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Viclee Nominees Pty Ltd v Team Venture Pty Ltd

 

[2009] QSC 47

 

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

PARTIES:

FILE NO/S:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

DELIVERED ON:

12 March 2009

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

13, 24, 27 February 2009

JUDGE:

White J

ORDER:

  1. The plaintiff is entitled to possession of the premises situated at Shop 1, ARIA, Cnr Surf Parade & Albert Avenue, Broadbeach being the land described as Lot 2               in SP159284 County Ward Parish Gilston title reference 50443864. 
  2. Unless the defendant successfully submits that a different order should be made, the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to this application and these proceedings.
  3. Directions for costs submissions by the defendant, if any:

(a) The defendant file in the court and serve on the solicitors for the plaintiff any submissions which it wishes to make about costs on or before 26 March 2009. These submissions may be sent by email to the offices of Bolster & Co at the email address known to the defendant and to the Associate of White J.

(b)) The plaintiff to respond to those submissions by email by 2 April 2009.

CATCHWORDS:

LANDLORD AND TENANT – TERMINATION OF THE TENANCY – FORFEITURE – RE-ENTRY AND PROCEEDINGS TO RECOVER POSSESSION – GENERALLY – where plaintiff is landlord of shop premises leased to defendant – where plaintiff alleges defendant in arrears of rent – where plaintiff served on defendant notice to terminate tenancy – where plaintiff applies for summary judgment – whether plaintiff should be entitled to possession of shop premises

LANDLORD AND TENANT – RENT – BREACH OF COVENANT TO PAY – CONSEQUENCES – where defendant made payments to plaintiff and contends there are no arrears of rent – where defendant contends it is not liable for electricity under terms of lease – where plaintiff alleges defendant is liable for electricity – where plaintiff attributes payments by defendant to rent and electricity – whether defendant required to pay electricity of shop premises upon proper construction of lease – whether defendant has breached covenant to pay rent

LANDLORD AND TENANT – COVENANTS – ACTION FOR BREACH OF COVENANT – DAMAGES FOR BREACH – where lease provides for plaintiff to maintain air-conditioning facilities of shop premises – where plaintiff failed to provide fully operational air-conditioning from time to time – whether plaintiff has breached provision of lease

LANDLORD AND TENANT – COVENANTS – FOR QUIET ENJOYMENT AND TITLE – BREACH – where plaintiff served on defendant two notices to terminate tenancy and attempted to recover possession of shop premises – whether plaintiff has breached covenant for quiet enjoyment by defendant

TRADE AND COMMERCE – TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 (CTH) AND RELATED LEGISLATION – CONSUMER PROTECTION – MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE CONDUCT OR FALSE REPRESENTATIONS – CHARACTER OR ATTRIBUTES OF CONDUCT OR REPRESENTATION – RELIANCE, INDUCEMENT AND CAUSATION – where defendant alleges it was induced to enter into lease by representation of plaintiff’s property manager – whether representation was in substance a departure from terms of lease

PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – where plaintiff applies for summary judgment – whether defendant has real prospects of successfully defending the proceedings – whether summary judgment should be granted under r 292 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld)

Electricity Act 1994 (Qld), ss 20B, 20H

Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s 37A

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 292

Baltic Shipping Co. v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344, cited

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232, cited

Food Co Management Pty Ltd v Go My Travel Pty Ltd [2002] 2 Qd R 249, cited

Fujiyama Teppanyaki Japanese Restaurant Ltd v Morgan [2004] ANZ ConvR 26, distinguished

Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway v Anderson [1898] 2 Ch 394, cited

Sanderson v Berwich-Upon-Tweed Corporation (1884) 13 QB 547, cited

Team Venture Pty Ltd v Viclee Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 116, cited

World By Nite Pty Ltd v Michael [2004] 1 Qd R 338, cited

COUNSEL:

Mr M Amerena for the plaintiff

The defendant with leave by its director Kathy Tan Chai Fong

SOLICITORS:

Jonathan C Whiting as town agent for Bolster & Co. for the plaintiff

The defendant appeared on its own behalf through its directors

[1] The plaintiff has applied to the court for an order that it is entitled to possession of the premises situated at Shop 1 ARIA, Corner Surf Parade and Albert Avenue, Broadbeach.  The plaintiff is the landlord and the defendant the tenant of the premises where the defendant operates a Chinese restaurant.

