterprises Pty Ltd, owns real property in Redland Bay Road, Capalaba (Capalaba Park).  Shayher Alliance Pty Ltd as TTE, owns real property in Lorraine Street, Capalaba (Capalaba Central).  Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd as TTE, owns real property in Morayfield Road, Morayfield (Morayfield).  Lipoma Pty Ltd as TTE owns real property in Bunker Road, Victoria Point (Victoria Point). Each property is a commercial property, in the nature of a shopping centre.
  2. [2]
    In 2015, the respondent issued valuations for those real properties.  The valuations were to take effect on 30 June 2016. Each of the appellants objected to the respondent’s valuation.
  3. [3]
    In 2017, the respondent declined the objections on the grounds that each was supported by a comparison to similar properties and their sale prices.
  4. [4]
    Each of the appellants challenged those decisions in the Land Court.  Their respective appeals were heard together having regard to the similarities in the grounds of appeal.  The appeals, in respect of Capalaba Park, Capalaba Central and Victoria Point, were dismissed.  The appeal in respect of Morayfield was allowed, with the valuation amended from $43 million to $41,292,480.
  5. [5]
    Each of the appellants appeal the decision of the Land Court.  A number of grounds of appeal are identified in each appeal.  In essence, those grounds contend that the Member erred in adopting an approach of looking for error in advance, without a detailed consideration of the valuation evidence; failed to properly consider the valuation evidence in determining each appeal; failed to give adequate reasons; and denied natural justice.

Land Court

  1. [6]
    Evidence was given by two valuers, Mr Ladewig (engaged by the appellants) and Mr Weir (engaged by the respondent).  Whilst each valuer applied the same primary valuation methodology, differences arose as to the ranking and use to be made of comparable sales and as to the allowances to be made for relevant matters, such as, agreements for lease.
  2. [7]
    The appellants contended the valuations were excessive, did not properly reflect the characteristics of the properties, were based on erroneous methodologies and were not supported by sales evidence.
  3. [8]
    The respondent’s valuations for Capalaba Park ($21 million), Capalaba Central ($25 million amended to $23,900,000 after receipt of the joint expert report), Victoria Point ($21 million) and Morayfield ($45 million amended to $43 million after the delivery of the valuers’ joint expert report) were the subject of valuers’ assessments of $18,800,000; $21,400,000; $18,800,000 and $30,800,000 respectively by Mr Ladewig, and $21,100,000; $23,900,000; $21 million and $43 million respectively by Mr Weir.
  4. [9]
    Whilst Mr Ladewig and Mr Weir applied the same primary valuation methodology, they reached differing conclusions as to the rate for the unencumbered site area for each of the subject properties.  Mr Weir assessed Capalaba Park, Capalaba Central, Victoria Point and Morayfield at $280 per square metre; $250 per square metre; $250 per square metre; and $350 per square metre respectively, whereas Mr Ladewig assessed the rate for each of those properties as $250 per square metre; $225 per square metre; $225 per square metre; and $275 per square metre.
  5. [10]
    In reaching those rates, each used the same unencumbered rate for all but three of the comparable sales, being properties at Hope Island, Karalee and Delacombe in Victoria.  The different rate in respect of these properties arose by reason of different treatment of agreements for lease.
  6. [11]
    Mr Weir’s approach was to take account of the hypothetical purchaser’s apportionment of the worth of the leases.[1]  He accepted the hypothetical purchaser would normally be an experienced developer.[2]  By contrast, Mr Ladewig relied on the actual purchaser’s mind and the actual figures for the agreement for lease, taking a midpoint between the relevant range.[3]
  7. [12]
    Mr Ladewig and Mr Weir also differed in their ranking and use of comparable sales at Meadowbrook, Loganholme and Banyo.  Mr Weir treated Meadowbrook as a secondary sale, expressing concern about a buy-back clause in the contract, but relied on Loganholme.  Mr Ladewig considered Meadowbrook an inferior sale and gave Loganholme less weight as it was older and had questionable circumstances.  Mr Ladewig did not consider the terms of Meadowbrook to be overly unusual.
  8. [13]
    Both Mr Ladewig and Mr Weir assessed the Banyo sale at a similar unencumbered rate and agreed it was a superior comparable sale but disagreed as to the extent of adjustment required to account for the size of Banyo compared to the subject properties.
  9. [14]
    Mr Ladewig and Mr Weir also differed in their approaches to the type of shopping centre and the relevance of its catchment.  Mr Weir considered a property’s place in the retail hierarchy (major regional, subregional and neighbourhood) and its catchment essential factors in both valuing the subject properties and considering comparable sales.
  10. [15]
    Mr Ladewig considered those factors not relevant when determining the value of the subject properties, valuing subregional and major regional shopping centres according to the size of the site and having regard to catchment on the basis it was limited to the immediate locality.
  11. [16]
    Mr Weir also had regard to a centre’s trading performance. Mr Ladewig had no regard to such information, as a valuation is to be determined as if there were no improvements on the land.

