Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
  • sclq logo
  1. Caselaw
  2. QCA
  3. 1999
  4. James Thane Pty Ltd v Conrad International Hotels Corporation - [1999] QCA 516

Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

James Thane Pty Ltd v Conrad International Hotels Corporation[1999] QCA 516

James Thane Pty Ltd v Conrad International Hotels Corporation[1999] QCA 516

 

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

 

CITATION:

James Thane Pty Ltd v Conrad International Hotels Corporation

Conrad International Hotels Corporation v Workers’ Compensation Board

Conrad International Hotels Corporation v Jupiters Limited

[1999] QCA 516

PARTIES:

HEATHER JANE TETU

(first plaintiff)

and

MATTHEW HUGHES

(second plaintiff)

v

JAMES THANE PTY LTD

(ACN 002 995 119)

(first defendant/appellant)

and

CONRAD INTERNATIONAL HOTELS CORPORATION

(ARBN 010 471 137)

(second defendant/respondent)

and

JUPITERS LIMITED

(ACN 010 741 045)

(third defendant)

and

WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD OF QUEENSLAND

(third party)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 4481 of 1999

SC No 1835 of 1999

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

PARTIES:

HEATHER JANE TETU

(first plaintiff)

and

MATTHEW HUGHES

(second plaintiff)

v

JAMES THANE PTY LTD

(ACN 002 995 119)

(first defendant)

and

CONRAD INTERNATIONAL HOTELS CORPORATION

(ARBN 010 471 137)

(second defendant/respondent)

and

JUPITERS LIMITED

(ACN 010 741 045)

(third defendant)

and

WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD OF QUEENSLAND

(third party/appellant)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 4482 of 1999

SC No 1835 of 1999

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

PARTIES:

HEATHER JANE TETU

(first plaintiff)

and

MATTHEW HUGHES

(second plaintiff)

v

JAMES THANE PTY LTD

(ACN 002 995 119)

(first defendant)

and

CONRAD INTERNATIONAL HOTELS CORPORATION

(ARBN 010 471 137)

(second defendant/appellant)

and

JUPITERS LIMITED

(ACN 010 741 045)

(third defendant/respondent)

and

WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD OF QUEENSLAND

(third party)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 4571 of 1999

SC No 1835 of 1999

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

DELIVERED ON:

14 December 1999

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 November 1999

JUDGES:

McMurdo P, Thomas JA and Williams J

Separate reasons for judgment  of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made.

ORDER:

Appeal No 4481 of 1999: Appeal allowed.  Vary the judgment so that it provides that the first defendant is liable to contribute 10% of the plaintiff’s damages and the second defendant is liable to contribute 90% of the plaintiff’s damages.  Dismiss the respondent’s notice of contention.  Order the respondent second defendant pay the appellant’s costs to be assessed.

Appeal No 4482 of 1999: Appeal dismissed.  Order the appellant first defendant to pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed.

Appeal No 4571 of 1999: Appeal allowed.  Declare that the appellant/second defendant is entitled to be indemnified by the respondent/third defendant to the full extent of any liability which the appellant/second defendant has arising out of the plaintiff’s claim.  Order the respondent third defendant to pay the appellant’ costs to be assessed.

CATCHWORDS:

NEGLIGENCE – APPORTIONMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY AND DAMAGES – evidence reasonably capable of supporting findings made by trial judge – trial judge had the advantage of hearing various witnesses – primary findings made by trial judge should stand.

NEGLIGENCE – APPORTIONMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY AND DAMAGES – whether 30/70 apportionment is sustainable – evidence established that the active negligence was on the part of Conrad and its employees – Thane negligent as it failed to ensure safety of all its employees pursuant to s 9(1) Workplace Health and Safety Act 1989 – whether Thane entitled to rely on Conrad’s employees to ensure that lifting apparatus was safe – clear known dangers associated with the use of apparatus – Thane liable to some extent.

Law Reform Act 1995, s 6(c) and s 7.

Evans v Port of Brisbane Authority (1992) ATR 81-169 considered.

Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd (1978) 1 NSWLR 649 considered.

Podresek v Australian & Steel Pty Ltd (1989) 59 ALJR 492, considered.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO AND LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION – LIABILITY FOR INDEMNITY – whether Conrad is a principal within the meaning of s 47 Workers’ Compensation Act 1990 – whether Conrad was only a party to the agreement as agent for Jupiters – whether Conrad personally liable on the contract – test is the objective intentions of the parties having regard to the nature and terms of contract and surrounding circumstances – Conrad undertook obligations of its own pursuant to the contract and also acquired rights – s 47 is not limited to indemnifying only one principal.

Bridges & Salmon Ltd v The “Swan”(Owner) [1968] 1 Ll LR 5, considered.

Clarke Equipment Credit of Aust Ltd v Klyose Holdings Pty Ltd (1989) 21 NSWLR 60, considered.

Smit International Singapore Pty Ltd v Kurnia Dewi shipping SA [1997] 1 Ll LR 552, considered.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO AND LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION – PERSONS LIABLE TO PAY COMPENSATION – LIABILITY FOR INDEMNITY – whether Conrad entitled to an indemnity from Jupiters pursuant to the Management Agreement – for Conrad to lose its right of indemnification it must be shown that the direct gross negligence of Conrad caused the liability – vicarious liability not sufficient.

