Queensland Judgments


Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

GCE v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner


[2006] QSC 58






Trial Division





24 March 2006




15 February 2006


Mackenzie J


1.That the application is dismissed;

2.That there be no order as to costs;

3.That all documents filed in the matter, the written submissions of counsel and the transcript be sealed in a suitable receptacle and marked “not to be opened without the order of a judge”;

4.That the applicant’s identity not be published;

5.That the reasons be published to the parties;

6.That the parties have leave to make further written submissions concerning further publication of the reasons, such submissions, if any, to be delivered to my Associate on or before 4pm on 28 March  2006;

7.That if there are no such submissions, the reasons be published forthwith on the Queensland Courts website;

8.That if further submissions are made, the issue of further publication be reserved.


ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS FOR REVIEW – GENERALLY – where application for review of decision by Anti-Discrimination Commissioner refusing to extend time limited by s138 of Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 for making a complaint under that Act – where Commissioner not satisfied that complainant had shown good cause for extension of time – whether error of law on face of the record – whether error relating to facts – whether privacy of applicant should be preserved

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld)

Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld)

Attorney- General v Leveller Magazine Ltd (1979) AC 440

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1998) 185 CLR 541

Buderim Ginger Ltd v Booth (2003) 1 QdR 147

J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) (1995) 2 Qd R 10

Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411

R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13


J  P Murphy for the applicant

A A J Horneman-Wren for the respondent


Porter Davies for the applicant

[1] This is an application under the Judicial Review Act 1991 for review of a decision of the delegate of the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner refusing to extend the time limited by s 138 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 for the making of a complaint under that Act.  The applicant is aggrieved by the decision because it precludes her having her complaint of sexual harassment heard and determined on the merits.  The respondent adopted the stance endorsed by the High Court in R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 as the “usual course” by not making substantive submissions in support of the respondent’s delegate’s decision.


[2] The application to the Commission, which, inter alia, sought orders under s 138(2) that the Commissioner accept the applicant’s complaint and that pursuant to s 172 the time limit for making a complaint under s 138(1) be extended, was received by the Commission on 3 August 2004.  The affidavit of the applicant filed with the application, which is annexed to her solicitor’s affidavit in the present application, refers to a series of events commencing not long after she started work in November 1996 and continuing until 2003. It provided a history of the complaints of sexual harassment, and other events occurring from about mid 1999 following a change in officeholders at the top.

[3] Whether the other events were related to or consequential upon the alleged sexual harassment is not an issue in these proceedings. It can be gleaned from the exhibits to the affidavit of the applicant’s solicitor in the present proceedings that the complaint, in so far as it related to certain administrative decisions taken from about mid 1999 onwards, was not accepted by the Commissioner, apparently on the ground that those events did not disclose potential breaches of the Act.  That decision was notified by letter dated 9 September 2004.  No steps were taken to challenge it. 

[4] The decision in respect of which the present proceedings have been brought is contained in a letter dated 13 July 2005.  The issue before the Commissioner’s delegate was whether the discretion to accept the complaints that fell outside the statutory time limit should be accepted.  For reasons stated in the letter, the delegate rejected the complaint.  The underlying reason for rejecting it was that the complainant had not shown good cause why the time limit for bringing the complaint should be extended.  The delegate acted on the basis that the allegations raised in the complaint related to events commencing after the date of commencement of employment up to 23 August 2000.  The complaint having been received by the Commission on 3 August 2004, the delegate observed that any incident alleged to have occurred prior to 3 August 2003, the latest date upon which an act occurring within the twelve month limitation period could have occurred, had occurred approximately 3 to 7 years outside the statutory time limit.  That delay was characterised as “very significant”.

[5] The applicant accepted the accuracy of the sections of the reasons relating to “Length of Delay” and “Circumstances of the Complainant”.   With regard to the section relating to the “Reasons for Delay”, references to paragraphs of the applicant’s affidavit in support of the application to the Anti-Discrimination Commission have been appended to the reasons.  The references support the decision maker’s findings of fact.  They may not be exhaustive, but provide, at least, an evidentiary basis for the findings. 