Primary decision

  1. [17]
    The Member observed that, although a valuation appeal is a two-step process, the appellant bore the onus of establishing error, the first step in the process.  Further, whilst there were several grounds of appeal, the only ground upon which evidence was called was as to the valuations being excessive, having regard to comparable sales.  There was no evidence presented to the effect that the valuations were erroneous in principle or tainted by significant error of fact.
  2. [18]
    The Member accepted that each valuer had undertaken a process of valuation by comparison of the subject land to values disclosed by previous sales.  However, Mr Ladewig had undertaken that task by looking at the sales and scaling them to the size of the site, without explaining how the size of the site affected his scale of the value.  The Member found that, whilst there may not be a mathematical formula when scaling for size, an explanation is important so that the Court may understand a valuer’s process of reasoning and analysis.
  3. [19]
    The Member found Mr Ladewig did not have regard to the retail hierarchy of shopping centres and did not accept that census data for a suburb was a relevant consideration in determining value, whereas Mr Weir’s approach did involve an examination of size within the context of a retail hierarchy, including a needs-based analysis on the demographics of the catchment, the retail size the land could support and where the site sat in the retail hierarchy.  The Member expressed a preference for that more nuanced approach to valuation.
  4. [20]
    The Member recorded that the parties had identified three common issues to each appeal.  First, the value added by intangible improvements, namely agreements for lease.  Second, the comparability of sales evidence and the retail hierarchy.  Third, the relevance of trading performance.
  5. [21]
    As to the first, the Member found that, whilst both valuers agreed that an existing agreement for lease would affect the price a party may pay for a site and affect the way in which that site would operate as a comparable sale, Mr Ladewig adjusted the sales by reference to the purchaser’s view of the value of the agreement for lease, whereas Mr Weir adjusted the sale by reference to an industry standard.
  6. [22]
    As to the second, the Member found that, whilst both valuers agreed that the highest and best use was “retail in line with its current use”, Mr Ladewig had no regard to the designation of the shopping centres in the retail hierarchy, because he assessed the properties as a vacant block of dirt, whereas Mr Weir assessed the subject sites having regard to the size of the catchments of shopping centres of a different use of order.
  7. [23]
    As to the third, the Member found that the valuers disagreed as to the relevance of trading performance.  Mr Weir relied on the centre’s trading performance, whereas Mr Ladewig contended that was not a proper approach as a site’s value is its expected realisation under a bona fide sale, assuming all non-site improvements for the land had not been made.
  8. [24]
    Having found these differences in approach, the Member held that the respondent’s valuation for Capalaba Park was not so obviously excessive that a taint or error must be inferred, such that the appellant had not satisfied its onus of proof of error in the valuation.
  9. [25]
    The Member held that the respondent’s valuation for Capalaba Central acknowledged the effect of the presence of easements, flood impact and design constraints and the evidence did not otherwise establish that the respondent’s valuation was obviously excessive. 
  10. [26]
    The Member observed that the difference between that valuation and the valuation contended for by that appellant “is close to what is an acceptable margin of error”, a reference to an earlier submission by the respondent that a valuation was not excessive if the two valuations contended for fell within a range of ten per cent.  That difference merely established that different valuers had different views and that no error had been established in respect of the respondent’s valuation of Capalaba Central
  11. [27]
    The Member found, in respect of Victoria Point, that the difference in the valuations of each valuer did not demonstrate error as it did not show that the respondent’s valuation was obviously excessive.  Accordingly, the appellant had not satisfied the onus of proof.
  12. [28]
    Finally, in relation to Morayfield, the Member noted that the valuers disagreed on the rate per square metre for the unencumbered site area, the discount to be applied to the flood impacted land and to the suspended slab land.  Mr Weir had undertaken a subjective assessment based on his experience, whereas Mr Ladewig adopted an agreed mitigation strategy.  The Member accepted that latter approach as both logical and transparent and found there was error in the respondent’s valuation.
  13. [29]
    In assigning a valuation for Morayfield, the Member noted that Mr Ladewig had no regard to where the site fell in the hierarchy of shopping centres and took no account of the centre’s catchment, portraying the site as if it were a neighbourhood centre, whereas Mr Weir had regard to the site being a higher order shopping centre, of sufficient size to draw from a very wide catchment, rendering the site superior to almost all of the comparable sales.  The Member found that Mr Weir had sufficiently identified the different market and amended the valuation accordingly.

