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Tonia v State of Queensland

 

[2010] QSC 434

 

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

  

CITATION:

Tonia v State of Queensland [2010] QSC 434

PARTIES:

Jacinta Lee Tonia

(Plaintiff/ Applicant)

v

State of Queensland

(Defendant/ Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS 443/10

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application for Extension of Time

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

19 November 2010

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane 

HEARING DATE:

22 October 2010

JUDGE:

Boddice J

ORDER:

1.That the limitation period for this proceeding be extended to 16 February 2009.

2.That the costs of and incidental to this application be costs in the proceeding.

CATCHWORDS:

Limitation of actions - Extension of limitation periods - Extension of time in personal injuries matters - Knowledge of material facts of decisive character - What are material factswhere the applicant had an ongoing lower back injury – where the applicant was deemed no longer employable as a member of the Queensland Police Service – where the applicant was required to retire on medical grounds – whether the applicant’s claim is statute barred

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld)

WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld)

Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld)

Baillie v Creber & Anor [2010] QSC 052

Brease v State of Queensland [2007] QSC 043

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541

Dick v University of Queensland [2000] 2 Qd R 476

Honour v Faminco Mining Services Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 352

Limpus v State of Queensland [2004] 2 Qd R 161

NF v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 1110

Spain v Dipompo Jacks Constructions Pty Ltd & Anor [2009] QCA 323

Stevenson v State of Queensland [2004] QCA 483

Watters v Queensland Rail [2001] 1 Qd R 448

Wood v Glaxo Australia Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 431

COUNSEL:

Murphy, DJ – plaintiff/ applicant

Mellick, AS – defendant/ respondent

SOLICITORS:

Sciaccas Lawyers & Consultants - plaintiff/ applicant

Crown Solicitor - defendant/ respondent

  1. The applicant is a 35 year old former police officer. She was a member of the Queensland Police Service (“QPS”) from 15 December 1995 until 12 September 2008, when she retired on medical grounds. The applicant commenced proceedings in this Court on 14 January 2010 claiming that as a result of being required to wear a police utility belt with full accoutrements over the period of her service, she suffered a low back injury resulting in loss and damage. Her claim, which is regulated by the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) (“the 1996 Act”) and the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (“the 2003 Act”) was served on 16 February 2009. 
  1. The respondent has pleaded the claim is statute barred by reason of s 11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (“the Act”).  The applicant seeks an extension of that limitation period pursuant to s 31 of the Act.  The critical questions for determination on the application are whether the applicant has demonstrated:
  1. that a material fact of a decisive character came within her means of knowledge on a date on or after 16 February 2008, the relevant date for the purposes of s 31 of the Act;
  1. there is otherwise evidence to establish the right of action;
  1. there is good reason for the exercise, in her favour,  of the discretion to extend the limitation period.

Claim

  1. Relevantly, the applicant alleges:
  1. From on or about 15 December 1995 to late 2004 (excluding periods of maternity and other leave) she was required, whilst performing her duties, to wear her QPS issued utility belt with full accoutrements in accordance with the Queensland Police Code of Dress.
  1. In or about late 2004, she requested provision of a lighter QPS utility belt having produced a medical certificate supporting that request on the ground she was suffering from a lumbar spine injury.
  1. In or about December 2004, she was provided with a QPS issued web utility belt which she wore from December 2004 to August 2007, whilst performing operational duties.
  1. As a result of wearing the two varieties of QPS issued utility belts with accoutrements, she suffered personal injuries.
  1. Her personal injuries were caused by the respondent’s breach of contract and/or breach of duty, including a special duty of care owed by the respondent as it knew the applicant suffered a lumbar spine injury which made her more susceptible to injury, and failed to take proper or adequate precautions in relation thereto.
  1. As a result of those breaches she suffered loss and damage.
  1. The respondent denies it was in breach of contract or in breach of duty, and denies that any breaches caused the applicant’s personal injuries. It further pleads that the applicant’s claim is statute-barred in that her injury was suffered “more than three years prior to 16 February 2009” being the date of service of her notice of claim for damages pursuant to the 1996 Act and the 2003 Act.

