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Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2)[2025] ICQ 15

Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2)[2025] ICQ 15

  INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2) [2025] ICQ 015

PARTIES:

ANGLO COAL (MORANBAH NORTH MANAGEMENT) PTY LTD

(appellant)

v

MARK DOUGLAS STONE

(respondent)

FILE NO:

C/2023/19

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

DELIVERED ON:

25 August 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

The orders were determined on written submissions without oral hearing.

MEMBER:

Davis J, President

ORDERS:

  1. 1.
    Order 2 made on 27 June 2025 is revoked.
  1. 2.
    The decision of the Industrial Magistrates Court to convict the appellant is suspended until further order of this Court.
  1. 3.
    The further trial of the charge is remitted to the Industrial Magistrates Court to be heard by an Industrial Magistrate other than Industrial Magistrate Quinn with the following directions:
  1. 1.
    The Industrial Magistrate is to determine according to law whether the appellant is guilty or not guilty of the charge with one circumstance of aggravation, namely:
  1. “The said contraventions of the said Act caused bodily harm to Vincent Wilson, John Jones and Mark Barnham.”
  1. 2.
    Upon reaching such determination, the Industrial Magistrates Court:
  1. (i)
    is not to acquit the appellant in the event of a finding that it is not guilty;
  1. (ii)
    is not to proceed to sentence of the appellant or to take any action upon any finding the appellant is guilty; and
  1. (iii)
    is to refer the matter back to this Court for further proceedings and findings.
  1. 4.
    The costs of the appeal are reserved until further order.

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – where the appellant was successful on appeal – where the parties sought orders consequent upon that success – where the appellant sought to have the charge determined by the appeal court – where the respondent sought a retrial – where the first trial had miscarried due to a misunderstanding of critical statutory provisions – where the real issues were not satisfactorily  litigated at the first trial – where the real issues were not decided by the Industrial Magistrate at the first trial – whether it is appropriate to determine the charge on the record below – whether it is appropriate to have the charge reheard – where the Industrial Relations Act 2016 empowered the appeal court to “suspend” the conviction and order a retrial – whether on any retrial the Industrial Magistrates Court determines guilt and proceeds to convict or acquit – whether conviction or acquittal would create an inconsistency with the suspended conviction – whether the Industrial Magistrates Court should determine whether the appellant is guilty – whether the appeal court ought then further act on that finding

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 15

Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld), s 29, s 41, s 48

Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulations 2017 (Qld), reg 66

Criminal Code of Queensland 1899 (Qld), s 648

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 407, s 542, s 558

Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 29

Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 011, related

Brawn v The King (2025) 99 ALJR 872; [2025] HCA 20, cited

Capuano v Q-Comp [2005] 1 Qd R 232; [2004] QSC 333, cited

Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Rosniak (No 2) [1992] NSWCA 94, cited

Hurley v Clements & Ors [2010] 1 Qd R 215; [2009] QCA 167, cited

M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63, followed

Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501; [1996] HCA 46, followed

Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123; [2020] HCA 12, cited

R v Collins; ex parte Attorney-General [1996] 1 Qd R 631, cited

R v Jerome and McMahon [1964] Qd R 595, cited

R v Shillingsworth [1985] 1 Qd R 537, cited

R v Tonks and Goss [1963] 1 VR 121, cited

Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300; [2005] HCA 81, followed

COUNSEL:

S C Holt KC with A C Freeman KC made written submissions for the appellant

G R Rice KC made written submissions for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Ashurst for the appellant

Office of Work Health Safety Prosecutor for the respondent

  1. [1]
    The matters, the subject of these reasons, arise from orders made on 27 June 2025 (the primary judgment).[1]
  2. [2]
    On that day I made the following orders on an appeal from the Industrial Magistrates Court against the conviction of Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd, on a charge laid on complaint by the respondent,[2] of an offence against the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (CMSHA):
  1. “1.
    Appeal allowed.
  1. 2.
    The conviction is set aside.
  1. 3.
    The respondent shall on or before 4 pm on 11 July 2025 file and serve any written submissions on the question of what further orders ought to be made.
  1. 4.
    The appellant shall on or before 4 pm on 25 July 2025 file and serve any written submissions on the question of what further orders ought to be made.
  1. 5.
    Each party has leave to file and serve on or before 4pm on 1 August 2025 a notice of intention to make further oral submissions on the question of what further orders ought to be made.
  1. 6.
    In the event no application is filed pursuant to order 5, the issue of further orders will be determined on any written submissions received and without further oral hearing.”
  1. [3]
    The time for the filing of written submissions, pursuant to orders 3 and 4, was extended and both parties have now filed submissions.  Neither party filed an application pursuant to order 5 to make oral submissions and so the issues left outstanding from the primary judgment are to be decided without further oral hearing.[3]