COUNSEL:

Mr J Griffin QC for the appellant

Mr P H Morrison QC with him Mr R Perry for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Bain Gasteen for the appellant

Allen Allen Hemsley for the respondent

  1. MCMURDO P:  I have read the reasons prepared by Williams J and am in general agreement with them for the reasons he has given.
  1. I would only add the following comments in respect of Appeal No 4481 of 1999. The failure by Thane to inspect the equipment to be used by its employees was both a breach of its common law duty to its employee and a breach of s 9 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1989.  As the breach in this case also amounts to negligence, it is unnecessary to express a final view as to whether a breach of s 9 gives rise to a civil cause of action, although the contrary was not suggested in this case.  I agree with the apportionment suggested by Williams J.
  1. I agree with the proposed orders in respect of each appeal.
  1. THOMAS JA:  I have read Williams J’s reasons and am generally in agreement with them.  I shall however state my own reasons for interfering with the apportionment of 30 per cent/70 per cent which the learned trial judge made as between the employer (Thane) and Conrad.  Some statement of the background circumstances is necessary.
  1. Although Jupiters owned the entire complex, for all practical purposes Conrad was its manager. It had control of the premises and of what was to be done on them. This included the control of staff. Although Jupiters, by arrangement with Conrad, was the employer of all staff except the four controlling managers, Conrad, which employed those controlling managers, was in fact in command of all staff and gave the day to day instructions to all staff. In short all the employees at the complex were under Conrad's supervision and control. The same may be said with respect to the control of equipment used in the area. The same may also be said in relation to responsibility for the project around which this case centred, namely the presentation of a show called “Jewel of the Orient Express” at the Conrad Jupiters complex.
  1. This show was the subject of a “pre-production and presentation agreement” made on 16 March 1992. The substantial nature of the project can be seen from the fact that the estimated pre-production expenses were $1.6 million. The pre-production agreement was made between Ms Tetu's employer (Thane), which was described as “the producer”, and Conrad. It is true that at the commencement of the document Conrad is described as “agent for Jupiters” but the remainder of the contract, including the signatories to it, show that Conrad was also contracting as a party in its own right. I interpret the reference “as agent for Jupiters” as a simple statement of fact that Conrad acted as Jupiters' agent, but this in no way detracts from Conrad's identity as an active party in its own right. The pre-production agreement recited that “Conrad operates and manages the complex” and the agreement proceeded to prescribe the limited role of the producer and the more dominant and residual role of Conrad. Inter alia it required Thane to “cause its employees and independent contractors to submit to the reasonable direction and control of Conrad”. There was a proviso in favour of Thane that it might (subject to Conrad's directions) direct sound technicians, machinists, electricians, wardrobe personnel and backstage crew in the performance of their duties. The personnel mentioned in the proviso were all employees whom “Conrad” would “cause Jupiters to employ”. These clauses (5.2 and 5.3) suggest that a certain amount of overlapping direction might occur in this area, and that Conrad reserved the ultimate power of direction.
  1. Thane's loss of control over the site at which its employees (including Ms Tetu) would perform was not the result of any abnegation or lack of concern for its employees. It was a commercial necessity, or at least a reasonable and proper commercial arrangement which resulted in another party (Conrad) taking major control of the project that it desired to present.
  1. Thane engaged another company (Key Largo), which is described as a production company specialising in the technical management of musicals and scenic design, to attend to the technical management of the show. For all practical purposes Key Largo should be regarded as a sub-contractor or agent of Thane, and any fault or lack of care that can be attributed to Key Largo must be ultimately carried by Thane. It would seem that all relevant parties including the plaintiff, Thane, Key Largo and Conrad concurred at an early stage that the trapeze act forming part of the production should be performed in the body of the auditorium over the audience rather than on the stage, and that Ms Tetu should be lifted mechanically. Significantly, once the decision was made to move the trapeze act into the auditorium, Mr Bowie (a Conrad manager) said that the complex would take charge of the installation of the trapeze frame. This was done under the supervision of Mr McLaggan who was subject to the direction of Conrad. From this time on, as the learned trial judge found, the technical aspects of the trapeze act were under the control of employees of the complex, that is to say Conrad's staff. Once the show opened, Key Largo's responsibilities were complete and two Conrad employees, Mr Venker and Mr Bowker, had responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the lifting equipment for the trapeze act.
  1. Various inappropriate steps ensued, leading to the following conclusion by an expert accepted by the learned trial judge:

“This accident occurred because the load placed on the wire rope exceeded the strength of the swaged joint.  Excessive load on the winch wire rope was generated when the hitch plate impacted the guide lug and the winch continued to operate causing the load on the wire rope to increase until failure of the swaged joint occurred”.