[6] In the section headed “Conclusion”, some of the reasons for delay are discussed in relation to whether good cause has been shown for granting an extension of time.  It is accepted by the applicant that s 24(b) of the Judicial Review Act requires the existence of a “fact” found by the decision maker to be negatived by the applicant.  Further, it is accepted that the finding of fact must be “plainly wrong”. 

[7] Where proceedings are brought under the Judicial Review Act, there is no determination of the merits of the application.  It is important not to revisit the merits of the decision by putting oneself into the decision maker’s shoes (Buderim Ginger Ltd v Booth (2003) 1 Qd R 147, 157, Atkinson J). The only issues are whether, in reaching the decision not to extend time, the decision maker committed one or more of the kinds of errors applicable to administrative decisions referred to in s 20(2) of the Judicial Review Act, including whether, as contended in ground 7, added in the amended application for a statutory order of review filed by leave and without opposition during the course of the hearing, there was an error of law on the face of the record on the part of the decision maker.

Sufficiency of reasons

[8] The applicant’s counsel made preliminary observations in his written outline about the sufficiency of the reasons for the decision, having regard to s 3 and s 34 of the Judicial Review Act and s 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954.  He conceded in oral argument that no complaint had been made in a timely way about the reasons and that it was too late to take any  point about them in the present proceedings. 

[9] The statutory provisions relied on merely reflect a wider principle that the reasoning supporting findings of fact and law should be sufficiently stated in reasons for judgment or similar decisions.  The reasons set out the material taken into account the nature of the discretion to be exercised, the evidence concerning delay, factors personal to the applicant which appear to be relevant background information, and the facts found about the reasons for delay.  The issue of prejudice was addressed with reference to relevant authority, with findings of fact.  There is then a section headed “Conclusion” in which reasons are given why the decision maker was not persuaded that the time for accepting the complaint should not be extended. 

[10] While the reasons do not expand on her reasoning processes to the extent that might be necessary in some cases, the findings in the “Reasons for Delay” section are for the most part uncontroversial.  In the “Conclusion” section, while in a couple of instances the expression of the conclusion may have benefited from expansion in the interests of clarity, what was intended is, in my view, reasonably clear.  In my view the reasons are sufficient. 

Ground 7

[11] Since it is a pivotal matter, it is convenient to start with this ground, added in the amended application.  It is as follows:

“The decision maker committed an error of law on the face of the record when she applied the incorrect test, namely whether, on the balance of fairness between the parties, it would be reasonable to enlarge time, when the correct test required consideration of whether the applicant had shown good cause for time to be enlarged.”

[12] The decision maker identified s 138(2) of the Anti-Discrimination Act as the source of power to accept the complaint notwithstanding that more than one year had expired since the relevant events occurred.  The concept of  “good cause”  was discussed in a way that clearly demonstrated that the decision maker was aware of the relevant considerations.  Some of those which appear to be relevant to this case were dealt with in sections of the reasons, and conclusions were expressed including that the complainant had not shown good cause. 

[13] The argument underlying the applicant’s contention that a wrong principle was applied is that, in the second last paragraph of the reasons, there is a reference to “the balance of fairness between all parties”.  As the applicant points out, this phrase is to be found in s 175 of the Act which is concerned with what the Tribunal may do if a complaint is referred to it by the Commissioner, although the complaint has been made more than one year after the alleged contravention.  In the present proceedings, the Commissioner’s delegate’s decision was governed by s 138; what the Tribunal might do was irrelevant.

[14] However in the context in which the remark was made, it is far from clear that the delegate was doing more than emphasising that, given the matters listed in the “Conclusion” section of the reasons, including a finding that the applicant had not established good cause, rejection of the complaint was also objectively fair to all parties.  I am therefore not persuaded that the delegate applied an incorrect test in deciding that the applicant had failed to show good cause. 