The position of each of the parties

  1. [4]
    Two issues fall to be determined.  The first is as to the further hearing of the charge and the second is as to costs.[4]  The written submissions dealt with both issues.
  2. [5]
    There are three possibilities as to the further hearing of the charge:
    1. the matter is remitted back to the Industrial Magistrate who heard the trial for final determination according to law, as explained in the primary judgment; or
    2. the further hearing is remitted back to the Industrial Magistrates Court to be heard by an Industrial Magistrate, other than the Industrial Magistrate who heard the trial, to be determined according to the law, as explained in the primary judgment; or
    3. the further hearing of the charge is conducted and determined in this Court.
  3. [6]
    Neither party submitted that the further hearing of the matter should be remitted to the Industrial Magistrate who heard the trial.  My view is that the Industrial Magistrate who heard the trial should not hear any retrial.  He made factual findings and those findings were made against a misunderstanding of the relevant statutory provisions.  There is a danger that any further consideration by the learned Industrial Magistrate may subconsciously be tainted by those findings.[5]
  4. [7]
    Anglo submitted that this Court should conduct any further hearing which is necessary to decide the charge.  It submitted that on any further hearing it will seek to make submissions, both orally and in writing, as to the defence created by s 48(2)of the CMSHA[6]  and its application to the evidence that was led at the trial.
  5. [8]
    The prosecution submits that the charge should be remitted to the Industrial Magistrates Court to be retried afresh.
  6. [9]
    On the question of costs of the appeal the parties also differ.  Anglo submitted that the costs question should be reserved until “the real issues in dispute between the parties … are determined by this Court”.[7]  That submission assumes that the further hearing of the charge will be conducted by this Court.  The prosecution submits that there should be no order as to costs.

The decision on appeal

  1. [10]
    In the primary judgment, detailed reasons were given explaining the orders made on 27 June 2025.[8]  It is necessary, however, for present purposes, to explain some features of both the trial and the appeal.
  2. [11]
    The charge[9] was as follows:

“Charge one

On the 20th day of February 2019, at Moranbah North Mine in Moranbah in the Magistrates Court District of Clermont in the State of Queensland, Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd, ACN 069 603 587, on whom a safety and health obligation was imposed by section 41(1)(a) of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) did fail to discharge the said obligation, in contravention of section 34 of the said Act AND the said contravention of the said Act caused the death of Bradley Alistair Hardwick AND the said contravention of the said Act caused bodily harm to Vincent Wilson, John Jones, Craig Banks and Mark Barnham.”