  1. It is unnecessary to canvass the evidence in detail. Mr Morrison QC on behalf of Conrad referred to considerable passages of the evidence and urged different interpretations than those drawn by the learned trial judge. Indeed the cross-appeal that he supported sought a higher level of contribution from Thane. In particular he submitted that Mr Martin and Mr Clarke (employees of Key Largo) had continued to participate in decisions concerning the equipment and its management. The weight of the evidence however supports the view that Conrad employees assumed control of the relevant rigging work and were responsible for its failure. There is some evidence that Messrs Venker and Bowker resented Mr Martin and that Key Largo personnel were not encouraged to intrude unduly into this area of activity. At the same time Mr Martin conceded in evidence that there was nothing specifically inhibiting him from raising questions about the mechanised lift and winch if he had wished to do so, and he did have the expertise to have made useful suggestions had he been involved. He also conceded that although he was not physically involved in installing the lifting apparatus he was involved in discussion about what was to be done at the rehearsal stage and that he was present when others discussed aspects of the lifting equipment.
  1. The learned trial judge made extensive findings of fact, but provided only very short discussion of the basis upon which the 30/70 apportionment was made between Thane on the one hand and Conrad on the other. Whilst numerous findings of fault were made against Conrad, the central finding against Thane was that it was in breach of s 9(1) of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1989 in failing to ensure the safety of all of its employees in circumstances where it was practicable to do so.  Reference was also made to Mr Clarke's assumption that the apparatus was safe because he had not been told otherwise, from which the learned trial judge concluded that there was a failure on Key Largo's part, and in turn on Thane's part, to ensure that the equipment used by Ms Tetu was safe, describing this failure by Mr Clarke as an abrogation of his proper responsibilities.  The only other relevant discussion of the question of contribution would seem to be the learned trial judge's actual conclusion namely “the appropriate basis for apportionment of liability between the defendants is 30 per cent to the first defendant and 70 per cent to the second defendant.  I do not believe that it would be just and equitable for Jupiters to make any contribution in these circumstances”.
  1. For reasons developed hereunder, that conclusion seems to me, with respect, to attribute excessive responsibility to Thane.

Contribution between tortfeasors

  1. Sections 6 (c) and 7 of the Law Reform Act 1995 provide:

“(6) Where damage is suffered by any person as a result of a tort (whether a crime or not)- …

  1. any tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage may recover contribution from any other tortfeasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise, so, however, that no person shall be entitled to recover contribution under this section from any person entitled to be indemnified by the person in respect of the liability in respect of which the contribution is sought.”

“(7) In any proceedings for contribution under this division the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person's responsibility for the damage; and the court shall have power to exempt any person from liability to make contribution, or to direct that the contribution to be recovered from any person shall amount to a complete indemnity”.

