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Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd v Sato[2023] ICQ 14

Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd v Sato[2023] ICQ 14

INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd v Sato [2023] ICQ 014

PARTIES:

MAURICE ALEXANDER MANAGEMENT PTY LTD

(appellant)

v

KAORI SATO

(respondent)

FILE NO:

C/2020/23

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

DELIVERED ON:

21 June 2023

HEARING DATE:

1 June 2021

MEMBER:

Davis J, President

ORDER:

The appeal is dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – COMMONWEALTH – INDUSTRIAL INSTRUMENTS – APPLICATION AND EFFECT – EFFECT – where the respondent was an employee of the appellant – where the respondent’s employment was governed by an enterprise agreement made in 2006 (the first agreement) – where the first agreement was made pursuant to the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) – where the first agreement was superseded by an agreement in 2010 (the second agreement) and an agreement in 2015 (the third agreement) – where the first agreement provided for payment of a loading to compensate for entitlements, including long service leave – where the respondent was a casual employee of the appellant for more than 10 years – where the Workplace Relations Act 1996 was repealed – where the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) was enacted – where the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) provided that State and Territory provisions prevailed over Commonwealth enterprise bargains – where there were transitional provisions – where the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) provided for long service leave – where the respondent claimed that service under the first agreement counted towards calculation of long service leave entitlements under the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) – where the QIRC held the service did count – where the appellant appealed – whether there was error in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission’s finding

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 26, s 27, s 29, s 113, s 113A

Fair Work Bill 2008

Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009, s 2, s 5A, s 7

Industrial Relations Act 1999, s 43, s 47, s 49

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 475, s 477, s 557

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), s 61, s 62, s 170LT, s 170LY, s 170LZ, s 346D

Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005, schedule 7

CASES:

Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410; [1995] HCA 24, cited

Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253; [2011] HCA 26, cited

Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd v Bartram (2007) 161 IR 307, followed

Conroy’s Smallgoods v Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union [2023] FCAFC 59, cited

Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; [2014] HCA 7, cited

Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472; [1930] HCA 12, cited

Jemena Asset Management (3) Pty Ltd v Coinvest Ltd (2011) 224 CLR 508; [2011] HCA 33, followed

Maughan Thiem Auto Sales Pty Ltd v Cooper (2014) 222 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 94, cited

Mondelez Australia Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (2020) 271 CLR 495; [2020] HCA 29, cited

Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104; [2015] HCA 37, cited

New South Wales v Commonwealth of Australia (2006) 229 CLR 1; [2006] HCA 52, cited

Programmed Integrated Workforce Pty Ltd v Fox [2022] ICQ 32, cited

Queensland Independent Education Union of Employees v Beerwah and District Kindergarten Association Inc (2008) 188 QGIG 169; [2008] ICQ 18, cited

Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2022] ICQ 23, cited

R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507; [2019] HCA 35, followed

Sato v Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd [2020] QIRC 213, related

Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54, cited

WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato (2020) 278 FCR 179; [2020] FCAFC 84, cited

WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato (2021) 271 CLR 456; [2021] HCA 23, cited

COUNSEL:

CJ Murdoch KC for the appellant

A Rich (Solicitor) for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Ashurst Australia for the appellant

Slater & Gordon for the respondent

  1. [1]
    The appellant, Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd (MAM) was the employer of the respondent, Kaori Sato.  Ms Sato claimed that she was entitled to payment of long service leave.
  2. [2]
    During her employment with MAM, Ms Sato was subject to an enterprise agreement made pursuant to the provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)[1] and later was subject to enterprise agreements made pursuant to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).[2]  As later explained, long service leave was provided for by Queensland State legislation, namely the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (1999 IR Act).[3]
  3. [3]
    While it was common ground that Ms Sato served the requisite 10 years’ service with MAM which would qualify her for long service leave, MAM resisted the claim in reliance upon provisions of the first enterprise agreement.
  4. [4]
    The application before the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) was conducted upon an agreed statement of facts and written submissions.  There was  no oral hearing.
  5. [5]
    The QIRC ordered the payment to Ms Sato of a sum representing her entitlement to long service leave[4] being $8,253.55.[5]
  6. [6]
    MAM appealed that decision.  There is no dispute as to the quantum of Ms Sato’s claim.  The only issue is whether she is entitled to the sum awarded.

Background

  1. [7]
    Ms Sato worked as a casual flight attendant.
  2. [8]
    On 27 March 2006, Ms Sato’s employment with MAM commenced.  It finished on 24 September 2016 after a period of continuous service of 10 years and six months.  Any entitlement to long service leave arose at 10 years’ service.[6]
  3. [9]
    As earlier observed, over the period of her employment with MAM, Ms Sato’s working conditions were regulated by three consecutive enterprise agreements:
  1. The Flight Attendants’ Association of Australia Domestic/Regional Division Casual Flight Attendants Enterprise Agreement 2006 (“the 2006 agreement”);
  2. The Flight Attendants’ Association of Australia Domestic/Regional Division Casual Flight Attendants Enterprise Agreement 2010 (“the 2010 agreement”); and
  3. the Flight Attendants’ Association of Australia Domestic/Regional Division Casual Flight Attendants Enterprise Agreement 2015 (“the 2015 agreement”).
  1. [10]
    Over the course of the three enterprise agreements Commonwealth industrial legislation was in force.  The 2006 agreement was approved pursuant to the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth).  Each of the 2010 agreement and the 2015 agreement were approved pursuant to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).
  2. [11]
    Presently in force in Queensland is the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (2016 IR Act).  It provides for long service leave entitlements.[7]  The 1999 IR Act was in force over the relevant period and it is common ground that it governs Ms Sato’s claim to long service leave.
  3. [12]
    While the 1999 IR Act governed Ms Sato’s entitlement to long service leave, the proceedings in the QIRC were conducted pursuant to the 2016 IR Act which vests jurisdiction both in the QIRC and this Court.
  4. [13]
    The periods of service during the time of each of the 2010 agreement and the 2015 agreement are taken into account in the calculation of service for the purposes of entitlement to long service leave.  That much is admitted.  It is the period under the 2006 agreement which is contentious.
  5. [14]
    The 2006 agreement contained the following provision:

“13.       BASE HOURLY RATE

13.1 A Flight Attendant shall be paid a base hourly rate as set out in clause 39. This hourly rate of pay includes:

13.1.1 a casual loading that is paid in lieu of any entitlement to paid annual leave, paid personal leave (including sick leave), long service leave or payments for notice of termination or redundancy; and

13.1.2 expenses incurred during the course of a Flight Attendant’s duty as follows:

  • Miscellaneous expenses.
  • Grooming allowance.