  1. [12]
    Bradley Hardwick, a mine worker, worked at the Moranbah North Mine, a coal mine operated by Anglo.  On 20 February 2019, Mr Hardwick parked an Anderson Wright Cat 120 Grader on a sloped area of the mine known as a “drift”.  He applied both the service brake and the parking brake of the grader.  Once the grader’s engine was turned off the air pressure required to operate the service brake fell and the parking brake could not hold the grader.  The grader rolled down the drift into the mine, colliding with another vehicle on the drift.  Mr Hardwick was killed.  Vincent Wilson, John Jones and Mark Barnham,[10] occupants of the other vehicle, suffered bodily harm.
  2. [13]
    It was common ground that the parking brake was defective.
  3. [14]
    Anglo, being a coal mine operator, has an obligation “to ensure the risk to coal mine workers while at [its] mine is at an acceptable level”.[11]  An “acceptable level of risk” is a risk “within acceptable limits” and “as low as reasonably achievable”.[12] 
  4. [15]
    Section 37 of the CMSHA provides that if a regulation prescribes a way of achieving an acceptable level of risk then a party may discharge its safety and health obligation only by following the prescribed way.  If the prescribed way is followed then the safety and health obligation is discharged. 
  5. [16]
    The Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulations 2017 provides, relevantly, that a coal mine’s safety and health management system must provide for the continued effectiveness of braking systems on mobile plant, and the system must provide for “appropriate testing of parking brakes”.[13] 
  6. [17]
    There was a peculiarity in the braking systems of the grader.  If the parking brake was engaged then the service brakes were automatically engaged.  Therefore, defects in the parking brake system were masked by the service brakes.  This meant that special procedures had to be followed when testing the parking brake system so its capabilities were tested independently of the service brakes.
  7. [18]
    Anglo tested the grader’s brakes consistently with the manufacturer’s recommendations.  Those tests did not identify defects in the parking brake because they did not achieve testing of the parking brake system independently of the service brakes.
  8. [19]
    Section 48 of the CMSHA provides defences to offences against the CMSHA, relevantly:
  1. “48
    Defences for div 2, 3 or 3A
  1. (1)
    It is a defence in a proceeding against a person for a contravention of an obligation imposed on the person under division 2, 3 or 3A in relation to a risk for the person to prove—
  1. (a)
    if a regulation has been made about the way to achieve an acceptable level of risk—the person followed the way prescribed in the regulation to prevent the contravention; or
  1. …
  1. (2)
    Also, it is a defence in a proceeding against a person for an offence against section 34 for the person to prove that the commission of the offence was due to causes over which the person had no control.
  1. (3)
    The Criminal Code, sections 23 and 24, do not apply in relation to a contravention of section 34.
  1. …” (emphasis added)
  1. [20]
    The onus of proving both the defence under s 48(1) and the defence under s 48(2) fell upon Anglo.
  2. [21]
    Until closing submissions at the trial, Anglo only relied on the defence under s 48(1).  Its change of position, whereby it sought to also rely upon the defence under s 48(2), was only prompted by written submissions received from the prosecution prior to closing submissions being heard.
  3. [22]
    Counsel for Anglo protected Anglo’s position by clearly stating reliance upon s 48(2).  A written submission concerning s 48(2) was provided to the Industrial Magistrate.  However, Counsel maintained that the primary defence relied upon was that conferred by s 48(1).  Reliance upon the defence in s 48(2) was not developed in oral submissions.  The Industrial Magistrate made token reference to s 48(2) in his reasons for convicting Anglo of the charge, and did not decide any of the substantive issues that arose under s 48(2).
  4. [23]
    Therefore, the Industrial Magistrate considered whether the testing of the parking brakes that Anglo had performed was “appropriate”, but did not consider in any substantial way whether the “commission of the offence was due to causes over which [Anglo] had no control”.[14]
  5. [24]
    On appeal, it was determined that if Anglo had a defence to the charge it was the defence created by s 48(2), not s 48(1) of the CMSHA.  The Industrial Magistrate had to decide whether “the commission of the offence was due to causes over which [Anglo] had no control”.[15]  That required the Industrial Magistrate to:
    1. identify the act or omission constituting the “offence”;
    2. identify the “causes” of the “commission of the offence”; and
    3. determine whether Anglo had proved that the “causes” of the “commission of the offence” were causes “over which [Anglo] had no control”.
  6. [25]
    As no such analysis was conducted, it was held that the trial miscarried.[16]

Orders for the further hearing of the charge

A preliminary issue

  1. [26]
    Section 558 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 provides, relevantly, as follows:
  1. “558
    What court may do
  1. (1)
    On an appeal under section 556 or 557, the court may—
  1. (a)
    dismiss the appeal; or
  1. (b)
    allow the appeal, set aside the decision and substitute another decision; or
  1. (c)
    allow the appeal and amend the decision; or
  1. (d)
    allow the appeal, suspend the operation of the decision and remit the matter, with or without directions, to the commission or an Industrial Magistrates Court to act according to law.”
  1. [27]
    The prosecution submits that, because by the orders made on 27 June 2025, the conviction was set aside, any decision of this Court, on a further hearing of the charge, to reinstate the conviction, would result in the two decisions being inconsistent with each other i.e., there would be a decision setting aside the conviction and a decision convicting Anglo.  That, it was submitted, would erode public confidence in the judicial system.  No authority was cited for such a proposition.
  2. [28]
    The prosecution’s submission misunderstands the nature of a criminal appeal.
  3. [29]
    While the categories of miscarriage of justice are not closed,[17] miscarriage will generally be identified as involving a departure from trial according to law (procedural miscarriage),[18] or conviction where a reasonable doubt as to guilt ought to have been entertained.[19]  Here the miscarriage is procedural.  Through error of law, the Industrial Magistrate did not determine the real issues.  There was no determination on appeal as to whether a doubt ought to be entertained as to guilt.
  4. [30]
    If this Court undertakes the further hearing of the charge, it will hear further submissions, hear further evidence (if necessary), and address the true issues in the case.  Having set aside the convictions due to procedural miscarriage, this Court would set about determining the case according to law.  Any conviction arising from that process will not erode public confidence but would be one determined according to law.
  5. [31]
    However, the setting aside of the conviction does give rise to another issue.

