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Del Bono v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2)[2023] QIRC 183

Del Bono v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2)[2023] QIRC 183

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Del Bono v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2) [2023] QIRC 183

PARTIES:

Del Bono, Marco

(Appellant)

v

Workers' Compensation Regulator

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

WC/2023/19

PROCEEDING:

Application in an existing proceeding

DELIVERED ON:

15 June 2023

HEARING DATE:

29 May 2023

MEMBER:

Dwyer IC

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

ORDER:

  1. The parties are to present their cases on the basis that the compensation claim is governed by s 39A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) as in force on 26 May 2020.
  2. The matter be listed for mention on a date to be advised to be programmed for expedited hearing.

CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS' COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION – Appeal by Appellant against review decision of the Respondent – Review decision that Appellant did not have a terminal condition by virtue of s 39A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – Appellant contends that Regulator is applying the incorrect version of s 39A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – Appellant seeks an order that the parties present their cases on the basis that the compensation claim is governed by s 39A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) as in force on 26 May 2020 –  application opposed by the Respondent – meaning of the term 'sustained' as it is used in s 732 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) –  whether the same meaning prescribed in s 36A(4) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ought to be applied throughout the statute – parties to present their cases on the basis that the compensation claim is governed by s 39A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) as in force on 26 May 2020

LEGISLATION:

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ss 32, 36A, 39A, 128A, 128B, 131, 732, 745

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Acts Amendment Act 2005 (Qld) Sch, s 14

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2019 (Qld) ss 36, 77

Explanatory Notes, Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2019 (Qld) 9

CASES:

Armstrong v Local Government Workcare [2014] ICQ 7

Bartosek v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 192

Del Bono v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 453

R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; 269 CLR 507; 93 ALJR 1106; 373 ALR 214; 277 A Crim R 539

Registrar of Titles (W.A.) v Franzon [1975] HCA 41; (1975) 132 CLR 611

Wicks v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No.2) [2021] QIRC 112

APPEARANCES:

Mr M. Black, Counsel instructed by Maurice Blackburn Lawyers for the Appellant

Mr S. McLeod KC, directly instructed by the Workers' Compensation Regulator

Reasons for Decision

Introduction 

  1. [1]
    Mr Marco Del Bono appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator') dated 25 January 2023.
  1. [2]
    The decision, which is in two parts, firstly sets aside a decision of XtraCare, insurer for Glencore Queensland Limited ('Glencore') that Mr Del Bono does not have an 'injury' within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ('the Act') and substitutes it with a decision that Mr Del Bono does have an injury pursuant to ss 32 and 36A of the Act. This part of the decision is not the subject of the appeal.
  1. [3]
    The second part of the decision confirms an earlier decision of Glencore to reject Mr Del Bono's application for compensation for a terminal condition in accordance with s 39A of the Act. It is this decision that Mr Del Bono appeals.  
  1. [4]
    There is an extensive factual history of Mr Del Bono's claim set out in an earlier decision of this Commission.[1] It is not necessary to replicate that history in these reasons. Suffice to note that it is no longer controversial that Mr Del Bono was employed by Mount Isa Mines Limited ('MIM')[2] for a period of approximately four to five years between 1950 and 1955. Throughout the course of his employment with MIM, Mr Del Bono was exposed to a variety of dusts.
  1. [5]
    Mr Del Bono is currently 92 years of age and, apart from his time at MIM and brief periods before and after, has resided in Italy for the majority of his life.
  1. [6]
    On 26 May 2020, Mr Del Bono was diagnosed as having pulmonary fibrosis in the form of dust related diffuse fibrosis ('the condition'). On 21 September 2020, Mr Del Bono lodged an application for compensation under the Act which resulted in the series of rejections and reviews that culminated in an earlier appeal to this Commission.
  1. [7]
    On 23 November 2022, Hartigan IC (as Her Honour then was) determined that Mr Del Bono was a 'worker' within the meaning of the Act and returned the matter to the Regulator for further consideration of Mr Del Bono's claim.[3] The decision under appeal in these proceedings is the product of that further consideration. 
  1. [8]
    On 22 February 2023, Mr Del Bono filed in the Industrial Registry an appeal against the Regulator's decision.
  1. [9]
    Mr Del Bono appeals only the Regulator's decision that he does not have a 'terminal condition' by virtue of s 39A of the Act. Mr Del Bono appeals this decision on the basis that the Regulator ought to have applied s 39A(1) of the Act as in force on 26 May 2020, i.e. the date of Mr Del Bono's diagnosis.
  1. [10]
    By an application filed in the Industrial Registry on 14 March 2023, Mr Del Bono seeks, inter alia, orders for directions to that effect.
  1. [11]
    While a number of current and repealed statutory provisions require consideration in this appeal, the pivotal matter for determination in this application is the proper construction of the term ''sustained'' as it appears in s 732 of the Act.