13.1.3 A payment in lieu of shift penalties.”

  1. [15]
    MAM argued that:
  1. clause 13.1 operated so as to exclude Ms Sato’s service under the 2006 agreement in the calculation of any long service leave claim.  This, it was submitted, was part of the price Ms Sato paid in exchange for the casual loading;
  2. alternatively, Ms Sato’s claim for long service leave has been satisfied by the casual loading;
  3. alternatively, any discretion conferred by s 475 of the 2016 IR Act to award unpaid entitlements to Ms Sato should be exercised in favour of MAM by the QIRC refusing to order payment to Ms Sato.
  1. [16]
    The Industrial Commissioner held:
  1. there is a distinction between entitlement to long service leave and accrual of service leading to an entitlement to long service leave;[8]
  2. “entitlement” which is the term used in clause 13.1 arises at a point in time namely, after 10 years of continuous service;[9]
  3. the entitlement did not arise during the currency of the 2006 agreement;[10]
  4. therefore, clause 13.1 did not operate to exclude the service under the 2006 agreement from the calculation of entitlement to long service leave;[11]
  5. given the proper construction of clause 13.1:
    1. (i)
      the claim for long service leave had not been satisfied;[12]
    2. (ii)
      there was no basis to decline to make an order in Ms Sato’s favour under s 475 of the 2016 IR Act.[13]

The appeal

  1. [17]
    MAM appeals on 5 grounds, namely:

“1.  The Commission determined the matter by giving a particular meaning to clause 13.1.1 of the Flight Attendants’ Association of Australia Domestic/Regional Division Casual Flight Attendants Enterprise Agreement 2006 (the ‘Construction Point’). The Construction Point was not agitated by the Applicant (‘Ms Sato’), nor did the Commission put the Respondent (‘MAM’) on notice about the Construction Point, or provide to MAM any opportunity to address the Commission in respect of the Construction Point. This amounts to a denial of procedural fairness such that there was a failure by the Commission to properly exercise its jurisdiction.

  1. The Commission erred in law in failing to find that clause 13.1.1 had the effect that for the period of its operation Ms Sato did not for the purposes of s. 43 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 accrue service.
  1. The Commission erred in law and committed jurisdictional error in finding that Ms Sato had an entitlement to long service leave.
  1. The Commission erred in finding that it was necessary that the casual loading payable to Ms Sato identify an amount of that casual loading which was separately attributable to long service leave and that therefore set off was unavailable to MAM.
  1. In taking the above erroneous finding into account when exercising the Commission’s discretion under section 475 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 the Commission erred in law and committed jurisdictional error.”

Ground 1 – Procedural fairness

  1. [18]
    This ground alleges that MAM was not given an opportunity to be heard on the construction of clause 13.1 of the 2006 agreement as ultimately found by the QIRC.  Ms Sato submits that procedural fairness was afforded to MAM.
  2. [19]
    There is no need to consider the merits of this ground.
  3. [20]
    There were no factual disputes.  The question of construction is a matter of law.  MAM has a right to appeal on an error of law under s 557 of the 2016 IR Act.[14]  It is for this Court to determine the proper construction of clause 13.1 and the parties have made full argument on the point in this Court.  There is no utility in determining whether or not procedural fairness was afforded to MAM in the QIRC.[15]

Ground 2 – What is the proper construction of clause 13.1?

  1. [21]
    The purpose of construction of any legal instrument[16] is to ascertain the objective meaning of the text with reference to the context of the relevant clause or provision.  The context includes the document’s purpose and any statutory scheme against which it was enacted or agreed.[17]
  2. [22]
    Business contracts are made in the context of commercial dealings and will be interpreted in light of what a reasonable business person would have understood the terms to mean.  That consideration will include “that the parties … intended to produce a commercial result”.[18]  Here, the enterprise bargain is a contractual agreement entered into between an employer and employee representatives.  It must be construed in an industrial context.[19]
  3. [23]
    The enterprise agreement (a Commonwealth industrial instrument) was entered into[20] against the background of a legislative scheme which included Chapter 2 of the 1999 IR Act.  Chapter 2 was entitled “Pre-modernisation employment conditions”, reflective of the modernisation of awards process that occurred in the early part of the 21st century.[21]  Part 3 concerns long service leave and s 43 provided, relevantly here:

“43 Entitlement

  1. (1)
    This section applies to all employees, other than seasonal employees.
  1. (2)
    An employee is entitled to long service leave on full pay of—
  1. (a)
    for the first 10 years continuous service—8.6667 weeks; and
  1. (b)
    if the employee has completed at least a further 5 years continuous service—another period that bears to 8.6667 weeks the proportion that the employee’s further period of continuous service bears to 10 years.
  1. (3)
    An employee who has completed at least 7 years continuous service is entitled to a proportionate payment for long service leave on the termination of the employee’s service…”
  1. [24]
    When long service leave was first introduced, it was not available to part-time or casual employees.[22]  That changed.  Difficult issues arise with the notion of “continuous service” for casual employees as casual employment is generally constituted by a series of individual contracts of employment, the duration of each being the duration of each casual work period.[23]  These issues were addressed by s 47 of the 1999 IR Act with the calculation of entitlement to be performed under s 49 which provides:

“49 Payment for long service leave

  1. (1)
    This section applies if an employee who is entitled to long service leave was a casual employee or regular part-time employee at any time during the employee’s continuous service to which the long service leave relates.
  1. (2)
    The minimum amount payable to the employee for long service leave is worked out using the formula—

actual service x 8.6667 x hourly rate

52 10

Example—

An employee who worked 15600 ordinary working hours over a 10-year period and is being paid an hourly rate of $12 is entitled to be paid—

15600 x 8.6667 x $12 = $3120.01

52 10

  1. (7)
    In this section—

actual service means the total ordinary working hours actually worked by an employee during the employee’s period of continuous service.

casual employee means an employee mentioned in section 47(1).

