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- Rimland v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors)[2022] ICQ 9
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Rimland v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors)[2022] ICQ 9
Rimland v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors)[2022] ICQ 9
INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Rimland v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors) [2022] ICQ 009 |
PARTIES: | SUZANNE RIMLAND (appellant) v STATE OF QUEENSLAND (DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES, DISABILTY SERVICES AND SENIORS) (respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | C/2021/16 |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal |
DELIVERED ON: | 22 April 2022 |
HEARING DATE: | 8 December 2021 |
MEMBER: | Davis J, President |
ORDER/S: | The appeal is dismissed |
CATCHWORDS: | INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – DISMISSALS – UNFAIR DISMISSAL – WHAT CONSTITUTES – where the appellant was employed as a psychologist in the Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors – where her employment became affected by “workplace change” – where the appellant became subject to Directive 17/16 – Supporting employees affected by workplace change (SEAWC Directive) – where the Chief Executive was satisfied that the appellant was not performing her duties satisfactorily – where the Chief Executive suspected that the unsatisfactory performance was caused by mental or physical illness or disability – where the alleged unsatisfactory performance of duties was a failure to fulfil the applicant’s obligations under the SEAWC Directive – whether performance of obligations under the SEAWC Directive are “duties” – where the Chief Executive directed the appellant to attend an Independent Medical Examination – where the appellant did not attend the Independent Medical Examination – whether the direction to attend the Independent Medical Examination was lawful – where the appellant was given a show cause notice in relation to failing to appear at the Independent Medical Examination – whether the show cause notice complied with Guideline 01/17: Discipline – whether non-compliance invalidated the disciplinary process – whether the failure to appear at the Independent Medical Examination constituted a ground for discipline – where the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission dismissed the appellant’s unfair dismissal application – whether the appellant has shown error of law or excess or want of jurisdiction Directive 1/18 - Managing employee Health, Safety and Wellbeing - Independent Medical Examinations under the Public Service Act 2008 Directive 17/16 - Supporting employees affected by workplace change Queensland Public Service Officers and Other Employees Award - State 2015 Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 317, s 320, s 531, s 557, s 565 Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, r 139(2)(c) Public Service Act 2008, s 9, s 47, s 53, s 174, s 175, s 177, s 187, s 188 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 |
CASES: | Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, followed Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, followed Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253, cited Dean-Braieoux v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 209, followed Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472, cited Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503, followed George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104, followed Goldie v Commonwealth of Australia (2002) 117 FCR 566, cited Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942, followed Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, followed Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475, followed New South Wales v Robinson (2019) 266 CLR 619, cited Queensland Bacon v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266, cited R v Elfar; R v Golding; R v Sander [2017] QCA 149 and [2018] 1 Qd R, cited R v Rondo (2001) 162 A Crim R 562, cited Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1, followed Rimland v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors) [2021] QIRC 265, related Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612, cited State of New South Wales v Smith (2017) 95 NSWLR 662, cited SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 91 ALJR 936, followed The Australian Workers’ Union of Employees, Queensland v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service [2020] QIRC 67 , cited The Queen v A2; The Queen v Magennis; The Queen v Vaziri (2019) 269 CLR 507, followed Together Queensland Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2022] ICQ 6, cited |
APPEARANCES: | The appellant appeared for herself C Laird for the respondent |
- [1]Ms Suzanne Rimland, the appellant, appeals against a decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) dismissing her application under s 317 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act) wherein she alleged unfair dismissal.
Background
- [2]Ms Rimland is a registered psychologist who held a position in the Communities, Disability Services and Seniors Department.
- [3]In 2018, Ms Rimland became an employee “affected by workplace change”. It was therefore necessary to find her an alternative position.
- [4]Commission Chief Executive Directive 17/16 - Supporting employees affected by workplace change (SEAWC Directive)[1] is, as its name suggests, a directive by the Commission Chief Executive designed to regulate the actions of both employer and employees in reallocating an employee affected by workplace change to a new position.
- [5]The SEAWC Directive relevantly provides:
“7. Principles
7.1 The government’s commitment to employment security, as a key component of fairness for employees, is set out in the Employment security policy. Consistent with the policy departments and employees are responsible for pursuing best value service delivery through performance improvement and skills development strategies in preference to downsizing, restructuring or outsourcing.
7.2 Notwithstanding clause 7.1, the government acknowledges that workplace change may occur that impacts on staffing requirements, including as a result of external (e.g. Federal) initiatives. Where such change occurs:
- (a)open and timely communication will underpin the actions of departments and employees[2]
…
- (c)in accordance with this directive, affected permanent employees will be actively supported to find suitable alternative employment, including through effective case management (see clause 11)
- (d)in accordance with this directive, affected permanent employees will actively participate in efforts to find suitable alternative employment
- (e)departments will notify the employee organisation(s) for affected employees of the change and workforce strategies. The timing of such notification must be reasonable having regard to the scale and context of staffing impacts. …[3]
9. Actions following workplace change
9.1. Where workplace change results in permanent employees being displaced from a substantive (ongoing) role, departments and affected employees must work cooperatively to transfer (or with the employee’s consent, redeploy) the employee to a suitable alternative (ongoing) role.
9.2 Where a suitable alternative role cannot be immediately identified, the department must notify the affected employee in writing that they will be registered for priority transfer (and/or redeployment) in accordance with this directive.
9.3 Notwithstanding clause 9.2, a department will consider expressions of interest initiated by affected employees for a voluntary redundancy.
9.4 The department may also invite employees to express interest in a voluntary redundancy where there is a reasonable basis for believing the cohort of affected employees would be interested in receiving such an invitation.
9.5 An expression of interest under clause 9.3, or an invitation to express interest under clause 9.4 does not oblige the department to make an offer nor an affected employee to accept an offer.
9.6 An offer of a redundancy is on the terms provided for in the directive on early retirement, redundancy and retrenchment.
10. Registration process
10.1 …[4]
10.3 When registering, an affected employee must:
- (a)nominate between one and three role categories in which they have the most skill and experience
- (b)attach a copy of their current resume, including details of at least one referee who can comment on their conduct and performance within the last 12 months
- (c)advise of any preferred alternative employment locations (towns/cities). It is important to note that while such preferences will be considered, transfers (and/or redeployments) may occur (in accordance with clauses 12 and 13) to any location where a suitable alternative role becomes available.