[2] The application for summary judgment first came on for hearing on 13 February 2009.  The defendant was represented that day by two of its three directors.  Ms Kathy Tan has been the spokesperson for the defendant and was authorised by her two co-directors, who are her husband and brother respectively to speak. 

[3] The plaintiff alleges that the defendant has failed to pay the rent on various due dates contrary to the covenant in the lease.  The plaintiff further alleges that notice to remedy the breach has been given with a reasonable time being allowed to carry out the obligation under the lease.  A notice terminating the tenancy was given on 17 October 2008.  The defendant continues in possession of the premises.

[4] The defendant filed a notice of intention to defend and defence on 23 December 2008.  Due to error on the part of the plaintiff’s pleader the incorrect clause of the lease was identified as the covenant to pay rent and the defendant joined issue in its defence.  At the same time it asserted that it “continues to pay the rent due upon the presentation of invoices” and had not, otherwise, failed to pay rent.

[5] The plaintiff issued an amended statement of claim rectifying the error and filed the present application.  It was the plaintiff’s case that as at 13 February the defendant had not paid the rent for the months of July, August and September 2008 and, although some repayments had been made during the latter part of 2008, was in arrears inclusive of GST but exclusive of electricity and interest in the sum of $96,170.34.  The plaintiff relied on the affidavit of Dee Bishop, a property manager who looks after the plaintiff’s property interests and who has access to the plaintiff’s leasing records concerning this tenancy, for the records of payment.

[6] On behalf of the defendant Ms Tan contended that there were no arrears of rent, only of electricity, and that was because of longstanding difficulties with the plaintiff over the provision of reliable air-conditioning to the restaurant.  Clause 13 of the lease precludes a set-off, for example, for damages for failure of the air-conditioning.  The defendant was, however, granted an adjournment to enable it to produce material which would support the assertion that there was no outstanding rent owing to the plaintiff when the figures were considered.  Directions were given about the provision of that material.

[7] On the adjourned date, 24 February 2009, the defendant produced an affidavit sworn by Ms Tan.  Not all the exhibits to which she referred had been served on the plaintiff.  Ms Tan contended that this material demonstrated that no rent was outstanding.  Exhibit 1 to her affidavit had been provided to the plaintiff.  It was a schedule purporting to summarise the rent payments since the inception of the tenancy on 16 March 2006 to 15 February 2009.  The tax invoices for rent and the bank statements evidencing payment were included as exhibits to the original affidavit but were not provided to the plaintiff.  Ms Tan said that this was because the plaintiff had the tax invoices and the pressure under which the defendant’s directors were working, both in preparation for the defence and in running the restaurant, was too great to be able to copy all this material.

[8] Exhibit 1 showed payments said to be for rental over the life of the tenancy of $669,506.05, leaving a credit of $72.  The defendant had filed a new defence on 23 February in which it denied, on a proper construction of the lease, being in arrears of rent because the plaintiff had impermissibly substituted “outlays/outgoings for rental” in its notice of termination.  This was alleged to be because:

“The Landlord through its agent, Ms Bishop at Rincom Property Services in negotiation prior to the signing of the Lease [said] that the Defendant would not be liable for any outgoings but would have to pay for any services installed by the Defendant such as gas, telephone.”

[9] The balance of the defence is an analysis of the relevant clauses in the lease to demonstrate that the defendant is not liable for electricity provided to its tenancy.  The defendant counterclaims for damages for breach of the landlord’s covenant of quiet enjoyment because of the actions of the plaintiff in terminating the lease twice and attempting to recover possession of the premises when no rent was outstanding; damages for breach of the covenant to remedy faulty air-conditioning; and for misrepresentation inducing entry into the lease.

[10] Mr Amerena for the plaintiff, contended that some of the payments referred to by Ms Tan as rental payments were for electricity and paid in response to electricity invoices and could not now be characterised as rental payments.  He sought a  further adjournment to evidence the electricity payments and to have the nature of the electricity supply explained.