Law

  1. Section 31 of the Act provides:

“(1)This section applies to actions for damages for negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or a provision made by or under a statute or independently of a contract or such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person or damages in respect of injury resulting from the death of any person.

(2)Where on application to a court by a person claiming to have a right of action to which this section applies, it appears to the court –

(a)that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and

(b)that there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation;

the court may order that the period of limitation for the action be extended so that it expires at the end of 1 year after that date and thereupon, for the purposes of the action brought by the applicant in that court, the period of limitation is extended accordingly.”

  1. A material fact relating to a right of action includes the nature and extent of the personal injury so caused.[1]  It is of a decisive character if, and only if a reasonable person knowing those facts and having taken the appropriate advice on those facts would regard those facts as showing:

“(i)that an action on the right of action would (apart from the effect of the expiration of a period of limitation) have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award of damage as sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action; and

(ii)that the person whose means and knowledge is in question ought in the person’s own interest and taking the person’s circumstances into account to bring an action on the right of action.”[2]

  1. Each of these conditions is to be regarded from the point of view of a reasonable person, being a person who has taken “the appropriate advice on those facts”.[3]  Both conditions must be satisfied if the material fact is to have a decisive character.[4]  Appropriate advice means advice of competent persons qualified in their respective fields to advise on the medical, legal and other aspects of the facts.[5] 
  1. The material fact is not of a decisive character if, before knowing that fact, a reasonable person would know facts that that person would regard (having taken appropriate advice) as showing that an action would have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action; and that the potential claimant ought to, in the person’s own interests and taking the person’s circumstances into account, bring an action on the right of action. However, if, without knowledge of that fact, a reasonable person, having taken the appropriate advice, would not regard the facts known to that person as showing that an action would (ignoring the effect of the limitation period) have a reasonable prospect of success, and of resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action, the fact is of a decisive character.[6]
  1. Whether an applicant satisfies the requirements of s 31 of the Act requires a step by step approach, namely:
  1. to inquire whether the facts of which the applicant was unaware were material facts;
  1. if they were, to ascertain whether they were of a decisive character;
  1. if so, whether those facts were within the means of knowledge of the applicant before the specified date.[7]
  1. If the applicant establishes a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within her means of knowledge before the requisite date, the applicant must then establish there is a prima facie case of causative liability against the respondent, and that the discretion ought to be exercised in her favour.
  1. In exercising that discretion, consideration must be given to any prejudice to the respondent.[8]  In NF v State of Queensland,[9] Keane JA, with whom Williams JA and Holmes J agreed, said at [44]:

“The Brisbane South decision is concerned to ensure that an extension of time under the Act should not become the occasion for a trial which is unfair to the defendant.  It is authority for the following propositions:

(a)the onus is upon the applicant who has satisfied the conditions in s 31(2) of the Act to show good reason for the exercise in his or her favour of the discretion vested in the Court by that provision;

(b)the principal consideration which guides the exercise of that discretion is the concern whether a claim, which is prima facie out of time, may yet be fairly litigated;

(c)if a fair trial is unlikely, the discretion conferred by s 31(2) should not be exercised in the applicant’s favour.”

