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Taylor v State of Queensland

 

[2009] QSC 318

 

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

 

CITATION:

Taylor v State of Queensland [2009] QSC 318

PARTIES:

JEREMY TAYLOR
(plaintiff)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(defendant)

FILE NO/S:

6309/99

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court

DELIVERED ON:

1 October 2009

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

29 September 2009

JUDGE:

A Lyons J

ORDER:

The plaintiff is granted leave to proceed

CATCHWORDS:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, r 389(2), r 547

Dempsey v Dorber [1990] 1 Qd R 418, followed

Grahame Cavanough v Commonwealth of Australia [2000] QSC 068 at [48], followed

Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Ltd & Ors [2000] QCA 178, followed

COUNSEL:

Mr D. Williams for the plaintiff

Mr P. Rashleigh for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

David Hooper the Mobile Lawyer for the plaintiff

Crown Law for the defendant

A LYONS J

  1. Pursuant to r 389(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) the plaintiff seeks an order to take a new step in the proceedings, no step having been taken for two years from the last step in the proceedings.  The application is opposed by the defendant, the State of Queensland.

Chronology of proceedings

  1. The plaintiff commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in the Central West Registry, Common Law Division on 28 November 1997. The action was for damages for personal injury as a result of assault and negligence. It was alleged that on or about 3 December 1994 the plaintiff was arrested by police officers in Cairns and taken to the police station. Whilst in police custody the plaintiff claims he was assaulted by police officers and that as a result of that assault he sustained the following injuries:

(a) injury to the left eye;

(b) injury to the jaw;

(c) bruising and contusions; and

(d) shock.

The plaintiff has completely lost the vision in his left eye and alleges that the State of Queensland was vicariously liable for assault by the police officers. The plaintiff further alleges that his injuries, loss and damages were caused by the negligence of the defendant which he particularised in his statement of claim.  In particular, he claims that a Constable Clarkson was the police officer who allegedly punched him.

  1. The defendant filed its defence to the claim on 23 November 1998. On 12 May 1999 the defendant applied to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court of Queensland and on 7 June 1999 the matter was transferred to this Court.  It would appear therefore that the defendant took over 18 months to file a notice of Defence and have the file transferred to Queensland.  Between July 1999 and September 2004 there were further numerous delays.  In particular, a notice of change of solicitors was filed and there were further delays by the plaintiff in providing a list of documents and a statement of loss and damage.  Non-party disclosure was also sought from various medical practitioners and medical centres.
  1. On 5 June 2003 the Crown Solicitor wrote to the solicitors for the plaintiffs reminding them that the plaintiff had not taken a step in the proceedings for over two years and that no further step in the proceedings could be taken without an order of the Court under r 389(2) of the UCPR.
  1. The plaintiff’s statement of loss and damage and a list of documents were ultimately forwarded to the Crown Solicitor on 23 February 2004. That letter also advised the plaintiff would seek leave to proceed pursuant to UCPR r 389(2).  The Crown Solicitor replied requesting that the plaintiff make the necessary application for leave to proceed by 31 August 2004 or otherwise advise of the plaintiff’s intention with respect to the claim.  That letter from the Crown Solicitor indicated that the Crown Solicitor had instructions to make an application to the Court for an order that the matter be struck out for want of prosecution if no application was received or no response made. A further notice of change of solicitors was provided to the Crown Solicitor by letter dated 27 August 2004.
  1. By letter dated 29 September 2004 the Crown Solicitor advised the solicitors for the plaintiff that he had instructions to consent to the application for leave to proceed.  Leave was therefore granted in accordance with the application on 30 September 2004 by her Honour, Holmes J.