A second preliminary issue

  1. [32]
    Section 558 of the Industrial Relations Act contains four subsections, s 558(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d).  Each subsection should be read as conferring a separate power.  Each of the subsections (except 558(1)(a)) describe not one order that can be made but several.  Those individual orders within each of the subsections cannot be read interchangeably across the various subsections.[20]  The only power of remittal is that bestowed by s 558(1)(d).  If there is to be a remittal then the “decision” (here, the conviction) may not be set aside, rather its operation must be “suspended”.  It is not possible, on a proper construction of s 558, to set aside the conviction under s 558(1)(b) and remit the matter to the Industrial Magistrates Court, pursuant to s 558(1)(d). 
  2. [33]
    If the order setting aside the conviction[21] stands, then this Court must substitute another decision. It must hear and dispose of the charge.
  3. [34]
    The intention expressed in the primary judgment was to allow the appeal but consider whether the case should be remitted back to the Industrial Magistrates Court or whether this Court should finally determine the charge.[22]  The parties have, in their written submissions, engaged fully on that question.
  4. [35]
    While orders were pronounced on 27 June 2025 and filed by the Registrar,[23] no orders have been drawn up and perfected.  Consequently, the Court has jurisdiction to reopen the orders,[24] and, if appropriate, make an order suspending the conviction and remitting the case pursuant to s 558(1)(d).