11. Actions to support employment security
11.1 Departments and affected employees must work cooperatively in supporting employment security, as set out in the Employment security policy and this directive[5]
…
11.3 A case manager must be assigned to support an affected employee who has been displaced following workplace change. The case manager’s role includes, but is not limited to:
- (a)assisting the affected employee to understand and participate in the placement process, including, where needed, providing or facilitating support to prepare resumes and/or participate in selection activities
- (b)identifying and facilitating appropriate (re)training and development for the affected employee
- (c)working with relevant managers to ensure the affected employee is provided with meaningful duties, including identifying, and where appropriate, facilitating temporary placements of the employee to develop experience/skills. This may include the releasing department funding short-term placements
- (d)working with the employee in identifying and referring the affected employee for suitable alternative vacancies (see clause 12)
- (e)assisting the affected employee to take appropriate action in respect to feedback if the employee is unsuccessful after applying or being referred for a role.
11.4 An affected employee is responsible for participating in reasonable opportunities for retraining/development and transfer (and, if they have consented to it, redeployment). This includes, but is not limited to:
- (a)actively participating in the placement process
- (b)working with their case manager to identify and undertake appropriate (re)training/development opportunities
- (c)positively engaging in suitability assessments
- (d)identifying, and where appropriate, applying for vacancies outside the referral process
- (e)as appropriate, taking action in response to feedback from selection or referral processes
12. Referral of vacancies for service-wide priority transfers, redeployment and longer term secondment[6]
…
12.4 Where a releasing department identifies a possible match, they must refer the relevant employee/s by submitting a short statement outlining the reason for possible suitability to the receiving department, along with the employee’s resume.
- (a)A full-time employee may only be referred for a part-time vacancy with their consent.
- (b)A part-time employee may be referred to a full-time vacancy. The employee may elect to maintain their current part-time percentage, or increase their part-time percentage or agree to a full-time role.
…
13. Suitability assessments
13.1 Where an affected employee is referred under clauses 11.2 or 12 a suitability assessment must be undertaken by the receiving department. A representative of the releasing department must be involved in the suitability assessment process.
- (a)Where a part-time employee, or a full-time employee who is currently working part-time (e.g. following parental leave), is referred for a role available on a full-time basis, the receiving agency must proceed with the suitability assessment, including considering what arrangements can be put in place to enable the employee to undertake the role part-time (e.g. job-sharing).[7]
…
13.3 Where an affected employee is assessed as suitable, a transfer or secondment (at level) direction, or a redeployment/secondment (to a lower level) offer is made, with date of effect specified. An affected employee’s agreement to a redeployment/secondment to a lower level should be recorded in writing.
- (a)The date of commencement of duty must be discussed between the employee and the receiving department, taking into account, as applicable, approved leave and/or a current placement. Where an employee is not on leave, or undertaking a placement (e.g. a secondment) a commencement date of two calendar weeks will generally be considered appropriate.
- (b)An affected employee may make a submission to the releasing department that the transfer or secondment (at level) direction is unreasonable. This submission should be made within five business days of notification of the transfer direction. If the submission is accepted, the transfer or secondment direction is withdrawn. If the submission is not accepted, the transfer or secondment direction stands.
- (c)Notwithstanding clause 13.3(b), an affected employee may decline a transfer or secondment (at level) direction on one occasion only without having to demonstrate unreasonableness. In such cases, the employee remains on the register and eligible for further referrals…[8]
13.7 Affected employees who are assessed as unsuitable must be provided with a copy of the suitability report and with constructive feedback by the recruiting manager to assist them in future referrals/applications. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, feedback is to be provided within two business days of the suitability report being provided to the affected employee.
- (a)Feedback must also be shared with the case manager to assist in the performance of their role (e.g. identifying developmental/training requirements).”
(emphasis added)
- [6]Various steps were taken to find an alternative position for Ms Rimland. There is dispute about that process. Ultimately, a decision was made by the Chief Executive to require Ms Rimland to submit to a medical examination.
- [7]That step was purportedly taken under s 175 of the Public Service Act 2008 (the PS Act). Sections 174 and 175 are both relevant and they provide:
“174 Application of pt 7
This part applies to a public service employee if—
- (a)the employee is absent from duty or the employee’s chief executive is reasonably satisfied the employee is not performing his or her duties satisfactorily; and
- (b)the chief executive reasonably suspects that the employee’s absence or unsatisfactory performance is caused by mental or physical illness or disability.
175 Chief executive may require medical examination
The chief executive may—
- (a)appoint a doctor to examine the employee and give the chief executive a written report on the examination; and
- (b)require the employee to submit to the medical examination.” (emphasis added)
- [8]By s 174(a), the Chief Executive was required to be, and asserted that he was, “reasonably satisfied” that Ms Rimland was “not performing [her] duties satisfactorily”. The Chief Executive found that compliance by Ms Rimland with her obligations under the SEAWC Directive was part her “duties”. He was “reasonably satisfied” that Ms Rimland had not fulfilled her obligations under the SEAWC Directive and therefore was not performing her duties satisfactorily.
- [9]Correspondence passed between the Department and Ms Rimland where she mentioned “past trauma” in the context of refusing particular proposed appointments. A doctor’s report was requested from Ms Rimland and ultimately she produced it.
- [10]On the evidence available to him, the Chief Executive said that he formed a “reasonable suspicion” that the conduct that he was “reasonably satisfied” was unsatisfactory performance of duties by Ms Rimland was caused by “mental or physical illness or disability”.
- [11]Directive 1/18 - Managing employee Health, Safety and Wellbeing - Independent Medical Examinations under the Public Service Act 2008 (IME Directive)[9] provides, relevantly:
“8. Statement of intent and expectation
8.1 The Queensland Government is committed to supporting public service employees who experience illness or injury to maintain their employment, including where appropriate, through the application of reasonable adjustment…
9. Decision to require an employee to submit to a medical examination
9.1 In some cases, early communication and management efforts may not be successful in addressing performance issues or current absences.
9.2 Where the conditions in section 174 are satisfied, section 175 of the PS Act provides that a chief executive may appoint a doctor. to examine the employee and give the chief executive a written report on the examination. It also provides that a chief executive may require the employee to submit to the medical examination. Failure to comply may be grounds for discipline action.
9.3 The conditions in sections 174(a) and (b) of the PS Act must both be met before a chief executive may require the employee to submit to a medical examination. Firstly, section 174(a) requires that an employee is either absent from duty (which is a question of fact) OR the chief executive must have sufficient grounds, supported by evidence, to be reasonably satisfied the employee is not performing his or her duties satisfactorily. For the second part, in section l74(b), the chief executive must have sufficient grounds, which have been documented, to support their reasonable suspicion that the employee’s current absence or unsatisfactory performance is caused by a mental or physical illness or disability.