Relevant legislation

  1. [12]
    Sections 128A and 128B of the Act establish the entitlements of a worker with a latent onset injury that is a terminal condition. The entitlement for Mr Del Bono, if established, is monetarily significant.[4] The terms 'latent onset injury' and 'terminal condition' are regulated and defined by the Act.
  1. [13]
    Section 36A of the Act relevantly provides:

 36A Date of injury

  1. (1)
    This section applies if a person—
  1. (a)
    is diagnosed by a doctor after the commencement of this section as having a latent onset injury; and
  1. (b)
    applies for compensation for the latent onset injury.
  1. (2)
    The following questions are to be decided under the relevant compensation Act as in force when the injury was sustained—
  1. (a)
    whether the person was a worker under the Act when the injury was sustained;
  1. (b)
    whether the injury was an injury under the Act when it was sustained.

(2A) However, subsection (2)(b) does not apply if the latent onset injury is a specified disease and section 36D applies to the person.

  1. (3)
    Section 131 applies to the application for compensation as if the entitlement to compensation arose on the day of the doctor’s diagnosis.
  1. (4)
    Subject to subsections (2) and (3), this Act applies in relation to the person’s claim as if the date on which the injury was sustained is the date of the doctor’s diagnosis.
  1. (5)
    To remove any doubt, it is declared that nothing in subsection (4) limits section 236.
  1. (6)
    Subsections (2) to (4) have effect despite section 603.
  1. (7)
    In this section—

relevant compensation Act means this Act or a former Act.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [14]
    The first relevant definition in the Act for 'terminal condition' took effect from 2 November 2005 when s 234 of the Act was renumbered as s 39A ('the 2005 amendment').[5] The 2005 amendment provided:

39A Meaning of terminal condition

  1. (1)
    A terminal condition, of a worker, is a condition certified by a doctor as being a condition that is expected to terminate the worker’s life within 2 years after the terminal nature of the condition is diagnosed.
  1. (2)
    A condition is a terminal condition only if the insurer accepts the doctor’s diagnosis of the terminal nature of the condition.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [15]
    The Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2019 (Qld) ('the amendment Act') amended s 39A(1) with effect from 30 October 2019 ('the 2019 amendment').[6] The 2019 amendment provided:

39A Meaning of terminal condition

  1. (1)
    A terminal condition, of a worker, is a condition certified by a doctor as being a condition that is expected to terminate the worker’s life.
  1. (2)
    A condition is a terminal condition only if the insurer accepts the doctor’s diagnosis of the terminal nature of the condition.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [16]
    Relevantly, the 2019 amendment Act also inserted s 732.[7] Section 732 provides:

732 Requirements for certification of terminal condition

  1. (1)
    New section 39A[8] applies in relation to a terminal condition only if the latent onset injury to which the condition relates was sustained by a worker on or after 31 January 2015.
  1. (2)
    Former section 39A[9] continues to apply in relation to a terminal condition if the latent onset injury to which the condition relates was sustained by a worker before 31 January 2015.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [17]
    It is not controversial that Mr Del Bono received a diagnosis of a latent onset injury on 26 May 2020. At that time, the medical practitioner who made the diagnosis estimated that the injury would end Mr Del Bono's life within 2.36 years i.e. greater than the maximum period prescribed in the 2005 amendment.[10]
  1. [18]
    It follows that determining which version of s 39A applies to Mr Del Bono will determine whether he has an entitlement in accordance with the terms of s 128B of the Act. The decisive factor will be the date upon which Mr Del Bono 'sustained' his injury within the meaning of s 732 of the Act.

Submissions

  1. [19]
    Mr Del Bono filed submissions contemporaneously with his application in existing proceedings dated 14 March 2023. The parties each filed further submissions in accordance with directions issued from my chambers on 22 March 2023.
  1. [20]
    In addition to submissions, Mr Del Bono also filed an affidavit of Ms Grace Fredericks on 24 May 2023. Ms Fredericks is a solicitor acting on behalf of Mr Del Bono. The affidavit attaches a number of relevant exhibits including Mr Del Bono’s workers' compensation claim and medical reports referred to by both parties in this application.