Determination of the appropriate order

  1. [36]
    Anglo’s submission is that the case can be re-heard on the transcript (with exhibits) of the trial before the Industrial Magistrate.  It says that the essential factual issues concern the interaction between Anglo and the manufacturer of the grader, and those issues have been tried.  The prosecution resists that course, submitting that the parties should relitigate the case on the proper issues.[25]
  2. [37]
    Anglo’s submission cannot be accepted.
  3. [38]
    As is clear from the primary judgment, the factual issues and the legal considerations which arise under s 48(1)(a) are fundamentally different from those arising under s 48(2) of the CMSHA.
  4. [39]
    In order to prove a defence under s 48(1) Anglo must prove that it complied with reg 66.  It will have proved compliance with reg 66 if it proves:
    1. it conducted testing of the parking brakes; and
    2. that testing was “appropriate”.
  5. [40]
    The testing will be “appropriate” if the testing was such as to fulfill the purpose of testing the parking brake.[26]Therefore, there being no doubt that testing was done, the sole question became whether that testing was “appropriate”.  For reasons explained, it was not.
  6. [41]
    In order to prove a defence under s 48(2) Anglo must:
    1. identify the “offence”; and
    2. identify the “causes” of the “commission” of the “offence”;
    3. prove that those “causes” were ones “over which [Anglo] had no control’.
  7. [42]
    The “offence” is the failure to perform “appropriate testing” of the parking brake.  Proof of the “cause” of the “commission of the offence” must involve an examination of the reasons why Anglo failed to perform “appropriate testing”.
  8. [43]
    Once the “causes” of Anglo’s failure to perform appropriate testing of the parking brakes are identified, the inquiry shifts to an assessment of “control” by Anglo over the “causes” of the “commission” of the offence.
  9. [44]
    Self-evidently, the two defences call for completely different factual enquiries and give rise to different legal considerations.
  10. [45]
    Anglo’s trial strategy was to prove what it did to test the brakes and to prove that what it did was “appropriate”.  To establish a defence under s 48(2) it must show that it had no control over whatever caused it to fail to do appropriate testing.
  11. [46]
    At the trial in the Industrial Magistrates Court, various witnesses gave evidence and were cross-examined on the topic of the “appropriateness” of the testing.  Examination-in-chief and cross-examination was conducted to that end.  The real issues had not even been identified by the time those witnesses gave evidence.  The real issues were not canvassed with them.  Expert witnesses gave evidence under the same circumstances.
  12. [47]
    A further hearing by this Court would be an attempt to make findings and draw inferences in relation to issues that were not satisfactorily litigated.  That is neither practically possible, nor desirable.
  13. [48]
    The appropriate course is to set aside order 2 made on 27 June 2025, and make orders under s 558(1)(d) suspending the operation of the decision of the Industrial Magistrate to convict Anglo and remitting the matter to the Industrial Magistrates Court constituted by an Industrial Magistrate other than Industrial Magistrate Quinn to rehear the case. 
  14. [49]
    By order made under s 558(1)(d), this Court suspends the operation of the decision to convict and then remits the matter.  “Suspension” of a decision is a common concept upon challenge to an administrative decision.[27]  Section 558 of the Industrial Relations Act applies to appeals from the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, as well as from decisions made in the criminal jurisdiction of the Industrial Magistrates Court.  Suspension of a conviction is an unusual concept.
  15. [50]
    In Maxwell v The Queen,[28] the High Court explained the distinction between a finding of guilt, and conviction upon that finding.  The conviction is a judicial action taken upon the finding of guilt.  In Queensland jury trials, that act of conviction is taken by the administration of the allocutus.[29]  In jurisdictions such as the Industrial Magistrates Court, where there is no provision for the administration of the allocutus, the act of conviction is usually preceding to sentence.[30]  Here the Industrial Magistrate, after finding the case proved against Anglo said, “I will now hear submissions on penalty”.  Anglo was convicted at that point, notwithstanding that sentencing was adjourned.
  16. [51]
    By s 558(1)(d), the “decision” (which must be the conviction) is not set aside but suspended.  What must be contemplated is that the Industrial Magistrates Court either finds that Anglo is guilty or not guilty and then the matter comes back to this Court.  This Court will then, in the event of a guilty finding by the Industrial Magistrate, revoke the suspension of the conviction.  In the event that the Industrial Magistrate does not find Anglo guilty this Court would set aside the conviction and substitute another decision being one of acquittal.
  17. [52]
    The function of the Industrial Magistrates Court would be to make findings but not to then act on those findings by way of convicting or acquitting.[31]  Although I can find no authority on point, that must be so.  If the Industrial Magistrate has power to either convict or acquit then, in the event of a conviction, there will be two convictions on the one charge, although one will be suspended.  In the event of an acquittal by the Industrial Magistrate, there would be an acquittal and a conviction on the same charge.  None of that could be what was intended.
  18. [53]
    The Industrial Magistrate held a reasonable doubt as to the circumstance of aggravation that the contravention of the CMSHA caused the death of Mr Hardwick.  Having so found, the Industrial Magistrate said, “I find Anglo Coal Moranbah North Management Pty Ltd not guilty of that charge”.
  19. [54]
    The allegation that the contravention caused Mr Hardwick’s death was not a “charge”, but a circumstance of aggravation which was not found proved.  Anglo should have the benefit of that determination.
  20. [55]
    As previously observed,[32] the prosecution did not press at trial the second circumstance of aggravation as it related to any injury to Craig Banks.  Anglo should have the benefit of that concession on any retrial.

Costs

  1. [56]
    The prosecution submits that s 545(1) of the IR Act provides a prima facie position that each party bears their own costs.   Section 545(1) provides:
  1. “545
    General power to award costs
  1. (1)
    A person must bear the person’s own costs in relation to a proceeding before the court or commission.
  1. …”
  1. [57]
    Given that, for the reasons I have explained, the matter must come back to this Court after the Industrial Magistrate has retried the charge, it is appropriate to reserve the question of costs until that occurs.  This Court can then determine final orders, including costs.

Orders

  1. 1.
    Order 2 made on 27 June 2025 is revoked.
  1. 2.
    The decision of the Industrial Magistrates Court to convict the appellant is suspended until further order of this Court.
  1. 3.
    The further trial of the charge is remitted to the Industrial Magistrates Court to be heard by an Industrial Magistrate other than Industrial Magistrate Quinn with the following directions:
  1. 1.
    The Industrial Magistrate is to determine according to law whether the appellant is guilty or not guilty of the charge with one circumstance of aggravation, namely:
  1. “The said contraventions of the said Act caused bodily harm to Vincent Wilson, John Jones and Mark Barnham.”
  1. 2.
    Upon reaching such determination the Industrial Court:
  1. (i)
    is not to acquit the appellant in the event of a finding that it is not guilty;
  1. (ii)
    is not to proceed to sentence of the appellant or to take any action upon any finding the appellant is guilty; and
  1. (iii)
    is to refer the matter back to this Court for further proceedings and findings.
  1. 4.
    The costs of the appeal are reserved until further order.