Application

  1. The applicant’s case is that the QPS issued utility belts were heavy and awkward to wear, resulting in a lower back injury which ultimately forced her to be medically retired from the QPS. The utility belt was said to consist of “a large leather notebook holder, torch, glove pouch, radio buckle, gun holster, ammunition pouches, mag light holder and tape recorder pack”.[10]
  1. The applicant’s material asserts:
  1. Whilst the applicant first noticed pain in her lower back and hips “from about 2000”, she did not seek medical treatment at that time and did not have time off work.  Fellow officers indicated lower back pain “was common to experience” and “just something I would need to get used to”.[11] 
  1. The applicant continued to suffer symptoms during late 2001 and 2002, which she mentioned to Senior Sergeant Crawford.  The applicant did not consider the symptoms so significant as to seek medical advice or treatment. 
  1. Whilst the applicant’s lower back pain increased during her pregnancy in 2003, she did not have any concern about the security or longevity of her employment as the lumbar symptoms were aggravated by her pregnancy.[12] 
  1. Upon her return to work after the birth of her child, the applicant noticed her lumbar spine symptoms were increasing and consulted Dr Paul Anderson.  He believed the lumbar symptoms were the result of wearing her utility belt and requested she be provided with a lighter belt.[13]  This lighter web style utility belt was provided in 2004 and worn by the applicant until 2007. 
  1. Notwithstanding use of the lighter utility belt, the applicant continued to suffer lumbar symptoms.  However, they became secondary to a thyroid condition which became the focus of her health issues.  This condition necessitated her having 12 months leave between 2005 and 2006.[14]
  1. In 2007, the applicant sought medical treatment for her continuing back symptoms.  She underwent a CT scan on 13 July 2007 which revealed a protrusion of L3/L4 and L5/S1.[15]  For the latter half of 2007, she was placed “on a return to work program at the request of the QPS as a result of her thyroid condition and her hysterectomy”.  She also received conservative treatment for her lower back pain.  The applicant remained of the view her back symptoms would not have a permanent effect on her employment.[16]
  1. On 7 November 2007 the applicant lodged an application for workers compensation in regard to her lower back.[17]
  1. On 14 February 2008 the applicant  met with a QPS rehabilitation coordinator.  She was told there was an expectation she would return to full time work shortly.
  1. On 21 March 2008 the applicant was served with a notice directing her to attend medical appointments so as to determine her fitness to return to work.
  1. On 21 May 2008 the applicant attended a meeting where she was provided with a report of Dr Mark Byrne, orthopaedic surgeon.  She was told she was no longer employable.  She was advised to apply for ill health retirement.[18] 

(k)The applicant completed an application to retire on medical grounds on 26 May 2008, which was processed, effective from 12 September 2008.[19]

(l)Prior to her forced medical retirement, the applicant always held the view that with appropriate treatment she would remain employed with the QPS in some capacity.  She was aware of other officers with similar injuries who had continued in that employment.[20]

  1. The applicant consulted a solicitor on 16 April 2008 in relation to an application to review another decision of WorkCover Queensland and a claim for personal injuries allegedly arising out of a motor vehicle accident.  On or about 22 May 2008, the applicant telephoned her solicitor advising she had been called to a meeting and provided with the report of Dr Byrne.  Her solicitor undertook further inquiries, although these were predominantly directed towards those matters he had obtained initial instructions to pursue from the applicant.
  1. After lodgement of the notice of claim on 16 February 2009, the applicant’s solicitors arranged for a medico-legal report from Dr Scott Campbell, neurosurgeon, and an expert report from Roger Kahler, principal consultant from the Intersafe Group. Dr Campbell opined the applicant has a right L3/4 disc protrusion with associated right radicular symptoms.  He assessed her as suffering a 10% whole person impairment, with 50% of that impairment being due to factors other than the wearing of the gun belt.  This impairment is likely to be permanent.  Mr Kahler opined there were readily available a number of alternate solutions to the wearing of the utility belts. 
  1. The applicant identified the material facts of a decisive character relied upon as:

“1.On 31 March 2008 when the plaintiff was served with a notice by Senior Sergeant Crawford directing her to attend a number of medical appointments so that the issue of her fitness to return to work could be addressed.

