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  4. Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 2) - [2023] ICQ 3

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Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 2)[2023] ICQ 3

Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 2)[2023] ICQ 3

INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2023] ICQ 003

PARTIES:

SIMON NICHOLSON (WORK HEALTH AND SAFETY PROSECUTOR)

(applicant)

v

CARBOROUGH DOWNS COAL MANAGEMENT PTY LTD

(first respondent)

ACTING MAGISTRATE ATHOL KENNEDY

(second respondent)

SIMON NICHOLSON (WORK HEALTH AND SAFETY PROSECUTOR)

(applicant)

v

RUSSELL CLIVE UHR

(first respondent)

ACTING MAGISTRATE ATHOL KENNEDY

(second respondent)

SIMON NICHOLSON (WORK HEALTH AND SAFETY PROSECUTOR)

(applicant)

v

JEREMY DAVID FUTERAN

(first respondent)

ACTING MAGISTRATE ATHOL KENNEDY

(second respondent)

FILE NO:

C/2022/19

PROCEEDING:

Application

DELIVERED ON:

21 March 2023

HEARING DATE:

Orders made on consideration of written submissions with no oral hearing

MEMBER:

Davis J, President

ORDER:

In application C/2022/19:

The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application for an extension of time on the indemnity basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – GENERAL RULE: COSTS FOLLOW EVENT – INDEMNITY COSTS – PARTICULAR CASES – HOPELESS CASES – UNREASONABLE CONDUCT OR DELINQUINCY RELATING TO PROCEEDINGS – where the first respondent in C/2022/19 was the respondent to a complaint alleging an offence against the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 –  where the Industrial Magistrates Court had jurisdiction to hear the complaint –  where the summons erroneously compelled the first respondent to appear in the Magistrates Court, not the Industrial Magistrates Court – where the magistrate struck out the complaint – where the applicant appealed to the District Court –  where the applicant also appealed to the Industrial Court of Queensland – where the applicant also applied for prerogative relief –  where the application for prerogative relief was made out of time – where the application for extension of time was dismissed – were the first respondent sought costs on the indemnity basis – where many of the particulars alleged on the complaint clearly could not be proved against the first respondent – where the case against the first respondent was otherwise unclear from the particulars of the complaint – where a party is only liable to costs if the proceedings are brought “vexatiously or without reasonable cause” or it should have been apparent that the proceedings had “no reasonable prospect of success” – where there was no suggestion of the application being brought vexatiously – whether the application was brought without reasonable cause or if was reasonably apparent that the application had no reasonable prospect of success – whether costs should be awarded against the applicant – whether costs ought to be awarded on the indemnity basis

Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, Part 3, s 42, s 255

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 505, s 545

Justices Act 1886, s 42, s 51

CASES:

Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam Law 93, cited

Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225, cited

Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International

Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397, cited

Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors [2021] ICQ 11, followed

Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 3) [2022] ICQ 021, followed

Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd & Ors [2022] ICQ 34, related

Rosniak v Government Insurance Office (1997) 41 NSWLR 608, followed

COUNSEL:

B J Power KC and B Dighton made written submissions on behalf of the applicant

P J Roney KC made written submissions for the first respondent in application C/2022/19

SOLICITORS:

Office of the Work Health and Safety Prosecutor for the applicant

Australian Business Lawyers & Advisors for the first respondent in application C/2022/19

