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JD Enterprises (Qld) Pty Ltd v Staedtler (Pacific) Pty Ltd

 

[2014] QSC 237

 

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

 

PARTIES:

FILE NO/S:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

DELIVERED ON:

30 September 2014

DELIVERED AT:

Rockhampton

HEARING DATE:

22 September 2014

JUDGE:

McMeekin J

ORDER:

1. Further submissions to be made by the parties on or before 4pm 2nd October 2014.

CATCHWORDS:

CORPORATIONS – WINDING UP – WINDING UP IN INSOLVENCY – STATUTORY DEMAND – APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE STATUTORY DEMAND where the applicant seeks to set aside a statutory demand sent by the respondent for debts owed – where the applicant contends the respondent induced the contract by misleading representations – where the applicant contends there is a genuine dispute about the debt owed – where there was a defect in the affidavit material accompanying the statutory demand – whether the statutory demand should be set aside.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 459E, s 459G, s 459H, s 459J,

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 453, r 995

Balmain New Ferry Co Pty Ltd v Robertson (1906) 4 CLR 379; [1906] HCA 83 cited

Broke Hills Estate Pty Ltd v Oakvale Wines Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 638 cited

Diploma Construction Pty Ltd v KPA Architects Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 91 cited

Dolvelle Pty Ltd v Australian Macfarms Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 717 cited

JJMMR Pty Ltd v LG International Corporation [2003] QCA 519 cited

Macleay Nominees Pty Ltd v Belle Property East Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 743 cited

Mayaman Developments Pty Ltd v TQ Constructions Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 144 cited

Re Morris Catering (Australia) Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 601 cited

COUNSEL:

J Faulkner for the applicant

S McLennan for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Barron & Allen Lawyers for the applicant

Barry Nilsson Lawyers as town agents for Turks Legal for the respondent

  1. McMeekin J: The respondent, Staedtler (Pacific) Pty Ltd, is in the business of supplying stationary. It did so to the applicant, JD Enterprises (Qld) Pty Ltd, which conducts a newsagency. The applicant has not paid for all the goods supplied. The respondent claims that it is owed $32,505.74 for those goods. Eventually the respondent issued a statutory demand pursuant to s 459E of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Act”). The demand includes claims for interest ($581.09) and legal costs ($3,905.44).
  1. Accompanying the demand was an affidavit. It referred to certain documents being exhibited to it. When initially served the exhibits were not attached but were served subsequently.
  1. This present application is made pursuant to s 459G of the Act to set aside that statutory demand.

The Grounds for Setting Aside

  1. There is no dispute between the parties about the quantity or price of the goods that were supplied. After service of the demand the applicant by its directors, Mr and Ms Shepperson, complained that the applicant had been induced to buy too much stock by misleading representations made by the respondent’s sales representative. The Sheppersons maintain that they had no prior experience of running a newsagency, that the sale representative was familiar with this business when conducted by its previous owner, and that instead of purchasing a reasonable quantity of the various items the business needed they were induced by certain representations into purchasing enough to run the business for two years.
  1. As a consequence the applicant maintains that the respondent has breached s 18 of the Australian Competition and Consumer Law Act 2010 (Cth)[1] (“the ACL”) and that it is entitled to an order that will “prevent or reduce the loss or damage suffered, or likely to be suffered” by it.[2] The possible remedies available “include …an order declaring the whole or any part of a contract …  to be void; and …to have been void ab initio or void at all times on and after such date as is specified in the order … or  … an order refusing to enforce any or all of the provisions of such a contract or arrangement.”[3]
  1. It follows, so the applicant contends:
  1. that there is a genuine dispute between it and the respondent about the existence of the debt to which the demand relates, thus justifying the setting aside of the demand (see s 459H(1)(a)) of the Act or, at worst, that the applicant has an offsetting claim for an equivalent amount: s 459H(1)(b) of the Act; or
  1. that by reason of the omission of the exhibits either the statutory demand was defective and that substantial injustice will be caused if the demand is not set aside (s 459J(1)(a) of the Act) or that the pre-conditions of the Act have not been met and so the jurisdiction is not exercisable; or
  1. that there is another reason why the demand should be set aside namely that there was no basis at all for over 10% of the debt claimed, a reference to the claim for legal costs and interest (see s 459J(1)(b) of the Act).
  1. The application was brought within the 21 days stipulated in the legislation.
  1. The respondent contends that there is no genuine dispute on the evidence, no offsetting claim that would reduce the amount outstanding to less than the statutory minimum of $2000; and that the demand was not defective or, if it was, there is no injustice at all to the applicant.

