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Kettering Pty Ltd v Noosa Shire Council

 

[2002] QCA 16

 

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

 

CITATION:

Kettering P/L v Noosa Shire Council [2002] QCA 16

PARTIES:

KETTERING PTY LTD  ACN 010 014 150
(appellant/respondent)
v
NOOSA SHIRE COUNCIL
(respondent/appellant)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 429 of 2001

P&E Appeal No 176 of 1995

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Planning and Environment Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

8 February 2002

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

29 October 2001

JUDGES:

McPherson and Davies JJA and Ambrose J

Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made.

ORDER:

Appeal allowed.

Set aside the order made in the Planning and Environment Court and make, in lieu, the following order:

Section 3.5(4)(d) of the Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1990 has the effect that no compensation is payable to the respondent for injurious affection by the coming into force of the development control plan described in these reasons.

Order the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of this appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

LOCAL GOVERNMENT - TOWN PLANNING - GENERAL MATTERS - PLANNING SCHEMES AND INSTRUMENTS AND LIKE MATTERS - QUEENSLAND - where appellant owned land that was zoned "rural pursuits" under the respondent's planning scheme - where appellant could reasonably have been expected to succeed in rezoning the land - where respondent amended the planning scheme ending this prospect - whether payment of compensation was excluded by s 3.5(4)(d) of the Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1990

LOCAL GOVERNMENT - TOWN PLANNING - GENERAL MATTERS - ACQUISITION AND COMPENSATION - COMPENSATION - IN GENERAL - whether payment of compensation under s 3.5 of the Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1990 is excluded where a planning scheme indirectly restricts the use of land

Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1990 (Qld), s 3.5(1), s 3.5(4)(c), s 3.5(4)(d), s 3.5(4)(g), s 4.5(1), s 4.5(6)

Sparke v Noosa Shire Council [2001] QdR 344, considered

T M Burke Estates Pty Ltd v Noosa Shire Council [1998] 2 QdR 448, considered

T M Burke Estates Pty Ltd v Council of the Shire of Noosa(2001) 113 LGERA 368, considered

COUNSEL:

P D McMurdo QC with T N Trotter for appellant

D R Gore QC with M E Rackemann for respondent

SOLICITORS:

Wakefield Sykes (Tewantin) for appellant

Deacons for respondent

  1. McPHERSON JA: Planning schemes affect what a person may do with his land. Generally, they do so by imposing prohibitions or restrictions on what may be done with it. If a new prohibition or restriction is imposed or an existing one is altered or increased, the effect often is to make the land less useable or saleable and correspondingly to reduce its market value. In those circumstances the owner may be given a statutory right to compensation from the local government that imposed or altered the prohibition or restriction in question.
  1. A right to compensation is conferred by s 3.5(1) of the Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1990. I say “is” conferred knowing that the Act has now been repealed and replaced by the Integrated Planning Act 1997; but the events that are said to have given rise to the respondent’s claim for compensation in this case took place under the Act of 1990, which I shall refer to simply as the “Act”.  Section 3.5(1) gives a right to compensation “in accordance with this section” where a person’s interest in premises in a planning scheme area is injuriously affected. So far as material here, it contemplates that the injurious affection may take place in one of two ways:
  1. by the coming into force of any provision contained in a planning scheme; or
  1. by any prohibition or restriction imposed by the planning scheme.
  1. Having in s 3.5(1) conferred a right to compensation, subs (4) of s 3.5 proceeds to qualify it by taking it away in certain specified circumstances. One is where the claimant’s interest is affected by a planning scheme which by its operation limits the size of allotments: s 3.5(4)(c). Another is where the subdivision of the land is prohibited or restricted: s 3.5(4)(g). Another, which is contained in s 3.5(4)(d), is where the planning scheme by its operation prohibits or restricts the use of the land for a particular purpose.
  1. In none of those cases has the owner a right to compensation. Any right he might have had under s 3.5(1) is removed by the exceptions introduced by s 3.5(4). Section s 3.5(4)(d), however, also contains a specific limitation on the extent of the primary exception in s 3.5(4)(d). Having first excepted the right to compensation in a case where the planning scheme by its operation prohibits or restricts the use of the land for a particular purpose, s 3.5(4)(d) goes on to limit it as follows:

“… unless the applicant establishes that the applicant had a legal right immediately before the provision in question of the planning scheme came into force to use the land … for the particular purpose which is so prohibited or restricted.”