  1. [1]
    This is an application for costs by Jeremy David Futeran, who is the first respondent in the proceedings which are C/2022/19.
  2. [2]
    Mr Futeran successfully resisted an application by the Work Health and Safety Prosecutor (The Prosecutor).  The application sought an extension of time to bring an application for prerogative relief seeking to challenge a decision of a magistrate (the second respondent) to dismiss criminal proceedings brought against Mr Futeran.  That application failed with judgment being published as Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd & Ors[1] (the principal judgment). 
  3. [3]
    Mr Futeran was the Site Senior Executive of the Carborough Downs Coal Mine (the mine) between 12 August 2019 and 24 September 2019.
  4. [4]
    On 25 November 2019, an accident occurred at the mine and a mine electrician, Bradley James Duxbury, was killed.
  5. [5]
    Mr Aaron Guilfoyle, who held the position of The Prosecutor, swore complaints against Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd (Carborough) who operated the mine, Mr Futeran who had previously been the Site Senior Executive, and Russell Clive Uhr who was Mr Futeran’s successor as Site Senior Executive. 
  6. [6]
    The complaints all alleged offences against the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (CMSH Act).  The CMSH Act casts safety obligations upon various persons who hold various positions within a coal mine.[2]  The position of Site Senior Executive attracts safety obligations.[3]
  7. [7]
    Part of the process of bringing proceedings pursuant to the Justices Act 1886 is for the complainant to draw and swear the complaint[4] and also to draw the draft summons for a justice of the peace to sign.  The justice of the peace will sign the summons once satisfied that an offence is shown by the complaint.[5]  The summons compels a defendant’s attendance at the court specified in the summons.
  8. [8]
    It is the Industrial Magistrates Court not the Magistrates Court which has jurisdiction to hear the complaint against Mr Futeran.[6] 
  9. [9]
    An error was made in the preparation of the summons; it nominated the Magistrates Court not the Industrial Magistrates Court as the court before whom Mr Futeran should appear.
  10. [10]
    Mr Futeran applied to the second respondent (a magistrate) to dismiss the complaint as the Magistrates Court had no jurisdiction.  That application was successful. 
  11. [11]
    The Prosecutor then appealed that decision to this Court and also appealed to the District Court. 
  12. [12]
    It was then thought by The Prosecutor that the better course of action was to seek prerogative relief against the second respondent. That application was brought in proceedings C/2022/19.[7]  Mr Futeran obviously is an interested party to that application. The case now being mounted is that the complaint was valid and the magistrate[8] (who is also an industrial magistrate)[9] ought not to have denied jurisdiction by striking out the complaint but ought to have sat as the Industrial Magistrates Court and exercised the jurisdiction of that court.  The magistrate could have amended the summons so as to require Mr Futeran’s appearance at the Industrial Magistrates Court. It could then have been served again upon Mr Futeran if that was necessary.
  13. [13]
    An application for prerogative relief was filed on 8 November 2022.  By then, there were three separate proceedings on foot all with a view to attempting to regularise the summary proceedings; an appeal to the District Court, an appeal to this Court and the application for prerogative relief.  The appeals were later abandoned.
  14. [14]
    By the time the application for prerogative relief was filed, the time for filing such an application had passed, and The Prosecutor sought an extension of time to bring applications against each of Carborough, Mr Uhr and Mr Futeran. 
  15. [15]
    An extension of time was granted to bring prerogative proceedings against Carborough and Mr Uhr, but the application was dismissed against Mr Futeran.[10] 
  16. [16]
    When dismissing the application, I made orders for the exchange of written submissions on costs and directed the parties to file an application for leave to make oral submissions on costs if they wished to advance oral submissions.  No party filed or served such an application, but written submissions were received.  I have decided the costs issue on the written submissions.
  17. [17]
    Mr Futeran seeks costs on the indemnity basis.  The Prosecutor submits that no order as to costs should be made but if, contrary to that submission, costs are awarded in favour of Mr Futeran, the costs should be calculated on the standard basis not the indemnity basis.

Statutory provisions

  1. [18]
    The Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act) alters the usual position that costs follow the event.  Section 545 relevantly provides:
  1. “545
    General power to award costs
  1. (1)
    A person must bear the person’s own costs in relation to a proceeding before the court or commission.
  1. (2)
    However, the court or commission may, on application by a party to the proceeding, order—
  1. (a)
    a party to the proceeding to pay costs incurred by another party if the court or commission is satisfied—
  1. (i)
    the party made the application or responded to the application vexatiously or without reasonable cause; or
  1. (ii)
    it would have been reasonably apparent to the party that the application or response to the application had no reasonable prospect of success; or …”
  1. [19]
    In Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 3),[11] I observed:
  1. “[26]
    Section 545 of the IR Act displaces what might be described as the ‘usual rule’ that costs follow the event.[12] As I observed in Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors:[13]
  1. [25]
    Section 545 and provisions like it have been the subject of analysis in various decisions. The following principles can be identified:
  1. (a)
    The starting point is that each party bears their own costs.[14]
  1. (b)
    A discretion to depart from that point only arises, relevantly here, if one of the jurisdictional facts identified in s 545(2)(a)(i) or s 545(2)(a)(ii) are established.[15]
  1. (c)
    The assessment of ‘reasonable cause’ in s 545(2)(a)(i) is:
  1. (i)
    an objective assessment;[16] and
  1. (ii)
    made considering the facts existing as at the time of the institution of the proceedings, here the appeal.[17]
  1. (d)
    Section 545(2)(a)(ii) prescribes a separate and distinct jurisdictional fact giving rise to a discretion to award costs. In consideration of whether s 545(2)(a)(ii) is engaged, facts which arise after the commencement of the proceedings may be relevant.”[18]

