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[2024] QCA 76
This matter turned on whether the owners of a horse had a right of appeal under the Racing Integrity Act 2016 against a decision under rule 240(1) of the Australian Rules of Racing (“AR”) to disqualify the horse after it had won a significant race as a result of the detection of a prohibited substance in its urine sample. In a judgment delivered by Fraser AJA, with whom Morrison JA and Williams J agreed, the Court held that AR conferred upon the owners both a contractually enforceable entitlement to natural justice as a condition of any application of rule 240(1) and a right of appeal under rule 280(1) in respect of any disqualification of their horse under rule 240(1).
Morrison JA, Fraser AJA and Williams J
7 May 2024
On 11 January 2020 there was a thoroughbred race meeting at the Gold Coast. A gelding by the name of Alligator Blood was entered into and won Race 6. The prize pool was almost $1 million. A urine sample was collected from the horse following the race and a few months later it was publicly announced that a prohibited substance had been detected in the post-race sample. [1].
The owners of the racehorse were successful at first instance in applying for a declaration that the disqualification by the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission (“the Commission”) of the horse from its first placing in the race is void and of no effect. Racing Queensland Board and the Commission appealed against the declaration ordered by the primary judge. [2].
The leading judgment in the Court of Appeal was given by Fraser AJA, with whom Morrison JA and Williams J agreed. The central issue on the appeal was whether the stewards ought to have afforded natural justice to the owners by providing them with notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard.
The decision of the primary judge
The primary judge held:
“(a)It is an implied term of the contract created by the [Australian Rules of Racing (“AR”)] that the stewards are obliged to observe the principles of natural justice by providing notice of their hearing to the owners and an opportunity to be heard before any findings were made;
(b)The stewards’ hearing was flawed because they did not provide to the owners that required notice of the stewards’ hearing or an opportunity to be heard;
(c)A consequence of that procedural breach is that the disqualification of the owners’ horse resulting from the stewards’ findings was void.” [7].
In the appeal, Racing Queensland and the Commission argued that the primary judge erred in holding that the owners do not have such a right to appeal and, for that reason, erred in finding that the AR include the implied term. [8].
The horse was disqualified under rule 240(1) of the AR. [9]. Fraser AJA explained that “rule 240(1) assumes that some person is, or persons are, empowered to make and will make the necessary factual inquiry, consider the results of the inquiry, and take any appropriate action, including the adjudication required by that rule”. [20]. Fraser AJA found that “when rule 240(1) is read as a whole … the statement that ‘the horse must be disqualified’ is … a command to the stewards that, if they find that the conditions expressed in the rule are satisfied, they must exercise their power to disqualify the horse”. [24]. Ultimately, Fraser AJA found that the stewards decision fulfilled the requirements of rule 240(1).
Racing Queensland and the Commission submitted that rule 280(1)(a) of the AR conferred upon the owners a right of appeal against the stewards decision under rule 240(1) to disqualify their horse. As Fraser AJA explained, there are four relevant aspects to rule 280(1). [11]. First, rule 280(1) creates a right to appeal to the Principal Racing Authority (“PRA”). In Queensland, the Commission is the PRA. [12]. Second, the reference to “person” in rule 280(1) encompasses each individual owner of the horse and includes any “Syndicate” which owns a horse. In this case, one of the owners, Mr Endresz, is the manager of a Syndicate constituted by the owners. [13]. Third, the owners fulfil the stipulated standing requirement for an appeal in respect of a disqualification of their horse that they are persons “to whom a decision relates”. [14]. Fourth, an appeal seeking to challenge the disqualification of the horse would be an appeal “in respect of … a penalty” in terms of rule 280(1)(a). [15].
The primary judge found that r 280(1) could not confer a right of appeal upon an owner when the owner does not have standing to seek review under Chapter 6 of the Racing Integrity Act 2016. [35]. Fraser AJA identified “the real question” in the appeal was whether the “identified provisions of the Racing Integrity Act 2016 are inconsistent with the creation by rule 280(1)(a) of a right by owners of a horse to appeal to the Commission in respect of the disqualification of the horse under rule 240(1)”. [42]. His Honour found that no provision of the Racing Integrity Act 2016 expressly invalidates the right of appeal given by rule 280(1)(a) or any right of appeal under the AR. [45]. Fraser AJA concluded that “[u]pon the proper construction of the AR, the owner of a horse has a right to appeal under rule 280(1)(a) against a decision under rule 240(1) that the horse is disqualified from the race or races described in the latter rule”. [46]–[48].
The next issue in the appeal was whether the stewards’ obligation to observe the principles of natural justice before embarking upon an adjudication under rule 240(1) is excluded by the AR. [49]. The Commission and Racing Queensland argued that the AR, construed as a whole, appropriately provides natural justice to the owners of horses disqualified under rule 240(1) by the dual mechanism of:
1.providing to the trainer and any other person in charge of the horse at the relevant time an opportunity to be heard in response to a charge of a breach of rule 240(2) of the AR; and
2.providing the owners with a full right of appeal on the merits under rule 280(1)(a). [57].
Fraser AJA rejected the first mechanism on the basis that no rule indicates that trainers should be regarded as representing an owner’s interest in relation to rule 240(1). [58]. Furthermore, the owners have a distinct interest in opposing a disqualification under rule 240(1) and the interests of the owner of a horse may not necessarily align with the interests of the trainer or other person in charge of the horse. [59].
The Court accepted the second argument advanced by the Commission. Because the “so-called ‘appeal’ is in substance a review by the Commission of its own decision made by its stewards, rule 280 should be construed as providing for a full hearing upon the merits in which no weight is given to the first instance decision of the stewards”. [64].
In conclusion, Fraser AJA found that the AR “confer upon the owners both a contractually enforceable entitlement to natural justice as a condition of any application of rule 240(1), as found by the primary judge and, contrary to the primary judge’s conclusion, a right of appeal under rule 280(1) in respect of a disqualification of their horse under rule 240(1)”. [69].
Disposition
In the result, the appeal was dismissed and the applications by the Commission were refused. Leave to make submissions as to costs was granted. [1], [72], [73].
K Mythen of Counsel