Mr Del Bono's submissions

  1. [21]
    Citing the decision of (then) President Martin in Armstrong v Local Government Workcare,[11] ('Armstrong') Mr Del Bono submits that, pursuant to s 36A(4), his latent onset injury was 'sustained' for the purposes of s 732 on the date he was diagnosed as having the condition i.e. 26 May 2020.
  1. [22]
    Accordingly, Mr Del Bono contends that the 2019 amendment applies as his latent onset injury was sustained on or after 31 January 2015.
  1. [23]
    Mr Del Bono refers to the transitional provision s 745(2), which reads:

745 Saving of former s 39A for particular purposes

  1. (1)
    This section applies in relation to a condition that is a latent onset injury sustained by a worker on or after 31 January 2015.
  1. (2)
    Former section 39A[12] continues to apply in relation to the condition if, before the commencement, the worker, or the worker’s dependants—

(a) made an application for compensation under section 132; and

(b) gave the insurer medical evidence about the terminal nature of the condition.

(2A) For subsection (2), it does not matter whether the application was decided, or lump sum compensation under section 128B or 128D was paid, before the commencement.

  1. (3)
    Also, former section 39A continues to apply in relation to a claim for damages for the injury if the worker has given the insurer a notice of claim before the commencement.
  1. (4)
    In this section—

former, for a provision of this Act, means the provision as in force from time to time before the commencement.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [24]
    In circumstances where Mr Del Bono made an application for compensation and gave the insurer medical evidence about the terminal nature of the condition prior to the commencement (i.e. 1 July 2022), Mr Del Bono submits the 2019 amendment applies.

The Regulator's submissions

  1. [25]
    The Regulator contends that unlike in s 36A(4) of the Act, there is no clarifying definition in s 732 for the word 'sustained'. The Regulator contends that if the legislature had of intended the word 'sustained' as expressed in s 732 be read in any way other than its ordinary meaning, then the legislature would have included a clarifying definition similar to s 36A(4).
  1. [26]
    Applying what it contends is the ordinary meaning to the term 'sustained' in s 732 of the Act, the Regulator then refers to a passage of the report of Associate Professor Deborah Yates, consultant thoracic physician, dated 25 February 2021. That passage reads:[13]

 It is my opinion that all the dusts inhaled during his work would have contributed towards his current condition and that this is a terminal condition. There is radiological evidence that he has suffered from this condition since at least 2011 this is progressing. It is difficult to accurately estimate his life expectancy, but I would expect this to be approximately 3 years.

(Regulator's underlining)

  1. [27]
    The Regulator seeks to rely on Associate Professor Yates' observation about Mr Del Bono's radiology to establish that, as Mr Del Bono has (apparently) had evidence of the condition present in radiology since 2011, then 2005 amendment ought to be applied as Mr Del Bono's condition was 'sustained' before 31 January 2015.
  1. [28]
    The Regulator closes its submissions by contending that Armstrong does not assist in the proper construction of s 39A, as that decision was in relation to the date of diagnosis pursuant to s 131.

Mr Del Bono's submissions in reply

  1. [29]
    Mr Del Bono opens his submissions in reply by seeking to provide context to the legislature's use of the word 'sustained' in s 732 of the Act by reference to the Explanatory Notes to the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2019.
  1. [30]
    The Explanatory Notes provide:[14]

 A worker with a terminal condition has an entitlement to the latent onset terminal lump sum compensation of up to $743,041 under the WCR Act. The WCR Act currently defines a terminal condition as a condition that is expected to terminate the worker’s life within two (2) years after the terminal nature of the condition is diagnosed (section 39A). However, some workers are diagnosed with a terminal work-related condition with a life expectancy greater than 2 years (for example 3 or 5 years) which means they are excluded from accessing this payment. The Bill amends the WCR Act to extend entitlement to the latent onset terminal entitlements by removing the reference to two years and replacing it with an assessment that the insurer is satisfied that the worker has a latent onset condition that is terminal.

and further:[15]

 Section 732 provides that the new requirement for certification of a terminal condition (see clause 34) will apply for injuries that were sustained on or after 31 January 2015. This date aligns with the changes for deemed diseases for firefighters with certain cancers and will ensure that this beneficial provision will have application for those firefighters and for workers with a terminal coal lung dust disease and for workers with a terminal silicosis disease.