The reasons for dismissing the application for an extension of time

  1. [20]
    There were two principal reasons why the application for an extension of time failed against Mr Futeran but succeeded against Carborough and Mr Uhr.  The first was that Mr Futeran could point to special prejudice caused by the delays in the prosecution of him.  Secondly, the case against Mr Futeran as particularised in the complaint seemed misconceived and would have to be recast, at least.
  2. [21]
    The complaint and accompanying particulars sworn against Mr Futeran include allegations that:
  1. Mr Futeran was the Site Senior Executive at the mine from 12 August 2019 to 24 September 2019;
  2. underground longwall mining techniques were utilised;
  3. a longwall known as LW9C was commissioned on 13 August 2019;
  4. there was a risk of spall;[19]
  5. a safety and health management system (SHMS) was deployed in relation to LW9C which provided for flippers to control the risk of spall;
  6. flippers were not operative;
  7. coal fell and killed Mr Duxbury.
  1. [22]
    The breaches of duty alleged against Mr Futeran were:
  1. “25.
    The defendant failed to ensure the risk to persons, namely workers, from coal mining operations at the mine was at an acceptable level, in that he:
  1. a.
    Failed to ensure that all roof shield flippers at LW9C were capable of effective deployment prior to commissioning and the commencement of operations in LW9C; and/or
  1. b.
    Failed to ensure adequate maintainenance [sic] and/or repair of flippers throughout the operation of LW9C to ensure flippers were capable of effective deployment; and/or
  1. c.
    Failed to ensure the prescribed response under the TARP which was in force, when flippers were defective to the extent that they met the trigger for Level 3 Response (Red) under the TARP; and/or
  1. d.
    Failed to ensure workers complied with the SHMS, in that he:
  1. i.
    Failed to ensure workers did not enter a Restricted Access Zone and/or a No Access Zone when flippers were defective and/or not effectively deployed; and/or
  1. ii.
    Failed to ensure workers completed a Take 5 prior to entering a Restricted Access Zone and/or a No Access Zone.
  1. e.
    Failed to implement a SHMS which:
  1. i.
    Detected and ensured reporting by shift supervisors of the quantity and frequency of defects to flippers; and/or
  1. ii.
    Required repairs to flippers as soon as reasonably practicable; and/or
  1. iii.
    Required that operations in LW9C cease where repairs to flippers could not be completed as soon as reasonably practicable; and/or
  1. iv.
    Required that operations in LW9C cease until repairs to flippers were completed such as to reduce the TARP level below Level 3 Response (Red). …”
  1. [23]
    Paragraphs 25b, c and d are all ongoing matters and could not be the responsibility of a Site Senior Executive who had left the mine like Mr Futeran.
  2. [24]
    The only allegations which could possibly apply to Mr Futeran are those made in paragraphs 25a and 25e.  Those allegations may relate to the commissioning of Longwall 9C which was done at a time that Mr Futeran was Site Senior Executive.
  3. [25]
    The paragraphs preceding paragraph 25 of the particulars set out the material facts alleged.  Those facts do not support the allegation in 25a.  The only allegation is that on 25 November 2019 the flippers were defective.[20]There is no allegation that they were incapable of effective deployment prior to commissioning.
  4. [26]
    The allegation in paragraph 25e is also problematic.  Particulars of Mr Futeran’s involvement with the creation of the SHMS, are not alleged.[21]
  5. [27]
    Most of the allegations in paragraph 25 are doomed to fail and paragraphs 25a and 25e would have to be recast or further particulars delivered.
  6. [28]
    The applicant relies upon paragraph [53] of the principal judgment to support a submission that the case against Mr Futeran has been found to have reasonable prospects of success.  Paragraph [53] should be put in proper context.  Paragraphs [48]-[53] of the principal judgment state:
  1. “[48]
    There has been debate as to the extent to which merits of the principal application ought to be explored on applications for extension of time to bring judicial review.[22]
  1. [49]
    However, it is at least appropriate to look to see whether the claim for relief is arguable.[23]
  1. [50]
    Each complaint follows the form of the section against which the offence is alleged. That is all that is required for a valid charge laid pursuant to the Justices Act 1886.[24]
  1. [51]
    The complaint in each of the three cases charges an offence which the Industrial Magistrates Court, and only the Industrial Magistrates Court, has jurisdiction to hear. The summons which compels the parties to appear at the Magistrates Court is not part of the complaint and could not render the complaint a nullity.[25] The second respondent is an Industrial Magistrate by force of s 505 of the IR Act[26] and could have sat as the Industrial Magistrates Court.
  1. [52]
    Arguably, the second respondent was obliged to sit as an industrial magistrate and deal with the matter according to law. That may have involved amending the summons[27] or otherwise securing the appearance of the respective defendants before the Industrial Magistrates Court.
  1. [53]
    The application for prerogative relief is, in my view, clearly arguable.”
  1. [29]
    In this part of the principal judgment, all three cases are considered together.  Observations are made only about the apparent failure of the second respondent to exercise jurisdiction.  In that respect, the applications for prerogative relief were described as “clearly arguable”.
  2. [30]
    Specific problems with the case against Mr Futeran are dealt with in detail under the heading “Is there a case against Mr Futeran?”[28] To suggest that in the principal judgment a conclusion was reached that there were reasonable prospects against Mr Futeran, is to take paragraph [53] of the judgment obviously out of context.