hourly rate means the hourly rate for ordinary time payable to the employee—

  1. (a)
    if the employee takes the long service leave—on the day that the employee starts the leave; or
  1. (b)
    if the employee’s employment is terminated—on the date that the termination takes effect.”[24]
  1. [25]
    Section 43 embodies the concept of an “entitlement to” long service leave.  Clause 13.1 of the 2006 agreement seeks, by its express terms, to displace “any entitlement to … long service leave”.
  2. [26]
    In a carefully reasoned judgment, the Industrial Commissioner concluded that the “entitlement to long service leave” in clause 13.1.1 of the 2006 agreement was the same concept as “entitled to long service leave” in s 43 of the 1999 IR Act.  He regarded s 43 as context against which to construe clause 13.1.1.[25]
  3. [27]
    The Industrial Commissioner held that as “entitlement” under s 43 to long service leave arose on the tenth anniversary of the commencement of continuous service,[26] and as long service leave was not a continually accruing “entitlement”, clause 13.1.1 ought to be construed accordingly.  Therefore, the Industrial Commissioner reasoned, all that was being excluded by clause 13.1 was any “entitlement” to actually be paid long service leave which crystalised during the period of the 2006 agreement.[27]
  4. [28]
    The 2006 agreement does not define the term “entitlement” or specifically refer to s 43 or any other provision of the 1999 IR Act.  While s 43 is undeniably part of the context against which the enterprise agreement should be construed, it is not conclusive of the construction of clause 13.1.1.  Depending on context, “entitlement” to long service leave might mean an accrued and existing right to leave or payment in lieu, or may mean a right to long service leave under a statute or industrial instrument, whether or not the right has crystalised.[28]
  5. [29]
    Terms of employment are derived from various sources:  the contract of employment, any relevant awards, any enterprise agreements and any statutory provisions.[29]  Clause 3 of the 2006 agreement provides:

“3. NO EXTRA CLAIMS

This is a comprehensive Agreement in settlement of all of the Association’s Enterprise Bargaining claims. It replaces in its entirety the all other certified agreements[30], awards, orders of industrial commissions or industrial agreements that would otherwise apply to Flight Attendants. The parties agree that it is a term of this agreement not to pursue any extra claims except where provided for under this Agreement and/or except where consistent with the National Wage Case principles.”

  1. [30]
    The relevant awards and certified agreements[31] were not before the QIRC and were not before me.  The 2006 agreement assumes that there are obligations and rights consequent upon an employee’s employment as a casual flight attendant.  Various provisions of the 2006 agreement then seek to vary those terms and conditions.
  2. [31]
    Against that background, clause 13.1 imposes an obligation upon MAM to pay a “base hourly rate”.  The base hourly rate “includes” a number of items which may otherwise attract a separate payment.  These are broken into two categories:
  1. entitlements;[32] and
  2. expenses.[33]
  1. [32]
    The expenses are “miscellaneous expenses” and “grooming expenses”.  Grooming expenses are further dealt with in clause 17 of the 2006 agreement to which it is unnecessary to turn.
  2. [33]
    The list of “entitlements” in clause 13.1.1 is not exhaustive.  Other entitlements are provided by the 2006 agreement.[34]
  3. [34]
    Clause 13.1.1 refers to “any entitlement to be paid annual leave” and then other entitlements are listed.  Clearly, the word “entitlement” relates to each entitlement listed so that the clause means that the annual loading is paid “in lieu of”:
  1. any entitlement to paid annual leave;
  2. any entitlement to paid personal leave (including sick leave);
  3. any entitlement to long service leave;
  4. any entitlement to payments for notice of termination or redundancy.
  1. [35]
    In each case, the right to payment arises in futuro.  Paid annual leave accrues daily but is only payable when an employee elects to take leave.  Paid leave for sickness or personal reasons arises when the sickness is contracted or the personal reasons arise.  The “entitlement” to annual leave and leave for sickness and personal leave is the right to receive the benefit of leave with pay if the preconditions to those rights arise.
  2. [36]
    As the Industrial Commissioner held, on a particular day, long service leave crystallises as a right to take leave with pay.  It crystallises though because the employee has a right to have periods of service counted towards the ultimate entitlement to long service leave.  The entitlement to long service leave is a right to paid leave when a specified term of service has been achieved.
  3. [37]
    The casual loading is, in effect, a periodically paid sum which is designed to extinguish various “entitlements”.  It does that by compensating the employee with inflated pay rates to extinguish the benefit of the otherwise accruing “entitlements”.
  4. [38]
    Construed in that context, it is the service which is accruing and which ultimately crystallises into an entitlement to take paid long service leave.  On a proper construction of clause 13.1, “the entitlement” to long service leave is the right to count service under the 2006 agreement towards an ultimate long service leave entitlement.  I therefore respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the Industrial Commissioner and ground 2 of the appeal is made out.
  5. [39]
    Success on ground 2 does not determine the appeal in favour of MAM.

Ground 3 - Was Ms Sato entitled to long service leave?

  1. [40]
    Ms Sato submits that if clause 13.1 of the 2006 agreement operates so that her service under the agreement does not count in the calculation towards long service leave, that position was effectively reversed by s 113A of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). 
  2. [41]
    MAM submits that s 113A does not affect what it says is an accrued right not to pay long service leave where that right has been obtained in exchange for the obligation to pay the loading. 
  3. [42]
    As previously observed, s 43 of the 1999 IR Act provides for an entitlement to long service leave and s 49 concerns its calculation.  Therefore, by force of the 1999 IR Act, Ms Sato would become entitled to long service leave calculated in accordance with s 49 once she had completed “10 years continuous service” with MAM.  If she completed seven years continuous service, she would, upon termination, be entitled to a proportion of the sum calculated under s 49.  Commonwealth legislation has impacted upon the operation of the 1999 IR Act.
  4. [43]
    Before the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the Commonwealth industrial relations scheme was constituted under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth).  The Workplace Relations Act provided for awards and, by Part VIB, enterprise bargaining.  By s 170LT, the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission)[35] could certify an agreement which passed a “no disadvantage test”[36] and met other requirements.
  5. [44]
    Section 170LY of the Workplace Relations Act governed the relationship between a certified agreement, an award, an order of the Commission and other certified agreements.
  6. [45]
    Section 170LZ governed the relationship between a certified agreement and State and Commonwealth laws and State industrial instruments.  It provided:

“170LZ Effect of a certified agreement on Commonwealth laws or State laws, awards or agreements

  1. (1)
    Subject to this section, a certified agreement prevails over terms and conditions of employment specified in a State law, State award or State employment agreement, to the extent of any inconsistency.
  1. (2)
    Provisions in a certified agreement that deal with the following matters operate subject to the provisions of a State law that deals with the matter:
  1. (a)
    occupational health and safety;
  1. (b)
    workers’ compensation;
  1. (c)
    apprenticeship;
  1. (d)
    any other matter prescribed by the regulations.
  1. (3)
    If a State law provides protection for an employee against harsh, unjust or unreasonable termination of employment (however described in the law), subsection (1) is not intended to affect the provisions of that law that provide that protection, so far as those provisions are able to operate concurrently with the certified agreement.
  1. (4)
    To the extent of any inconsistency, a certified agreement displaces prescribed conditions of employment specified in a Commonwealth law that is prescribed by the regulations.
  1. (5)
    In this section:

Commonwealth law means an Act or any regulations or other instrument made under an Act.

prescribed conditions means conditions that are identified by the regulations.

State law means a law of a State or Territory (including any regulations or other instrument made under a law of a State or Territory), but does not include a State award or a State employment agreement.” (emphasis added)

  1. [46]
    It is not contentious that:
  1. the 2006 agreement is “a certified agreement” as that term is used in s 170LZ(1);
  2. the provisions of Part 3 of Chapter 2 of the 1999 IR Act provided “terms and conditions of employment” as that term was used in s 170LZ(1);
  3. the 1999 IR Act is a “State law” as that term is defined in s 170LZ(5) and used in s 170LZ(1);
  4. the provisions of Part 3 of Chapter 2 of the IR Act were not caught by the exceptions in s 170LZ(2).
  1. [47]
    Where a law of the Commonwealth is inconsistent with a law of a State, the law of the Commonwealth prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.[37]  The effect of s 170LZ(1)[38] is to ensure that a Commonwealth certified agreement has a status equivalent to a law of the Commonwealth.
  2. [48]
    Provisions in Commonwealth industrial legislation purporting to give primacy to Commonwealth industrial instruments over inconsistent State laws have been held to be effective.[39]
  3. [49]
    Therefore, by force of s 170LZ, to the extent that the 2006 agreement is inconsistent with Chapter 2 of the 1999 IR Act, the 2006 agreement prevails.  That means, given my construction of clause 13.1 of the 2006 agreement, s 170LZ operates so that Ms Sato’s service is not counted towards any entitlement to long service leave.
  4. [50]
    However, the Commonwealth Parliament passed the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 which commenced a reform of the Commonwealth industrial relations system.  Upon the commencement of the amendments, Schedule 7 of the Workplace Relations Act contained transitional provisions, including clause 2 relevantly in these terms:

“2 Continuing operation of pre-reform certified agreements—under old provisions

  1. (1)
    Subject to this Schedule, the following provisions of the pre-reform Act continue to apply in relation to a pre‑reform certified agreement, despite the repeals and amendments made by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005:
  1. (a)
    …
  1. (g)
    sections 170LY and 170LZ; …
  1. (r)
    any other provision relating to the operation of the provisions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. …”
  1. [51]
    It is not contentious that:
  1. the 2006 agreement is a “pre-reform certified agreement”;
  2. section 170LZ continues to apply to the 2006 agreement.
  1. [52]
    Therefore, s 170LZ of the Workplace Relations Act would continue to operate so as to give primacy to clause 13.1 of the 2006 agreement over the long service leave entitlements granted by the provisions of Part 3 of Chapter 2 of the 1999 IR Act.
  2. [53]
    In 2006, the Work Choices case[40] was decided which led to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).  The Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 provided:

“5A Transitional instruments continue to be subject to the same State and territory interaction rules

  1. (1)
    The same State and Territory interaction rules that applied in relation to WR Act instruments of a particular kind immediately before the WR Act repeal day continue to apply in relation to instruments of that kind that become transitional instruments.
  1. (2)
    State and Territory interaction rules are provisions of a law of the Commonwealth, as in force immediately before the WR Act repeal day, the effect of which is that:
  1. (a)
    an instrument prevails over, or excludes, a law of a State or Territory; or
  1. (b)
    an instrument has effect subject to a law of a State or Territory.

Note: Most of the state and Territory interaction rules were in the WR Act.”

And:

“7 No loss of accrued rights or liabilities when transitional instrument terminates or ceases to apply

  1. (1)
    If a transitional instrument terminates, or ceases to apply in relation to a person, that does not affect:
  1. (a)
    any right or liability that a person acquired, accrued or incurred before the transitional instrument terminated or ceased to apply; or
  1. (b)
    any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right or liability.
  1. (2)
    Any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the transitional instrument has not terminated or ceased to apply.
  1. (3)
    This item has effect subject to a contrary intention in this Act or in the FW Act.”
  1. [54]
    It is not contentious that:
  1. section 170LZ of the Workplace Relations Act is a “State and Territory interaction rule” for the purpose of s 5A, so s 170LZ continued to apply;
  2. the 2006 agreement is a “transitional instrument”.[41]
  1. [55]
    MAM relied on s 7(1)(a) for the proposition that the covenant in clause 13.1 of the 2006 agreement was an accrued right which survived the various legislative amendments and the termination of the 2006 agreement.
  2. [56]
    The Fair Work Act set up a different regime of interaction between State and Commonwealth laws.
  3. [57]
    Sections 26 and 27 of the Fair Work Act provide, relevantly here:

“26 Act excludes State or Territory industrial laws

  1. (1)
    This Act is intended to apply to the exclusion of all State or Territory industrial laws so far as they would otherwise apply in relation to a national system employee or a national system employer.
  1. (2)
    A State or Territory industrial law is:
  1. (a)
    a general State industrial law; or
  1. (b)
    an Act of a State or Territory that applies to employment generally and has one or more of the following as its main purpose or one or more of its main purposes:
  1. (i)
    regulating workplace relations (including industrial matters, industrial activity, collective bargaining, industrial disputes and industrial action) …
  1. (3)
    Each of the following is a general State industrial law:
  1. (a)
    the Industrial Relations Act 1996 of New South Wales;
  1. (b)
    the Industrial Relations Act 1999 of Queensland;
  1. (c)
    the Industrial Relations Act 1979 of Western Australia;
  1. (d)
    the Fair Work Act 1994 of South Australia;
  1. (e)
    the Industrial Relations Act 1984 of Tasmania…