The effect of that limitation is to restore the right to compensation originally conferred by s 3.5(1) that was taken away by s 3.5(4)(d), but to do so only in the particular circumstances specified in the limitation that is added to s 3.5(4)(d). In that event, but not otherwise, the owner is entitled to compensation.

  1. The respondent in the present case claims that its land has been injuriously affected by a restriction comprised in a development control plan which came into force as part of the planning scheme on 21 September 1991. The land was previously zoned “rural pursuits”, but the respondent claims that it had a reasonable prospect of successfully applying to the appellant Council for approval to a rezoning and a subdivision of the land that would produce 73 house lots and 132 group title units. Because of the coming into force of the development control plan, that prospect has been extinguished. The land will now produce no more than 24 house sites and 75 units. It is that restrictive effect of the plan that is said to give rise to the claim for compensation.
  1. The first step is to identify the respondent’s position as it was before 21 September 1991. At that time it could have applied to the Council for its approval to a rezoning and subdivision. If that application had been approved, it would have had to have been followed by a further application under s 4.5(1) of the Act to the Minister for the approval of the Governor in Council under s 4.5(6) of the Act for a consequential amendment of the planning scheme. That double process of application and approval was a condition precedent to the use of the land for the purpose the respondent had in mind. Until those approvals were obtained, the respondent could not be said to have had a “legal right” to use the land in that way or for that purpose. It is true that s 3.5(5) of the Act supplies a partial explanation or exposition of what is meant by “legal right” in s 3.5(4)(d), which appears helpful to the respondent. It says that, for the purpose of that provision, it is not to be taken that the applicant did not have a legal right “by reason only that the applicant's right depended on an exercise of discretion by the local government in the applicant’s favour”, provided that the applicant shows it was reasonable to expect that the exercise of discretion would have been in the applicant’s favour if it had been sought immediately before the planning scheme provision came into force.
  1. The point on this appeal is to my mind covered by the decision in Sparke v Noosa Shire Council [2001] 1 Qd R 344, which also turned on s 3.5(4)(d) and s 3(5) of the Act. In giving the reasons of this Court in that case, Pincus JA said ([2001] 1 Qd R 344, 346) of  the respondent Council’s submission in that case:

“In the result, then, the respondent says there were two approvals necessary, each of them discretionary. For that reason on the respondent’s argument, the case does not fall within subs (5) of s 3.5 … The respondent says the appellants did not have the legal right referred to in sub s (4)(d) and their not having it was not by reason only that that right depended on the exercise of a discretion by the respondent. It also depended upon the exercise of a discretion by the Governor in Council.”

His Honour, with the concurrence of McMurdo P and Thomas JA, went on to reject an argument by the appellant claimants in that case, which he said “would distort the meaning of s 3.1(5)”. In the result, the Court there affirmed the decision of the Planning and Environment Court, which had dismissed the claim for compensation.