Appellants’ submissions

  1. [30]
    The appellants submit that the Member erred in adopting an approach of looking for error in advance, without detailed consideration of the valuation evidence.  Whilst it was correct that each appellant had the onus of proof in respect of the grounds of appeal, satisfaction of that onus was to be assessed on all of the evidence, not in advance of any consideration of that evidence.  The Member also adopted a gloss to the standard of proof by requiring, in respect of error, that the valuation be obviously excessive.
  2. [31]
    The appellants further submit that the Member erred in treating the appellants’ valuation evidence as merely establishing a different valuation rather than making out that the valuations were excessive as this conclusion was made without the Member considering the valuation evidence in any detail.
  3. [32]
    The appellants submit that success in a valuation appeal from the Land Court requires an appellant to demonstrate error on a consideration of the whole of the evidence before the Court.  Establishment of error does not involve a two-step process.  This Court must conduct a real review of the evidence to determine whether error below has been established in fact or law.  If a consideration of that evidence establishes that the valuations were excessive, error is established by an appellant.  There is no requirement for an appellant to establish that the valuations were “obviously excessive”.
  4. [33]
    The appellants submit that a consideration of all of the relevant circumstances, in the context of the evidence presented to the Court as a whole, establishes that the respondent’s valuation in each appeal was excessive.  Once that conclusion is reached, there were good reasons to accept Mr Ladewig’s valuations in respect of each property, justifying a valuation materially lower than that propounded for by the respondent. 
  5. [34]
    The appellant, in respect of the Victoria Point property, further contends that the Member erred in relying upon the sale of the Victoria Point property in 1999. The parties were not advised of an intention to rely upon that sale and were not given an opportunity to invite submissions regarding that issue.  Procedural fairness required the parties be given such an opportunity.
  6. [35]
    The appellant, in respect of the Morayfield property, further submits that error is established by consideration of the evidence as a whole. The Member erred in expressing a preference for Mr Weir’s valuation opinion as three aspects of his evidence rendered that opinion evidence unreliable.  Mr Ladewig’s evidence was not affected by those errors and ought to have been accepted in all the circumstances.

Respondent’s submissions

  1. [36]
    The respondent submits that the Member properly held that none of the appellants successfully discharged their onus of establishing that the valuations were excessive in respect of the Capalaba Park, Capalaba Central and Victoria Point properties.  Further, the Member properly accepted the respondent’s valuation of the Morayfield property, subject to an adjustment for the flood affected portion.
  2. [37]
    The respondent submits that the Member properly rejected Mr Ladewig’s valuation methodology as erroneous.  Once the Member properly had grounds to reject Mr Ladewig’s methodology, there was no evidence upon which to conclude that the valuations were excessive.
  3. [38]
    The respondent submits that, whilst this Court is obliged to conduct a real review of the record and reasons, and draw its own inferences and conclusions about the correctness of each valuation the subject of appeal, each appellant bears an onus of establishing that the orders below are the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error warranting the setting aside in whole or part of the decision.
  4. [39]
    The respondent submits that a fair reading of the Member’s reasons supports a conclusion that the Member gave a detailed consideration of each of the valuer’s evidence and of the issues relevant to the appeals.  The reasons in respect of each appeal must be read in the context of the reasons as a whole, including the Member’s earlier, detailed discussion of the evidence and the issues arising on appeal.
  5. [40]
    The respondent submits that the Member did not apply a gloss by using the words “obviously excessive”.  Whether a valuation is excessive involves a challenge against an opinion in which there is ordinarily room for inferences and inclinations.  As such, a difference in values of sufficient quantum is necessary to conclude that a valuation was excessive.  The Member’s reference to the evidence merely establishing a different valuation for the site must be read in the context of the Member’s clear rejection of Mr Ladewig’s valuation approach.
  6. [41]
    The respondent submits that the Member did not deny natural justice in referring to the 1999 sale of a Victoria Point property.  The observation in respect of that sale was made after a conclusion that the evidence of the valuers did not demonstrate error and did not establish that the valuation was excessive.
  7. [42]
    Finally, the respondent submits that the Member did not err in a determination of the Morayfield valuation.  Mr Weir compared sites with sites, in order of hierarchy, adopting an approach which made best use of the sales evidence.  Mr Weir also considered risks and rewards of developing a major regional shopping centre.  His square meterage rate was supported by a consideration of the comparable sales as a whole.