The Relevant Statutory Provisions

  1. Section 459H of the Act provides:

Determination of application where there is a dispute or offsetting claim

(1)This section applies where, on an application under section 459G, the Court is satisfied of either or both of the following:

(a)that there is a genuine dispute between the company and the respondent about the existence or amount of a debt to which the demand relates;

(b)that the company has an offsetting claim.

(2)The Court must calculate the substantiated amount of the demand in accordance with the formula:

Admitted total – Offsetting total

where:

"admitted total" means:

(a)the admitted amount of the debt; or

(b)the total of the respective admitted amounts of the debts;

as the case requires, to which the demand relates.

"offsetting total" means:

(a)if the Court is satisfied that the company has only one offsetting claim--the amount of that claim; or

(b)if the Court is satisfied that the company has 2 or more offsetting claims--the total of the amounts of those claims; or

(c)otherwise--a nil amount.

(3)If the substantiated amount is less than the statutory minimum, the Court must, by order, set aside the demand.

(4)If the substantiated amount is at least as great as the statutory minimum, the Court may make an order:

(a)varying the demand as specified in the order; and

(b)declaring the demand to have had effect, as so varied, as from when the demand was served on the company.

(5)In this section:

"admitted amount" , in relation to a debt, means:

(a)if the Court is satisfied that there is a genuine dispute between the company and the respondent about the existence of the debt--a nil amount; or

(b)if the Court is satisfied that there is a genuine dispute between the company and the respondent about the amount of the debt--so much of that amount as the Court is satisfied is not the subject of such a dispute; or

(c)otherwise--the amount of the debt.

"offsetting claim" means a genuine claim that the company has against the respondent by way of counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand (even if it does not arise out of the same transaction or circumstances as a debt to which the demand relates).

"respondent" means the person who served the demand on the company.

             (6)  This section has effect subject to section 459J.

  1. Section 459J of the Act provides:

 

Setting aside demand on other grounds

(1)On an application under section 459G, the Court may by order set aside the demand if it is satisfied that:

(a)because of a defect in the demand, substantial injustice will be caused unless the demand is set aside; or

(b)there is some other reason why the demand should be set aside.

(2)Except as provided in subsection (1), the Court must not set aside a statutory demand merely because of a defect.

Is There a Genuine Dispute?

  1. The respondent concedes that there is a genuine dispute about the claim for legal costs. That can be put to one side for the moment. It maintains its claim for interest but that in turn depends on the existence of the primary debt for goods sold and delivered and that debt was the focus of submissions. I turn then to that principal claim.
  1. A running account was kept. The respondent contends, and no evidence was led to the contrary,[4] that stock was supplied and invoiced and payments made as set out in the following table:

 

Date

Invoice Amount

Amount Paid

Balance

2.10.13

$32,851.19

 

 

13.11.13

$5,084.62

 

$37,935.81

2.01.14

$34.53

 

 

6.01.14

$250.28

 

 

19.01.14

$4,285.12

 

$42,505.74

10.02.14

 

$5,000

$37,505.74

14.04.14

 

$1,500

$36,005.74

9.05.14

 

$500

$35,505.74

16.05.14

 

$500

$35,005.74

9.06.14

 

$1,000

$34,005.74

11.06.14

 

$500

$33,505.74

13.06.14

 

$500

$33,005.74

26.06.14

 