9.4 The chief executive is to provide the employee with at least two weeks’ notice of a medical examination appointment unless the employee agrees to a shorter notice period. The direction to require an employee to submit to a medical examination must set out the basis and reasons for the direction under section 174.” (emphasis added)
- [12]On 29 March 2019, Ms Rimland received a letter referring her to an independent medical examination. There was an error in that letter and so, on 16 April 2019, Ms Rimland was provided with a new direction to attend an independent medical examination. It is common ground that Ms Rimland did not attend the examination as directed. The issue is as to the lawfulness of the direction.
- [13]On 7 May 2019, Ms Rimland was given a show cause notice. The disciplinary process was governed by ss 187 and 188 of the PS Act which, relevantly, provide:
“187 Grounds for discipline
- (1)A public service employee’s chief executive may discipline the employee if the chief executive is reasonably satisfied the employee has—
- (a)engaged in repeated unsatisfactory performance or serious under performance of the employee’s duties, including, for example, by performing duties carelessly, incompetently or inefficiently; or
…
- (d)contravened, without reasonable excuse, a direction given to the employee as a public service employee by a responsible person;[10] or …
188 Disciplinary action that may be taken against a public service employee
- (1)In disciplining a public service employee, the employee’s chief executive may take the action, or order the action be taken, (disciplinary action) that the chief executive considers reasonable in the circumstances.
Examples of disciplinary action
• termination of employment
• reduction of classification level and a consequential change of duties
• transfer or redeployment to other public service employment
• forfeiture or deferment of a remuneration increment or increase
• reduction of remuneration level
• imposition of a monetary penalty
• if a penalty is imposed, a direction that the amount of the penalty be deducted from the employee’s periodic remuneration payments
• a reprimand …” (emphasis added)
- [14]The show cause letter alleged that Ms Rimland had failed to attend the independent medical examination. This appeared in the show cause letter:
“It is alleged that you have failed to follow reasonable direction to attend an Independent Medical Examination (IME).
If accepted, this allegation could constitute grounds for discipline pursuant to section 187(1)(d) of the Act, in that you have contravened, without reasonable excuse, a direction given to you as a public service employee by a responsible person.
The allegation, if proven, could constitute grounds for discipline pursuant to the abovementioned subsection of the Act because you were directed, but failed, to attend two IMEs[11] during the month of April 2019, which were scheduled to guide the department in supporting your ongoing employment.”
And:
“If a disciplinary finding is made in relation to the above allegation, section 188(1) of the [PS] Act provides examples of disciplinary action that the delegate may consider reasonable in the circumstances. I am currently giving serious consideration to:
• termination of your employment.” (emphasis added)
- [15]Ms Rimland responded. She said that there was nothing in the SEAWC Directive which could be said to raise questions of her behaviour or competence. Her point was that the precondition in s 174(a) was not fulfilled. She also had arguments that the precondition in s 174(b) was not fulfilled. She refused to attend the Independent Medical Examination.
- [16]Ms Rimland’s employment was terminated. She applied for relief under s 317 of the IR Act.
- [17]
- part of the duties of Ms Rimland was to comply with the SEAWC Directive;
- Ms Rimland did not comply;
- that non-compliance satisfied s 174(a) leading to reasonable satisfaction that Ms Rimland was not performing her duties satisfactorily;
- there was evidence from which it could be reasonably suspected that the unsatisfactory performance was caused by mental or physical illness or disability as prescribed by s 174(b);
- therefore, the direction to attend the Independent Medical Examination was lawful and reasonable;
- the failure to attend the independent medical examination was a proper basis for disciplinary action;
- the decision to terminate Ms Rimland’s employment was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable.[13]
The current appeal
- [18]The appeal is mounted pursuant to s 557 of the IR Act. That provides, relevantly:
“557 Appeal from commission
- (1)The Minister or another person aggrieved by a decision of the commission may appeal against the decision to the court on the ground of—
- (a)error of law; or
- (b)excess, or want, of jurisdiction.
- (2)Also, the Minister or another person aggrieved by a decision of the commission may appeal against the decision to the court, with the court’s leave, on a ground other than—
- (a)error of law; or
- (b)excess, or want, of jurisdiction. …”
- [19]As of right, Ms Rimland can pursue a ground based on an error of law or excess, or want, of jurisdiction. By leave, she may appeal on other grounds, including errors of fact. Section 565 limits the circumstances in which leave can be given, but that is not relevant here as Ms Rimland limits her appeal to errors of law.
- [20]Ms Rimland’s grounds of appeal are:
“1 Appeal is in accordance with the Industrial Relations Act 2016, Chapter 11, Part 6 s. 557(i )(a) - error of law
- 2.Critically relevant sections of the relevant industrial instruments have not been referenced against the evidence provided to the Commission (affidavits, exhibits, statements at hearing). This includes the Public Service Commission’s Directive on Supporting Employees Affected by Workplace Change (Number 17/16) (the SEAWC Directive), the Discipline Guideline, and the Industrial award regarding dispute resolution, and the right to have an external agency[14] review disputed decisions (QIRC). The employer’s obligations to the employee (s. 11.3 of the SEAWC Directive) are not referenced or considered in relation to the evidence in the case. Nor does the decision reference those sections of the SEAWC Directive that refer to what constitutes a referra1 or refusal to a vacant position (as opposed to the cooperative identification of a suitable/unsuitable match). The general protection regarding alterations to an employee’s position underpins the construction of this mandated cooperative process. The decision of 30 July 2021[15] repeats the respondent’s error in interpretation of the deployment process as a unilateral referral and the subsequent employee disagreement being a ‘refusal’ to be deployed
- 3.Evidence of other repeated breaches of the general protections are ignored (adverse actions, dismissal).
4 The decision fails in its test of the evidence across a wide range of assertions. Hearsay is accepted as fact and exhibits ignored. This impacts the reasoning in the decision regarding the existence or not of grounds for a referral to an Independent Medical Examination (IME) under the Public Service Act Part 7 (Mental or Physical incapacity) and my challenge to its lawfulness. There is no evidence in the papers that anything other than the employer’s interpretation of the SEAWC Directive and failure to provide and respect OH&S response (the supplied medical letter) was the reason for the IME[16] referral. There are numerous references throughout the decision document to unsupported[17] (lacking evidence) employer claims about my ‘refusal’ to accept a referral, including to psychology roles, in context of the supplied medical letter and the SEAWC Directive. The content of the supplied private medical letter and repeated offers by my doctor to engage with the employer were ignored by the employer and an IME would have provided no additional information (according to Part 7 of the Public Service Act). The only reason to pursue an IME was to provide false claims to the medical practitioner, which I was not allowed to see and which the Commissioner dismissed as irrelevant to the case. Claims presented for the IME were based on hearsay, lack of acceptable evidence. My analysis of the quality of this evidence was ignored, including the missing information and contradictory information.”