  1. On 21 May 2008 the plaintiff attended a meeting with Superintendent Ryan and was provided with a report of orthopaedic surgeon Dr Byrne and advised that she was no longer employable by QPS.
  1. On 26 May 2008 the plaintiff completed an application to retire on medical grounds. Or
  1. The processing of the plaintiff’s medical retirement on 12 September 2008.”[21]
  1. The applicant submits that each of these material facts pertains to “the nature and extent of the personal injury” in that they evidenced the extent of the injury, namely, that it forced her to retire on medical grounds, and the economic consequences of the injury, namely, the loss of career and of consequent income. It is further submitted that each of these material facts only came to be within the applicant’s means of knowledge after 16 February 2008, being within a period of 12 months prior to the date of 16 February 2009 when the applicant gave notice of her claim.
  1. The respondent asserts the application for an extension of time must fail as whilst retirement on medical grounds can be a material fact of a decisive character, the material relied upon by the applicant:
  1. does not establish a causal link between the wearing of the police utility belt and the applicant’s significant ongoing low back problem.  Her ongoing problems are caused by unrelated underlying degenerative disease and the applicant’s weight gain, both of which have a profound effect on her ability to efficiently perform police duties;
  1. even if the applicant has established a material fact was not within her means of knowledge at the relevant time, that fact was not of a decisive character as the applicant has failed to establish that any newly discovered fact transformed her claim into one that is worthwhile pursuing due to her other significant health problems;
  1. the applicant has failed to show good reason for the exercise of the discretion in her favour.

A material fact of decisive character

  1. Whilst the applicant proffered four material facts of a decisive character, commencing with service of a notice directing her to attend a number of medical appointments on 31 March 2008 and ending with the processing of her retirement on medical grounds on 12 September 2008, the essential material fact relied upon is that the applicant was no longer employable as a member of QPS, necessitating retirement on medical grounds. That fact came to her knowledge on 21 May 2008 when she was provided with the report of Dr Byrne advising she was no longer employable by QPS. 
  1. The respondent accepts that retirement on medical grounds is the material fact of a decisive character relied upon by the applicant.[22]  The respondent also accepts there are cases where retirement on medical grounds will amount to a material fact of a decisive character.[23]  However, the respondent submits that that fact was not of a decisive character in the applicant’s case as the reports of Doctors Byrne and Knight, whilst establishing the existence of a significant lower back problem, do not provide any causative link between that back problem and the wearing of the police utility belt with full accoutrements, and the report of Dr Campbell was not created until after the applicant gave notice of her claim.
  1. I am satisfied the applicant’s inability to continue in employment with the QPS with the resultant need that she retire medically unfit is a material fact. That fact impacted on the nature and extent of the applicant’s low back injury, and its economic consequences in relation to her ability to continue in her employment, as was her intention. The economic effects of the injury can be material facts relating to the right of action. In Watters v Queensland Rail,[24] Thomas JA said:

“This court has consistently treated the consequences of injury including economic consequences, as a potentially material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action.  In Byers the material fact was that the plaintiff’s injury was such as to necessitate his changing to a different and lighter job.  The court (Lee J, with whom McPherson and de Jersey JJ (as their Honours then were) agreed) observed that ‘this new fact transformed his case into one which would then probably result in a substantial award of damages’ and held that it was a sufficient basis for extending the limitation period.  Such cases are almost invariably concerned with assessments of degree as to whether the plaintiff's actual knowledge of physical injury and its warning signs and consequences had by a given date already afforded sufficient information to have justified the commencement of proceedings.  The fact that a plaintiff’s injury was more serious than he or she had hitherto realised has long been recognised as capable of being a material fact.  Such a fact of course needs to be weighed in context with facts already known and reasonably capable of being known.” (citations omitted)

  1. His Honour further stated at 456:

“The essential requirement for an extension of time is set out in s 31(2)(a) which requires proof that ‘a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant ...’.  That composite test is extrapolated by definitions of its three main components in s 30(1)(a), s 30(1)(b) and s 30(1)(c).  The section contemplates analysis of the character of the material fact.  One particular matter that s 30(1)(b) specifically requires the material fact to bear is an economic characteristic.  It must produce the conclusion that the action would result in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action.  In this context it would seem inappropriate to limit the connotation of ‘the nature and extent of the personal injury so caused’ to medical concepts or to the mere consequences to the person of the plaintiff.  The economic effects of the injury are encompassed, whether one adverts to s 30(1)(a)(iv) or to the residuum of s 30(1)(a).”