Action taken since the leave to proceed was granted in September 2004

  1. The Crown Solicitor wrote to the solicitors for the plaintiff on 6 October 2004 requesting certain documents from the plaintiff’s list of documents as well as the statement of loss and damage in the proper form. That letter stated that the statement of loss and damage which had been provided did not comply with r 547 of the UCPR.
  1. In a letter dated 13 May 2005 to the Crown Solicitor the solicitors for the plaintiff enclosed a request for trial date for signing by the defendant. On 24 May 2005, the Crown Solicitor wrote to the solicitors for the plaintiff returning the request for trial date unsigned explaining once again that the plaintiff had not yet provided the statement of loss and damage which complied with r 547. That letter to the solicitors on the record in Queensland enclosed a copy of the letter to the solicitors in New South Wales which was dated 6 October 2004 outlining the deficiencies in the statement of loss and damage and requesting that the plaintiff provide a fresh statement of loss and damage. The letter also advised that the Crown Solicitor was obtaining instructions to arrange a medical examination of the plaintiff by a psychiatrist and an ophthalmologist. The letter therefore stated that the request for trial date was in fact premature.
  1. That letter to the solicitors on the record in Queensland which was dated 24 May 2005 indicated that the Crown Solicitor looked forward to receiving the plaintiff’s fresh statement of loss and damage which complied with the UCPR.
  1. By letter dated 2 June 2005 the Queensland solicitors replied to the Crown Solicitor advising that they were seeking instructions from their principals in New South Wales.
  1. In June 2005 the defendant sought further non party disclosure. By letter dated 9 June 2005 the Crown Solicitor once again returned the unexecuted request for trial date to the Queensland solicitors for the plaintiff.  Further medical reports were provided by the solicitors for the plaintiff in September 2005 to the Crown Solicitor. On 22 September 2005 the solicitors for the plaintiff forwarded to the Crown Solicitor by way of service a signed copy of the plaintiff’s statement of loss and damage pursuant to r 547 of the UCPR.  On 27 September 2005 the Queensland solicitors also forwarded the plaintiff’s statement of loss and damage and request for trial date.  The letter requested that the request for trial date be signed and returned so it could be filed.  This letter was not responded to by the Crown Solicitor until 1 February 2006 almost five months later.  In that letter the Crown Solicitor apologised for the delay and listed a panel of ophthalmologists and psychiatrists that the plaintiff might wish to submit to for medical examination.
  1. A further year went by, however, and on 24 January 2007 the Crown Solicitor wrote to the plaintiff’s solicitors referring to the letter of the previous year of 1 February 2006 and noting that they had received no response.  The letter inquired as to which of the specialists set out in the letter of 1 February 2006 the plaintiff wished to attend for the purpose of an independent medical examination.  The letter also noted that once the choices of doctors were provided, arrangements would be made for appointments.
  1. That letter of 24 January 2007 gave notice to the plaintiffs that it had been over 12 months since a step had been taken in the proceedings and in accordance with r 389 a notice of intention to proceed needed to be provided.  The letter also asked whether the plaintiff intended to proceed with the matter.
  1. On 14 February 2007 the solicitors for the plaintiff indicated they had no particular preference as to an ophthalmologist or psychiatrist and asked the Crown Solicitor to appoint an ophthalmologist and a psychiatrist at the earliest date. The letter also noted that the solicitors were seeking instructions from their principals Watson Stafford in Fairfield New South Wales in relation to the delivery of a notice of intention to proceed and the filing and serving of a notice of change of solicitors.
  1. On 25 June 2007 the Crown Solicitor advised the plaintiff’s solicitors that an appointment had been made for the plaintiff to see Dr Jonathan Chalk. An appointment had been previously made to see Dr Kevin Vandeleur and his report was provided on 20 June 2007. The plaintiff was not able to be advised in time of his appointment with Dr Jonathan Chalk scheduled for 12 July 2007.
  1. On 14 August 2007 the Crown Solicitor received a letter from David Hooper Solicitor of Northmead, New South Wales dated 21 March 2007 notifying that he had been instructed to act on behalf of the plaintiff in place of Messrs Watson Stafford and asked the Crown Solicitor to note their records accordingly. That letter also indicated that the solicitor had instructions to apply for an order for leave to proceed pursuant to r 389 of the UCPR.
  1. The same letter was received again by the Crown Solicitor dated 9 August 2007. That letter also advised that the solicitor had received instructions to apply for an order for leave to proceed pursuant to r 389 and that the claim would be amended to include a claim for illegal arrest and false imprisonment. The basis of the claim was then set out. The letter also asked the Crown Solicitor to advise whether the defendant would consent to the plaintiff being granted leave to proceed pursuant to r 389 of the UCPR and, whether the defendant would consent to the amendments sought.  The plaintiff also asked the Crown Solicitor to provide an updated list of documents pursuant to r 211 and 214 of the UCPR.
  1. By letter dated 31 August the Crown Solicitor wrote to David Hooper, solicitor, indicating that the claim had been dogged by delays for many years and that it had been almost two years since a step had been taken in the action.
  1. On 16 November 2007, David Hooper, solicitor, wrote to the Crown Solicitor and advised he was seeking instructions as to whether the plaintiff wished to proceed with his false imprisonment claim and advised that otherwise he had instructions to apply for an order for leave to proceed with the assault claim pursuant to r 389. The letter confirmed that the plaintiff resided in Forbes in New South Wales and would require assistance with travel and accommodation. The letter confirmed, however, that the plaintiff would attend at any suitably notified appointment with the psychiatrist, Dr Chalk. The Crown Solicitor wrote on 2 December 2007 noting that another appointment had been arranged for Dr Chalk on 30 January 2008. On 27 February 2008 the Crown Solicitor wrote to David Hooper, solicitor, enclosing a report of Dr Chalk which had been received on 20 February.  The letter also inquired as to the plaintiff’s intention with respect to the false imprisonment charge.
  1. On 29 April 2008 the Crown Solicitor wrote to David Hooper confirming that the plaintiff had abandoned the false imprisonment claim and noting that David Hooper was the plaintiff’s solicitor and that Brennans Solicitors Maroochydore was their Queensland town agent. On that date, the solicitors for the plaintiff also requested that the Crown Solicitor sign a request for trial date. On 27 May 2008 Brennans solicitors enclosed a request for trial date and asked that the defendant return a signed copy. A further request was made on 23 June 2008.
  1. On 30 September 2008 David Hooper, solicitor, once again wrote to the Crown Solicitor requesting the reply to the request for trial date be signed and returned.
  1. On 2 October 2008, almost five months later, the Crown Solicitor wrote to David Hooper advising that the Crown Solicitor would not sign the request for trial date because the plaintiff had not complied with the time frames as provided by the UCPR 1999.  In particular, the Crown Solicitor noted that the letter dated 16 November 2007 indicated that the plaintiff had instructions to apply to the court for an order for leave to proceed but that such an application had not in fact been filed.  The Crown Solicitor indicated that in relation to a request for mediation, such a request would be attended to once the issue of obtaining a court’s leave to proceed had been dealt with.
  1. On 2 February 2009 the Crown Solicitor wrote to David Hooper, solicitor,
    seeking a response to the letter of 2 October 2008. No response was received until 15 August 2009 some 10 months later.  By that letter dated 15 August 2009, David Hooper, solicitor, enclosed by way of service upon the Crown Solicitor a notice of change of address for service.
  1. Under cover of letter dated 28 August 2009, David Hooper, solicitor, by way of service upon the Crown Solicitor enclosed this application seeking to take a step in these proceedings pursuant to s 389(2) of the UCPR.