- [21]Ground 1 can be ignored. It is not a proper ground of appeal and, with respect, is not intended as such. It is merely an observation by Ms Rimland that her appeal is brought under s 557(1)(a) and confirms that the appeal is based on errors of law. Ground 3 is vague and meaningless. Grounds 2 and 4 raise a series of alleged errors, some of which appear at least capable of being errors of law, some obviously concern factual issues. There is some doubt whether the application to appeal states “concise grounds of appeal” as required by r 139(2)(c) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 but that need not be decided. In her written submission, Ms Rimland articulated her complaints clearly.
- [22]In her written submissions, Ms Rimland identified eight issues arising from her grounds of appeal. These were:
- “Error of law - Failure to reference the relevant sections of Public Service Commission Directive 17/16 Supporting employees affected by workplace change (Exhibit 1) and related evidence”. (Point 1)
- “Error of law - Failure to correctly assess the relevance of the Part 7 of the Public Service Act (Mental and Physical Incapacity) and the Public Commission’s Directive on this (Directive No 1/18, s 11.1, 11.2)”. (Point 2)
- “Error of law - Failure to reference section 7.2 of the “Queensland Public Service Officers and Other Employees Award - State 2015” (Exhibit 33) or relate this instrument to the evidence in the case”. (Point 3)
- “Error of law - (i) Grounds for discipline not met, and (ii) discipline process not met”. (Point 4)
- “Error of law - basing decisions on respondent hearsay rather than evidence provided in the case”. (Point 5)
- “Error of law - Fail to reference the overarching general protections”. (Point 6)
- “Error of law - failure to consider occupational health and safety law”. (Point 7)
- “Error of law/want of jurisdiction - my detailing false information on me which is placed in the public record, including medical information”. (Point 8)[18]
- [23]The outline explained Ms Rimland’s complaints under these eight heads. What was evident from Ms Rimland’s written and oral submissions, is that all her arguments, one way or another, went to five main complaints.
- [24]Firstly, the quality of the evidence was not sufficient to enable the QIRC to make the findings which it did.[19]
- [25]Secondly, she submitted that on a proper construction of s 174 of the PS Act, any obligations upon her under the SEAWC Directive are not part of her “duties”.[20]
- [26]Thirdly, that in determining that she did not comply with the SEAWC Directive, the QIRC misapplied or failed to apply various statutory or other provisions.[21]
- [27]Fourthly, the QIRC misapplied provisions when determining that there was a reasonable suspicion that Ms Rimland’s alleged unsatisfactory performance was caused by mental illness or disability.[22]
- [28]Fifthly, that the discipline process was not followed.[23]
- [29]Ms Rimland’s grounds of appeal and the eight matters identified in her written submissions are all intertwined into those five broad complaints.
Was the quality of the evidence lacking?[24]
- [30]The obligation of the QIRC is not to hear an appeal of the decision to terminate the employment of the employee. Its function is to determine itself whether the basis for the dismissal exists and, if so, whether the dismissal was “harsh, unjust or unreasonable”.[25] That approach was adopted here.[26]
- [31]As part of the fact finding function of the QIRC, it is up to the Industrial Commissioner to determine what evidence she accepts or rejects, and what inferences she draws from evidence which she accepts. The QIRC is not bound by the rules of evidence.[27] It may receive any material which it considers reliable. No objection was taken here to the material tendered to the QIRC.
- [32]Ms Rimland points to the finding at paragraph [173] of the judgment below. That is in these terms:
“[173] The Respondent says that Ms Rimland was spoken to and written to on multiple occasions regarding her obligations under the SEAWC and that she was not considered to be meeting these obligations. Further to this, the Respondent says that it is unclear what more it could do to demonstrate concerns regarding a health issue other than to request on a number of occasions that medical information be provided.”
- [33]Paragraph [173] only records a submission. It does not record a finding. In any event, Ms Rimland was written to on numerous occasions about her performance under the SEAWC.[28]
- [34]Ms Rimland’s complaint is that the QIRC placed a different complexion on the correspondence than does she.[29] That is a factual issue.
- [35]There is no substance in this complaint. It does not raise an error of law.
Proper construction of s 174; are SEAWC Directive obligations part of “duties”?[30]
- [36]Ms Rimland’s point is that she held the role of a psychologist. Her “duties”, put broadly, are to render psychological services. She submits that in the absence of any breach of her obligations in performing that role, s 174(a) is not engaged. The respondent asserts that compliance with her SEAWC obligations were part of Ms Rimland’s “duties” for the purposes of s 174(a) of the PS Act.
- [37]Although Ms Rimland was subject to workplace change, she was still a Public Service employee.[31] Section 11 of the PS Act provides:
“11 Relationship between chief executives and their public service employees
- (1)The chief executive of a department is, for the State, responsible for the employment of public service employees of that department.
- (2)The public service employees of a department are responsible to that department’s chief executive in relation to their employment in that department.”[32]
- [38]A directive, such as the SEAWC Directive, is a “ruling”.[33] It was a ruling by the Commission Chief Executive. The power of the Commission Chief Executive to make rulings is granted by s 53 of the PS Act. It provides:
“53 Rulings by commission chief executive
- (1)The commission chief executive may make a ruling about—
- (a)a matter relating to any of the commission’s or the commission chief executive’s functions; or
- (b)the overall employment conditions for persons employed or to be employed as—
- (i)chief executives, senior executives or senior officers; or
- (ii)public service officers on contract whose remuneration is equal to, or higher than, the remuneration payable to a senior officer; or
(ba) a matter relating to the application of chapter 6 or 7 to a former public service employee; or
- (c)other specific matters that, under this Act, the commission chief executive may make a ruling about.
- (2)To remove any doubt, it is declared that the commission chief executive can not make a ruling about the remuneration or conditions of employment of a public service employee who is covered by an industrial instrument.”[34]
- [39]There is no challenge to the validity of the SEAWC Directive. It was made within the power vested by s 53 of the PS Act.
- [40]By s 47(3) of the PS Act:
“(3) A directive binds the persons to whom it applies.”
- [41]Therefore, the Commission Chief Executive has power to make rulings for the redeployment of Public Service employees, and those employees are “bound by the rulings”.
- [42]Terms and conditions of employment of an employee are sourced from the contract of employment, industrial instruments, statutes and statutory directions.[35]
- [43]In construing s 174(a) and in particular the word “duties”, it is necessary to determine the intention of Parliament by considering the actual text of the statute as a whole and having regard to relevant context and purpose.[36]
- [44]The SEAWC Directive requires both departments and affected employees to do things. The SEAWC Directive forms part of the terms and conditions of employment of the affected employees, including Ms Rimland. As the direction is binding upon both the Department and the employees, lawful obligations fall upon both parties.[37]
- [45]Sections 174 and 175 of the PS Act have as their purpose the bestowal of a power upon the Chief Executive to require an employee who is not performing their obligations to undergo a medical examination so they can be further managed. In proper context, the term “duties” in s 174(a) is synonymous with “obligations” and, relevantly, “terms of employment”.