  1. Statements of principle are difficult to find in relation to the proper approach to be taken by a trial judge in assessing contribution between tortfeasors under this legislation. By contrast there is a wealth of authority asserting the reluctance of courts of appeal to interfere with such assessments as are made by trial judges.[1]  Perhaps this is partly the result of a shortage of recognised criteria.
  1. It has been suggested that certain statements in Podrebersek[2] are applicable to exercises of apportionment between tortfeasors,[3] although Podrebersek was a decision on apportionment in the context of contributory negligence.  Although additional factors may be involved in comparisons of fault in assessments of contributory negligence and of contribution between tortfeasors respectively, the common feature is that an assessment must be made of each person's responsibility for the damage.  It is said in Podrebersek that this involves a comparison both of culpability, that is of the degree of departure from a proper standard of care, and of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage.
  1. In the present state of authority there remains a tension between culpability and causation that was noticed in 1989.[4]  Decisions under similar English legislation have fluctuated in taking into account such factors,[5] but I do not think that Australian authority has expressed a preference for one factor over the other. The statute requires an assessment of “responsibility”, and it seems appropriate that the tension should remain.  Both factors may be relevant to the tortfeasor's responsibility for a plaintiff's damage.  They usually operate in tandem, but circumstances may arise where one of these factors may be more significant than the other.  It is recognised in Podrebersek that the circumstances of some cases may be such that a comparison of the relative importance of the respective parties in causing the damage will be of little if any importance.[6]
  1. For example a difficulty sometimes arises, as it arguably does in the present case, when one party is liable solely through a breach of statutory duty. In the case of an absolute statutory duty, liability may exist entirely without fault. In the case of other statutory duties, liability may arise upon conduct which reveals a minimal level of fault in comparison with the level of fault recognised by the common law as establishing negligence. Where the operative fault and the acts or omissions that cause the plaintiff's loss can be seen to be those of one party, whilst another party may have a legal liability to the plaintiff by reason only of an absolute duty, the latter party would in my view be entitled to 100 per cent contribution, that is to say an indemnity from the party guilty of the active fault. Such an approach was adopted by the Court of Appeal in New South Wales (Moffitt P, Reynolds and Glass JJA) in Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd.[7]  In that case there were two parties who were found liable to the plaintiff, one the owner of a bull who had handed it to an auctioneer for sale, and the other the auctioneer who failed to control it properly during the sale in consequence of which a bystander was injured.  The liability of the owner was based upon his non-delegable absolute duty as an owner who was aware of the bull's dangerous propensities; however he was not guilty of any actual fault on the occasion in question, as his son when making delivery of the bull had made full disclosure of its dangerous tendencies to the auctioneer, and thereafter was not in a position to exercise control.  In those circumstances the Court of Appeal dealt with the matter by ordering a full indemnity from the auctioneer in respect of the damages that the owner was liable to pay to the plaintiff. 
  1. Another decision, Evans v Port of Brisbane Authority,[8] relied on by counsel for the appellant in the present case, has at least some resemblance with the present circumstances.  In Evans an employer, through no fault of its own, was precluded by various rules and practices of other parties from exercising effective control over its own employees whilst they were working on the Port of Brisbane work site.  In that case I took the view that although the employer could not eliminate or delegate the duty that it owed to its employees when they went to a work site that was effectively controlled by others, there had been no personal negligence on the part of the employer, the injury was not reasonably foreseeable by the employer, and the employer was not liable to the plaintiff; and alternatively that if such a liability did exist, the appropriate apportionment would be 100 per cent against the active tortfeasor and 0 per cent against the employer.
  1. The main difficulty I have encountered in the present case is in determining whether any contribution at all ought to be ordered against Thane. I have concluded that it should, namely on the basis that the opportunity existed for Messrs Clarke and Martin to have become more involved than they did in the choice of equipment and the manner in which it would be used. It is likely that if Mr Martin had asked or looked he would have detected some defect and would have been in a position to suggest that it be remedied. When a comparison is made however between this failure to act more intrusively in a situation essentially controlled by others and the conduct of those others which actually led to the unfortunate accident, the apportionment must reflect a very substantial difference.
  1. In all the circumstances I consider that the apportionment proposed by Williams J namely 10 per cent against Thane and 90 per cent against Conrad is the appropriate apportionment and that this is a case where it is appropriate for an appellate court to vary the apportionment of the primary tribunal.
  1. In relation to the other issues raised in the three appeals I do not wish to add anything to what Williams J has written. I agree with the orders proposed by his Honour in each matter.
  1. WILLIAMS J:  The plaintiffs in the action, H J Tetu and M Hughes, sued a number of defendants claiming damages for personal injuries each sustained in consequence of a trapeze apparatus failing which caused Tetu to fall from a significant height thereby sustaining serious personal injuries.  At the outset of the trial the Court was informed that quantum had been agreed in the amount of $1,399,372.03 for Tetu and $150,000 for Hughes.  The issue which remained for determination was that of liability as between the defendants.
  1. For purposes of the hearing with respect to liability there were two camps. In the first were James Thane Pty Ltd, Jupiters Limited, and also the third party, Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland. In the opposing camp was Conrad International Hotels Corporation (“Conrad”).
  1. James Thane Pty Ltd (“Thane”) was a producer of stage shows and the employer of both the plaintiffs. It had entered into a contract called a Pre-Production and Presentation Agreement dated 16 March 1992 to produce a show in the complex generally known as Jupiters Casino on the Gold Coast.
  1. Conrad, pursuant to a Management Agreement dated 16 May 1998, was the manager of all operations at the Jupiters Casino complex which was owned by Jupiters Limited (“Jupiters”). 
  1. The third party, the Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland (“WCB”), was the insurer of Thane’s liability to its employees pursuant to the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act 1990.  The WCB also acknowledged that by operation of s 47 of that Act it was also obliged to indemnify Jupiters with respect to the claim made by the plaintiffs – the basis of that concession will be examined later.  In consequence, notwithstanding the relationship between Jupiters and Conrad, the former was on the same side as Thane in the fight over liability.
  1. The hearing of evidence occupied some six days and there were numerous lengthy documents tendered as exhibits.  The record consists of some 1,285 pages.  Extensive reasons for judgment were delivered on 21 April 1999. Both Thane and Conrad were found to have been negligent and an apportionment of 30 per cent against Thane and 70 per cent against Conrad was made. 

Appeal No 4481 of 1999

  1. Thane has appealed contending that in the light of all the findings made by the trial judge it should obtain 100 per cent contribution from Conrad.  Conrad countered by lodging a Notice of Contention in which it sought a variation of the judgment to make Thane solely responsible for satisfying the awards of damages in favour of the plaintiffs.
  1. The outline of submissions on behalf of Conrad runs for some 49 pages, nine pages longer than the judgment.  The basic premise underlying the submissions on behalf of Conrad is that the learned trial judge ought not to have made findings which were made, should have preferred evidence other than that which was accepted, and should have made additional findings favourable to Conrad.  I do not intend to go point-by-point through the matters raised on behalf of Conrad.  It is sufficient to say that having read the judgment, having considered the written submissions on behalf of Conrad, having heard the oral argument addressed to the Court, and having considered the passages in the evidence to which the Court was specifically referred I have come to the conclusion that there was evidence reasonably capable of supporting the findings made by the learned trial judge.  On a number of issues, some more important than others, there was a clear conflict of testimony, and logical arguments can be advanced for saying that one conclusion rather than another should have been reached.  In the circumstances here the trial judge was in the particularly advantageous position of seeing and hearing the various witnesses which makes it difficult for this court to interfere with findings of fact.
  1. I will refer briefly to two matters which are germane to that conclusion. The two men who, on the whole of the evidence, were primarily responsible for the construction, maintenance and operation of the trapeze apparatus were Venker and Bowker, who were servants of Conrad for purposes of the litigation. Bowker, who was operating the controls of the apparatus at the time of the fall, was not called to give evidence and the learned trial judge concluded that Venker was an “unreliable” witness; however, many findings were made based on evidence of the latter. The findings which counsel for Conrad submitted this Court should substitute for those made by the learned trial judge largely involved total acceptance of Venker’s evidence and placing a favourable interpretation on the conduct of Bowker. There is no basis for this Court doing so particularly in the light of such a critical credibility finding with respect to Venker.
  1. Conrad’s case also involved asking the Court to make adverse findings with respect to the witness Martin who was a stage technician employed by a sub-contractor to Thane. The learned trial judge dealt with one critical issue involving Martin in the following way:

“It was put to Mr Martin that he had reviewed the lifting equipment for safety and while he agreed that this was possible he did not recall doing so.  I have concluded that he did not do so.  Mr Martin’s awareness of what was required for safety leads me to conclude that had he reviewed it he would have been only too aware that the equipment did not comply.  It was not, as he said, part of his scope of work and so was a matter he avoided.  Mr Martin was certain that had he discovered that the lifting device was not registered, or did not have the correct certification, he would have raised his concerns with Mr Clark, his immediate superior.”

  1. That was a finding which involved largely an assessment of Martin’s credibility and an assessment to some extent of his character. It was a finding which was clearly open on the evidence and the reasoning cannot be attacked on objective grounds. Again it is asking too much of this Court to reverse such finding (and the associated reasoning) and substitute a contrary finding for it.
  1. Therefore so far as this appeal is concerned all the primary findings made by the learned trial judge should stand.  The question becomes whether or not in the light of those findings the 30/70 apportionment is sustainable.  That gives rise to the consideration whether inferences drawn by the learned trial judge were appropriate.
  1. The learned trial judge made numerous findings as to where and how the failure of the trapeze apparatus was due to negligence on the part of both Thane and Conrad. As will be seen shortly, most findings of negligence were with respect to the conduct of servants of Conrad. It is also of some significance that (primarily for the purpose of determining an issue of indemnity between Conrad and Jupiters) the learned trial judge concluded that the “behaviour by Mr Venker and Mr Bowker was grossly negligent”.  But the issue of apportionment was dealt with very briefly; all that appears in the judgment is the following:

“The appropriate basis for apportionment of liability between the defendants is 30 percent to the first defendant and 70 percent to the second defendant.  I do not believe that it would be just and equitable for Jupiters to make any contribution in these circumstances.”

  1. There is no doubt that on the findings made the negligence for which Conrad was responsible was significantly greater than that of Thane; but the argument on behalf of Thane is that the reasons for judgment do not justify a conclusion that it should bear 30 per cent of the blame.
  1. In consequence it is necessary to refer to some of the relevant findings in more detail. The learned trial judge found that the fall occurred “when the ferrules used by Mr Bowker to hand swage the joins in the steel cable failed”.  Though it was not said expressly, that amounts to a finding by the learned trial judge that the immediate cause of the incident was the failure of the ferrules used to hand swage the joins in the steel cable supporting Ms Tetu in the air. 
  1. However one cannot ignore the fact that immediately after making that finding the learned trial judge said that: “However the weakness of the swaged joins was only part of the problem.”
  1. The show opened on 31 August 1992 and the fall occurred during the 113th staging of it.  About two weeks prior to the fall the learned trial judge found that Bowker “changed the steel cable which had begun to fray”. The reasons recorded that Bowker “said he had put two swages or ferrules on the new steel cable, making it doubly safe”.
  1. Though Bowker did not give evidence, contemporaneous statements he made to other persons about the work he did were admitted into evidence and relied on by all sides. That last finding by the learned trial judge is based on a statement Bowker made to the plaintiff Tetu according to her evidence.
  1. Notwithstanding those findings which were material to the immediate cause of the collapse of the trapeze apparatus the learned trial judge made other findings of negligence. Those findings were made against the background of findings of fact as to the responsibility as between the defendants with respect to the construction and maintenance of the apparatus in question. The following background findings are relevant:
  1. once the decision was taken to perform the act in the body of the auditorium rather than over the stage, Conrad took charge of the installation of the trapeze frame because it was over the audience and had to be attached to the fabric of the building;
  1. the mechanical work was done by and under the supervision of an engineer, McLaggan, who worked under the supervision of Conrad managers;
  1. once the show opened the responsibility of Key Largo Pty Ltd, a technical sub-contractor to Thane, ceased and Venker and Bowker had responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the lifting equipment for the trapeze act;
  1. there was no reason for Thane or its sub-contractor to doubt the experience of Bowker and Venker as each had been employed at the complex for many years;
  1. the winch and steel cable for lifting Ms Tetu were installed by Bowker under Venker’s supervision;
  1. the hand swaging of the cable was effected by Bowker;
  1. after the show opened maintenance of the equipment was entirely the responsibility of Venker and Bowker;
  1. sometime immediately before or after the show opened, the automatic limit switch on the winch was de-activated by Bowker.