[11] The plaintiff’s application for summary judgment was resumed on 27 February.  Ms Bishop, in a further affidavit, exhibited all of the tax invoices relating to rental and electricity.  There is no or little dispute about the figures,[1] only the proper attribution of payments.  Ms Bishop’s schedule detailing all of the invoices delivered to the defendant for both rent and electricity also records the payments made by the defendant in respect of those invoices.  It reveals that at various times during the tenancy the defendant has been in arrears for both rental payments and electricity payments.  Ms Bishop calculated (setting aside interest) that the defendant is presently indebted to the plaintiff in the total sum of $101,231.08 comprising $82,792.56 for rental and $18,438.52 for electricity supplied to the restaurant.

[12] Ms Bishop has also prepared schedules relating solely to electricity and solely to rental with a schedule dealing with payments received from the defendant referable solely to an invoice for rent.  She agreed with the schedule of payments which constituted Exhibit 1 to Ms Tan’s affidavit.  While those payments coincide with the record of payments received by the plaintiff some were in response to electricity invoices.  Ms Bishop has highlighted those payments in Exhibit 1 that relate solely to electricity and those which relate to both electricity and rent.

[13] Before turning to the terms of the lease one further matter should be mentioned.  On 15 February 2008 the applicant served the defendant with a notice to remedy breach requiring the defendant to pay the $19,908.11 in rent and $4,204.23 for electricity supplied to the restaurant.  The defendant paid the outstanding rent in three instalments but queried the electricity account because it was so much higher than the previous month’s account and one of the air-conditioning units was not operational.  On 11 March 2008, after failed discussions, the plaintiff issued a notice of termination.  The defendant brought an application in this court seeking a declaration that the lease was still on foot notwithstanding the plaintiff’s purported termination.  The matter was heard by Skoien AJ on 28 May 2008.  At the time of hearing the defendant had paid all outstanding rent and disputed electricity amounts and had sworn to an ability to meet rental payments in the future.  His Honour found in favour of the defendant on a construction of the lease about the circumstances in which the lease could be validly terminated.  He concluded:

“Other interesting arguments were put to me particularly on the contractual responsibility or otherwise of the applicant to pay its electricity costs.  Neither it, nor the other arguments, can affect my decision based on the above reasons.”[2]

[14] The lease is for a term of five years commencing on 15 March 2006 with one five year option.  By cl 7 the defendant covenanted to pay the rent specified in Item 11 of the reference schedule by an initial payment in advance and then by calendar months in advance on the first day of each month being one-twelfth of the annual rental then due as fixed or varied.  The initial rent was $17,500 plus GST per month.  It is now $18,800.13 plus GST per month.  By cl 47 the covenant to pay rent is an essential term of the lease.

[15] Although the defendant’s liability for operating expenses is “Nil” according to Item 13 of the reference schedule, its terms must be considered because the defendant contends that since “operating expenses” includes “electricity” there has been an impermissible charging of the defendant for electricity.  Clause 10 provides relevantly:

“(1)(a)The Lessee shall pay to the Lessor the Lessee’s percentage of operating expenses specified in Item 13 in the Reference Schedule for the term of this Lease.”

[16] “Operating expenses” are defined in cl 10(2)(a) to mean:

“…all rates, taxes, outgoings, costs and expenses incurred by the Lessor in the control, management, maintenance and ownership of the property and the Building, and more particularly the following:

(iii)The Lessor’s costs of management and administration of the Building, including:

(E)the supply of services, facilities and amenities for the Building, including electricity, gas, power, fuel, oil, garbage compacting and removal, waste disposal, telephone, intercommunication system, public address system, background music, supply of washroom and toilet requisites;

 

(iv) Costs and expenses relating to

 

(F)    operating, maintaining, servicing and repairing plant and equipment, services and facilities provided by  the Lessor, including plumbing, electrical and other  services, air conditioning, ventilating, heating or  cooling the Building (or any part of the Building),  elevators, fire detection prevention and protection  equipment, the costs of electricity and power to  operate the services and facilities, and fees paid for  service contracts and to specialist contractors.”