  1. Prior to the meeting on 21 May 2008, the following state of affairs existed:
  1. While the applicant had an ongoing lower back injury, she had, after identification of that injury by CT Scan on 13 July 2007, been placed on a return to work program at the request of QPS.  She was also receiving conservative treatment in the form of physiotherapy and acupuncture for her lower back.  A rehabilitation program aimed at improving her condition to facilitate her return to substantive duties was devised in September 2007.
  1. On 14 February 2008 the applicant attended a meeting with QPS personnel, including a rehabilitation coordinator.  The applicant was told there was an expectation she would return to full time work within the next three weeks.  There were also discussions regarding the provision of an accoutrement vest in place of the police utility belt, although those vests were still on trial.
  1. The applicant was aware of other officers with similar injuries who had continued in employment with QPS.
  1. A reasonable person knowing those facts, who had taken appropriate advice, would not regard those facts as showing that an action would have reasonable prospects of success resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action. The applicant was being transitioned back into full time work. There was no indication she would be unable to continue in employment with QPS in the future.
  1. Whilst it may be said the applicant had notice back in March 2008, when she was served with a notice directing her to tend medical appointments, that there was a question as to her ability to continue in her employment, that notice must be viewed against the fact that as recently as 14 February 2008 the applicant had met with representatives of QPS and was told there was an expectation she would return to full time work shortly thereafter. Against that background, a reasonable person who had taken appropriate advice, would not draw a conclusion that what was in issue was her ability to continue in employment with QPS.
  1. However, a reasonable person knowing the material fact that on 21 May 2008 the applicant was told she was no longer employable by QPS, having taken appropriate advice, would regard the facts known to that person as showing that an action would have a reasonable prospect of success and result in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action.
  1. Whilst the respondent submits that that fact was not of a decisive character as the report of Doctor Byrne did not provide a causal link between the inability to continue in her duties and the low back injury, the report of Dr Byrne accepted the “mechanism of injury would appear to be wearing a heavy gun belt, whilst sitting in a car, and walking around” and that “most likely [the applicant] suffers from an aggravation of underlying degenerative disease in the lumbosacral spine”.[25]  That indicates a causal link between the wearing of the gun belt and ongoing difficulties with her lower back, even though there were other ongoing unrelated conditions. 
  1. Further, that report would cause a reasonable person, having taken appropriate advice, to review the significance of Dr Anderson’s earlier report indicating that the applicant’s recurrent lumbar back pain was affected by the wearing of the gun belt. That information, when coupled with the information about the applicant’s inability to be employed, would result in a reasonable person, having taken appropriate advice, considering that those facts establish a right of action which would have a reasonable prospect of success resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of the action. This is particularly so when regard is had to the applicant’s relatively young age.
  1. I am satisfied the material fact relied upon by the applicant is of a decisive character. Without knowledge of the fact of the medical retirement, the applicant was left in a situation where she had knowledge that she had a significant lower back injury, but a reasonable person, having taken appropriate advice, would not have considered that an action in respect thereof would have had reasonable prospects of success, resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action as the applicant was continuing in her employment, and a rehabilitation plan had been established as recently as 14 February 2008 with a view to the applicant returning to full time work.[26] 