Footnotes

[1] Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 011.

[2]  To whom I will refer to as “the prosecution”.

[3] Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 011 at [139].

[4] Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 011 at [130], [131] and [138].

[5] Hurley v Clements & Ors [2010] 1 Qd R 215 at [57] to [59].

[6]  The significance of which is explained later.

[7]  Anglo’s written submissions, dated 8 August 2025, at [26].

[8] Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 011.

[9]  Excluding the particulars.

[10]  The prosecution did not proceed with the circumstance of aggravation as it related to Craig Banks.

[11] Coal Mine Safety and Health Act 1999, s 41(1).

[12] Coal Mine Safety and Health Act 1999, s 29(1).

[13]  Regulation 66(2)(b).

[14] Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999, s 48(2).

[15] Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 011 at [87]-[97].

[16] Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 011 at [116]-[124].

[17] Brawn v The King (2025) 99 ALJR 872, 876.

[18] Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300 at [16], [19], [36] and [41].

[19] M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123 at [39].

[20]  See generally, Capuano v Q-Comp [2005] 1 Qd R 232.

[21] Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 011, order 2.

[22] Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 011 at [128]-[130].

[23] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 542.

[24]  See generally, Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Rosniak (No 2) [1992] NSWCA 94.

[25]  Prosecution’s written submissions, dated 11 July 2025, para. [14].

[26] Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 011 at [81]-[86].

[27] Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 15(1)(a); Judicial Review Act 1991, s 29(2)(a).

[28]  (1996) 184 CLR 501.

[29] Criminal Code 1899, s 648; R v Collins; ex parte Attorney-General [1996] 1 Qd R 631 at 638; following R v Shillingsworth [1985] 1 Qd R 537 at 543.

[30] R v Jerome and McMahon [1964] Qd R 595; R v Tonks and Goss [1963] 1 VR 121.

[31]  For the distinction, see Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501.

[32] Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 011 at [12].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone (No 2)

  • MNC:

    [2025] ICQ 15

  • Court:

    ICQ

  • Judge(s):

    Davis J, President

  • Date:

    25 Aug 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management) Pty Ltd v Stone [2025] ICQ 11
10 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2025] ICQ 11
Cite 2 - [2025] ICQ 11
Cite 3 - [2025] ICQ 11
Cite 4 - [2025] ICQ 11
Cite 5 - [2025] ICQ 11
Cite 6 - [2025] ICQ 11
Cite 7 - [2025] ICQ 11
Cite 8 - [2025] ICQ 11
Cite 9 - [2025] ICQ 11
Cite 10 - [2025] ICQ 11
Brawn v The King [2025] HCA 20
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2025] HCA 20
Brawn v The King (2025) 99 ALJR 872
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2025) 99 ALJR 872
Cite 2 - (2025) 99 ALJR 872
Capuano v Q-Comp[2005] 1 Qd R 232; [2004] QSC 333
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2004] QSC 333
Cite 2 - [2005] 1 Qd R 232
Cite 3 - [2005] 1 Qd R 232
Hurley v Clements[2010] 1 Qd R 215; [2009] QCA 167
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] QCA 167
Cite 2 - [2010] 1 Qd R 215
Cite 3 - [2010] 1 Qd R 215
M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1994) 181 CLR 487
Cite 2 - (1994) 181 CLR 487
M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1994] HCA 63
Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1996) 184 CLR 501
Cite 2 - (1996) 184 CLR 501
Maxwell v The Queen [1996] HCA 46
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1996] HCA 46
Pell v The Queen [2020] HCA 12
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] HCA 12
Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2020) 268 CLR 123
Cite 2 - (2020) 268 CLR 123
R v Collins; ex parte Attorney-General [1996] 1 Qd R 631
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1996] 1 Qd R 631
Cite 2 - [1996] 1 Qd R 631
R v Jerome and McMahon [1964] Qd R 595
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1964] Qd R 595
Cite 2 - [1964] Qd R 595
R v Shillingsworth [1985] 1 Qd R 537
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1985] 1 Qd R 537
Cite 2 - [1985] 1 Qd R 537
Weiss v The Queen [2005] HCA 81
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] HCA 81
Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) 224 CLR 300
Cite 2 - (2005) 224 CLR 300

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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