  1. [31]
    Mr Del Bono submits that the legislature's use of the word 'sustained' in the Explanatory Notes is deliberate, and the legislature should be taken to have been aware that the word 'sustained' has a special meaning in the Act i.e. the meaning given by s 36A(4).
  1. [32]
    Mr Del Bono submits that the words ''this Act applies'' in s 36A(4) also refers to s 732, which became a part of ''this Act'' when it was inserted by the amendment Act. It is submitted that there is no proper basis upon which to construe s 732 in any way other than as subject to the deeming effect of s 36A(4).
  1. [33]
    Mr Del Bono contends that this submission is supported by the decision of Power IC in Bartosek v Workers’ Compensation Regulator,[16] where s 36A(4) was used to determine whether the appellant was diagnosed with a terminal condition on or after 31 January 2015 for the purposes of s 732. 
  1. [34]
    Mr Del Bono closes his submissions in reply by asserting that there is no evidence that any opinion about the diagnosis of the condition was formed before 31 January 2015. Mr Del Bono submits that the reference in Associate Professor Yates' report to radiological evidence that he ''…has suffered from this condition since at least 2011…'' was one of the matters that informed the diagnosis, but it was not the diagnosis itself.

Consideration

  1. [35]
    At the hearing of this application both parties agreed that the singularly decisive issue was the construction of the language of s 732 of the Act, and in particular, the meaning of the term 'sustained'.[17]
  1. [36]
    In essence, Mr Del Bono contends that the term 'sustained' as it appears in s 732 of the Act has the same meaning ascribed to it in s 36A(4), namely, it means the date upon which Mr Del Bono was diagnosed with his latent onset condition. Mr Del Bono further contends that the date in question is 26 May 2020. If that contention is correct, then Mr Del Bono 'sustained' his injury after 31 January 2015 and the 2019 amendment applies.
  1. [37]
    Conversely, the Regulator argues the meaning ascribed by s 36A(4) does not extend to s 732, and that the language of s 732 ought to be given its ordinary meaning. It is then contended by the Regulator that, while not disputing the date of diagnosis was 26 May 2020, the term 'sustained' contained in s 732 of the Act is broader and, in essence, is synonymous with the condition being identifiable or present.[18]
  1. [38]
    The Regulator contends that such a construction of the Act produces a conclusion that Mr Del Bono's latent onset injury was in fact 'sustained' within the meaning of s 732 of the Act in 2011 i.e. before 31 January 2015 and therefore the 2005 amendment applies. In those circumstances the estimate of a life expectancy exceeding 2 years would exclude Mr Del Bono from entitlements available under s 128B of the Act.
  1. [39]
    While the parties have taken the Commission to a number of authorities in which some of the relevant statutory provisions have been applied, there would appear to be no authority that directly deals with the precise controversy here i.e. an interpretation of the term 'sustained' as it appears in s 732 of the Act or the scope of the application of s 36A of the Act to its other parts.
  1. [40]
    The question for determination is therefore one of statutory construction.

Meaning of the term 'sustained'

  1. [41]
    In considering the proper approach to statutory construction in Wicks v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No.2),[19] His Honour Deputy President Merrell adopted these comments of the High Court:[20]

In R v A2, Kiefel CJ and Keane J, in summarising the principles of statutory construction, stated in part:

  1. The method to be applied in construing a statute to ascertain the intended meaning of the words used is well settled. It commences with a consideration of the words of the provision itself, but it does not end there. A literal approach to construction, which requires the courts to obey the ordinary meaning or usage of the words of a provision, even if the result is improbable, has long been eschewed by this Court. It is now accepted that even words having an apparently clear ordinary or grammatical meaning may be ascribed a different legal meaning after the process of construction is complete. This is because consideration of the context for the provision may point to factors that tend against the ordinary usage of the words of the provision.
  1. Consideration of the context for the provision is undertaken at the first stage of the process of construction. Context is to be understood in its widest sense. It includes surrounding statutory provisions, what may be drawn from other aspects of the statute and the statute as a whole. It extends to the mischief which it may be seen that the statute is intended to remedy. "Mischief" is an old expression. It may be understood to refer to a state of affairs which to date the law has not addressed. It is in that sense a defect in the law which is now sought to be remedied. The mischief may point most clearly to what it is that the statute seeks to achieve.