Principles relied on by Applicant

[15] As the applicant’s submissions imply, although there are six other grounds, they could also be grouped as particulars of grounds raising error of law and the making of findings in the absence of evidence.  The applicant adopted, as had the decision maker, a passage of the reasons of Atkinson J in Buderim Ginger at 156, with which de Jersey CJ and McPherson JA agreed, as the legal framework for the decision maker’s decision. It is in the following terms:

“Although it is not essential to show that there is a reason for and justification for the delay in order to show good cause, such a consideration is always relevant to such a decision.  In forming an opinion that the complainant has shown good cause, the Commissioner is not fettered by rigid rules but must take into account all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case such as the length of the delay; whether the delay is attributable to the acts or omissions of the complainant or his or her legal representatives, the respondent, or both; the circumstances of the complainant; whether there has been a satisfactory explanation for the delay; and whether or not the delay will cause prejudice to the respondent”

[16] It was submitted that, in coming to that decision, the decision maker would proceed correctly if she:

(a) considered those facts that existed and were relevant to the exercise of the discretion to extend time; and

(b) placed what she regarded as the appropriate weight on each of the facts as found, and reached what might be described as a consolidated or composite conclusion of that weighting or evaluation process. 

[17] The focus of the applicant’s complaint is essentially whether the decision maker performed her function by considering all the facts together or whether she assessed relevant factors individually and, having formed an adverse conclusion about some of them as good cause for delay individually, found no good cause.  It was submitted that it was inappropriate to decide that individual elements in the case were insufficient to establish good cause, and decide on that basis that good cause had not been shown.  The ultimate decision whether good cause had been shown had to be made on the basis of all of the relevant facts considered together, not separately.  This will be returned to later. 

[18] It was also submitted that there was nothing to indicate that the decision maker had had regard to the strength of the case in reaching her conclusion.  For this proposition, the applicant relied on the passage from Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411 at 417.  The passage relied on follows Fitzgerald J’s observations that it was neither necessary nor desirable, if indeed possible, to enumerate material circumstances to be considered on an application for extension of time.  He continued that it was obvious that an attempt at fully investigating the merits of a claim on such an application was inappropriate.  He then said:

“I would not exclude from consideration in an appropriate case some obvious strength or weakness in an applicant’s case…”

This is far from saying that the strength of the case is in any way decisive in the mix of factors.  It is easier to see why demonstrated weakness is a factor militating against an extension being given.  The present case is not in that category as there is independent evidence supporting the applicant’s claims. 

Ground 1

[19] This ground revolves around a finding, essentially a repetition of a statement in the applicant’s affidavit in paragraph 348, that in December 1997 she instigated the appointment of a sexual harassment reference officer (“SHRO”) in her work place.  That is reflected in a conclusion that links it with the receipt of information concerning a right to complain to the Anti-Discrimination Commission in October 1997.  It was submitted that the conclusion is to be interpreted as meaning that because she had information about the Commission, she was able to use that information to instigate the appointment of the SHRO. 

[20] Three things were said about this.  The first was that in the official documents about sexual harassment, there was extensive discussion of the SHRO’s functions.  By contrast, discussion of complaining to the Commission was cursory and suggestive that it was a place of last resort.  It was submitted that it was misconceived to find that she was acting on information about the Commission when she instigated the appointment of the SHRO.  Secondly, it was submitted that her instigation of the appointment of a SHRO was irrelevant to delay in complaining to the Commission.  An internal complaint mechanism was different from a complaint to a “public quasi judicial forum”.  Thirdly, as the decision maker had correctly found, there was no mention of the time limit in the documents the applicant had obtained. 

[21] In my view, the decision maker’s conclusion involves no more than stating that the applicant had information in respect of mechanisms available to combat sexual harassment, including a complaint to the Commission and internal processes in respect of which an SHRO was one element.  The fact that she took a step for the purpose of having one appointed was evidence of her ability to understand the options at that time and to act upon them.  That is plainly relevant to characterisation of the delay.  The construction suggested by the applicant is one that attributes significance to the words used that is not in my view intended.  The ground is therefore not made out. 