Should the applicant pay the costs?

  1. [31]
    It was not suggested that the application for an extension of time was made vexatiously.[29]  The issue is whether it was made “without reasonable cause”[30] or in circumstances where it would have been reasonably apparent to The Prosecutor that the application for an extension of time had no reasonable prospects of success.[31] 
  2. [32]
    In my view, there was no reasonable cause to bring the application for extension of time against Mr Futeran.  What is clear from the complaint is that most of the breaches alleged in paragraph 25 of the particulars cannot succeed against him for the reasons I have explained.  What is not apparent is what the case against Mr Futeran actually is.  It can logically only be some breach in commissioning the longwall seemingly with an inadequate SMHS.  Against the prospect that a case may be able to be mounted to that effect is the fact that many of the particulars will simply fail against Mr Futeran because, by the time those breaches occurred, he was long gone from the mine.
  3. [33]
    The discretion to award costs in favour of Mr Futeran is therefore enlivened.
  4. [34]
    Whether costs should be awarded on the indemnity basis, or at all is a matter of discretion.  Any judicial discretion must be exercised judicially and for the purpose for which the power was granted.  Many cases have sought to identify when there should be departure from the usual position that costs are assessed on a party/party basis.[32] 
  5. [35]
    Unreasonable conduct will often result in an indemnity costs order.[33] The commencement of proceedings “foredoomed to fail” may demonstrate unreasonable conduct resulting in an indemnity costs order.  Here, as I have explained, most of the particularised allegations against Mr Futeran must fail and no confidence can be taken from any of the material before me that the other particularised allegations would succeed.
  6. [36]
    There are dangers in applying cases decided in a “costs follow the event” regime to considerations under s 545 of the IR Act.  As I observed in Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors:[34]
  1. “[42]
    The filing of proceedings which are ‘foredoomed to fail’ would often, in a regime where costs generally follow the event, result in an order that the costs be assessed on an indemnity basis.
  1. [43]
    However, that is not the regime established by s 545 of the IR Act. The discretion to award costs only arises at all where the appeal is filed ‘vexatiously or without reasonable cause’ or it was ‘reasonably apparent [to] the appellant that [the appeal] had no reasonable prospect of success’. Even when one of those preconditions are fulfilled, costs on any basis do not inevitably follow. A discretion arises to depart from the usual rule established by s 545(1), namely that each party bear their own costs.
  1. [44]
    In a regime where even vexation only gives rise to a discretion to award costs, it cannot be that there is a general rule that commencing a proceeding which is ‘foredoomed to fail’ (a term synonymous with ‘no reasonable prospect of success’) will lead to an award of indemnity costs.”
  1. [37]
    It must be a rare case which justifies an award of indemnity costs in this Court.  In my view though, this is such a case.
  2. [38]
    Whether or not the second respondent was correct in dismissing the case, the fact remains that the proceedings which have followed the magistrate’s order are all sourced back ultimately to an error by The Prosecutor of the most basic kind; causing Mr Futeran to be summoned to a court which had no jurisdiction to hear the complaint.  What followed were misconceived appeals and it is apparent that there are very significant (if not fatal) problems with the case as particularised in the complaint against Mr Futeran.
  3. [39]
    Mr Futeran should not be out of pocket in defending this shambolic prosecution.  He should be awarded indemnity costs for defending the application to extend time to bring an application for prerogative relief against him.

