R v Bale
[1999] QCA 113
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- Unreported Judgment
- Appeal Determined (QCA)
- R v Bale[1999] QCA 113
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R v Bale[1999] QCA 113
R v Bale[1999] QCA 113
COURT OF APPEAL |
|
de JERSEY CJ |
|
PINCUS JA |
|
FRYBERG J |
|
CA No 41 of 1999 |
|
THE QUEEN |
|
v. |
|
HENRY VALENTINE BALE | (Applicant) |
BRISBANE |
|
DATE 12/04/99 |
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JUDGMENT |
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The applicant was convicted in the District Court on 9 October 1997 on five counts of indecent dealing with a girl under 14 years. He appealed against those convictions. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed his appeal on 19 December 1997.
On 19 February 1999 he lodged an application for extension of time within which to bring a further appeal against conviction. The question of the competency of the application arises. That issue was generally canvassed in the Queen against Pettigrew CA 364 and 466 of 1995 in context of section 8 subsection 1 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991.
There is no need here to traverse that decision because neither of the grounds advanced in support of the application would warrant extending time to facilitate any second appeal assuming the discretion to exist. The first ground is expressed as follows, "It was not known until recently that there was no corroboration against me in this case."
That is quite plainly not so because the learned trial Judge in summing-up reminded the jury of the applicant's counsel's submission that "there's nothing to confirm or support or strengthen the complainant's evidence".
The second ground is in these terms, "The motive for this complaint as suggested in committal has been proved $250,000. This is what the girl is suing for."
This relates to another suggestion ventilated at the trial. The learned Judge again referred in his summing-up to the applicant's counsel's submission with relation to "an application for compensation for criminal assault" as providing "a motive for lying". That the complainant may now have exercised a statutory right to pursue an application for compensation or sued for compensation is obviously not a matter which could possibly be said to render the convictions doubtful. It would simply be a case of her exercising her right consequent upon or following the convictions. The question of motivation was, as I have said, explored at the trial anyway.
I would dismiss the application.
PINCUS JA: I agree.
FRYBERG J: I agree. In relation to matters other than section 8 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991, I would draw attention to the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal in The Queen v. Smith, two decisions, the first reported in the Queensland Law Reporter 1968 and the second in the Queensland Law Reporter for 1969 and the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Western Australia in Matta v. The Queen reported in 126 Federal Law Reports at page 127.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The application is dismissed.