The proper approach under r 389

  1. When the court is considering whether or not to dismiss an action for one of prosecution or whether to give leave to proceed under r 389 of the UCPR it is necessary to consider the precise terms of the rule which provides as follows:

389Continuation of proceeding after delay

  1. If no step has been taken in a proceeding for 1 year from the time the last step was taken, a party who wants to proceed must, before taking any step in the proceeding, give a month’s notice to every other party of the party’s intention to proceed.
  2. If no step has been taken in a proceeding for 2 years from the time the last step was taken, a new step may not be taken without the order of the court, which may be made either with or without notice.
  3. For this rule, an application in which no order has been made is not taken to be a step.”
  1. These were set out by Atkinson J in Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Ltd & Ors [2000] QCA 178:

“ATKINSON J:  When the Court is considering whether or not to dismiss an action for want of prosecution or whether to give leave to proceed under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (“UCPR”) r 389, there are a number of factors that the Court will take into account in determining whether the interests of justice require a case to be dismissed.[1]  These include:

(1)how long ago the events alleged in the statement of claim occurred[2] and what delay there was before the litigation was commenced;

(2)how long ago the litigation was commenced or causes of action were added;[3]

(3)what prospects the plaintiff has of success in the action;[4]

(4)whether or not there has been disobedience of Court orders or directions;[5]

(5)whether or not the litigation has been characterised by periods of delay;[6]

(6)whether the delay is attributable to the plaintiff, the defendant or both the plaintiff and the defendant;[7]

(7)whether or not the impecuniosity of the plaintiff has been responsible for the pace of the litigation and whether the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff’s impecuniosity;[8]

(8)whether the litigation between the parties would be concluded by the striking out of the plaintiff’s claim;

(9)how far the litigation has progressed;[9]

(10)whether or not the delay has been caused by the plaintiff’s lawyers being dilatory.  Such dilatoriness will not necessarily be sheeted home to the client but it may be.[10]  Delay for which an applicant for leave to proceed is responsible is regarded as more difficult to explain than delay by his or her legal advisers;[11]

(11)whether there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay;[12] and