Against those background findings of fact various other particulars of negligence were held by the learned trial judge to have been established by the evidence.  The following is a summary thereof:

  1. a contributing factor was the inadequacy of the winch and changes which had been made to its operations.  Without the limit switch, when the performer was raised the hitch plate was allowed to impact on the guide lug which became worn as a result of continual impact by the hitch plate.  The failure to stop the winch at that precise moment when the hitch plate came into contact with the guide lug caused the cantilever to distort and also caused the load on the wire rope to be increased due to interference between the hitch plate and guide lug.  That resulted in the winch rope being torn from its swaged connection because of the failure of the swaging.  The power of the winch was such that it had the power to create kinetic stress on the 5.5 mm cable sufficient to almost break the cable.  The winch did not comply with the Australian Standard relating to hoists used for lifting persons.  The hoist rope was 5 mm in diameter where it should have been 8 mm;
  1. associated equipment was defective and inadequate.  The ferrules were the incorrect type and of incorrect size.  The hand tool used for swaging was the incorrect size.  The load placed on the wire rope exceeded the strength of the swaged joint;
  1. neither Venker nor Bowker was the holder of a rigger’s certificate of competency;
  1. Conrad failed to use reasonable diligence in the supervision, through its executive staff, of the employees, in particular Bowker and Venker, and failed to implement systems which ensured that all safety provisions were complied with;
  1. Conrad failed to comply with various provision of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1989.
  1. In the light of those findings it is obvious that the negligence of Conrad was far greater than that of Thane. Thane was found to be negligent because it was in breach of s 9(1) of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1989 in failing to ensure the safety of all its employees in circumstances where it was practicable to do so.  Senior counsel for Thane expressly did not contest on the hearing of the appeal the conclusion that Thane was liable to the plaintiffs for breach of the absolute duty applied to it by virtue of s 9.
  1. The only other pertinent comment made by the learned trial judge which indicates the basis of the finding of negligence against Thane is the statement: “As Thane had engaged Key Largo and in particular Mort Clark, to assume responsibility for their mechanical aspects of the show, the failure to ensure that the equipment used by the trapeze artist was safe was an abrogation of Mr Clark’s proper responsibilities for which Thane is liable to its employees.”
  1. Having regard to all the findings and the whole of the evidence it is clear that the active negligence was on the part of Conrad and those for whom it was responsible. Any contributory negligence on the part of Thane was predicated on the fact that it failed to fulfil its obligation to ensure that the equipment was safe for use by its employees. The finding against Thane is effectively that it assumed that Conrad had rendered the lifting apparatus safe and that it should have taken more steps to ensure that such was in fact the case.
  1. Counsel for Thane relied heavily on the reasoning of Thomas J in Evans v Port of Brisbane Authority & Ors (1992) Aust Torts Reports 81-169.  On the facts in that case it was held that the employer of the injured plaintiff should recover 100 per cent contribution from the active tortfeasors.  It is not necessary to refer to the facts of that case in detail.  There is no doubt as to the correctness of the decision of Thomas J on the facts then before him.  But the facts here are not identical.  Here were clear known dangers associated with the use of the trapeze apparatus and those dangers were, or should have been, clearly appreciated by Thane and those for whom it was responsible.  In the circumstances they were not entitled to abrogate their responsibility by saying they trusted and believed in Conrad's employees.  In hindsight it is obvious that simple checks would have revealed at an early stage at least some of the defects which were found to have contributed to the incident.
  1. However, the findings make it clear that Conrad was responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of the apparatus and it was the negligence of Venker and Bowker, particularly the latter, which was the immediate cause of the accident.
  1. Given all the findings by the learned trial judge I have come to the conclusion that an apportionment of 30 per cent cannot be supported. However, as noted above Thane remained liable to some extent because of its failure to carry out an inspection which would have revealed defects in the system. In the circumstances an apportionment of 90 per cent against Conrad and 10 per cent against Thane more accurately reflects responsibility for the negligence as found.
  1. The appeal should be allowed to the extent of varying the apportionment of liability as indicated.

Appeal No 4482 of 1999

  1. As noted above the WCB was the insurer of Thane and also conceded for purposes of the litigation that s 47 of the Act applied so that it was also obliged to indemnify Jupiters. That acknowledgment was based upon its construction of the Pre-Production and Presentation Agreement of 16 March 1992. The learned trial judge concluded after a careful consideration of that Agreement that both Conrad and Jupiters were “principals” for purposes of s 47 so that the WCB was obliged to indemnify both.
  1. The WCB has appealed against that decision, contending that upon the proper construction of the Agreement Conrad was not a principal for purposes of s 47.
  1. So far as is relevant s 47 provides:

“(1)In this section –

“contractor” means a person who by a contract undertakes to carry out, or to secure the carrying out of, work for another.

“principal” means a person for whom work is to be carried out by another under a contract to which the person is a contracting party.

. . .

  1. When a contract is made between a principal and a contractor for work to be carried out and workers are used in carrying out the work, or any part of it –
  1. the principal is declared to be an employer of every such worker used in carrying out work in performance of the contract . . .
  1. the cover of a policy maintained by the principal with the board extends to indemnify the principal against the principal's legal liability existing independently of this Act to pay damages in respect of injury to any such worker while used in carrying out work for which the contract is entered into, or any part of that work.

. . .