Ground 2

[22] The point involved in this ground is that because of the medical evidence and that of the applicant, a fact found by the decision maker did not exist.  That fact, according to the submission, was that the applicant’s health did not hinder her to an extent that amounted to good cause for delay. The affidavit from the treating medical practitioner expresses a view on the subject and the time frame of development of the applicant’s condition (especially paragraphs 18 and 19).  As the conclusion reached by the decision maker is essentially a value judgment formed on the basis of all relevant facts, not merely the medical evidence, it is not pertinent to judge good cause solely by reference to the medical evidence.  For example, the evidence in paragraphs 245, 267, 299, 332-333 and 337-374 provide a context for the conclusion.  In my view, the ground as formulated is not made out. 

Ground 3

[23] The issue raised in this ground concerns two “facts” which are said to be non-existent.  The first is a not unreasonable inference from paragraphs 173-175, 208 and 223 of the applicant’s affidavit and from the fact that the person named as being involved had not suffered any consequences.  The belief is asserted in the applicant’s written submission to the decision maker (page 274 of solicitor’s affidavit). The second is literally true as stated in the fourth dot point of the section headed “Reasons for Delay”.  The series of events in paragraphs 337-374 is of some relevance to this as well.  The complaint that the fact was non-existent is not in my view made out.  With respect to the issue raised in paragraphs 46 to 49 of the applicant’s written submissions, the evidence discloses that there were complex and perhaps competing influences operating on the applicant in the period leading up to the event referred to in paragraph 299 of her affidavit and more fully elaborated on in paragraphs 314-332.  Included in the mix of factors was the commendable quality demonstrated in paragraphs 325-331 and in paragraph 22(c) of the doctor’s affidavit.  In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the argument advanced in paragraphs 46 to 49 of the written submissions is made out. 

Ground 4

[24] The ground as argued goes beyond the ground in the notice of appeal.  As it appears in the notice of appeal, the focus is on whether there was ever a decision by the applicant not to pursue the complaint.  Paragraphs 245, 267, 299 and 332-333 relate to the early stages.  It is implicit in the decision maker’s reasons that the complainant’s interest in making a complaint revived.  Paragraphs 687-710, 721-723, 807-819, 871-874 and 886-887 support this conclusion. 

[25] In my view it is not open to characterise what the decision maker says in dot point 4 of the “Conclusion” section of the reasons as a failure to make a finding as to the material effect of the “initial” lack of legal advice.  The legal advice was only sought about 3 years after the matter was initially raised.  Insofar as there is a complaint that there was no identified material effect of the legal advice, and the decision maker’s conclusion is described as a finding that she was unclear as to any effects, in my view, that is not what the decision maker was saying.  It is really a finding that there is no evidence of any effect of any advice she got that materially affected her decision not to lodge a complaint to the Anti-Discrimination Commission.  It was not a non-probative irrelevant finding, since it merely said there was no evidence on a subject that may have been relevant if it had been proved to exist.  However, there was no evidence on that issue except that at paragraph 721-723.  The ground is therefore not made out. 

Ground 5

[26] The written submissions with respect to this ground focus on the proposition that the decision maker did not explain how she used the fact that the applicant had taken other action.  It was submitted that if the decision maker took no account of other action in the applicant’s favour, there had been an improper exercise of the power (s 20(2)(e)), consisting of a failure to take into account a relevant consideration (s 23(b)). 

[27] It was submitted that Buderim Ginger was authority for the proposition that pursuit of other remedies was a factor in the applicant’s favour.  However, the focus of the reasons of de Jersey CJ at 152 particularly, and Atkinson J in her judgment is the proposition that in the Trial Division judgment involved in that case there was nothing in the material to show that the applicant who was seeking leave to bring the application out of time had sought redress for unlawful discrimination within the 12 month period.  In so finding, the Trial Division judge had set aside the Commissioner’s decision in the applicant’s favour which had granted leave.  It was held by the Court of Appeal that the applicant had from the beginning been relying on certain facts which he was pursuing as an industrial issue.  The very same facts were later identified by an advisor as a foundation for an unlawful discrimination claim as well.  That had been unknown to the applicant up to that time. 

[28] de Jersey CJ said at 152:

“While the claim which the complainant relevantly advanced related directly to unpaid long-service leave payments, the circumstances which based that claim were at the forefront of the complainant’s approaches and enquiries, and it was those circumstances which Ms Johnston eventually suggested may have involved unlawful discrimination.  In my respectful view, the particular circumstance that the complainant did not, for two years, advance, in terms, that specific claim of discrimination, did not in these circumstances mean that ‘good cause’ could not have been shown.” 