$500

$32,505.74

  1. Mr McLennan, who appeared for the respondent, submitted that, properly characterised, the applicant’s claim is for an “offsetting claim” under s 459H(1)(b). That was the characterisation adopted in JJMMR Pty Ltd v LG International Corporation [2003] QCA 519 by the Court of Appeal where the claim was for damages for false and misleading conduct, under ss 52 and 82 of the Trade Practices Act. The expression is defined in s 459H(5) to mean “a genuine claim that the company has against the respondent by way of counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand …”.
  1. Mr Faulkner, who appeared for the applicant, contended that the possible remedies were not limited to damages but included setting aside the contract and returning the parties to their original positions by ordering the return of all stock and monies paid. Hence it followed that the existence of the entire debt was in dispute and so this was not merely an offsetting damages claim.
  1. In either case what needs to be shown is that the “dispute” or the “offsetting claim” is a “genuine” one.
  1. However characterised, the respondent argues that there was no evidence that supported the contention that the dispute or offsetting claim here was a genuine one as opposed to one merely “manufactured or got up simply for the purpose of defeating the demand made against the company” to adopt the phrase used by McPherson JA in JJMMR at [18].
  1. There is a deal of force in the submission. There is little in the way of evidence, independent of the assertion only now made, that indicates that there was any genuine dispute about the conduct of the sales representative. However Mr McLennan contends that there is a more fundamental point.
  1. If the applicant had advanced evidence to the effect that the misleading conduct complained of had the potential to affect all of the stock the subject of the outstanding debt then it might be said that the scope of the “genuine dispute” extended to the whole of the debt. But that is not the applicant’s case.
  1. Ms Shepperson’s affidavit makes plain that in her discussions with the respondent’s representative she intended to order sufficient stock to allow for 12 months’ trading. Her complaint is that she was induced to order two years’ worth. Thus her complaint is that she has ordered about twice what she would have if properly advised.
  1. Once it is accepted that the dispute relates to only part of the stock ordered then it is impossible to accept the submission that the entire debt is in dispute. Indeed the applicant apparently continues to use the stock purchased from the respondent in its business from day to day. It is then incumbent on the applicant to advance evidence as to the scope of the dispute. So much is plain from the obligation placed on the Court to “calculate the substantiated amount of the demand in accordance with the formula” set out (s 459H(2)) and the definition in s 459H(5)(b) of “admitted amount”:

“if the Court is satisfied that there is a genuine dispute between the company and the respondent about the amount of the debt - so much of that amount as the Court is satisfied is not the subject of such a dispute

  1. It is for the applicant to lead evidence that would enable an estimate to be made of the offsetting amount. The authorities consistently support that approach: Broke Hills Estate Pty Ltd v Oakvale Wines Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 638 at [30] - [32] per Gzell J; Mayaman Developments Pty Ltd v TQ Constructions Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 144 at [23] per Daubney J; Macleay Nominees Pty Ltd v Belle Property East Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 743 at [18] per Palmer J; Diploma Construction Pty Ltd v KPA Architects Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 91 at [90].
  1. The evidence need not be precise but must be sufficient to at least enable the Court to either carry out the calculation required to determine that the scope of the offsetting claim, if accepted, reduces the debt to less than the statutory minimum of $2,000, or show that it would otherwise be unjust not to set aside the demand.
  1. Apart from inference the evidence is silent as to what quantity of stock was delivered but extraneous to the applicant’s stated needs. Accepting Ms Shepperson’s complaint that she ordered about twice the amount that she would have if properly advised the inference is that but for the misleading conduct the applicant would have ordered about $16,425 worth of stock in October, one-half of the actual order.
  1. The applicant has paid $10,000 in total. If that is applied to the purchase in October there remains a balance owing of at least $6,425, well above the statutory minimum.[5]
  1. But that is not the limit of the obvious indebtedness of the applicant.
  1. Accepting all that the applicant claims, it still must pay for the stock that it has accepted and sold on to its customers. No authority was cited for the proposition that the applicant could take the respondent’s stock, sell it - presumably at a profit, and then not be under an obligation to pay for it. So any order under s 243 of the ACL could not have the effect of declaring the whole contract void ab initio. The Court could not, in respect of that sold stock, restore the parties to the positions that they formerly enjoyed. Mr Faulkner did not contend otherwise. In my view it is clear beyond argument that the applicant remains indebted to the respondent for so much of the stock that the applicant has sold.
  1. There were orders subsequent to the initial order in October. There was a re-order five weeks after the initial purchase occurred, on 13 November. Each item on the list of stationary purchased then appeared on the initial invoice of 2 October.[6] The amount of the re-order totalled $5,084.62.
  1. Similarly the invoice of 19 January 2014 included a supply of stock that appears on the original invoice – Product number 110-HB 10. The cost of that item was $3,123.36.[7]
  1. Significantly, the claimed misleading conduct is not said to relate to such re-orders and it is difficult to see how any such conduct could. Common sense suggests that no business would re-order items unless the original quantity had been sufficiently depleted to warrant the re-order. No explanation was offered as to why the applicant would do otherwise.
  1. It follows that $8,207.98 of the stock purchased by the applicant in October needed replenishing. Even if one makes the assumption that all other stock initially purchased was superfluous to requirements, an assumption contrary to the applicant’s own case, the applicant owes the respondent $16,415.96 – for the stock originally purchased and on sold and for the equivalent re-ordered stock. Again applying the $10,000 paid there is a substantial indebtedness.
  1. In fact the orders subsequent to the initial order and, so far as the evidence shows, untainted by any misleading conduct allegation, totalled $9,654.55. Applying the $10,000 paid to those orders means that only $345.55 has been paid towards the applicant’s indebtedness for the initial October order. Taking the applicant’s case at its highest results in an indebtedness of about $16,080.
  1. The applicant has not descended to any useful detail in its assertions as to how much of the stock purchased was extraneous to its needs. The only detail given is this:

“The Applicant is still holding over half that amount of stock that was purchased last year … the cost of that excessive stock is at the least equivalent to or in excess of $32,505.74”[8]

  1. I do not understand how that claim can be correct. Mr Faulkner who appeared for the applicant could not offer any rational explanation for the claim.
  1. As can be seen from the table above the reference to the “stock that was purchased last year” presumably refers to the first two invoices totalling $37,935.81. If the applicant is still holding “over half that amount of stock” then it is difficult to see how “the cost of that excessive stock is at the least equivalent to or in excess of $32,505.74”.
  1. It is true that a reference to “over half” could mean anything from 51% to 99%. But, unless the true situation is that the amount of stock still held - and superfluous to the needs of the applicant - is about 95% of the value of the quantity supplied, then the debt outstanding must exceed $2,000, given that there is no claim that the amount charged is otherwise inappropriate.
  1. The applicant is the only party in a position to supply the detail and does not do so.
  1. What evidence there is suggests that the surplus stock, assuming that there is surplus stock, cannot be anything like 95% of the stock purchased.
  1. That analysis is consistent with the evidence of attempts to return stock. The respondent maintained that it had a policy of accepting the return of stock if the customer so desired and that the issue of the return of stock was raised in the correspondence that passed between the parties.
  1. The correspondence shows that the Sheppersons listed the stock that they wished to return. The respondent disputed that two of the items on the list had been supplied by it. Correlating the cost of the items on the list, save for those two disputed items, with the original invoices shows that the cost of the stock offered by way of return was $9,083.23.[9]
  1. In the absence of any explanation the inescapable inference is that as at the date of the offer to return goods (in April 2014) the applicant had a use for the balance of the goods that had been delivered over and above those offered by way of return.
  1. I am conscious that Ms Shepperson claims that there was a dispute about the amount of stock to be returned and the amount of credit to be allowed and so no agreement eventuated.[10] She does not give any detail as to what the dispute was or what she maintains was the true quantity or value of stock offered to be returned.
  1. Thus what evidence there is indicates that no matter how genuine the claim that there was misleading conduct, the dispute was over an amount that left a debt owing that substantially exceeded the statutory minimum. There is no prospect of a court relieving the applicant of its liability in relation to that debt.
  1. I have therefore come to the view that so much of the debt that is not shown to be the subject of a genuine dispute, even taking the applicant’s case at its highest, results in a “substantiated amount” of the debt that is “at least as great as the statutory minimum”.
  1. Section 459H(4) applies and provides:

(4)If the substantiated amount is at least as great as the statutory minimum, the Court may make an order:

(a)varying the demand as specified in the order; and

(b)declaring the demand to have had effect, as so varied, as from when the demand was served on the company.