- [46]It follows that if there is reasonable satisfaction that Ms Rimland has not satisfactorily performed her obligations under the SEAWC Directive, s 174(a) is engaged.
Did the QIRC misapply or fail to apply various provisions?[38]
- [47]Ms Rimland points to numerous provisions
Clause 11.3 of the SEAWC Directive
- [48]When an employee is affected by workplace change, they must be registered.[39] When registering, an affected employee must provide certain things, including a current resume and a referee and preferred alternative employment locations. They must also nominate between one and three role categories in which they have the most skill and experience.[40] Clause 11, which is set out[41] at paragraph [5] of these reasons, casts obligations upon both employee and employer in a prescribed process designed to place the employee in suitable alternative employment.
- [49]Ms Rimland’s point is that while the Industrial Commissioner, in the judgment, referred to cll 11.1 and 11.4, there is no reference to cl 11.3.
- [50]The structure of cl 11 is that by cl 11.1, it is said that there are mutual obligations and then by cl 11.3, obligations are placed upon the case manager. By 11.4, obligations are placed upon the affected employee.
- [51]Ms Rimland complains that while there are mutual obligations, there has been a concentration on her conduct not that of the case worker.
- [52]It is understandable that the focus of the QIRC was upon Ms Rimland’s obligations. It was a breach of her obligations that allegedly triggered s 174(a) of the PS Act. However, Ms Rimland has a point that if the QIRC applied the SEAWC Directive as if there were not mutual obligations, that may prove legal error.
- [53]The Industrial Commissioner analysed the SEAWC process carefully in the judgment.[42] The Industrial Commissioner then considered the reasonableness of the Independent Medical Examination direction and she said this:
“[143] Given that the unsatisfactory performance relied upon by the Respondent was with regard to Ms Rimland’s participation in the SEAWC process and Ms Rimland claims it was the Respondent’s implementation of the SEAWC process that was problematic, rather than her participation in it, I found it necessary to set out the evidence before me regarding the process from paragraphs [35] to [142]. Following the process as described by each of the parties, I am left with the impression that both parties found the process frustrating. However, I am satisfied that it was Ms Rimland’s failure to satisfactorily participate in the process that caused the Respondent to temporarily withdraw her from the process pending the receipt of independent medical advice.” (emphasis added)
- [54]The Industrial Commissioner was well aware that Ms Rimland complained about the respondent’s implementation of the SEAWC process. Consistently through the Industrial Commissioner’s judgment are references to complaints by Ms Rimland of actions which would be a breach of cl 11.3. Those complaints were rejected.
- [55]No error of law is shown by the failure of the QIRC to specifically refer to cl 11.3 of the SEAWC Directive.
Clause 12 of the SEAWC Directive
- [56]
- [57]Ms Rimland submits that cl 12 is only engaged and a suitability assessment done once there has been a “cooperative identification of a suitable vacancy”. This, she says, is the effect of clauses 11.3 and 11.4.[44]
- [58]To the extent that Ms Rimland submits that she must consent to, or approve of any potential placement, that is not the proper construction of the SEAWC Directive.
- [59]Clause 11 sets up a collaborative process, but ultimately, it is for the employer to identify what it considers an appropriate match and then make the referral under cl 12. It does not need Ms Rimland’s consent to take that step. Consent is only required to deploy a full-time employee to part-time.[45]
- [60]For the reasons already identified, the Industrial Commissioner was aware that the SEAWC Directive placed obligations on the case worker as well as Ms Rimland. Clause 11.3(d) does not require the case manager to obtain Ms Rimland’s agreement to the identification of a suitable vacancy. The issue, as identified by the Industrial Commissioner, was whether Ms Rimland had cooperated in the process. The Industrial Commissioner found that she had not. That was a finding of fact which discloses no error of law.
Clauses 13.3(b) and (c) of the SEAWC Directive
- [61]Clause 13 concerns suitability assessments. These are to be undertaken by the receiving department, that is the department in which the new role is available. Clause 13 also appears[46] at paragraph [5] of these reasons.
- [62]Ms Rimland says that the Commissioner has overlooked clauses 13.3(b) and (c) which has led her to find that Ms Rimland was not cooperating. As earlier observed,[47] the Industrial Commissioner was aware of the mutual obligations in the SEAWC Directive. The Industrial Commissioner extensively covered the evidence and made a finding that Ms Rimland had not cooperated in the process in a way that the SEAWC Directive obliged her to do.
- [63]There is nothing in clauses 13.3(b) or (c) to undermine the specific findings made of lack of cooperation.
By Part 7 of the Public Service Act (Mental and Physical Incapacity) - the Department was not entitled to seek a diagnosis
- [64]During the SEAWC process, a report of Ms Rimland’s doctor was obtained which referred to a “condition”, but not a diagnosis. That is said by Ms Rimland to be significant. Ms Rimland says that the PS Act did not authorise the Department to seek a diagnosis by referring her for an Independent Medical Examination.
- [65]Section 177 of the PS Act, which is contained in Part 7 of Chapter 5, provides, relevantly:
“177 Medical examination report
- (1)The report on the medical examination must include the examining doctor’s opinion as to whether the employee has a mental or physical illness or disability that may adversely affect the employee’s performance.
- (2)If the doctor considers the employee has an illness or disability mentioned in subsection (1), the report must also include the doctor’s opinion as to the following—
- (a)the likely direct or indirect effect of the illness or disability on the employee’s performance;
- (b)an estimate of how long the illness or disability or its effects are likely to last;
- (c)whether or not disclosing the information in the report to the employee might be prejudicial to the employee’s mental or physical health or wellbeing. …” (emphasis added)
- [66]By that section, the examining doctor reports his or her opinion as to whether the employee “has a mental or physical illness or disability …”. That is a diagnosis. That diagnosis is, by s 177 of the PS Act, what is sought through an independent medical examination directed under s 175 once the preconditions of s 174 are fulfilled.
Work Health and Safety Act 2011
- [67]No particular provision is referred to by Ms Rimland. Her written submissions suggest that it was not a matter pressed by her in the QIRC. There is nothing in the judgment of the QIRC to suggest it was an issue.
- [68]To the extent that the appointment of Ms Rimland to any particular role could have compromised her safety in the workplace, it would surely have been so only on the basis that it triggered her trauma issues. That, if anything, reinforces the appropriateness of a referral of Ms Rimland for an Independent Medical Examination.