  1. The state of affairs that prevails here is not to my mind legally distinguishable from that considered in Sparke v Noosa Shire Council [2001] 1 Qd R 344. The respondent here is within the ambit of the exception imposed by s 3.5(4)(d) upon the right to compensation conferred by s 3.5(1) and it is not taken out of that exception by the limitation added to s 3.5(4)(d) that begins with the word “unless …”. It remains within the exception because the respondent had to surmount not only the obstacle presented by the discretionary power of the Council as the local government under s 4.5(1), but also that presented by the discretionary power of the Governor in Council under s 4.5(6). Because of the existence of that discretionary power of the Governor in Council, it is not possible, in terms of s 3.5(5), to say that before 21 September 1991 it was “by reason only that the applicant’s right depended upon the exercise of discretion by the local government in the applicant’s favour” that the respondent in this case had no “legal right” in terms of s 3.5(4)(d) . The discretion of the Governor in Council under s 4(6) to refuse the application was another reason for saying that the respondent had no such legal right.
  1. What the respondent seeks to do is to discover a difference between the terms used in s 3.5(4)(d) and those used in s 3.5(1)(a)(i) and (ii). It is submitted that it is only if the operation of the prohibition or restriction referred to in s 3.5(4)(d) is “direct” that a claim is excepted from the right to compensation conferred by s 3.5(1), and that here the restriction is at best indirect. There is nothing in the wording of s 3.5(4)(d) that justifies any such construction. It apparently takes its stand on the presence in s 3.5(4)(d) of the expression “which by its operation” that is used in describing a planning scheme as one which prohibits or restricts use of the land. To my mind, the whole of that description is but the verbal equivalent in another form of the requirement in s 3.5(1)(a)(i) and (ii) that the land or the owner’s interest in it be injuriously affected by the coming into force of a planning scheme or by any prohibition or restriction imposed by such a scheme. Although s 3.5(4)(d) does not precisely repeat the language of s 3.5(1), it neither adds to nor detracts from that requirement of s 3.5(1)(a).
  1. The respondent’s submission would treat s 3.5(4)(d) as creating a right to compensation that is different from and in some respects wider than the right under s 3.5(1)(a) from which it is intended to detract. That would have the extraordinary result that, as the reasons of Davies JA demonstrate, the less direct or more remote the connection between the planning scheme provision and the injurious affection suffered by the owner, the stronger his prospect of recovering compensation would become. That is to ascribe an irrational outcome to the legislation. The foundation for the respondent’s claim to compensation is s 3.5(1) and the exception imposed upon it by s 3.5(4)(d) cannot create a right to compensation that rises above its source. Exceptions are by their nature limitations on and not extensions of the rules on which they operate.
  1. I should add that I have read, and I agree with, the observations of Davies JA on the decisions or the reasoning in T M Burke Estates Pty Ltd v Noosa Shire Council [1998] 2 Qd R 448 and T M Burke Estates Pty Ltd v Council of the Shire of Noosa (2001) 113 LGERA 368, and on the scheme of s 3.5 and its interpretation.
  1. The appeal should be allowed with costs, and the order made in the Planning and Environment Court set aside. In lieu there should be an order in the form proposed in the reasons of Davies JA.
  1. DAVIES JA:  This is an appeal by the Noosa Shire Council against the decision of a Planning and Environment Court judge, on the trial of a separate and preliminary point whether the provisions of s 3.5(4) and s 3.5(5) of the Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1990 precluded a claim for compensation for injurious affection to land which Kettering had made against the Council.  The decision was that s 3.5(4)(d) of the Act, the provision relied on by the Council, did not preclude Kettering from claiming compensation.
  1. That question arose in the following way. Kettering was the owner and developer of land in the Noosa Shire which was part of the planning scheme for the Shire of Noosa. Prior to the gazettal, on 21 September 1991, of a development control plan, which was part of that planning scheme, it was common ground that Kettering could reasonably have been expected to succeed in rezoning the land and subdividing it so as to yield 73 house lots and 132 building units or group title units and that afterwards and because of the gazettal of that development control plan it could reasonably expect rezoning and subdivision only for 24 house lots and 75 building or group title units. In consequence, it contended, the value of its land was reduced by $9,300,000. The main reason why the gazettal of the development control plan altered this expectation was that it contemplated that a substantial part of the land would not be capable of development for any type of residential use.
  1. This question came to be decided by the Planning and Environment Court in consequence of an earlier order of that court that this question be tried and determined separately from and before the other issues in the appeal. It was common ground before this Court that the question before the Planning and Environment Court and before this Court is one of construction of s 3.5(4)(d) of the Act.
  1. Section 3.5 is relevantly in the following terms:

"(1)Where a person -

(a)has an interest in premises within a planning scheme area and the interest is injuriously affected -

(i)by the coming into force of any provision contained in a planning scheme;  or

(ii)by any prohibition or restriction imposed by the planning scheme;

the person is, subject to compliance with this section, entitled to obtain from the local government compensation in respect of the injurious affection … and may claim that compensation in accordance with this section.

(2)Where land under a planning scheme is -

(a)included in a zone wherein, pursuant to the planning scheme, the only permitted use of the land (other than the continuance of the use to which the land was lawfully being put at the time of the coming into force of the planning scheme and other than a permissible use of the land) is a use for public purposes;  or

(b)is affected by a proposed road (including a road widening);

it is to be taken to be injuriously affected pursuant to (1)(a).