[29] This is a different sort of situation from the present, where the applicant knew from an early time in the chain of events that the conduct constituted sexual harassment and later had information about a possible remedy of applying to the Anti-Discrimination Commission.  Although there was nothing in the material about a time limit, elementary inquiries, which the applicant, because of her background, would have been able to make, would have revealed that there was one.  There was evidence of deliberation in paragraphs 245, 267 and 332-333 which placed the case in a different character from Buderim GingerBuderim Ginger plainly does not establish that in every case, pursuit of other courses of action assists an applicant in establishing good cause for delay.  In my view, it has not been established that the decision maker was wrong to refer to pursuit of alternative remedies as a factor in reaching the conclusion that good cause had not been shown in this respect. 

Ground 6

[30] This ground challenges the last finding in the “Conclusion” section of the reasons of the decision maker.  The decision maker referred to Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1998) 185 CLR 541 for the proposition that prejudice can be presumed from the mere passage of time.  She made findings that the passage of time was lengthy and may cause prejudice to the party’s ability to present their cases.  Passage of time would affect the memories of witnesses including the parties themselves.  She also found that the whereabouts of some potential witnesses should be ascertainable although unknown at the time of the decision.  She noted that there had also been investigations in 2000 to 2002 and there was no suggestion that relevant documents were not available.

[31] Her conclusion was that although the thrust of the complaint would have been known after steps taken in 2000 by the applicant, lapse of time was still so significant that it was likely to affect the recollection of potential witnesses including the parties themselves. 

[32] The complaint made about this conclusion is that it implies that there were other potential witnesses than the applicant, the respondent and perhaps one other.  If so, it was submitted, there was no evidence to support that finding.  In my view, it is apparent from the applicant’s affidavit that other persons might be potential witnesses in respect of events relating to the claim as it stood when the decision maker’s decision was made.  It is not sustainable to maintain that nothing relevant was taken into account against the presence of prejudice and invoking s 20(2)(e) and s 23(b) to remedy it.  In my view, the ground is not made out.

[33] It is now necessary to return to the issue discussed in paragraph [17] above, raised in the applicant’s written submissions in paragraphs 23 to 27.  The complaint relates to the second and third dot points in the “Conclusion” section of the decision.  In my view, the matters identified by the decision maker as ones which affected the applicant but not to an extent that constituted good cause were fundamental to the applicant succeeding in her application to extend time.  The reality is that because they are of that character, they are akin to “intermediate facts” in a circumstantial case.  If considering them individually the decision maker did not think they constituted good cause, it is difficult to see how her decision would have been different if she had weighed all the facts together.  It is not entirely clear – and this is one of the areas where more elaboration in the decision would have been helpful – whether she did in fact consider the issues in the various dot points separately or whether the second last dot point which says “in all the circumstances the complainant has not shown good cause” indicates that a global view was taken as well.  In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that there is a basis for setting aside the decision maker’s decision on the basis of the reasons advanced by the applicant in that regard.

[34] None of the grounds relied on have been made out for the reasons given above.  The application should therefore be dismissed.  The respondent indicated that no application for costs would be made.  Therefore there will be no order as to costs.        

Preservation of Privacy of Applicant

[35] Both the applicant and respondent made submissions in support of an order that the whole file be sealed and marked “not to be opened without the order of a Judge”.  It was submitted that the case fell within the limited exception referred to by the Court of Appeal in J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (1995) 2 Qd R 10, 44 (paragraph 2 in Lee J’s list of principles). The particular principle has some affinity with an exception referred to by Lord Diplock in Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd (1979) AC 440, 450 to the effect that the general rule that the administration of justice should take place in open court and publication of proceedings should be unrestricted may be departed from if it would damage some public interest for whose protection Parliament had made some statutory derogation from the rule.  The submissions focused on the provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act concerning privacy at the early stages of complaints.