(Emphasis added and footnotes omitted)

  1. [42]
    The context of language within a statute is plainly an important source to inform of the meaning of terms it contains. Further, it is a relatively trite rule of statutory construction that the same meaning ought to be given to the same word appearing in different parts of a statute unless there is a reason to do otherwise.[21]
  1. [43]
    There is no reason evident in this instance why the term 'sustained' in s 732 of the Act ought to be read in isolation of the rest of the Act. Indeed, the opposite is the case when one considers its important inter-relationship with s 36A and s 39A of the Act.
  1. [44]
    While it is submitted by the Regulator that the legislature could have provided a definition for the term 'sustained' in s 732 of the Act if that had been its intention, this submission entirely overlooks that the legislature has expressed the definition in s 36A(4) to apply to 'this Act'.
  1. [45]
    Even in the absence of the authorities that aid the task of construction in this instance, it is difficult to be persuaded by the Regulator's submission when one has regard to the express wording of s 36A(4) of the Act.
  1. [46]
    Section 36A(4) provides:

Subject to subsections (2) and (3), this Act applies in relation to the person’s claim as if the date on which the injury was sustained is the date of the doctor’s diagnosis.

(Emphasis added)

  1. [47]
    For obvious reasons the nature of latent onset injuries (in the general sense) is such that the date upon which a condition manifests will often be impossible to determine with any scientific accuracy. But because 'date of injury' is an essential material fact in every claim for workers' compensation, the Act includes a regime prescribing (in effect) a nominal date of injury for latent onset conditions. In any claim the date of an injury must be established or nominally prescribed because it is critical to the way in which the Act operates to reject, allow or govern a claim to determine (or decline) entitlements. 
  1. [48]
    Having regard to the language s 36A(4) of the Act it is clear that it not only prescribes how the date of a latent onset injury is nominally established but also, it plainly provides that the Act will be applied by reference to that prescribed date in relation to the person's claim. That is to say, once the date of injury is established by s 36A(4), that becomes the date of injury for all purposes under the Act, including s 732. 
  1. [49]
    In those circumstances the inescapable conclusion is that the term 'sustained' in s 732 of the Act has the meaning prescribed by s 36A(4).

Meaning of 'diagnosis'

  1. [50]
    For completeness, there ought to be some comment about the ancillary submissions about the term 'diagnosis'. The Regulator's oral submissions in support of the wider reading of the term 'sustained' touched on the notion of what might constitute a 'diagnosis'.[22]
  1. [51]
    There is no dispute that Mr Del Bono has a latent onset injury. There is no dispute (for the purposes of s 36A) that his condition was diagnosed on 26 May 2020.[23] Further, there does not appear to be evidence that Mr Del Bono was informed of this diagnosis at any earlier time. 
  1. [52]
    The Regulator made oral submissions that point to an apparent tension or qualification in the decision of  Armstrong between the (then) President's findings at paragraph 27 and later at paragraph 44.[24] Having careful regard to the language used it is clear there is no displacement by paragraph 44 of the plain proposition found at paragraphs 26 and 27.
  1. [53]
    The conclusion at paragraph 27 of Armstrong is that: for a statutory time period to be activated, the relevant diagnosis needs to be given to the prospective claimant. Paragraph 44 merely extends this by clarifying that the prospective claimant does not need to be given a diagnosis of 'latent onset injury' in order for a time limit to be activated.
  1. [54]
    In any event, to the limited extent it is necessary to comment, the observation of Associate Professor Yates do not constitute a 'diagnosis' of any kind contemplated by the (then) President in Armstrong.[25] Associate Professor Yates, who did not examine or meet Mr Del Bono, expresses an incidental and retrospective opinion about Mr Del Bono's radiology from 2011, and what it indicates to her. While her opinion may be correct, it falls well short of what the (then) President has held to be necessary for a 'diagnosis' for the purposes of s 36A of the Act.[26]