  1. If in the case of a contract such as is referred to in subsection (3) the principal is not indemnified against the legal liability referred to in subsection (3)(b), under –
  1. a policy maintained by the principal with the board; or
  1. a contract of insurance made independently of this Act;

the cover of a policy maintained with the board by the contractor extends to indemnify the principal against the principal's legal liability referred to in subsection (3)(b).”

  1. In order to appreciate the submissions it is necessary to quote reasonably extensively from the Agreement. The extracts most relevant for present purposes are the following:

“This agreement . . .

Between:

Conrad International Hotels Corporation . . . as agent for Jupiters Ltd . . . of Broadbeach Island, Broadbeach, Gold Coast in Queensland (Conrad)

and

[James Thane Pty Ltd] (the “Producer”)

. . .

whereas

A. Conrad operates and manages the Complex. 

B. Conrad . . . has commissioned the Producer to proceed with all necessary planning, design, cost estimating and all other ancillary activities necessary for the pre-production of the Show to be staged at the International Showroom.

. . .

D. Conrad . . . has agreed to appoint the Producer as producer to produce and present the Show subject to the terms hereof which appointment the Producer has agreed to accept.

Now this agreement witnesses that it is agreed by the parties as follows

. . .

“Complex” means the International Hotel and Casino at Broadbeach Island, Broadbeach, Gold Coast, Queensland in Australia and includes all equipment and other improvements contained therein and, where the context permits, includes any part thereof.

. . .

2.1 Conrad appoints the Producer to produce and present the show to the public in accordance with the Report and the terms of this Agreement.  The Producer accepts that appointment upon and subject to those terms.

. . .

3.1(a)  Subject to any agreement in writing to the contrary Conrad shall pay the actual Pre-Production Costs . . . as follows:-

. . .

  1. Conrad shall pay to the Producer for the Pre-Production and presentation of the Show to the public the following amounts . . .

. . .

4.1 The Producer shall not incur any expenditure or make any payments in respect of the Show except in accordance with the Report Provided However that Conrad may in its absolute discretion, upon application by the Producer to Conrad, grant prior written approval to expenditure to be incurred by the Producer other than in accordance with the Report. . . .

4.2 The Producer may from time to time submit to Conrad amendments to the Report which Conrad, in its sole discretion, may approve in writing or refuse.

. . .

4.4 Conrad may from time to time require its internal auditor to investigate the accounts and records of the Producer . . .

. . .

4.6 Conrad shall attend to payment of all wages, salaries and other sums due to persons engaged by the Producer in accordance with the Report . . .

5.1 All persons engaged in the presentation of the Show including, without limitation, all performers, singers, dancers, musicians and production manager . . . shall be employed or engaged by the Producer.

. . .

6.4 For the purposes of controlling the implementation of the Report and the running of the Show –

. . .

  1. Conrad’s prior written approval shall be obtained to any material variations in the Report and, once the Show opens, any variation or alteration in the presentation of the Show;
  1. Conrad shall be responsible for approving in writing all contracts proposed to be entered into by the Producer in connection with the Show. . . .

. . .

6.9 The Show shall be known by the name or such name as shall be determined by Conrad after consultation with the Producer.

6.10 . . . When required by Conrad, an intermission shall be incorporated in the presentation as such time during the presentation as shall be nominated from time to time by Conrad.

6.11 . . . The show shall commence at such times as shall be nominated from time to time by Conrad.

6.12 Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement Conrad shall be entitled, at its option, after completion of pre-production of the Show, to take over from the Producer the production of the Show . . .

7.1 In accordance with clause 4.5 Conrad shall be responsible for the costs of manufacture and/or supply of all plant, equipment, lighting, scenery, furniture, fittings, properties and costumes . . . required for the Show . . .

. . .

8.1 Conrad shall be solely responsible for the organisation and arrangement of such advertising and promotion for the show as it sees fit. . . .

. . .

9.2 The Producer shall indemnify and hold indemnified Conrad, Perpetual Trustees Queensland Ltd . . . Jupiters Management Ltd . . . Jupiters Ltd . . . and their and each of their employees and agents from and against all claims and expenses, losses, actions, suits and demands . . .

. . .

9.3 The Producer shall take out and maintain in the joint names of the Producer, Conrad, Perpetual Trustees Queensland Ltd, Jupiters Management Ltd and Jupiters Ltd an insurance policy covering third party liability . . .

. . .

12.1 Conrad shall be entitled to terminate this Agreement by giving notice in writing as follows:-

. . .

12A Conrad shall provide within the Complex an office (or similar facilities) for use by the Producer and persons included in the production and presentation of the Show . . .

. . .

13.7 Conrad may at any time by notice to the Producer assign any of its rights or liabilities under this Agreement. . . .

. . .

In witness whereof this Agreement has been executed on the day here and before written

Signed on behalf of Conrad International Hotels Corporation by William Robert Shephard as its duly authorised representative in the presence of . . .”