(4)Compensation is not payable -

(c)where an interest in premises is affected by a planning scheme which by its operation … limits the size of allotments …

(d)subject to subsection (2), where an interest in premises is affected by a planning scheme which by its operation prohibits or restricts the use of land … for a particular purpose, unless the applicant establishes that the applicant had a legal right immediately before the provision in question of the planning scheme came into force to use the land … for the particular purpose which is so prohibited or restricted;

(g)in respect of any affection of an interest in premises by or pursuant to a planning scheme … under which the subdivision of the land is prohibited or restricted.

(5)For the purposes of subsection (4)(d), it is not to be taken that an applicant did not have the legal right referred to in that subsection by reason only that the applicant's right depended upon an exercise of discretion by the local government in the applicant's favour if the applicant shows that it is reasonable to expect that the exercise of discretion would have been in the applicant's favour had it been sought immediately before the relevant provision of the planning scheme came into force.

(8)Subject to subsections (2A) and (9), the following provisions are to have effect in assessing compensation in respect of a claim made under subsection (1)(a) -

(a)the amount of compensation is (subject to paragraphs (b), (c) and (d)) to be an amount equal to the difference between the market value of the interest immediately after the time of the coming into operation of the planning scheme by virtue of the operation whereof the claim for compensation arose and what would have been the market value of that interest if the provision had not come into operation;

…"

  1. The learned Planning and Environment Court judge held, and the respondent contends, that, notwithstanding that the respondent's interest in its land was injuriously affected, pursuant to s 3.5(1)(a), by the coming into force of the development control plan, and that that was because the likely use of the land for residential purposes had been substantially reduced by the planning scheme, the planning scheme by its operation did not restrict the use thereof for residential purposes within the meaning of s 3.5(4)(d). That was because the court held and the respondent contends that s 3.5(4)(d) operates only where a planning scheme by its direct operation restricts the use of land and that was not the case here. The court was of the view and the respondent contends that that construction of s 3.5(4)(d) and that consequence here were compelled by the decision of this Court in T M Burke Estates Pty Ltd v Noosa Shire Council.[1]  It is convenient to turn immediately to the question whether that case requires that construction to be placed on the provision.
  1. In that case the appellant's land was zoned under the respondent's planning scheme so as to prohibit subdivision but was so designated under the scheme's strategic plan that there were reasonable prospects that in the future rezoning would be permitted to allow subdivision for residential use. On 5 May 1995 the designation of the land under the strategic plan was changed to "public and private open space" and a development control plan was gazetted with an objective of ensuring that no forms of urban development were permitted on it. Factually then, as Mr Gore QC for the respondent pointed out, that case is not substantially different from this. However in that case the respondent's counsel sought to argue only that compensation was not payable by reason of par (c) or par (g) of s 3.5(4). When asked whether it relied on par (d) senior counsel for the respondent specifically disavowed reliance on it. The Court then proceeded to consider only whether par (c) or par (g) precluded compensation.
  1. It held that neither of these paragraphs did preclude payment of compensation and the reason why it so held is that it concluded that, if either were given the construction contended for by the respondent it would deprive par (d) of any operation in one circumstance in which it was plainly intended to operate to permit payment of compensation; that is, where a legal right to use land for a particular purpose is prohibited or restricted.[2]  The Court said:[3]

"To give such a rezoning the effect that either para (c) or (g) would apply would have, it seems to us, a consequence unintended by the legislature in a case which comes within the exception in para (d).  Where it does, para (d), which is specifically concerned with the use of land, and consequently rezoning which directly affects that use, would not preclude the payment of compensation.  But if paras (c) and (g) are to be given the construction which his Honour gave them, each of them would preclude it in such a case because any prohibition or restriction on the use of land in consequence of a rezoning to a less intensive use would also ordinarily indirectly prohibit or restrict subdivision of land and limit the size of allotments.  In other words they would deprive the exception in para (d) of any operation in one circumstance when it appears it was plainly intended to operate.

In order to avoid such construction it is necessary to distinguish between the direct operation of rezoning, the change in use to which land may be put, and its indirect operation, that in consequence it may affect subdivision and the size of allotments.  That is the way in which these paragraphs in s 3.5(4) should, in our view, be construed."