27 State and Territory laws that are not excluded by section 26

(1A) Section 26 does not apply to any of the following laws:

  1. (a)
    the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 of New South Wales;
  1. (b)
    the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 of Victoria;
  1. (c)
    the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 of Queensland;
  1. (d)
    the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 of Western Australia;
  1. (e)
    the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 of South Australia;
  1. (f)
    the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 of Tasmania;
  1. (g)
    the Discrimination Act 1991 of the Australian Capital Territory;
  1. (h)
    the Anti-Discrimination Act of the Northern Territory.
  1. (1)
    Section 26 does not apply to a law of a State or Territory so far as:
  1. (b)
    the law is prescribed by the regulations as a law to which section 26 does not apply; or
  1. (c)
    the law deals with any non-excluded matters; or
  1. (d)
    the law deals with rights or remedies incidental to:
  1. (i)
    any law referred to in subsection (1A); or
  1. (ii)
    any matter dealt with by a law to which paragraph (b) applies; or
  1. (iii)
    any non-excluded matters.

Note: Examples of incidental matters covered by paragraph (d) are entry to premises for a purpose connected with workers compensation, occupational health and safety or outworkers.

  1. (2)
    The non-excluded matters are as follows:
  1. (a)
    superannuation;
  1. (b)
    workers compensation;
  1. (c)
    occupational health and safety;
  1. (d)
    matters relating to outworkers (within the ordinary meaning of the term);
  1. (e)
    child labour;
  1. (f)
    training arrangements, except in relation to terms and conditions of employment to the extent that those terms and conditions are provided for by the National Employment Standards or may be included in a modern award;
  1. (g)
    long service leave, except in relation to an employee who is entitled under Division 9 of Part 2-2 to long service leave…” (emphasis added)
  1. [58]
    Section 26 excludes the operation of State laws, specifically here, the 1999 IR Act.[42]  It then exempts certain State laws from the general exclusion.  Those laws are defined by s 27 as “non-excluded matters”.
  2. [59]
    By s 27(2)(g), a non-excluded matter is “long service leave, except in relation to an employee who is entitled under Division 9 of Part 2-2 to long service leave”.  Division 9 contains s 113A to which I will later return.
  3. [60]
    The effect of s 27(2)(g) is that to determine an entitlement to long service leave, one refers to State laws on that topic, relevantly here, the 1999 IR Act and then to Division 9 of Part 2-2 of the Fair Work Act.
  4. [61]
    Section 29 of the Fair Work Act concerns the interaction between modern awards and enterprise agreements with State and Territory laws.  It provides, relevantly, as follows:

“29 Interaction of modern awards and enterprise agreements with State and Territory laws

  1. (1)
    A modern award or enterprise agreement prevails over a law of a State or Territory, to the extent of any inconsistency.
  1. (2)
    Despite subsection (1), a term of a modern award or enterprise agreement applies subject to the following:
  1. (a)
    any law covered by subsection 27(1A);
  1. (b)
    any law of a State or Territory so far as it is covered by paragraph 27(1)(b), (c) or (d)…” (emphasis added)
  1. [62]
    An enterprise agreement prevails over State or Territory laws except in relation to “non-excluded matters” which includes long service leave.[43]
  2. [63]
    Section 29(1) is of similar structure to s 170LZ of the Workplace Relations Act.  Section 29(2) of the Fair Work Act, like s 170LZ(2) and (3), makes exceptions to the general interaction rules.  Section 29(2) excludes from the primacy of Commonwealth enterprise agreements over State laws “any law of a State … so far as … the law deals with long service leave”.[44]  Relevantly, that State law is Part 3 of Chapter 2 of the 1999 IR Act.
  3. [64]
    Section 27(2)(g) defines long service leave as not to include employees’ entitlements under Division 9 of Part 2-2.  Division 9 contains two sections, s 113 and s 113A.  They provide:

“113 Entitlement to long service leave

Entitlement in accordance with applicable award-derived long service leave terms

  1. (1)
    If there are applicable award-derived long service leave terms (see subsection (3)) in relation to an employee, the employee is entitled to long service leave in accordance with those terms.

Note: This Act does not exclude State and Territory laws that deal with long service leave, except in relation to employees who are entitled to long service leave under this Division (see paragraph 27(2)(g)), and except as provided in subsection 113A(3).

  1. (2)
    However, subsection (1) does not apply if:
  1. (a)
    a workplace agreement, or an AWA, that came into operation before the commencement of this Part applies to the employee; or
  1. (b)
    one of the following kinds of instrument that came into operation before the commencement of this Part applies to the employee and expressly deals with long service leave:
  1. (i)
    an enterprise agreement…
  1. (3)
    Applicable award-derived long service leave terms, in relation to an employee, are:
  1. (a)
    terms of an award, or a State reference transitional award, that (disregarding the effect of any instrument of a kind referred to in subsection (2)):
  1. (i)
    would have applied to the employee at the test time (see subsection (3A)) if the employee had, at that time, been in his or her current circumstances of employment; and
  1. (ii)
    would have entitled the employee to long service leave; and
  1. (b)
    any terms of the award, or the State reference transitional award, that are ancillary or incidental to the terms referred to in paragraph (a)…

Entitlement in accordance with applicable agreement-derived long service leave terms

  1. (4)
    If there are applicable agreement-derived long service leave terms (see subsection (5)) in relation to an employee, the employee is entitled to long service leave in accordance with those terms.
  1. (5)
    There are applicable agreement-derived long service leave terms, in relation to an employee if:
  1. (a)
    an order under subsection (6) is in operation in relation to terms of an instrument; and
  1. (b)
    those terms of the instrument would have applied to the employee immediately before the commencement of this Part if the employee had, at that time, been in his or her current circumstances of employment; and
  1. (c)
    there are no applicable award-derived long service leave terms in relation to the employee.
  1. (6)
    If the FWC is satisfied that:
  1. (a)
    any of the following instruments that was in operation immediately before the commencement of this Part contained terms entitling employees to long service leave:
  1. (i)
    an enterprise agreement;
  1. (ii)
    a collective agreement;
  1. (iii)
    a pre-reform certified agreement;
  1. (iv)
    an old IR agreement; and
  1. (b)
    those terms constituted a long service leave scheme that was applying in more than one State or Territory; and
  1. (c)
    the scheme, considered on an overall basis, is no less beneficial to the employees than the long service leave entitlements that would otherwise apply in relation to the employees under State and Territory laws;

the FWC may, on application by, or on behalf of, a person to whom the instrument applies, make an order that those terms of the instrument (and any terms that are ancillary or incidental to those terms) are applicable agreement-derived long service leave terms.