[36] It is of some weight that the applicant herself is pressing for such an order. The starting point is that the applicant was under no obligation to reveal her allegations in public or in a way in which they would inevitably become public.  The means of seeking redress with which the present proceedings are concerned is the making of a complaint to the Anti-Discrimination Commission.  Had the complaint not been refused by the Commission’s delegate because grounds for extending time had not been established, the matter would have first been considered by the Commissioner.  The option of directing that the complaint go to conciliation would have resulted in proceedings being conducted in private to that point.  Later steps attract increasingly less privacy as a matter of course, subject to statutory power to impose restrictions. 

[37] The present proceedings have been brought to vindicate the applicant’s contention that the time limit for making the complaint should have been extended.  The reality of the applicant’s position, once an extension of time was disallowed by the delegate, was that the only way she could have the complaint to the Commission progressed was to successfully impugn the refusal to extend the time.  As part of that process, the information, including the facts disclosed in her complaint that were considered by the decision maker had to be revealed to the court. 

[38] Had the present application been successful, the applicant would have been entitled to expect that, at least until a decision was made whether the matter should be referred to conciliation, the complaint would remain confidential.  If it was directed that it be conciliated, the conciliation proceedings would be held in private.  There is a clear legislative bias towards enabling the early stages of proceedings in the Commission to be kept private. Her failure to persuade me that there are any grounds for setting aside the delegate’s decision should not place her in a worse position than she would have been in during the period immediately after the complaint was made to the Commission.  I therefore order that the applicant’s identity not be published.  In the reasons she will be described by a pseudonym that does not identify her.  The details of her complaint are entitled to be protected from disclosure for the reasons explained.

[39] I have inspected the material before me with a view to deciding the extent to which it should be sealed in a suitable receptacle and not opened without the order of a Judge. Having done so, I am satisfied that the whole of the file, including written submissions and the transcript should be sealed and not opened without the order of a judge. The reasons for judgment will be published immediately to the parties.  I am satisfied that there should be publication of reasons so that, even if they are not informative as to the facts of the matter without reference to the supporting documents, the legal issues and methodology used to decide them are on the public record.  If there are any specific issues, not already raised, about publication of the reasons in the form in which they are released to the parties, written submissions may be delivered to my Associate by 4pm on 28 March 2006.  If there are none, the reasons will be publicly available and published on the Queensland Courts website as soon as practicable after that time.  If submissions are made, a decision will be made as soon as possible after the submissions have been considered.



1.That the application is dismissed;

2.That there be no order as to costs;

3.That all documents filed in the matter, the written submissions of counsel and the transcript be sealed in a suitable receptacle and marked “not to be opened without the order of a judge”; 

4.That the applicant’s identity not be published;    

5.That the reasons be published to the parties;

6.That the parties have leave to make further written submissions concerning further publication of the reasons, such submissions, if any, to be delivered to my Associate on or before 4pm on 28 March 2006;

7.That if there are no such submissions, the reasons be published forthwith on the Queensland Courts website;

8.That if further submissions are made, the issue of further publication be reserved.



Evidence supporting findings made in “Reasons for Delay” --- References relate to corresponding dot points in decision maker’s “Reasons for Delay”.

  1. Medical practitioner’s affidavit; symptoms supported by applicant;
  2. Paragraphs 225-238; 244.
  3. 173-177, 208, 223-224; page 274 solicitor’s affidavit.
  4. Paragraph 476.
  5. Receipt of documents – paragraphs 232; 236; perusal of documents shows no reference to time limit.
  6. Paragraphs 299, 327-332.
  7. Paragraphs 93, 102, 115, 240-242.
  8. Paragraph 348; the reasons repeat the words of the affidavit.
  9. Paragraphs 685-686; 712; 714.
  10. Paragraphs 687 – 706; 710; 721-722.
  11. Reply to request for further information by the Commissioner (page 323 solicitor’s affidavit).
  12. Paragraphs 240-243; 317–318.

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    GCE v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner

  • Shortened Case Name:

    GCE v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner

  • MNC:

    [2006] QSC 58

  • Court:


  • Judge(s):

    Mackenzie J

  • Date:

    24 Mar 2006

Litigation History

No Litigation History

Appeal Status

No Status