Order

  1. [40]
    It is ordered that:

In application C/2022/19:

The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application for an extension of time on the indemnity basis.

Footnotes

[1]  [2022] ICQ 34.

[2]Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, Part 3

[3]Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, s 42.

[4]Justices Act 1886, ss 42 and 51.

[5]Justices Act 1886, s 53. 

[6]Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, s 255.

[7]  The appeal to this Court.

[8]  The second respondent.

[9]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 505.

[10]Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd & Ors [2022] ICQ 34.

[11]  [2022] ICQ 021.

[12]Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 per McHugh J at [97].

[13]  [2021] ICQ 011.

[14]  Section 545(1).

[15]  See the opening words of s 545(2).

[16]Wanninayake v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines) [2015] ICQ 35 at [12]-[14] and MIM Holdings Ltd v Automotive, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Industrial Union of Employees, Queensland (2000) 164 QGIG 370.

[17]Kanan v Australian Postal and Telecommunications Union [1992] FCA 539.

[18]Maher v Isaac Regional Council [2020] QIRC 191 from [59].

[19]  Falling coal.

[20]  The joint meaning of paragraphs 19 and 20.

[21]  See generally, Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd & Ors [2022] ICQ 34 at [92]-[115].

[22]  See generally, Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 403 ALR 604.

[23]Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 403 ALR 604 at [18].

[24]Justices Act 1886, s 47.

[25]  See generally, Walsh v Doherty (1907) 5 CLR 196 at 199, Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635 at 641.

[26]Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s 36, Schedule 1, definition of “magistrate”, Magistrates Act 1991, s 6(8).

[27]Justices Act 1886, s 48(1)(b).

[28]Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd & Ors [2022] ICQ 34, commencing paragraph [92].

[29]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 545(2)(a)(i).

[30]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 545(2)(a)(i).

[31]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 545(2)(a)(ii).

[32]Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397, Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225, Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam Law 93.

[33]Rosniak v Government Insurance Office (1997) 41 NSWLR 608.

[34]  [2021] ICQ 11.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd (No 2)

  • MNC:

    [2023] ICQ 3

  • Court:

    ICQ

  • Judge(s):

    Davis J, President

  • Date:

    21 Mar 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam Law 93
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1976] Fam Law 93
Cite 2 - [1976] Fam Law 93
Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 F.C.R 225
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1993) 46 F.C.R 225
Cite 2 - (1993) 46 F.C.R 225
Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1988) 81 ALR 397
Cite 2 - (1988) 81 ALR 397
Kanan v Australian Postal and Telecommunications Union [1992] FCA 539
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1992] FCA 539
Kelsey v Logan City Council [2021] ICQ 11
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] ICQ 11
Cite 2 - [2021] ICQ 11
Cite 3 - [2021] ICQ 11
Kelsey v Logan City Council (No 3) [2022] ICQ 21
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] ICQ 21
Cite 2 - [2022] ICQ 21
Maher v Isaac Regional Council [2020] QIRC 191
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 191
MIM Holdings Ltd v AMWU (2000) 164 QGIG 370
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 164 QGIG 370
Nicholson v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd [2022] ICQ 34
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] ICQ 34
Cite 2 - [2022] ICQ 34
Cite 3 - [2022] ICQ 34
Cite 4 - [2022] ICQ 34
Cite 5 - [2022] ICQ 34
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1998) 193 CLR 72
Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1991) 171 CLR 635
Rosniac v Government Insurance Office (1997) 41 NSW LR 608
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1997) 41 NSW LR 608
Cite 2 - (1997) 41 NSW LR 608
Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 403 ALR 604
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2022) 403 ALR 604
Cite 2 - (2022) 403 ALR 604
Walsh v Doherty (1907) 5 CLR 196
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1907) 5 CLR 196
Wanninayake v Queensland [2015] ICQ 35
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] ICQ 35

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Chen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No 2) [2023] ICQ 213 citations
1

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