References to instruments

  1. (7)
    References in this section to a kind of instrument (other than an enterprise agreement) are references to a transitional instrument of that kind, as continued in existence by Schedule 3 to the Transitional Act.

113A Enterprise agreements may contain terms discounting service under prior agreements etc. in certain circumstances

  1. (1)
    This section applies if:
  1. (a)
    an instrument (the first instrument) of one of the following kinds that came into operation before the commencement of this Part applies to an employee on or after the commencement of this Part:
  1. (i)
    an enterprise agreement…
  1. (vi)
    a pre-reform certified agreement…
  1. (b)
    the instrument states that the employee is not entitled to long service leave; and
  1. (c)
    the instrument ceases, for whatever reason, to apply to the employee; and
  1. (d)
    immediately after the first instrument ceases to apply, an enterprise agreement (the replacement agreement) starts to apply to the employee.
  1. (2)
    The replacement agreement may include terms to the effect that an employee’s service with the employer during a specified period (the excluded period) (being some or all of the period when the first instrument applied to the employee) does not count as service for the purpose of determining whether the employee is qualified for long service leave, or the amount of long service leave to which the employee is entitled, under this Division or under a law of a State or Territory.
  1. (3)
    If the replacement agreement includes terms as permitted by subsection (2), the excluded period does not count, and never again counts, as service for the purpose of determining whether the employee is qualified for long service leave, or the amount of long service leave to which the employee is entitled, under this Division or under a law of a State or Territory, unless a later agreement provides otherwise. This subsection has effect despite sections 27 and 29.
  1. (4)
    References in this section to a kind of instrument (other than an enterprise agreement) are references to a transitional instrument of that kind, as continued in existence by Schedule 3 to the Transitional Act.” (emphasis added)
  1. [65]
    Section 113 can be ignored.  There is an enterprise agreement which expressly deals with long service leave:  the 2006 agreement, clause 13.1.  Therefore, subject to s 113A, the 1999 IR Act gives a right to Ms Sato to long service leave.  That entitlement arises when there has been 10 years continuous service, which she has achieved.
  2. [66]
    Subsections 113(4)-(7) deal with enterprise agreements that are on foot which include long service leave provisions.  Provided the terms pass a no disadvantage test in comparison to the relevant State or Territory provisions for long service leave, the Fair Work Commission may order that the agreement prevails.[45]
  3. [67]
    Mr Murdoch KC, counsel for MAM made two significant submissions about s 113A.  Firstly, he submitted that s 113A does not apply here because clause 13.1 of the 2006 agreement does not “state that the employee is not entitled to long service leave”.[46]  He submits that the 2006 agreement recognises a potential claim for long service leave and deals with it other than by denying the entitlement.
  4. [68]
    Ms Murdoch’s second submission is that s 113A is permissory.  He points to s 113A(2) and the words “the replacement agreement may include terms to the effect that an employee’s service … does not count as service for the purpose of determining … long service leave”.[47]  He submits that the use of the term “may” suggests that s 113A provides one avenue, but not the only avenue, through which an employer can preserve any provision in an earlier enterprise agreement compromising an employee’s entitlement to long service leave.  He submits that pursuant to the 2006 agreement, MAM have paid the loading and therefore satisfied the claim for long service leave.
  5. [69]
    Relevantly to Mr Murdoch’s submissions, the position can, for the reasons explained, be summarised as follows:
  1. When the 2006 agreement was certified, it operated by force of the Workplace Relations Act to exclude any State law inconsistent with its terms.
  2. The 2006 agreement was inconsistent with the 1999 IR Act in that it excluded Ms Sato’s right to long service leave.
  3. The Fair Work Act also provided that Commonwealth enterprise agreements prevailed over State laws, which would include those in the 1999 IR Act which gave long service leave.
  4. However, the Fair Work Act excepted State long service leave laws so that employees like Ms Sato were not excluded from long service leave by Commonwealth enterprise agreements.
  5. If there was an enterprise agreement in force, then s 113 applied and the long service leave provisions in the agreement could be preserved by order of the Commission.
  6. If, as here the enterprise agreement had expired,[48] the entitlement to long service leave could be avoided by an employer by the mechanism in s 113A, that is, by preserving the exclusion of a long service leave entitlement in a subsequent agreement.
  1. [70]
    That construction is consistent with the supplementary explanatory memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008 which is terms:

“Item 7 - New clause 113A

  1. Item 7 also inserts a new clause 113A. Clause 113A provides for the situation where an employee is covered by a collective or individual agreement, or other specified instrument (such as a workplace determination), on commencement of the NES that expressly excludes the employee’s long service leave entitlements.
  1. Long service leave entitlements are based on an employee’s length of service - they do not allow for ‘discounting’ of any periods during which an agreement or other instrument excludes the entitlement. In effect, this means that where an agreement or other specified instrument that excluded long service leave ceases to operate, the terms of the scheme then begin to apply (e.g., under State or Territory legislation) and operate to provide a full entitlement to the employee, despite the purported period of exclusion.
  1. Clause 113A provides a one-off opportunity for an enterprise agreement made after commencement of the NES (referred to in clause 113A as the ‘replacement agreement’) to recognise in an ongoing way the effect of the exclusion of long service leave in an agreement, or other specified instrument, that applied on commencement (referred to as the ‘first instrument’).

It does this by allowing a replacement agreement to provide that some or all of the period of service during which the first agreement applied does not count as service for the purposes of determining long service leave entitlements.