  1. Whether I should make the orders contemplated by s 459H(4) depends on the applicant’s remaining arguments.

The Defect

  1. As mentioned the defect alleged is that the respondent failed to include in the material served certain exhibits referred to in the affidavit accompanying the statutory demand. Those exhibits were copies of emails sent to the applicant in which demands for payment were made on 20 March and 16 April 2014 and a copy of a demand made by the respondent’s solicitors to the applicant on 26 June 2014.
  1. The respondent accepts that the documents were not included in the original service but were served later.
  1. The applicant does not claim that the documents that were intended to be exhibited were not in fact sent to, and received by, the applicant on the dates alleged in the affidavit.
  1. Given that the applicant was well aware of the demands that had been made and not misled in any way by the affidavit then there is then no possibility of the applicant showing, on this ground, that “substantial injustice will be caused if the demand is not set aside” as required by s 459J(1)(a) of the Act.
  1. The more fundamental point is whether a defect of this type in the supporting affidavit renders the whole process invalid.
  1. Section 459E provides for the serving of the statutory demand and:

(3)Unless the debt, or each of the debts, is a judgment debt, the demand must be accompanied by an affidavit that:

(a)verifies that the debt, or the total of the amounts of the debts, is due and payable by the company; and

(b)complies with the rules.

  1. Here the debt claimed is not a judgment debt and so subsection (3) applies. The provision is mandatory – “the demand must be accompanied by an affidavit…”. The affidavit served here complies with s 459E(3)(a) in that it does verify the debt as due and payable by the applicant.
  1. The issue is whether the affidavit served here complies with “the rules” as required by s 459E(3)(b). The applicant submitted that r 435 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”) was breached by the failure to exhibit documents.
  1. “Rules” here means the rules of this Court: see the definition in s 9 of the Act. Rule 995 of the UCPR provides that the rules set out in Schedule 1A to the UCPR apply to proceedings brought pursuant to the Act. Section 2.6 deals with the form of affidavits and requires that they comply with the “rules of the court”. Section 5.2 of the rules in Schedule 1A requires that an affidavit accompanying a statutory demand “be in Form 7 and state the matters mentioned in that form”.
  1. Rule 435 UCPR does not in fact provide that exhibits must be served with the affidavit. It does provide that exhibits must be filed with the affidavit: r 435(8). So far as I am aware that rule was complied with. At most a failure to serve the exhibits contemporaneously with the affidavit would be an irregularity capable of being cured.
  1. All the matters mentioned in Form 7 are stated in the affidavit. There is no statement in Form 7 to the effect that documents referred to in the affidavit must be exhibited. Nor is there any statement that any prior demand for payment of the debt in question must be proved or, if made in writing, the writing be exhibited. Unsurprisingly perhaps, the Form does not contemplate the situation here of a deponent who neglects to serve with the affidavit documents that the deponent intends to, and claims to, exhibit.
  1. The failure to provide a document not required by the rules, the affidavit otherwise being perfectly explicable, does not, in my view, constitute a failure to comply with the rules.
  1. Even if I was of the contrary view I think it would still be necessary for the applicant to show that a substantial injustice would be caused if the demand was not set aside. The reference in s 459J to “a defect in the demand” is intended in my view to encompass the rules relating to the affidavit which must accompany the demand.
  1. I note that Santow J took that view in relation to an affidavit accompanying a statutory demand in an application to wind up a company under s 467A where a very similar provision appears: Dolvelle Pty Ltd v Australian Macfarms Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 717.