Applicable Principles

  1. [43]
    An appeal to this Court from the Land Court on a valuation appeal must be by way of rehearing.[4]  This Court may confirm the valuation or reduce or increase the valuation to the amount it considers necessary to correctly make the valuation under the Act.[5]
  2. [44]
    The appeal is to be determined on the evidence before the Land Court, with this Court undertaking a real review of the trial record and reasons, drawing its own inferences and conclusions, and giving the judgment which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to have been given at first instance.[6]
  3. [45]
    To succeed, an appellant must establish error, be it legal, factual or discretionary, warranting the setting aside in whole or part of the decision.[7]  An error of valuation principle is an error of law, as is a failure to make a finding on a material fact in issue.

Consideration

  1. [46]
    Whilst the appellants contend that error is established by reason of a failure by the Member to undertake her own independent assessment of the evidence, a consideration of the Member’s reasons do not support that contention.
  2. [47]
    Those reasons, although brief in the actual determination of each appeal, contained a discussion of the relevant principles, as well as a detailed discussion of the methodology of each valuer and the differences in the approach adopted by each valuer in relation to the issues identified as relevant to the appeal.
  3. [48]
    A reading of the reasons as a whole supports a conclusion that the Member did undertake the process of considering the evidence, drawing her own inferences and conclusions, before concluding that the appeals in respect of Capalaba Park, Capalaba Central and Victoria Point should be dismissed and that the appeal in respect of Morayfield be allowed with an amended valuation.
  4. [49]
    The Member also did not err by imposing a gloss in determining whether each appellant had established that the valuation was excessive.  The reference to “obviously excessive” was a convenient, short form acknowledgment that a valuation is a discretionary determination.  The reference to “the difference between the two valuations is close to what is an acceptable margin of error” was an acknowledgment that there are a range of values within a proper exercise of that discretionary determination.
  5. [50]
    Those references, when read in the context of the Member’s reasons as a whole, correctly record that it is only where the evidence establishes that the valuation given can properly be said to fall outside of a proper exercise of that discretionary determination that an appellant establishes error warranting intervention on appeal.
  6. [51]
    The Member also did not err by denying the appellant natural justice when referring to the 1999 sale of Victoria Point.  That appeal was dismissed on the basis that the evidence of the valuers did not demonstrate error, a conclusion supported by the proper rejection of Mr Ladewig’s methodology. The subsequent reference to the 1999 sale did not materially affect the Member’s reasons for dismissing the Victoria Point appeal.
  7. [52]
    Further, on a consideration of the record as a whole and of the Member’s reasons, no error is established in the dismissal of each of the appeals in relation to Capalaba Park, Capalaba Central and Victoria Point.
  8. [53]
    Mr Ladewig’s methodology did not have regard to the retail hierarchy of shopping centres or of that centre’s catchment.  He undertook the process of an assessment of valuation by looking at the basket of comparable sales and scaling them according to the size of the site.  A proper valuation necessarily requires an examination of the sites, in the context of the retail hierarchy and in the further context of a needs-based analysis of the demographics of that catchment.  A site is more than a block of dirt.  Its value is not affected solely by the size of that site.  Such an approach is properly to be described as overly simplistic.
  9. [54]
    That simplistic approach infected Mr Ladewig’s use of comparable sales of what were, largely, neighbourhood centres whereas the subject properties were sub-regional shopping centres.  Whilst one comparable sale, Delamore, was in that category, it was properly given little weight by either valuer, meaning it did not materially impact upon the central criticism of Mr Ladewig’s methodology.
  10. [55]
    It is also open, on a consideration of the evidence as a whole, to accept Mr Ladewig’s approach to the significance of agreements for lease but find that Mr Ladewig’s evidence as a whole did not support a conclusion that the respondent’s valuations were excessive.  Such a conclusion follows from the rejection of Mr Ladewig’s overall methodology.
  11. [56]
    Similarly, whilst a consideration of the evidence as a whole supports a conclusion that Mr Weir’s reliance upon trading performance was properly to be disregarded, the rejection of Mr Ladewig’s methodology rendered it open to reject his valuation opinion and accept Mr Weir’s valuation opinion, notwithstanding Mr Weir’s reliance on trading performance.
  12. [57]
    Once Mr Ladewig’s methodology is rejected and Mr Weir’s methodology is accepted, there was no evidence upon which it could be properly found that the evidence supported a conclusion that the respondent’s valuations for Capalaba Park, Capalaba Central and Victoria Point were excessive.
  13. [58]
    Nothing in the evidence founds a conclusion that “a taint or error must be inferred” from the respondent’s valuation.[8]  Mr Weir’s evidence was cogent and supported each of the respondent’s valuations, negating any basis for a conclusion that that valuation was excessive.
  14. [59]
    Different considerations apply in the assessment of the record as a whole and of the Member’s reasons in respect of Morayfield.  In respect of that property, the Member specifically did not accept Mr Weir’s deduction for the flood affected area and an area that requires a suspended slab, yet preferred Mr Weir’s assessment of the base rate per square metre for the unencumbered site area.
  15. [60]
    Whilst these conclusions may appear inconsistent, a consideration of the Member’s reasons of the evidence supports a conclusion that the Member’s findings were adequately explained in the reasons and consistent with the accepted evidence as a whole.
  16. [61]
    The Member’s acceptance of Mr Ladewig’s approach to the deduction for the flood affected area and the area that requires a suspended slab did not prevent an acceptance of Mr Weir’s base rate.  A preference for, and acceptance of, Mr Weir’s assessment of the base rate was explained by Mr Ladewig’s failure to consider Morayfield’s place in the retail hierarchy and failure to take into account the centre’s catchment.  The acceptance of Mr Weir’s evidence as to the base rate was entirely consistent with the Member’s earlier rejection of Mr Ladewig’s methodology and acceptance of, and preference for, Mr Weir’s approach.
  17. [62]
    That acceptance was open on a consideration of the evidence as a whole.  Central to Mr Weir’s evidence was the nature of Morayfield’s site and catchment.  As Mr Weir observed in evidence, “the better shopping centre sites are generally in that three to four hundred dollars a square metre”.  Mr Weir considered Morayfield to be in the category of a better shopping centre site, having regard to its presence as a major regional site with a substantial existing catchment.
  18. [63]
    Mr Weir’s evidence as to the significance of Morayfield’s place in the retail hierarchy and its catchment supports a conclusion that it was open on the whole of the evidence to accept Mr Weir’s base rate of $350 per square metre.  That rate was at the midpoint of the rates attracted by shopping centres of the nature of Morayfield.
  19. [64]
    Once it is concluded that it was open, on a consideration of the evidence as a whole, to accept Mr Weir’s opinion as to the base rate applicable to Morayfield, there is no basis to conclude that the Member erred in fixing the amended valuation of $43 million.