[17] Clearly there can be no charge to the defendant in respect of any of the electricity costs arising under cl 10 because operating expenses recovery is agreed at nil.    Whilst many of those expenses relate to the common areas or to the building generally, cl 10(2)(a)(iv)(F) could extend, in its terms, to the provision of electricity to the defendant’s tenancy.  But the lease must be read as a whole and cl 11 applies to the defendant.  It provides:

“(1)The Lessee will pay throughout this lease for any electricity, power, fuel, gas, oil, water, telephone, garbage removal, waste disposal, and other services or utilities provided by public, local or other authorities or suppliers to the Leased Premises and charged separately in respect of the Leased Premises, to the supplier of the service or utility.

 

(2)The Lessee will, if required by the Lessor or by an authority supplying any such service or utility, permit the installation of metres required to measure the quantity of the service supplied to the Lease Premises.”

[18] “Services” is defined in cl 1 to mean:

“…electricity, gas, water, sewerage, telephone, telecommunication, and any other services provided or available to leased premises in the Building or to Common Areas of the Building by public or local or statutory authorities and the pipes, wires, ducting and other means of providing those services to the Building and to leased premises.”

[19] Ms Bishop deposed that the plaintiff buys electricity in bulk and supplies it to tenants by individually metered supply.  In this way it supplied electricity to the defendant’s leased premises.  Ms Bishop stated:[3]

“The plaintiff is an “on supplier” of electricity under the terms of the Electricity Act 1994 and the cost of the electricity supplied by the plaintiff to the defendant is a Government regulated amount.  This situation is commonplace in shopping centres.  Following the conclusion of each month of the defendant’s tenancy the electricity meter has been read and I have supplied to the defendant a Tax Invoice for the electricity for the previous month.”

[20] Neither Mr Amerena nor Ms Tan addressed the provisions of the Electricity Act 1994 but s 20H provides for individual metering by an on-supplier to an end receiver and the maximum amount which a supplier may charge.  An on-supply agreement may be oral or incorporated into a lease.[4] The provision relating to the lessor’s recovery of electricity charges in s 37A of the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 relates to the lessor’s outgoings and is not applicable to this lease.

[21] The electricity tax invoices clearly state that they are for electricity for a particular period, for example, the tax invoice for the period 17 October 2006 to 17 November 2006, after noting the amount outstanding has an entry “Current reading …” followed by “Previous reading …” followed by “KWH Usage …”.  There are then set out the charges on the first 10,000KW followed by the charges on the balance amount.  There is a charge for reading the meter and GST. 

[22] The conclusion which I have reached is that on a proper construction of the lease the defendant agreed to be charged for electricity separately provided to its tenancy in respect of which a meter was installed to measure the amount of electricity consumed by that tenancy.  That means that the defendant cannot “apply” its payments for electricity to what is owing as rental.  Accordingly, the defendant is in arrears both with respect to rent and electricity although the provision in the lease upon which the plaintiff sues is the covenant to pay rent in accordance with the terms of cl 7.

[23] It remains to consider whether the defendant has raised other triable issues.  There are allegations which resolve into three separate issues, the failure to provide appropriate air-conditioning to the restaurant from time to time in breach of cl 27 of the lease; the breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment by:

“inconsiderate action to terminate the lease twice and to recover the possession of the premises … [which] has resulted in substantial losses and damages suffered by the Lessee”.

And by a representation about the defendant’s obligations, namely, that the plaintiff, through its agent, Ms Bishop,

“in negotiation prior to the signing of the Lease [represented] that the Defendant would not be liable for any outgoings but would have to pay for any services installed by the Defendant such as gas, telephone”.