A right of action

  1. The respondent contends that even if the applicant has established a material fact of a decisive character was not within her means of knowledge, the applicant has failed to establish she otherwise has a right of action. The basis for this submission is that the medical evidence establishes the applicant has significant pre-existing underlying degenerative disease, together with other non-related medical conditions, which have a profound effect on her ability to efficiently perform police duties.
  1. In order to satisfy the test that there is otherwise a right of action, an applicant must be able to point to the existence of evidence which, it can reasonably be expected, will be available at trial and will, if unopposed by other evidence, be sufficient to prove the applicant’s case.[27]  That test is undemanding.[28] 
  1. Whilst there is much medical evidence as to the significance of the applicant’s pre-existing underlying and/or unrelated medical conditions, it cannot be said the evidence relied upon by the applicant, which it can reasonably be expected will be available at trial, will, if unopposed by other evidence, be insufficient to prove her case. The observations of Moynihan J in Brease v State of Queensland[29] are apposite:

“Broadly speaking, there is evidence which if accepted at trial, is capable of founding a conclusion of causal links between alleged breach of duty, consequent injury and damage …”

  1. In this respect, it is also relevant to note the report of Mr Kahler in relation to liability, and the report of Dr Campbell as to the causal link between the applicant’s lower back injury and her employment with the QPS. Whilst there is no evidence the contents of those reports were known to the applicant prior to lodging her notice of claim, their contents are relevant to an assessment of whether the applicant, having established a material fact of a decisive character was not within her means of knowledge, has “otherwise established a right of action”.

The discretion

  1. The onus is upon the applicant to demonstrate a fair trial can be had in the circumstances of this case. In considering that onus, there is also an onus upon a defendant to identify any specific matters of prejudice.[30]
  1. The respondent does not point to any specific prejudice. It relies upon general prejudice resulting from delay. Further, it submits the applicant’s affidavit material does not address relevant issues such as the availability of witnesses and the prospects of a fair trial.
  1. Having considered all of the material, and having regard to the general prejudice relied upon by the respondent, I am satisfied the applicant has shown good reason for the exercise of the discretion in her favour. Whilst the applicant did not identify any issue relevant to witness availability, it is of significance that the respondent has been able to plead specifically to the applicant’s allegations, and does not identify the unavailability of any evidence or documents. In those circumstances, I am satisfied the claim may be fairly litigated and that a fair trial is likely.
  1. I am satisfied the applicant has demonstrated the requirements of s 31 the Act are met and that the limitation period for the proceeding should be extended to 16 February 2009.

Footnotes

[1] Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 30(1)(a)(iv).

[2] Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 30(1)(b).

[3] Honour v Faminco Mining Services Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 352 at [73].

[4] Honour v Faminco Mining Services Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 352 at [73].

[5] Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 30(2).

[6] Honour v Faminco Mining Services Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 352 at [74].

[7] Dick v University of Queensland [2000] 2 Qd R 476 at [26].

[8] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 547.

[9] [2005] QCA 110.

[10] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8) at [3].

[11] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8) at [4].

[12] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8) at [10].

[13] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8) at [12].  See also annexure JLT2.

[14] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8) at [16].

[15] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8) at [17].

[16] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8) at [18].

[17] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8) at [19]. See also annexure JLT6.

[18] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8) at [24].

[19] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8) at [25].

[20] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8) at [27].

[21] See the Plaintiff’s outline of argument filed by leave on 22 October 2010 at [50].

[22] See the Respondent’s outline of submissions filed by leave on 22 October 2010 at [9].

[23] See, for example, Stephenson v State of Queensland [2004] QCA 483, on appeal [2006] HCA 20.

[24] [2001] 1 Qd R 448 at 453.

[25] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia, filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8), exhibit JLT-9.

[26] Affidavit of Jacinta Lee Tonia, filed on 20 September 2010 (court document 8)at [20].

[27] Wood v Glaxo Australia Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 431 at 434-435.

[28] Baillie v Creber & Anor [2010] QSC 052 at [21].

[29] [2007] QSC 043 at [20].

[30] See Limpus v State of Queensland [2004] 2 Qd R 161 at [20].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Tonia v State of Queensland

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Tonia v State of Queensland

  • MNC:

    [2010] QSC 434

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    Boddice J

  • Date:

    19 Nov 2010

Litigation History

No Litigation History

Appeal Status

No Status