The Queensland Public Service Officers and Other Employees Award - State 2015
- [69]Ms Rimland refers to the grievance provisions in the Award which applied to her. Clause 7 of the Award provides:
“7.2 Employee grievance procedures - other than Award matters
- (a)The objectives of the procedure are to promote the prompt resolution of grievances by consultation, co‑operation and discussion to reduce the level of disputation and to promote efficiency, effectiveness and equity in the workplace.
- (b)The following procedure applies to all industrial matters within the meaning of the Act:
Stage 1: In the first instance the employee shall inform such employee’s immediate supervisor of the existence of the grievance and they shall attempt to solve the grievance. It is recognised that an employee may exercise the right to consult such employee’s union representative during the course of Stage 1.
Stage 2: If the grievance remains unresolved, the employee shall refer the grievance to the next in line management (‘the manager’). The manager will consult with the relevant parties. The employee may exercise the right to consult or be represented by such employee’s union representative during the course of Stage 2.
Stage 3: If the grievance is still unresolved, the manager will advise the chief executive and the aggrieved employee may submit the matter in writing to the chief executive if such employee wishes to pursue the matter further. If desired by either party the matter shall also be notified to the relevant union.
- (c)The chief executive shall ensure that:
- (i)the aggrieved employee or such employee’s union representative has the opportunity to present all aspects of the grievance; and
- (ii)the grievance shall be investigated in a thorough, fair and impartial manner.
- (d)The chief executive may appoint another person to investigate the grievance. The chief executive may consult with the relevant union in appointing an investigator. The appointed person shall be other than the employee’s supervisor or manager.
- (e)If the matter is notified to the union, the investigator shall consult with the union during the course of the investigation. The chief executive shall advise the employee initiating the grievance, such employee’s union representative and any other employee directly concerned of the determinations made as a result of the investigation of the grievance.
- (f)The procedure is to be completed in accordance with the following time frames unless the parties agree otherwise:
Stage 1: Discussions should take place between the employee and such employee’s supervisor within 24 hours and the procedure shall not extend beyond 7 days.
Stage 2: Not to exceed 7 days.
Stage 3: Not to exceed 14 days.
- (g)If the grievance is not settled the matter may be referred to the Commission by the employee or the union.
- (h)Subject to legislation, while the grievance procedure is being followed normal work is to continue except in the case of a genuine safety issue. The status quo existing before the emergence of a grievance or dispute is to continue while the procedure is being followed. No party shall be prejudiced as to the final settlement by the continuation of work.
- (i)Where the grievance involves allegations of sexual harassment an employee should commence the procedure at Stage 3.”
- [70]Ms Rimland sought to engage the process and the QIRC heard evidence about it.[48] No final findings on the point seemed to have been made.
- [71]The dispute which was the subject of complaint by Ms Rimland was the implementation of the SEAWC process and the direction to attend an Independent Medical Examination. As already observed, the first direction was given on 29 March 2020 and a second direction was given on 16 April. The day after, Ms Rimland formally lodged a complaint.[49]
- [72]By that point, the issues between Ms Rimland and the Department had been well ventilated. Whether that was or was not “consultation” for the purposes of cl 7.2(b), Stage 2 need not be decided.
- [73]The obligation in cl 7.2(b) to maintain the status quo is “subject to legislation”.[50] If, as the QIRC found, the conditions in each of s 174(a) and 174(b) were fulfilled, then the Chief Executive’s power could be exercised.
Did the QIRC properly find “reasonable suspicion” of mental illness?[51]
- [74]If the Chief Executive is “reasonably satisfied” that a Public Service employee has breached his or her duties,[52] the Chief Executive may refer the employee for examination if the Chief Executive “reasonably suspects” a causal connection between the unsatisfactory performance and “mental or physical illness or disability”.[53]
- [75]It is common for a statute to prescribe the state of mind of a particular person as a condition upon which a power arises. Sometimes, as in s 174(a) of the PS Act, that is a “satisfaction” which, by s 174(a), must be reasonably held. The Industrial Commissioner positively found that Ms Rimland had not complied with her obligations under the SEAWC.
- [76]The power prescribed by s 174(b) arises upon a “reasonable suspicion”. Suspicion is a state of intellectual conviction less than positive belief (“belief” being synonymous with “satisfaction”) in the existence of something.
- [77]
“Suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: ‘I suspect but I cannot prove.’ Suspicion arises at or near the starting-point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is in the end.”[55]
- [78]
- [79]
- [80]In the context of this case, the Chief Executive does not require proof that Ms Rimland’s unsatisfactory performance is “caused by mental or physical illness or disability”. He did not form a definite belief that it was. He need not form the view that it is the only possible cause. He need only “suspect” on reasonable grounds that it is. Sections 174 and 175 of the PS Act allow investigation of that “suspicion” by requiring the employee to undergo an Independent Medical Examination.
- [81]Deputy President Merrell, in Dean-Braieoux v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service),[60] considered ss 174 and 175 of the PS Act and the notion of the Chief Executive “reasonably” suspecting a causal connection between the “unsatisfactory performance” and any “mental or physical illness or disability”. He held, following Goldie v Commonwealth of Australia,[61] that whether a suspicion is “reasonable” must be considered in all the circumstances of the case to decide whether the suspicion is objectively reasonable.[62] In my view, that is the appropriate approach.
- [82]On 17 July 2018, Ms Rimland was resisting being placed in the role of Staff Welfare Officer with the Brisbane Youth Detention Centre. She wrote to the delegate, Mr Harper, asserting that she should not be placed in a role where she was required to respond to persons traumatised through work incidents or domestic violence. She enclosed a report authored by a social worker, Mr Doug Bourke, dated 5 July 2018. In that report, Mr Bourke, who holds a Bachelor of Social Work with Honours and is an Accredited Mental Health Social Worker, observed this:
“I provide an assessment on the current psychological situation of Suzanne,[63] based on six counselling sessions. Whilst not formally qualified to diagnose, I have had extensive experience in working clinically with many people suffering Post Traumatic Stress responses.
During our contact Suzanne has displayed patterns of somatic behaviours and reactions as well as cognitions and emotional responses consistent with past clients I have assisted, who were formally diagnosed with PTSD.