(12)whether or not the delay has resulted in prejudice to the defendant leading to an inability to ensure a fair trial.[13]

The court’s discretion is, however, not fettered by rigid rules but should take into account all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case[14] including the consideration that ordinary members of the community are entitled to get on with their lives and plan their affairs without having the continuing threat of litigation and its consequences hanging over them.[15]

  1. The decision in Tyler also stated that on an application for leave to proceed the applicant must show that there is a good reason for exempting the particular proceedings from the general prohibition and that the rationale of the rule requiring leave to proceed after a long delay is to present abuse of process.  It was clearly stated that the court must be satisfied that the continuation of the proceedings would not involve injustice or unfairness to one of the parties by reason of the delay.
  1. In determining therefore whether leave should be given, I will turn to an examination of the factors which were identified by Atkinson J as relevant.
  1. The events alleged in the statement of claim occurred in November 1994.
  1. The litigation was commenced shortly before of the expiration of the limitation period on 28 November 1997.  The cause of action was therefore commenced some 12 years ago however, the defendants then took some eighteen months to file a Notice of Defence and have the proceedings transferred to Queensland.
  1. In relation to the prospects of success, it is clear from the report of the ophthalmologist Dr Vandeleur that it is arguable that the plaintiff’s eye injuries could be the result of injuries sustained on 3 December 1994 rather than as a result of a further incident in October 1997.  He states that he considers that on the balance of probabilities an assault on 3 December 1994, which had not caused retinal detachment by 7 December 1994, could cause a retinal detachment that resulted in a loss of vision in October 1997.  Dr Vandeleur concluded that he was:

“absolutely certain that the injury received on 23 October 1997 did not cause the cataract nor did it cause the retinal detachment.  Both the cataract and the retinal detachment were obviously of long standing and were almost certainly caused by the trauma received on 3 December 1994”. 

The issue, however, is whether the injury was caused by the fight with police whilst he was in custody or whether the injury had occurred prior to his arrest in the mall in Cairns on the night of 3 December 1994.

  1. It is clear that there has been no disobedience by the plaintiff in relation to any court orders or directions.
  1. An examination of the file history as enunciated above however clearly indicates that this litigation has been punctuated by long periods of delay. Even after leave to proceed was granted by Justice Holmes on 30 September 2004 there has been long delay.
  1. In relation to prejudice, it is clear that the main witnesses are members of the police force and a doctor.  There is affidavit material from the police witnesses as well as from the ambulance service and the doctor indicating that they do not have a good recall of the events of the night of 3 December 1994.  It is clear, however, that Queensland Police put together a brief of statements from all of the witnesses for the court proceedings in Cairns in relation to the charges against the plaintiff.  There are statements and photographs on file which can refresh the memories of the witnesses.  There is also evidence of a doctor’s report which was served by the plaintiff in 1999.  It is also clear that the plaintiff was examined by a doctor shortly after he was injured and the report is available.
  1. It is also clear that the plaintiff has an alternative remedy such as a negligence action against the solicitors.

Delay

  1. The major issue in this case is really the long period of delay. Whilst it is clear that much of the delay has been attributable to the plaintiff or his solicitor, there have also been long periods of delay by the defendant particularly in 2005 and 2006. Further delays were then caused by the need to make suitable arrangements for the plaintiff to be examined by an ophthalmologist and a psychiatrist. Much of the delay was caused by the fact that the plaintiff lives in Forbes in New South Wales and had to travel over 1,000 kilometres to attend these separate appointments. Furthermore, it is clear from the material that the plaintiff experienced difficulty in meeting the costs of attending these appointments. It was not until 2 January 2008 that the defendant advised the plaintiff’s solicitors that assistance would be provided to the plaintiff with travel and accommodation expenses to allow him to attend the medical appointment with Dr Chalk in January 2008.
  1. The affidavit from David Hooper indicates that he did not receive the file from the previous solicitors until March 2008 and that there were several documents missing from that file. The affidavit from Mr Hooper then indicates that there were long delays of over one year between 2008 and 2009 due to his own personal circumstances. It would appear that the solicitor was involved in his own divorce proceedings throughout 2006 and it would seem that there were several other events in his life. He states “in the latter half of 2008 I was involved in more personal upheaval requiring the sale of my former home of 23 years and the relocation of my sole practitioner’s practice”. The solicitor further stated that it was not until December 2008 that he received a copy of the plaintiff’s statement of loss and damage through the cooperation of the defendant, as he had not received a copy of this document from the previous solicitors.
  1. Mr Hooper indicated that in early 2009, Mr Carmichael, the solicitor at the firm of Brennans in Queensland who had dealt with the file as town agent died of cancer. Significantly, he stated that it was Mr Carmichael who had undertaken to provide to him the draft affidavit and the copies of the documents missing from the file he had received from the previous solicitors. After the death of Mr Carmichael the firm of Brennans indicated they would no longer act as Mr Hooper’s Queensland agent.  During 2009 Mr Hooper has had difficulty in obtaining agents to act for him in Queensland.  As recently as 12 August 2009 he was advised that the firm he approached, namely Schultz, Toomey, O’Brien of Kawana, indicated that they would not act as agents. Mr Hooper advised that he has been unable to obtain Queensland agents. 
  1. Mr Hooper states:

“I inform the court that the plaintiff himself has done everything he could possible do to secure the progress of his proceedings. In particular, he has attended at the medical appointments arranged for him by the defendant in a timely fashion.  To the extent that he did not attend an appointment arranged for him with Dr Chalk in July 2007 such failure can be attributed to a failure to communicate with him by either myself or, by his former law firm, Messrs Watson Stafford.”

  1. It is clear that the plaintiff did attend upon the medical examinations arranged for him in June 2007 and January 2008. It is also clear that throughout 2007, the Crown Solicitor was clearly advised that the plaintiff intended to pursue his claim.  It is also clear that the plaintiff lives in Forbes and he may only be contacted by post as he does not have a telephone to receive incoming calls.  The solicitor for the plaintiff states further:

“I say that apart from the requirement to attend upon the defendant’s medical examinations and subject to his periods of incarceration the plaintiff is ready to proceed with this matter in September 2005 when his signed statement of loss and damage and a request for trial date was served upon the defendant, and that the plaintiff has at all times done everything that he could do to instruct that the matter progress to the next step in the proceedings.”

  1. Mr Taylor is an unemployed 35 year old Torres Strait Islander who is not only residing a long distance from Queensland but he is “basically illiterate and impecunious”. His counsel’s submissions is that Mr Taylor “should not be prejudiced by reason of the legal procedural difficulties encountered by his various legal representatives as due to his own personal situation he was hardly in a position to change solicitors had he wished to”. I also note that the affidavit by the solicitor David Hooper indicates that much of the reason for the delay in the last 18 months is attributable to his own personal circumstances.
  1. In relation to whether the matter is ready for hearing, it is clear that the litigation has progressed to a stage where the plaintiff has attended all his medical examinations and these reports have been served. It would also seem clear that the defendants have been content to arrange these medical appointments despite the fact the actual application for leave to proceed had not in fact been filed but rather was only anticipated.
  1. In coming to a determination in this matter I have relied upon a statement by Connolly J with whom the other members of the Court agreed in Dempsey v Dorber:[16]

“The question whether there is good reason for making such an order obviously involves a consideration of all relevant matters and the question of whether there was reasonable excuse for the delay is unquestionably a relevant matter…In my judgment, the proper approach to a question such as this is to identify the relevant factors, assess the weight to be given in the circumstances of the case to each of them, and then to determine, whether, on balance, there is good reason for making the order”

  1. In particular in considering the issue of delay in Grahame Cavanough v Commonwealth of Australia[17]  Mullins J stated:

There are four aspects of prejudice by the passage of time relied on by the defendant:

  1. the general presumption of prejudice because of long delay: Tricon Industries v Abel Lemon & Co Pty Ltd (No 2) [1998] 2 Qd R 551, 556;
  1. the loss of an earlier opportunity to have the plaintiff examined by medical specialists for the purposes of the action and the fact that Drs Jenkins and Weidmann have no immediate recollection of their consultations with the plaintiff;
  1. destruction of medical records by Dr Jenkins and Princess Alexandra Hospital and the failure to locate the original of Lieutenant Wilkinson's report;
  1. the diminished recollections of Messrs McCurdy and Dykstra.”
  1. Accordingly in the circumstances of the present case it is clear that whilst there is generally a presumption of prejudice because of long delay in the present case there has been no loss of opportunity to have the plaintiff examined by the relevant medical specialists, furthermore the medical records are available. The witnesses are available and whilst there may be diminished recollections contemporaneous statements were obtained in 1994. The defendant was always aware of the intention to bring this application and indeed would appear to have proceeded on the basis that the application would be successful. I consider that the same can be said of this action as was said of the action in Tyler by Atkinson J; [18]

“[37]  This litigation has been characterised by long periods of delay as has been set out.  Not all of the delay, however, was caused by the respondent. The appellant took some 15 months between November 1990 and February 1992 to respond to a very simple request for particulars. The matter has been progressing, albeit very slowly, to trial and is now virtually ready for trial.