Some Other Reason

  1. The final point argued was that there was “some other reason why the demand should be set aside” under s 459J(1)(b) of the Act
  1. As mentioned the respondent included in the demand amounts for interest ($581.09) and legal costs ($3,905.44). It maintains its demand for interest.
  1. The applicant’s submission is that there was simply no legal basis for these demands. No contractual term, it was said, gave to the respondent the right to claim either sum. Because it must succeed on its arguments for sums totalling a little over 10% of the demand the applicant contends that the whole demand should be set aside.
  1. No authority was cited to support the submission. I do not accept that there is any merit in the argument.
  1. The legislation clearly contemplates that situations will arise where some part of the debt demanded will be genuinely in dispute and some part not. In that case the court is given the task of determining the “substantiated amount”. Plainly enough, the inclusion of amounts that are found to be in dispute is not intended to invalidate the whole process. There is no special provision for amounts that are found not only to be in dispute but plainly not owing.
  1. There may well be situations where a creditor is seen to be using the statutory demand procedure oppressively and in such a way that the demand, in justice, should be set aside as a result, even if the Court was of the view that more than the statutory minimum was plainly owing. But where, as here, the amounts involved were discretely identified in the demand, and so the applicant quite capable of discerning what was being alleged against it, I fail to see why there is any injustice in permitting the creditor to pursue 90% of the debt it otherwise claims to be owing, assuming the correctness of the applicant’s arguments on this point.
  1. Quite apart from that the applicant’s arguments are contentious. The claimed contractual basis for the demands are said to be in the terms and conditions set out at the respondent’s website. The applicant argues that the first notice it had of the terms and conditions relied on was in February 2014 but that is not correct. It was then notified of changes to the terms and conditions. The original invoice includes the following: “Subject to our standard terms and conditions of sale available on www.staedtler.com”. Those terms and conditions[11] do include a right to claim interest (cl 6.5) and legal costs (cl 17.2) in certain circumstances. The applicant contends that those terms and conditions were not drawn to its notice before the debt was incurred and the dispute arose. Whether the respondent needed to do any more is debateable but arguably a question of fact for trial: Balmain New Ferry Co Pty Ltd v Robertson (1906) 4 CLR 379.
  1. As well the applicant maintains that the relevant circumstances do not apply. It is not at all clear that the applicant is correct in that. But no matter how meritorious these arguments might be they seem to be “run of the mill” arguments involving contractual debts. As Thomas J remarked in Re Morris Catering (Australia) Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 601 at 605, where his Honour emphasised that it was not the task of the court to “examine the merits or settle the dispute” and that “beyond a perception of genuineness (or lack of it) the court has no function.  It is not helpful to perceive that one party is more likely than the other to succeed.”
  1. That being so and not being persuaded that the respondent was setting out to use the procedure oppressively I see no reason to set aside the demand on this ground.
  1. I do accept that there is a genuine dispute about those items.

Conclusion

  1. In my view the statutory demand should not be set aside. The applicant has not discharged the onus of demonstrating that there is a genuine dispute, or that it has an offsetting claim for an amount, that would reduce the debt to less than the statutory minimum of $2,000.
  1. I propose to hear from counsel as to the appropriate orders in light of these reasons. I direct that such further submissions be made as the parties are advised on or before 4 pm on 2 October 2014.

Footnotes

[1] Which provides in s 18(1): “A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.”

[2] Section 237(2)(b) of the Australian Competition and Consumer Law Act 2010 (Cth)

[3] Ibid s 243

[4] The evidence on which I proceed is that available at the hearing. Subsequent to the hearing the applicant’s solicitors forwarded a further affidavit of Ms Shepperson which effectively attacked much of the factual basis upon which submissions proceeded at the hearing. I declined to receive the affidavit, no leave having been sought to read it. No application has been made to re-open the applicant’s case.

[5] I am conscious that the respondent applied the amounts received in a certain way and it may be it had the contractual right to do so: see cl 6.6 of the terms and conditions at p 18 of the exhibits to Mr Cashmore’s affidavit sworn 18 September 2014. The matter was not explored in argument.

[6] The invoices can be compared at pp 12 and 14 of the exhibits to Mr Cashmore’s affidavit sworn 18 September 2014.

[7] Ibid at p 17

[8] Affidavit of Ms Shepperson filed 21 August 2014 at paragraph 5

[9] Compare the discounted price in the initial invoice (at p12 of the exhibits to Mr Cashmore’s affidavit sworn 18 September 2014) to the list headed “Staedtler Returns Request’ (at p37)

[10] Paragraph 6 of the affidavit filed 21 August 2014 and see paragraph 4 of her supplementary affidavit. The respondent’s point made in the correspondence was that the return of $9,083 worth of stock did not discharge the debt owing of over $27,000: See p 38 of the exhibits to Mr Cashmore’s affidavit sworn 18 September 2014

[11] At pp 18-21 of the exhibits to Mr Cashmore’s affidavit sworn 18 September 2014.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    JD Enterprises (Qld) Pty Ltd v Staedtler (Pacific) Pty Ltd

  • Shortened Case Name:

    JD Enterprises (Qld) Pty Ltd v Staedtler (Pacific) Pty Ltd

  • MNC:

    [2014] QSC 237

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    McMeekin J

  • Date:

    30 Sep 2014

Litigation History

No Litigation History

Appeal Status

No Status