Morant v Ryan (The State Coroner)

This case centred on a decision by the State Coroner to refuse to hold an inquest into the death of a deceased person. An application was made to the District Court for a review of that decision, but the primary judge dismissed the application on the basis that an inquest would not be in the public interest. On appeal, the Court noted that the appellant must show error in the House v The King sense but was not required to establish jurisdictional error. Even so, the Court found no error in the primary judge’s reasons.

Bond JA and Boddice AJA and Wilson J

26 May 2023

In November 2014, police discovered the body of a deceased woman in her motor vehicle. [6]. Following investigation, the Deputy State Coroner determined that the cause of death was acute carbon monoxide poisoning, and that the death was due to suicide. [10]. The carbon monoxide had been produced by a generator which was found in the car. [6]. The appellant applied to the Coroner’s Court of Queensland for an inquest into the death on the basis of his belief that another person must have assisted the deceased at the scene. [9].

Under s 28 Coroners Act 2003, a coroner may hold an inquest into a death if they are satisfied that “it is in the public interest to hold an inquest”. In relation to the deceased, the Deputy State Coroner held that it would not be in the public interest to hold an inquest, and that there was no evidence of the involvement of another person in the death. [11]. The State Coroner reviewed and upheld that decision. [12]. The appellant applied to the District Court seeking an order setting aside the State Coroner’s decision and an order for an inquest into the death. [14]. Under s 30(8), the District Court may order an inquest “if satisfied it is in the public interest to hold the inquest”. Judge Loury refused the application based on findings similar to those made by the Deputy State Coroner. [15], [28].

The appellant brought an appeal from that decision under s 118(3) District Court of Queensland Act 1967. [19]. Under s 118(8) of that Act, an appeal from the District Court in its original jurisdiction is to be by way of rehearing. [34]. The Court noted that a determination of whether an inquest would be “in the public interest” requires a value judgment in respect of which there is room for reasonable differences of opinion, and no particular opinion is uniquely right. [36]. As such, the determination is to be regarded as an exercise of discretion. [36]. The correctness of a discretionary determination can only be challenged by showing that the decision-making process miscarried in the House v The King sense. [38]. The respondent submitted that tests formulated in contexts where the grounds of review are limited to those involving jurisdictional error were more apposite than the House v The King test to an appeal from a decision under s 30(8) Coroners Act 2003. [39]. That submission was rejected on the basis that, as noted above, the appeal was by way of rehearing, and because a contrary finding was made in Davis v Ryan (State Coroner) [2019] QCA 282, a decision which the Court was not convinced was wrong. [39].

Therefore, it was not necessary for the appellant to show that the primary judge had exercised their discretion in a way which was “arbitrary, capricious, irrational” or “not bona fide”, though if any of those matters could be established, there would be a finding of error in the House v The King sense. [40].

Ultimately, the Court found no error in the reasoning of the primary judge. [64].

L Inglis