  1. It is from the second last sentence in that passage that his Honour and the respondent appear to have reached the conclusion that par (d) applies to preclude payment of compensation only where the direct operation of the planning scheme prohibits or restricts the use of land for a particular purpose. But the Court in T M Burke was not saying that.  Rather it was saying that, in order to give par (d) an operation in an area in which it appears plainly to have been intended to operate to permit payment of compensation, that is, where the exception applies,[4] both par (c) and par (g) must be given a limited meaning:  they must be construed so as not to include the case where the operation of a planning scheme affects primarily the use of the land and only, in consequence of that affection, indirectly the size of allotments or the subdivision of land.  To give par (c) and par (g) a broader construction in such circumstances would be to circumvent the operation of that exception.
  1. It follows that T M Burke is not authority for construing the phrase "by its operation" in par (d) to have the effect of excluding payment of compensation only where the effect of a planning scheme upon the use of land is direct, thereby permitting payment whenever that effect may be indirect.  On the contrary this Court said nothing about that question.
  1. Reference should, however, be made to two further decisions of this Court, referred to in argument, which touch on but do not decide that question. The first is Sparke v Noosa Shire Council,[5] a unanimous decision of this Court concerned primarily with the construction of s 3.5(5) which defined the circumstances in which a legal right must be taken to exist for the purposes of par (4)(d).  It was common ground in that case that the first part in par (d), with which this Court is concerned in this case, was satisfied.  I should, however add that I can see no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision in Sparke nor do I consider that it produces any troublesome consequences in reaching a workable interpretation of s 3.5.[6]
  1. The second case is T M Burke Estates Pty Ltd v Council of the Shire of Noosa ("T M Burke No 2")[7] in which, having failed to litigate par (d) in T M Burke, the Council sought to raise it as a bar to payment of the compensation the right to payment of which this Court had held, in T M Burke, was not precluded by par (c) or par (g).  The Court held, by a majority, that, the right to compensation having been finally determined in T M Burke, there was an estoppel as to the existence of that right.  However the majority judges in T M Burke No 2, McMurdo P and Thomas JA, appear to have misunderstood the effect of the earlier decision in T M Burke.[8]  It may be this misunderstanding which caused their Honours to express some doubt about the correctness of the interpretation reached in that case and to suggest that it also[9] might produce troublesome consequences in reaching a workable interpretation of s 3.5.  Construed in the way in which they were construed in T M Burke, as I have explained it above, par (c) and par (g) do not, in my opinion produce any troublesome consequences.  Nor does par (d) construed in the way in which I would construe it below.
  1. The phrase "injuriously affected" is not defined in or for the purposes of s 3.5 although s 3.5(2) provides for two cases in which land under a planning scheme is "taken to be injuriously affected".  Such injurious affection appears to be measured by a loss in market value:  see s 3.5(8)(a).
  1. The scheme of s 3.5 is that a person is prima facie entitled to compensation for injurious affection to an interest by the coming into force of a provision in a planning scheme. It seems to have been common ground in this case that the respondent was so entitled unless its entitlement was excluded by s 3.5(4). That subsection then excludes from that right a number of specific cases in which the legislature considered that compensation should not be payable. Speaking generally, these are cases in which the coming into force of a provision of a planning scheme has only a remote or indirect effect on the value of a person's interest in premises. Paragraph (a) excludes any effect on building work done or contracts made unless required by law and approved by the local government; par (b) excludes any effect where the same effect has already been caused by some other provision already in force;  par (c), as already noted, excludes effects on the size of allotments or number of buildings or their size;  par (e) excludes compensation for anything done in contravention of a planning scheme;  par (f) excludes compensation in respect of anything done in contravention of an interim development control provision or building approval;  and par (g) excludes compensation in respect of a prohibition or restriction on subdivision only.
  1. Paragraph (d) can be seen to be subject to two exceptions. The first is by being made subject to s 3.5(2). It thereby does not prevent compensation being payable for a prohibition or restriction on the use of land where that is because the land is included in the zone in which, under the planning scheme, the only permitted use of the land is one for public purposes or because it is affected by a proposed road. The second exception, contained in par (d), is where the applicant had a legal right before the provision came into force to use land or erect a building for a particular purpose which is prohibited or restricted by the provision. In both of these cases compensation is payable.
  1. It can be seen from the paragraphs of s 3.5(4) that injurious affection which may give rise to compensation is thereby limited to affection of an interest in premises which is direct and immediate. Nowhere is this clearer than in what I have described as the exceptions to par (d):  for example, one of the ways in which a planning scheme might most directly and immediately operate to prohibit or restrict the use of land would be where, before it came into force, there was a right to use the land for a particular purpose which the provision prohibited or restricted.  To construe par (d), as the learned primary judge held and the respondent contends, so as to exclude payment of compensation only where a planning scheme, by its direct operation, restricts the use of land would be inconsistent with the scheme of these paragraphs in general and with the exceptions in particular.  The correct construction is to the contrary.
  1. So construed par (d) applies in this case to preclude payment of compensation. The reason why the respondent's interest is affected by the coming into force of the development control plan is that that plan, by its operation, restricts the use of land. But it does not do so immediately and directly; it does so only potentially thereby reducing its value. That is because a development control plan merely indicates the intentions for the future development of designated parts or the whole of a planning scheme area.[10]  That this development control plan is no more than a statement of intent for the future can be seen from an examination of the plan.
  1. The development control plan, in its opening paragraph states that the "Plan seeks to maintain the natural beauty of Noosa Hill by ensuring that any development in the area is integrated with the existing environment". Clause 6 states the intent of the Council and its implementation, in accordance with this aim, in relation to the four sub-precincts within precinct 2, the area within which the whole of the land the subject of these proceedings is situate. The intent of sub-precinct A is said to be to permit limited development of an intensity equivalent to that of conventional dwelling house development which should be designed to integrate with the existing vegetation and slopes; that intensity should not exceed one dwelling unit per 600 square metres and building height should not exceed two storeys or the existing tree height, whichever is the less. The intent of sub-precinct B is in similar terms though here it is proposed that the building height should generally not exceed one storey and any development should be set within existing trees. It is also said that the canopy of trees over Murwong Drive should be retained and it is acknowledged that this requirement may constrain construction of Murwong Drive and hence its ultimate carrying capacity. Sub-precinct C is intended to permit the most intensive of development forms as the land is said to be suited to conventional subdivision as well as development for unit accommodation. However density over the sub-precinct is proposed to be limited and may be further constrained following investigation of access and drainage constraints. It is intended that sub-precinct D, the largest of the sub-precincts, should be retained for open space. As mentioned earlier, it is the intention with respect to sub-precinct D which will cause the greatest restriction in the use of the respondent's land.
  1. It follows that I would allow the appeal, set aside the order made in the Planning and Environment Court and make, in lieu, the following order:

Section 3.5(4)(d) of the Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1990 has the effect that no compensation is payable to the respondent for injurious affection by the coming into force of the development control plan described in these reasons.

I would order the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of this appeal.

  1. AMBROSE J:  I agree with the orders proposed by McPherson JA.
  1. I have read the reasons for judgment of McPherson JA and Davies JA and agree with them.

Footnotes

[1][1998] 2 QdR 448;  hereinafter "T M Burke".

[2]See the phrase commencing "unless … " in that paragraph.

[3]At 451.

[4]That is, where the phrase commencing "unless …" in that paragraph applies.

[5][2001] 1 QdR 344.

[6]Contrary to the view expressed in the majority judgment in T M Burke Estates Pty Ltd v Council of the Shire of Noosa (2001) 113 LGERA 368 at 376.

[7]See fn 6.

[8]Their Honours appear to have assumed, wrongly in my opinion, that this Court had, in T M Burke, considered and rejected the  application to the case of s 3.5(4)(d).  This was not so, counsel for Burke having disavowed reliance on that clause.  As Pincus JA, who dissented said, rightly in my opinion, at 385 "this Court, understandably, came away from the 1997 hearing with the impression that the only points of resistance to the claim in the first case, present or prospective, were under pars (c) and (g)".

[9]That is, as well as the unanimous decision of this Court in Sparke.  See fn 6.

[10]Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act, s 2.5.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Kettering P/L v Noosa Shire Council

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Kettering Pty Ltd v Noosa Shire Council

  • MNC:

    [2002] QCA 16

  • Court:

    QCA

  • Judge(s):

    McPherson JA, Davies JA, Ambrose J

  • Date:

    08 Feb 2002

Litigation History

No Litigation History

Appeal Status

No Status