Suzanne was initially referred by Dr Bianca Pettigrew, on 17/04/2018, and the following were listed in the Mental Health Assessment and Plan she provided, ‘terrible insomnia, intrusive ruminations, low mood in context of profound fatigue and feeling overwhelmed with work and prospect of finding new job’. At the start of the initial session, I administered the Dass 21, with results in the normal range, (Depression-10, Anxiety-2 and Stress-1) the highest scores of 2 were against items 5, (lack of initiative), item 10 (nothing to look forward too), and item 13 (down hearted and blue).” (emphasis added)
And later:
“I suspect that Suzanne may, in fact, be eligible for a diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (Syndrome), by an appropriately qualified practitioner.” (emphasis added)
- [83]After explaining Ms Rimland’s history of trauma in the workplace as a result of her being a whistle blower, Mr Bourke then observed:
“Suzanne spoke of her insomnia, feelings of depression, lack of motivation and a sense of hopelessness. I gave her homework around consolidating these strategies, as action towards reducing the intrusiveness of the issues mentioned in her care plan.”
And later:
“I again expressed my thoughts that her behaviour was consistent with other clients I had worked with who suffered PTSD. She then remembered that when she left Queensland Health after ‘blowing the whistle’, she did receive a diagnosis of PTSD from Dr. Bill Wilke, this however was rejected by APHRA, who instead accepted an opinion that she suffered ‘Adjustment Disorder’.” (emphasis added)
- [84]Ms Bourke then made the following recommendation:
“As a result of my clinical contact with Suzanne on 14/04/2018, 1/05/2018 and 17/05/2018, 24/05/18 and 7/06/18 and 25/06/18; I would recommend that Suzanne be formally assessed to determine whether or not a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Syndrome) is appropriate in relation to her involvement as a whistle blower and the traumatic aftermath from that situation. I would also request that a treatment plan be developed for Suzanne.” (emphasis added)
- [85]Ms Rimland, by supplying Mr Bourke’s report, has herself squarely raised her mental health as an issue. Mr Bourke recommended that Ms Rimland be assessed to see whether a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is appropriate in relation to her.
- [86]Mr Harper then asked Ms Rimland to provide medical evidence. In his email to Ms Rimland of 23 July 2018, Mr Harper said, “I will need you to provide a diagnosis from your general practitioner and/or treating specialist in order for me to cease to put you forward for roles according to your current skills and abilities …”.
- [87]What Mr Harper was asking was exactly what Mr Bourke had recommended.
- [88]There were then various exchanges between Ms Rimland and Mr Harper. Ms Rimland’s position was that the various positions which had been offered to her were a “poor personal fit”. Ultimately, Ms Rimland agreed to provide a doctor’s report but said, “You will not get any diagnostic information from doctor, only comment about unsuitability for direct trauma-related work”.
- [89]Ultimately, on 7 August 2018, Ms Rimland provided a report from her doctor, Dr Pettigrew, relevantly:
“As per Ms Rimland’s consent for this communication, I do not include any diagnostic particulars nor do I comment on Ms Rimland’s professional qualifications as might be required for any given position. I aim to provide a framework within which a suitable role can be found that provides a safe, predictable and stable work environment that will not exacerbate Ms Rimland’s medical condition. To the best of my knowledge, Ms Rimland’s medical condition does not impair her capability as a psychologist.”
And later:
“I strongly recommend that Ms Rimland avoid roles that involve a high risk of exposure to conflict or hostility e.g. ‘front line’ child protection. I recommend that Ms Rimland avoid a role that involves management or assessment of [acutely][64] traumatised clients e.g. traumatised staff of youth detention or prisons. Ms Rimland is best placed to assess the impact of a given role on her health and responsiveness to clients. Ms Rimland would greatly benefit from a period of workplace stability, utilising her professional skills, ideally with accessible and supportive management and mentors.”
- [90]Ms Rimland’s position is that any trauma she was suffering which resulted in a limitation of the roles she could accept was a suitability or “role fit” consideration, not a mental health one. She submits that there was no basis upon which the Chief Executive could exercise the power under s 175 of the PS Act to require her to undertake a medical examination.
- [91]The power given by Parliament to the Chief Executive under s 175 of the PS Act arises if there is a reasonable suspicion held that Ms Rimland’s performance under the SEAWC Directive is caused by some “mental or physical illness or disability”. Ms Rimland’s view is not relevant. What is relevant is the view of the Chief Executive and whether that is held on reasonable grounds.
- [92]Here, there are reasonable grounds for the Chief Executive’s suspicion. Mr Bourke suspected that a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is appropriate. He outlined some of Ms Rimland’s symptoms. Dr Pettigrew recommended that Ms Rimland not undertake certain roles. By acting under s 175 of the PS Act, the Chief Executive was seeking to investigate the potential diagnosis suggested by Mr Bourke.
- [93]The Industrial Commissioner found that the relevant reasonable suspicion was held and that directing Ms Rimland to undergo an Independent Medical Examination was lawful. On the evidence she accepted, the Industrial Commissioner was right to reach that conclusion.
Was the discipline process followed?[65]
- [94]The PS Act contains ss 187 and 188 which I have set out at paragraph [13] of these reasons. Commission Chief Executive Guideline 01/17: Discipline (the Discipline Guidelines) provides procedural steps for the taking of disciplinary action against Public Service employees.
- [95]The following steps form the disciplinary process prescribed by the Discipline Guidelines:
“1. Initial enquiries and considerations.
- 2.Determining whether or not to proceed with a formal disciplinary process.
- 3.Show cause process for allegations (if yes to above).
- 4.Decision on disciplinary finding(s).
- 5.Show cause process (if disciplinary action proposed following a disciplinary finding).
- 6.Decision on disciplinary action.”[66]
- [96]Ms Rimland makes various complaints about the disciplinary process undertaken here. Firstly, she says that there were not proper initial enquiries and considerations. Secondly, she says that there should have been no determination that she had committed any disciplinary breach. Thirdly, she submitted that the show cause process was truncated.
- [97]As previously observed, the issues between Ms Rimland and the Department had been well ventilated by the time the direction was made that she attend an Independent Medical Examination. No further investigation was called for. Whether a disciplinary breach should have been found depends upon whether the direction was lawful. That has been considered.
- [98]The show cause notice given to Ms Rimland on 7 May 2019 set out various factual matters, then made a formal allegation that she had failed to follow a reasonable direction to attend an independent medical examination. The notice advised Ms Rimland that the allegation, if proven, could constitute grounds for discipline and told her that if the finding was made, consideration was being given to taking disciplinary action in the form of termination of her employment. The relevant parts of the show cause letter are set out at paragraph [14] of these reasons.
- [99]Ms Rimland says that there should have been two show cause letters. The first, pursuant to step 3 in the Discipline Guidelines, was for her to show cause as to the allegations against her and the second (step 5 in the process) was for her to show cause in relation to proposed discipline if the factual allegations were established.