[24] Clause 27(2)(a) provides that the lessor will maintain throughout the lease maintenance and service contracts “relating to the air conditioning … with specialist consultants or contractors”.  Clause 27(2)(b) obliges the lessor to ensure that the facilities are regularly inspected, serviced and repaired by specialist consultants or contractors under service contracts at intervals considered necessary or prudent by those specialists.  The lessor is obliged to use its best endeavours to ensure that each of the facilities is operating and is in working order and available for use during normal business hours.  Ms Tan deposed at [11] of her affidavit:

“The restaurant has to endure substantial business losses and costs from the frequent breakdown of the air-conditioning which remained unresolved since September 2007.  The management has to endure embarrassment, complaints and criticism from customers on the malfunctioning air-conditioning system.  I have written numerous letters to the Plaintiff for affirmative action to remedy the faults but no permanent solution was carried out.  An industrial bulky air-conditioning unit was put in the premises from December 2007 to 13 February 2009.  Refer ‘Exhibit 6’ showing photos of the area, complaint letters and record of air-conditioning breakdown.”

[25] Ms Bishop has not joined issue with the defendant about air-conditioning.  By cl 29(2)(b)(ii) the lessor is obliged to keep and maintain services to the building and the leased premises in good working condition and repair.  “Services” includes, by extension, air-conditioning, although the specific cl 27 relating to air-conditioning would govern that service.  It is, without more, not possible to reach a conclusion about the defendant’s likely success in proceedings for damages for breach of this provision of the lease or the quantum of its losses, if successful.  However, cl 13 precludes a deduction by means of a set-off or counterclaim in the following terms:

“The Lessee expressly agrees to make all payments due under this Lease, including for rent and outgoings, punctually on the date when each payment is due and shall not withhold or be entitled to withhold the whole or part of any such payment by way of deduction, set-off or counterclaim, in respect of any claim for damages or for compensation which the Lessee shall make or has made against the Lessor, until after the Lessor’s liability for damages or compensation is determined and the amount due to the Lessee is determined or agreed.”

[26] The covenant for quiet enjoyment is contained in cl 42.  It provides:

“The Lessor covenants with the Lessee:

 

(a)that whilst the Lessee complies with the financial and other obligations under this Lease,

 

(b)and subject to the powers and entitlements conferred on the Lessor under this Lease,

 

(c)the Lessee may occupy and have the use and enjoyment of the Leased Premises for the term of this Lease without interruption or disturbance from the Lessor and other persons lawfully claiming through or under the Lessor.”

[27] What conduct will amount to breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment or possession may take many forms.[5] In a well known dictum in Sanderson v Berwich-Upon-Tweed Corporation,[6] Fry LJ observed:

“But it appears to us to be in every case a question of fact whether the quiet enjoyment of the land has or has not been interrupted; and where the ordinary and lawful enjoyment of the demised land is substantially interfered with by the acts of the lessor … the covenant appears to us to be broken.”

In Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway v Anderson,[7] where the lessor sued for arrears of rent and the tenant counterclaimed for damages for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, Lindley MR commented:[8]

“A temporary inconvenience which does not interfere with the estate or title or possession is not, to my mind, a breach of covenant, nor is there any case that goes anything like the length required to show that it is.  Even the judgment of Fry LJ, in the case that carried it farthest, … must be taken with reference to the facts than before the Court …”

[28] The defence and counterclaim does not ascribe the failure of the air-conditioning to a breach of the obligation to allow quiet enjoyment of the tenancy.  In some circumstances the failure may be so complete and long-standing as to interfere impermissibly in the quiet enjoyment of the premises as occurred in Manchester.  Here the state of the evidence does not suggest such an interference with the tenancy to found a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment if it were pleaded.  The separate air-conditioning covenant sufficiently covers the defendant’s complaint.[9] 

[29] The defendant has claimed the two notices of termination as a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment.  Duncan notes:[10]

“Whilst the assertion by the lessor that the lessee’s title and right to possession may be invalid, the mere making of that assertion, however wrong it is, does not amount to a breach of the covenant.  Likewise, the threatening of, or taking proceedings for possession and damages would be similarly treated.  The covenant is not an absolute covenant protecting a lessee against eviction or interference …”.

That observation disposes of the defendant’s contention that it has been greatly vexed by the plaintiff’s conduct sufficient to breach the covenant.  Finally, the defendant is entitled to quiet enjoyment only so long as it pays the rent.  That it has not done. 