Conclusions

  1. [65]
    The Member properly concluded that the appellants in Capalaba Park, Capalaba Central and Victoria Point failed to establish error, warranting a conclusion that the respondent’s valuation in respect of each of those properties was excessive.
  2. [66]
    Further, a consideration of the record as a whole and of the Member’s reasons supports a conclusion that it was open on the evidence to find that none of those appellants had established that the respondent’s valuations in respect of each of those properties was excessive.  There was no error on the part of the Member in the application of the applicable test or in failing to properly consider the evidence as a whole.
  3. [67]
    No error has also been demonstrated in the Member’s determination of the amended valuation for Morayfield.  A consideration of the record as a whole supports a conclusion that it was open to accept Mr Weir’s base rate for Morayfield, notwithstanding the rejection of his evidence as to the deduction applicable to areas of that site.

Orders:

  1. Each appeal be dismissed.
  2. If the parties wish to make submissions on costs, the parties are to file and serve written submissions, limited to three pages, within seven days of the date hereof.
  3. Absent the filing of any submissions on costs, each appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed on the standard basis.

Footnotes

[1]Appeal Book p 35, l 40

[2]Appeal Book p 36, l 1.

[3]Appeal Book p 35, l 20.

[4]Land Valuation Act 2010 s 172.

[5]Ibid s 170.

[6]Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 [23]; [2003] HCA 22; Department of Natural Resources & Mines v Spender [2003] QLAC 86 [33]; Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines v Kent Street Pty Ltd (2009) 171 LGERA 365, 416-418; [2009] QCA 399.

[7]Ipswich City Council v Wilson (2011) 32 QLCR 357 [41]; [2011] QLAC 6.

[8]Players Pty Ltd v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2001] SASC 369 [21].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    YFG Shopping Centres Pty Ltd as Tte & Anor v Valuer-General; Shayher Alliance Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General; Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General; Lipoma Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General

  • Shortened Case Name:

    YFG Shopping Centres Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General; Shayher Alliance Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General; Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General; Lipoma Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General

  • MNC:

    [2020] QLAC 6

  • Court:

    QLAC

  • Judge(s):

    Boddice J, kingham FY, Member McNarara JR

  • Date:

    15 Dec 2020

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.
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