[45]  The prejudice caused by the passing of time may be as insidious as it is subtle in that the parties cannot demonstrate what it is that they have forgotten. It is necessary to remember however that the inevitable disadvantage to all parties of delay does not necessarily mean that the relevant issues cannot be fairly tried particularly where, as here, the case will for the most part be determined by contemporaneous documents. For some parts of the claim there is no documentary proof but these parts of the claim have been fully particularised in the statement of claim since June 1987.

[46]  The learned Chamber judge applied the correct test to the question of prejudice, namely whether the plaintiff has satisfied the onus of showing that any prejudice the defendant may suffer is not such as to cause injustice to the defendant should the action be permitted to continue.”

  1. I do not consider that the delay involved in this case has been such as to demonstrate that the matter cannot be fairly tried. Leave to proceed is therefore granted.
  1. I consider that in the circumstances the plaintiff should pay the defendant’s costs of the application on the standard basis however I will hear from the parties in this regard.

Footnotes

[1] Cooper v Hopgood Ganim [1999] 2 Qd R 113 at 119.

[2] Department of Transport v Chris Smaller (Transport) Ltd [1989] 1 AC 1197 at 1207-1208 per Lord Griffiths; Bishopgate Insurance Australia Ltd (In liquidation) v Deloitte Haskins and Sells, Supreme Court of Victoria, Appeal Div, No 4901 of 1989, 9 September 1994 at 22, 23; Hoy v Honan CA No 4058 of 1996, 19 August 1997 at 4; Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim (supra) at 120, 121.

[3] Cooper v Hopgood Ganim (supra) at 120 per Pincus JA.

[4]Keioskie v Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland CA No 46 of 1992, 15 September 1992 at 2-3 per McPherson J; Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim (supra) at 124.

[5] Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim (supra) at 121;

[6] Birkett v James [1978] AC 297 at 322-323; Bishopgate Insurance Australia Ltd (In liquidation) v Deloitte Haskins and Sells (supra) at 27; Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim (supra) at 119, 120, 124.

[7] Holmes v Civil & Civic Pty Ltd CA No 15 of 1992, 14 September 1992; Lewandowski v Lovell (1994) 11 WAR 124; Hoy v Honan (supra) at 5.

[8] Hoy v Honan (supra) at 3 per Derrington J; at 7 per Fitzgerald P.

[9] Keioskie v Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland (supra) at 10 per Thomas J.

[10] Campbell v United Pacific Transport Pty Ltd [1966] QdR 465 at 473, 475; Kaats v Caelers [1966] QdR 482 at 497; Tate v McLeod [1969] QdR 217 at 224-225; Collingwood v Calvert CA No 3028 of 1996, 6 December 1996 at 5, 7, per Fitzgerald P; Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim (supra) at 124.

[11] Gleeson v Brick [1969] QdR 361 at 369; Keioskie v Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland (supra) per Thomas J at 7.

[12] Campbell v United Pacific Transport Pty Ltd (supra) at 473-474; Witten v Lombard Australia Ltd (1968) 88 WN (Pt1) NSW 405 at 412; Dempsey v Dorber [1990] 1 QdR 418 at 420; Keioskie v Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland (supra) per Thomas J at 4; Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim (supra) at 124.

[13] Witten v Lombard Australia Ltd (supra) at 412; Dempsey v Dorber (supra) at 420; Keioskie v Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland (supra); Bishopgate Insurance Australia Ltd. (In liquidation) v Deloitte Haskins and Sells (supra) at 24-25; Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 554-555 per McHugh J; Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim (supra) at 118, 124.

[14] Witten v Lombard Australia Ltd (supra) at 412; Stollznow v Calvert [1980] 2 NSWLR 749; Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 538; Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim (supra) at 118-119, 124.

[15] Cooper v Hopgood Ganim (supra) at 124 per McPherson JA.

[16] [1990] 1 Qd R 418 at 420.

[17] [2000] QSC 068 at [48].

[18] Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Ltd & Ors [2000] QCA 178 at [37] and [45] – [46].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Taylor v State of Queensland

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Taylor v State of Queensland

  • MNC:

    [2009] QSC 318

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    A Lyons J

  • Date:

    01 Oct 2009

Litigation History

No Litigation History

Appeal Status

No Status