  1. In relation to this provision:

— the ability for a replacement agreement to discount periods of service does not apply where long service leave entitlements may have been excluded by implication - the exclusion must be in express terms;

— the period of service that may be discounted in an enterprise agreement may not exceed the period during which the first instrument applied (i.e., the effect of previous agreements cannot be included);

— the replacement agreement must commence immediately after the first instrument for the exclusion to have effect.

  1. Where an enterprise agreement includes such a provision, the period of service is taken not to count, and never to count, for the purpose of determining long service leave entitlements under either the NES or under State or Territory law, despite clauses 27 and 29 (which provide for the continued effect of State and Territory long service leave legislation). However, a period of service that is taken never to count for calculation of long service leave entitlements can be reinstated by subsequent agreement. This agreement need not be by way of an enterprise agreement but could occur, for example, through a contract of employment.”[49] (emphasis added)
  1. [71]
    Mr Murdoch’s first submission is therefore contrary to MAM’s interests.  In order to avail s 113A, which is the only way of preserving any right it has under clause 13.1 of the 2006 agreement, the exclusion must be one caught by s 113A.  The explanatory memorandum suggests that it must be in express terms, but it is unnecessary to decide the issue.
  2. [72]
    Mr Murdoch’s second submission should be accepted to the extent that s 113A is permissory.  The employer “may” enter into a subsequent agreement which accords with the terms of s 113A, and is not obliged to do so, but if it does not, then the State long service leave provisions will apply and time served under the 2006 agreement will count towards long service leave.
  3. [73]
    Here, there is no provision in the 2010 agreement which seeks to preserve the long service leave provisions in the 2006 agreement.  Ground 3 has no substance.

Ground 4 - Should there be a set-off?

  1. [74]
    The case was put before the Industrial Commissioner on the basis of a set-off.  A set‑off may arise where a payment is made for one purpose and is sought to be attributed to another.[50] 
  2. [75]
    That is not the case here.  MAM agreed to pay a loading in satisfaction of a number of entitlements which includes long service leave.  They are:
  1. long service leave;
  2. paid annual leave;
  3. paid personal leave (including sick leave);
  4. termination or redundancy payments;
  5. shift penalties;
  6. grooming allowances;
  7. miscellaneous expenses.
  1. [76]
    Long service leave is expressly one of the entitlements sought to be extinguished by the payment of loading.
  2. [77]
    The 2006 agreement could not have been certified unless it passed the no disadvantage test.[51]  The no disadvantage test is applied to the agreement as a whole so it cannot be concluded merely from the 2006 agreement passing the test that the loading mathematically satisfies all the entitlements which may otherwise arise under some other industrial instrument.
  3. [78]
    As explained, the long service leave entitlement is a statutory one which has primacy over the 2006 agreement.  The question then is whether it has been proved that the long service leave entitlement which has been quantified at $8,253.55 has been paid.
  4. [79]
    Neither before the QIRC nor this Court was there evidence quantifying the value of the loading over the term of Ms Sato’s employment, nor quantifying the value of the various entitlements (including long service leave) over the period of the 2006 agreement.
  5. [80]
    The Industrial Commissioner was correct to find that the long service leave had not been proved to have been satisfied.

Ground 5 - Should the remedy be denied to Ms Sato on discretionary grounds?

  1. [81]
    The Industrial Commissioner accepted that upon an application for the recovery of unpaid long service leave entitlements he had a discretion to refuse to make an order in favour of Ms Sato even if he found that she was legally entitled to the payment.[52]  There may be doubt as to whether such a discretion exists.[53]  However, it is not necessary to decide that issue.  The sole reason for the exercise of discretion in favour of MAM has been put on appeal as:

“…Ms Sato has been paid a casual loading in lieu of her entitlements such that she would unfairly obtain a windfall were long service leave to be paid. Accordingly, the Commission erred in making an order for MAM to pay an amount of long service leave to Ms Sato.”[54]

  1. [82]
    As I have already found, there is no basis upon which it could be concluded that the casual loading in fact satisfied the long service leave entitlements.
  2. [83]
    Ms Sato has established her legal entitlement to payment and there is, in my view, no logical reason why her remedy ought to be denied as a matter of discretion.

Conclusions and orders

  1. [84]
    All grounds of appeal have failed so the appeal should be dismissed.
  2. [85]
    No party sought costs of the appeal.
  3. [86]
    Therefore, the only order is:

Appeal dismissed.

Footnotes

[1]  The Flight Attendants’ Association of Australia Domestic/Regional Division Casual Flight Attendants Enterprise Agreement 2006

[2]  The Flight Attendants’ Association of Australia Domestic/Regional Division Casual Flight Attendants Enterprise Agreement 2010 and the Flight Attendants’ Association of Australia Domestic/Regional Division Casual Flight Attendants Enterprise Agreement 2015.

[3]  Chapter 2, Part 3.

[4] Sato v Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd [2020] QIRC 213.

[5]  Less taxation.

[6] Industrial Relations Act 1999, s 43.

[7] Industrial Relations Act 2016, Chapter 2, Part 3, Division 9.

[8] Sato v Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd [2020] QIRC 213 at [33]-[35].

[9]  At [33].

[10]  At [36] and [45].

[11]  At [46].

[12]  At [64]-[77].

[13]  At [90]-[92].

[14] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 557(1).

[15]  See generally Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 at 145.

[16]  In Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253, Crennan and Heydon JJ did not distinguish, in approach to construction, between statutes, contracts and testamentary instruments.

[17] R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507 at [32] – [44] and [162] – [163].

[18] Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640 at [53], followed in Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104.

[19]  See generally Mondelez Australia Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (2020) 271 CLR 495 at [3].

[20]  Under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth).

[21]  For a history of modernisation of awards in Queensland, see Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2022] ICQ 23 at [63]-[84].

[22] Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd v Bartram (2007) 161 IR 307 at [19].

[23]  See, for example, Programmed Integrated Workforce Pty Ltd v Fox [2022] ICQ 32 at [36]-[42], [53]-[77] and as to the concept of casual employment generally, see WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato (2021) 271 CLR 456.

[24]  As to “continuous service” for a casual employee, see s 47.

[25] Sato v Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd [2020] QIRC 213 at [38]-[43].