- [100]The purpose of the Guideline is described as:
“1. PURPOSE
This Guideline is an aid to managing disciplinary processes under the Public Service Act 2008 (PSA), Chapter 6 (‘Disciplinary action for public service employees and former public service employees’). This Guideline is to be used as an adjunct to (that is, not instead of) the PSA. Its purpose is to only provide guidance. It does not bind or substitute for decision makers needing to properly exercise their managerial discretion in line with the PSA, in response to the unique set of facts of each actual case. …” (emphasis added)
- [101]Procedural fairness must be afforded to a Public Service employee facing disciplinary proceedings. What procedural fairness encompasses depends upon the statutory regime and the particular circumstances of the case.[67] It is not the law that procedural fairness requires the Guideline to be strictly complied with. The Guideline is intended to provide guidance only, although regard can be had to it when considering whether obligations of procedural fairness have been met.
- [102]In the Industrial Commissioner’s reasons, she carefully considered the show cause process. As to the opportunities given to Ms Rimland to defend the allegations, the Industrial Commissioner observed:
“[176] In these circumstances, there was one allegation against Ms Rimland. That allegation was that Ms Rimland had failed, without reasonable cause, to follow the Direction to attend the IME. Ms Rimland was advised on two occasions (26th and 30th April) that failure to follow the direction could lead to disciplinary action. It was not in dispute that Ms Rimland had not attended the IME. In fact, she indicated on a number of occasions that she was not going to attend the IME and would not attend an IME. In the circumstances, I do not see that there was cause for there to be an investigation into whether Ms Rimland had attended the IME. It is clear that she did not.
[177] The show cause process gave Ms Rimland the opportunity to provide reasons why it was reasonable for her to refuse to attend the IME and why, if it was found that she had no reasonable excuse, she should not be terminated. Ms Rimland provided a response.
[178] There is nothing before me to suggest that Ms Rimland was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegation or that the show cause process was not conducted properly.”
- [103]I agree with the Industrial Commissioner. Procedural fairness has been afforded to Ms Rimland.
Conclusions
- [104]Ms Rimland has failed to identify any error of law in the decision of the QIRC, and the appeal should be dismissed.
- [105]I order that the appeal is dismissed.
Footnotes
[1] This directive has since been superseded.
[2] 7.2(b) provides that priority of continuing employment will be given to permanent employees over temporary contracted employees.
[3] Clause 7.3 casts the obligation to implement workplace strategies upon the relevant department and clause 7.4 preserves the force of relevant industrial instruments. Clause 8 concerns governance arrangements for workplace change.
[4] Clauses 10.1 and 10.2 provide for a register of affected employees.
[5] Clause 11.2 has no relevance here.
[6] Clauses 12.1 to 12.3 concern advertising of vacancies.
[7] Clause 13.2 concerns the timing of the suitability assessment.
[8] Clauses 13.4, 13.5 and 13.6 are machinery provisions concerning the suitability assessment.
[9] This directive has since been superseded.
[10] There is no contest that the direction was given by a “responsible person”.
[11] In fairness only one; the later one.
[12] Rimland v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors) [2021] QIRC 265.
[13] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 320.
[14] In the grounds this word was “ageny”, an obvious typographical error.
[15] This is an obvious reference by Ms Rimland to the decision from which the current appeal is mounted.
[16] Independent Medical Examination.
[17] This was misspelled as “unsuported”; just a typographical error.
[18] I have assigned “Point 1” to “Point 8” to the headings in Ms Rimland’s written submissions.
[19] “The first complaint”.
[20] “The second complaint”.
[21] “The third complaint”.
[22] “The fourth complaint”.
[23] “The fifth complaint”.
[24] The first complaint; Point 5.
[25] See the decision by Merrell DP, where the relevant authorities are referred to in The Australian Workers’ Union of Employees, Queensland v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service [2020] QIRC 67 at [38]-[46].
[26] Rimland v state of Queensland (Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors) [2021] QIRC 265 at [12]-[13] and subsequent reasoning.
[27] Industrial Relations Act 2016; s 531(2)(a) and (b).
[28] See Exhibit 17 and paragraph [25] to Ms Rimland’s affidavit filed 25 October 2019.
[29] Ms Rimland’s written submissions, paragraph 16.
[30] The second complaint; Point 2, Ms Rimland’s written submissions, paragraph 9.
[31] Public Service Act 2008, s 9(1).
[32] Statutory notes omitted.
[33] Public Service Act 2008, s 47(6).
[34] Statutory notes omitted.
[35] Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 419-421, Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472 at 479 followed and applied in Together Queensland Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2022] ICQ 6 at [19].
[36] Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503, SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 91 ALJR 936 at [14], [35]-[40] and The Queen v A2; The Queen v Magennis; The Queen v Vaziri (2019) 269 CLR 507 at [32] and see generally Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253 at [95]-[116].
[37] Public Service Act 2008, s 47(3).
[38] The third complaint, Point 1, Point 2, Point 3, Point 6, Point 7.
[39] SEAWC Directive, clause 10.1.
[40] SEAWC Directive, clause 10.3.
[41] To the extent that it is relevant to the present dispute.
[42] Rimland v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors) [2021] QIRC 265, paragraphs [35]-[83].
[43] To the extent that it is relevant to the current dispute.
[44] Set out at paragraph [5] of these reasons.
[45] SEAWC Directive, clause 12.4(a).
[46] To the extent that it is relevant to the current dispute.
[47] Paragraphs [53] and [54] of these reasons referring to paragraph [143] of the QIRC’s decision.
[48] Rimland v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors) [2021] QIRC 265 at [162]-[168].
[49] Letter 17 April 2019 to Ms Clare O'Connor, Director-General, Department of Communities, Disability Services and Seniors.
[50] Clause 7.2(h).
[51] The fourth complaint, Point 2.
[52] Public Service Act 2008, s 174(a).
[53] Public Service Act 2008, s 174(b).
[54] [1970] AC 942.
[55] At 948.
[56] (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 115.
[57] Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612, New South Wales v Robinson (2019) 266 CLR 619 and see the earlier case of Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266 at 303.
[58] (2001) 126 A Crim R 562.
[59] At [53] and see also State of New South Wales v Smith (2017) 95 NSWLR 662 at [117] and [118] and R v Elfar; R v Golding; R v Sander [2017] QCA 149 at [32] reported in part at [2018] 1 Qd R 608.
[60] [2021] QIRC 209.
[61] (2002) 117 FCR 566.
[62] At [39].
[63] A reference to Ms Rimland.
[64] Ms Rimland added the word “acutely” in handwriting to the letter before providing it to Mr Harper.
[65] The fifth complaint; Point 4.
[66] At cl 10.1.
[67] Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475, Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 at [37]-[38], Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 627.