Progress of proceedings

  1. [55]
    The application of Mr Del Bono also seeks orders that his appeal be expedited and listed for final hearing. Mr Del Bono is 92 years of age and, on any account, has a disease that all of the medical experts agree will reduce his life expectancy. One can understand the desire to have the matter fully resolved without delay.
  1. [56]
    While the Commission is not fully appraised of the full antecedents of this claim, it would appear that Mr Del Bono lodged an application for workers' compensation on 21 September 2020.[27]  On 9 June 2021, at page 32 of the reasons for decision, the self-insurer listed numerous grounds for the rejection of Mr Del Bono's claim. Those reasons included that Mr Del Bono was not a 'worker', that the terminal nature of his condition was not accepted, and that his (compliant) claim for compensation was filed seven calendar days outside of the prescribed time limit.
  1. [57]
    The first of those grounds was the subject of the earlier decision of this Commission from Hartigan IC (as Her Honour then was).[28] The second is addressed in this application. There is no indication in the material presently before the Commission as to whether there are any remaining jurisdictional objections to be taken by the Regulator. 
  1. [58]
    There may well be cogent reasons why the interlocutory issues have been dealt with in a piecemeal fashion but it would seem that this has regrettably served to delay the progression of Mr Del Bono's claim by at least two years.
  1. [59]
    Given Mr Del Bono's personal circumstances there is a genuine risk of serious prejudice to him if the appeal is not expedited.

Conclusion

  1. [60]
    For all of the above reasons it is the finding of the Commission that the term 'sustained' as it appears in s 732 of the Act has the meaning prescribed by s 36A(4) of the Act. Consequently, pursuant to s 732(1) of the Act, Mr Del Bono's condition arising from his latent onset injury was sustained on or after 31 January 2015, namely, 26 May 2020.
  1. [61]
    In those circumstances, having regard to the Act in force at the time of his claim was made, the meaning of 'terminal condition' contained in s 39A is not restricted by any estimated life expectancy.
  1. [62]
    Mr Del Bono's appeal ought to now be dealt with in an expedited manner.

Orders

  1. [63]
    The Commission makes the following Orders:

1. The parties are to present their cases on the basis that the compensation claim is governed by s 39A of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) as in force on 26 May 2020.

2. The matter be listed for mention on a date to be advised to be programmed for expedited hearing.

Footnotes

[1] Del Bono v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 453 ('Del Bono'), [25]-[33].

[2] A predecessor of Glencore.

[3] Del Bono (n 1).

[4] The entitlement for a terminal condition includes a lump sum payment in excess of $740,000.00.

[5] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Acts Amendment Act 2005 (Qld) Sch, s 14.

[6] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2019 (Qld) s 36.

[7] Ibid s 77.

[8] In this context, the 2019 amendment.

[9] In this context, the 2005 amendment.

[10] Exhibit 'GF-7' to the affidavit of Grace Fredericks sworn 24 May 2023 at page 6.

[11] [2014] ICQ 7 ('Armstrong'), [7]-[8],[24].

[12] In this context, the 2019 amendment.

[13] Respondent's submissions filed 3 April 2023 at paragraph 10.

[14] Explanatory Notes, Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2019 (Qld) 9.

[15] Ibid 27.

[16] [2022] QIRC 192.

[17] T 1-3 – T 1-4.

[18] While this submission is not expressly made by the Regulator it is implicit from their reliance on the comments on Mr Del Bono’s 2011 radiology that are contained in the expert report of Associate Professor Yates at Exhibit 'GF-8' to the affidavit of Grace Fredericks sworn 24 May 2023.

[19] [2021] QIRC 112.

[20] Ibid [41].

[21] See for example Registrar of Titles (W.A.) v Franzon [1975] HCA 41; (1975) 132 CLR 611 [11].

[22]T 1-10 – T 1-12.

[23] Respondent’s submissions filed 3 April 2023 at paragraph 12.

[24] Armstrong (n 11), [26]-[27], [44]; T 1-11 – T 1-12.

[25] Ibid at [26]-[27]; Exhibit 'GF-8' to the affidavit of Grace Fredericks sworn 24 May 2023 at page 3.

[26] Armstrong (n 11), [26]-[27].

[27] Exhibit 'GF-1' to the affidavit of Grace Fredericks sworn 24 May 2023.

[28] Del Bono (n 1).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Del Bono v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Del Bono v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2)

  • MNC:

    [2023] QIRC 183

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Dwyer IC

  • Date:

    15 Jun 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Armstrong v Local Government Workcare [2014] ICQ 7
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] ICQ 7
Cite 2 - [2014] ICQ 7
Bartosek v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 192
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 192
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 192
Del Bono v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 453
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 453
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 453
R v A2 [2019] HCA 35
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] HCA 35
Registrar of Titles (W.A.) v Franzon (1975) 132 CLR 611
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1975) 132 CLR 611
Cite 2 - (1975) 132 CLR 611
Registrar of Titles (WA) v Franzon [1975] HCA 41
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1975] HCA 41
Cite 2 - [1975] HCA 41
Wicks v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 112
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 112
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 112

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

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