[26] Queensland Independent Education Union of Employees v Beerwah and District Kindergarten Association Inc (2008) 188 QGIG 169.

[27] Sato v Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd [2020] QIRC 213 at [45].

[28]  See, for example, Maughan Thiem Auto Sales Pty Ltd v Cooper (2014) 222 FCR 1 at [42]-[43].

[29] Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472 at 479 and Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 419-421.

[30]  Probably this is a typographical error and the clause should read ‘It replaces in its entirety all the other certified agreements…’

[31]  Other than the 2006 agreement, and the later 2010 agreement and the later still 2015 agreement which were attached to the statement of agreed facts.

[32]  Clause 13.1.1.

[33]  Clause 13.1.2.

[34]  See clauses 15, 16, 18 and 19, being overtime, meal break penalty payments, accommodation away from home and parental leave, are all examples.

[35]  Constituted under the Workplace Relations Act 1996, s 61 and see s 62, and earlier equivalent provisions.

[36] Workplace Relations Act 1996, Part 8, Division 5A, and earlier equivalent provisions.

[37]  Constitution of Australia 2009.

[38] Jemena Asset Management (3) Pty Ltd v Coinvest Ltd (2011) 224 CLR 508 at [11].

[39]  See generally Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd v Bartram (2007) 161 IR 307.

[40] New South Wales v Commonwealth of Australia (2006) 229 CLR 1.

[41] Fair Work (Traditional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009, s 2(3)(a).

[42]  Section 26(3)(b).

[43]  The combined effect of s 29(2)(b) read with s 27(1)(d)(iii) (excluded matters) and s 27(2)(g) (long service leave).

[44]  Section 29(2)(b) read with s 27(1)(c) and s 27(2)(g).

[45]  Section 113(6).

[46]  Section 113A(1)(b).

[47]  Emphasis added.

[48]  “cease[d] … to apply to the employee”; Fair Work Act 2009, s 113A(1)(c).

[49]  And also consistent with dicta in Conroy’s Smallgoods v Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union [2023] FCAFC 59 at [275] and [276], a case which turned on the contraction of s 113.

[50] WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato (2020) 278 FCR 179, reversed on other grounds in WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato (2021) 271 CLR 456.

[51] Workplace Relations Act 1996, s 346D.

[52] Sato v Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd [2020] QIRC 213 at [91].

[53] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 477(1)(a).

[54]  Appellant’s written submissions, paragraph [52].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd v Sato

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd v Sato

  • MNC:

    [2023] ICQ 14

  • Court:

    ICQ

  • Judge(s):

    Davis J, President

  • Date:

    21 Jun 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1995) 185 CLR 410
Cite 2 - (1995) 185 CLR 410
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd [1995] HCA 24
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1995] HCA 24
Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] HCA 26
Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2011) 243 CLR 253
Cite 2 - (2011) 243 CLR 253
Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd v Bartram (2007) 161 IR 307
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2007) 161 IR 307
Cite 2 - (2007) 161 IR 307
Cite 3 - (2007) 161 IR 307
Conroy's Smallgoods v Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union [2023] FCAFC 59
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] FCAFC 59
Cite 2 - [2023] FCAFC 59
Electricity Generation Corporation (t/as Verve Energy) v Woodside Energy Ltd and Ors [2014] HCA 7
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] HCA 7
Electricity Generation Corporation (t/as Verve Energy) v Woodside Energy Ltd and Ors (2014) 251 CLR 640
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2014) 251 CLR 640
Cite 2 - (2014) 251 CLR 640
Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1930) 43 CLR 472
Cite 2 - (1930) 43 CLR 472
Ex parte McLean [1930] HCA 12
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1930] HCA 12
Jemena Asset Management (3) Pty Ltd v Coinvest Ltd [2011] HCA 33
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] HCA 33
Jemena Asset Management (3) Pty Ltd v Coinvest Ltd (2011) 224 CLR 508
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2011) 224 CLR 508
Cite 2 - (2011) 224 CLR 508
Jobs and Industrial Relations v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union [2020] HCA 29
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] HCA 29
Maughan Thiem Auto Sales Pty Ltd v Cooper (2014) 222 FCR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2014) 222 FCR 1
Cite 2 - (2014) 222 FCR 1
Maughan Thiem Auto Sales Pty Ltd v Cooper [2014] FCAFC 94
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] FCAFC 94
Mondelez Australia Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (2020) 271 CLR 495
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2020) 271 CLR 495
Cite 2 - (2020) 271 CLR 495
Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 37
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] HCA 37
Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2015) 256 CLR 104
Cite 2 - (2015) 256 CLR 104
New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2006) 229 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (2006) 229 CLR 1
New South Wales v Commonwealth of Australia (2006) HCA 52
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2006) HCA 52
Programmed Integrated Workforce Pty Ltd v Fox [2022] ICQ 32
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] ICQ 32
Cite 2 - [2022] ICQ 32
Queensland Independent Education Union of Employees v Beerwah & District Kindergarten Association Inc. [2008] ICQ 18
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] ICQ 18
Queensland Independent Education Union of Employees v Beerwah and District Kindergarten Association Inc (2008) 188 QGIG 169
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2008) 188 QGIG 169
Cite 2 - (2008) 188 QGIG 169
Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2022] ICQ 23
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] ICQ 23
Cite 2 - [2022] ICQ 23
R v A2 [2019] HCA 35
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] HCA 35
R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
Cite 2 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
Sato v Maurice Alexander Management Pty Ltd [2020] QIRC 213
6 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 213
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 213
Cite 3 - [2020] QIRC 213
Cite 4 - [2020] QIRC 213
Cite 5 - [2020] QIRC 213
Cite 6 - [2020] QIRC 213
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) 161 CLR 141
Cite 2 - (1986) 161 CLR 141
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) HCA 54
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) HCA 54
WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato [2021] HCA 23
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] HCA 23
WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato (2020) 278 FCR 179
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2020) 278 FCR 179
Cite 2 - (2020) 278 FCR 179
Workpac v Rossato [2020] FCAFC 84
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] FCAFC 84
Workpac v Rossato (2021) 271 CLR 456
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2021) 271 CLR 456
Cite 2 - (2021) 271 CLR 456
Cite 3 - (2021) 271 CLR 456

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Council of the City of Gold Coast (No 2) [2025] QIRC 1722 citations
1

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