[30] There is no application in the proceedings for relief against forfeiture.  This is, no doubt, because the defendant has maintained that no rent is owing because of its construction of the lease.  It is inappropriate in the absence of such an application to make comment on the likely success of an application for relief against forfeiture were it to be made.  It may be noted, however, that in exercising its equitable jurisdiction a court would normally require all rent and costs to be up to date and an expectation that future rent would be paid before granting relief.[11] 

[31] It is unlikely that damages would be recovered for distress associated with the failure to provide fully operational air-conditioning at all times.  Similarly, if it were pleaded as an aspect of the alleged breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.[12]

[32] Finally, the defendant alleges that it was induced to enter into the lease by Ms Bishop’s representation that the defendant would not be liable for any outgoings but would have to pay for any services installed by the defendant such as gas and telephone.  The defendant is not liable for outgoings.  Accepting Ms Tan’s expression “installed by the Defendant”, that is a difference of no real significance from the expression in cl 11 of the lease.  Clearly the defendant did not regard the electricity provided to the tenancy and metered as outside the agreement until, at earliest, when counsel advanced a submission before Skoien AJ in 2008.  This is an allegation which at best has little, if any, prospects of success.

[33] The test for granting summary judgment is that a defendant has “no real prospects” of successfully defending the proceedings and there is “no need for a trial”.[13] The overriding principle must, of course, be the justice of the case.[14]

[34] The defendant objects to having the matter disposed of summarily and wants a trial.  The directors are hard working people who are distressed and distracted by these proceedings.  They would prefer some negotiated settlement.  They can no longer afford legal representation.  They feel the lease is too favourable to the landlord.  These are not matters which sound against making the order for possession if there is no defence which has any prospects of success.  The covenant to pay rent has been breached and over many months.  In the absence of an application for relief against forfeiture, no other matters have been raised which would prevent the orders sought by the plaintiff being made.

Orders

1. The plaintiff is entitled to possession of the premises situated at Shop 1, ARIA, Cnr Surf Parade & Albert Avenue, Broadbeach being the land described as Lot 2 in SP159284 County Ward Parish Gilston title reference 50443864.

2. Unless the defendant successfully submits that a different order should be made, the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to this application and these proceedings.

3. Directions for costs submissions by the defendant, if any:

(a) The defendant file in the court and serve on the solicitors for the plaintiff any submissions which it wishes to make about costs on or before 26 March 2009. These submissions may be sent by email to the offices of Bolster & Co at the email address known to the defendant and to the Associate of White J.

(b) The plaintiff to respond to those submissions by email by 2 April 2009.

 

 

Footnotes

[1] Lest the defendant think that it has been overlooked, the apparent discrepancy between the figures in the invoice of 18 February 2008 and the electricity balance in the analysis schedule in “DBA-3” to the affidavit of Dee Bishop sworn 26 February 2008 and filed by leave on 27 February 2008 is noted, but makes no difference to the overall issues.

[2] Team Venture Pty Ltd v Viclee Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 116 at [15].

 

[3] Affidavit of Dee Bishop sworn 26 February 2009, filed by leave 27 February 2009 at para 3.

[4] s 20B(3).

[5] WD Duncan, Commercial Leases in Australia, 4th ed (2005) at p 192.

[6] (1884) 13 QB 547 at 551.

[7] [1898] 2 Ch 394.

[8] At 401.

[9] The facts here are very different from those which occurred in Fujiyama Teppanyaki Japanese Restaurant Ltd v Morgan in the High Court of New Zealand, [2004] ANZ ConvR 26.

[10] At p 192-3.

[11] World By Nite Pty Ltd v Michael [2004] 1 Qd R 338; Duncan at p 359.

[12] Baltic Shipping Co. v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344; (1993) HCA 4 at [44] per Mason CJ.

[13] UCPR r 292.

[14] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232; Food Co Management Pty Ltd v Go My Travel Pty Ltd [2002] 2 Qd R 249.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Viclee Nominees Pty Ltd v Team Venture Pty Ltd

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Viclee Nominees Pty Ltd v Team Venture Pty Ltd

  • MNC:

    [2009] QSC 47

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    White J

  • Date:

    12 Mar 2009

  • White Star Case:

    Yes

Litigation History

No Litigation History

Appeal Status

No Status