  1. The critical submission of counsel for the WCB is that, as evidenced by the recital of the parties to the agreement, Conrad was only a party as agent for Jupiters. In other words Jupiters was the principal, the contracting party, and therefore the only “principal” for purposes of s 47 of the Act. It was submitted that as Conrad expressly entered into the contract as agent for Jupiters, the latter was the only entity for whom the work was being carried out.
  1. It was agreed on each side that the critical issue determining the operation of s 47 was the identity of the person “for whom work is to be carried out”.
  1. That was also the approach adopted by the learned trial judge who concluded that “both Conrad and Jupiters are contracting parties and work was carried out for them by Thane under the contract to which they were contracting parties.”  That analysis resulted in a finding that not only was Conrad acting as agent for Jupiters in executing the contract but also undertook obligations and acquired rights of its own pursuant to the contract.  According to that view this was a contract where “the agent is a party to the contract as well as the principal”.
  1. The learned trial judge undertook a comprehensive historical survey of the equivalent of s 47 in workers’ compensation legislation in this State since 1905, but it is not necessary to rely on that for the purpose of properly construing s 47 and applying it to the facts; those matters can be resolved by the application of general principles.
  1. Of the most recent relevant authorities the best starting point is the decision of Brandon J in Bridges & Salmon Ltd v The “Swan” (Owner) [1968] 1 Ll L R 5.  At 12 he outlined the approach which should be adopted when the issue is whether a party contracted as agent but also in such a way as to be personally liable:

“Where A contracts with B on behalf of a disclosed principal C, the question whether both A and C are liable on the contract or only C depends on the intention of the parties.  That intention is to be gathered from (1) the nature of the contract, (2) its terms and (3) the surrounding circumstances … The intention for which the Court looks is not the subjective intention of A or of B.  Their subjective intentions may differ.  The intention for which the Court looks is an objective intention of both parties, based on what two reasonable businessmen making a contract of that nature, in those terms and in those surrounding circumstances, must be taken to have intended.”

  1. It is not necessary to refer to the detail of that case but the conclusion reached on the facts is summarised in the following passage at 14:

“It seems to me that, when a person who was known or correctly assumed to be the owner of a boat, has discussions with a repairing company’s manager about repairs to her, it is natural for the manager to assume that, if an order for the repairs is placed, that person will accept personal liability for them as such owner unless he makes the contrary clear beyond doubt.”

  1. That was approved of and applied by Clarke J in Smit International Singapore Pty Ltd v Kurnia Dewi Shipping S A [1997] 1 Ll L R 552.  Relevantly for present purposes the learned judge said at 558-9:

“… there is no reason in principle why both the principal and the agent should not be liable on a contract.  All depends upon the intentions of the parties, which are to be derived objectively from the nature of the contract, its terms and the surrounding circumstances.”

  1. Such an approach is not limited to the situation where agency is in issue; it applies wherever there is a question as to a qualification attached to the signature to a contract. Giles J had to consider whether a signature on a contract as director of a company, a party to the contract, also constituted an assent to be personally bound as a guarantor: Clarke Equipment Credit of Aust Ltd v Kiyose Holdings Pty Ltd (1989) 21 NSWLR 160.  That learned judge stated the general principle in the following terms at 174:

“… I conclude that the proper approach is to inquire whether there is to be found an intention that the signatory be personally bound to the contract evidenced in the document, meaning thereby not a subjective intention but an intention to be found objectively, notwithstanding a qualification attached to the signature.  That intention, or lack thereof, is to be found upon the construction of the document as a whole, including but not being limited to the qualification attached to the signature, in the light of the surrounding circumstances to the extent to which evidence thereof is permissible.  The inquiry is not limited to consideration of the signature and its qualification in order to determine whether or not the signature indicates an assent to be personally bound.”

  1. There, as is the more usual situation, the qualification was found at the end of the contract where it was executed. That is not the case here; Conrad’s signature when executing the contract is not qualified. The only reference in this contract to Conrad being the agent of Jupiters is in the recital of the parties. But, in my view, the problem is to be resolved by application of the principle derived from the authorities referred to above. One must determine the intention of the parties objectively having regard to the nature of the contract, the terms of the contract (including the qualification in the recitals), and the surrounding circumstances. Further, in my view, where a party signs a contract without qualification in the execution clause it would be natural for any other party to assume that the party so signing was contractually bound unless the contrary was made clear beyond doubt.
  1. The lengthy extract from the Pre-Production and Presentation Agreement quoted above establishes in my view that Conrad was a contracting party. It demonstrates that Conrad was in control of the management and operation of the complex, and in particular was the party responsible for ensuring that Thane met its contractual obligations. Clearly Conrad undertook obligations of its own pursuant to the contract and also acquired rights. Conrad was to pay presentation costs in respect of the show, was obliged to attend to the payment of all wages, salaries and other sums due to persons engaged by Thane, was obliged to cause Jupiters to employ persons to be engaged in the production and presentation of the show, and was responsible for the costs of manufacture and supply of all plant, equipment, lighting, scenery, furniture, fittings, properties and costumes. In addition Thane was subject to approvals, directions, requirements and other decisions of Conrad with respect to the performance. Thane also gave indemnities to both Conrad and Jupiters; the indemnity provisions (particularly found in clause 9) strongly suggest that Conrad was a contracting party. In reciting that Conrad was the agent of Jupiters the contract did no more than recognise that Conrad operated and managed the complex which was owned by Jupiters.
  1. When one considers all of the provisions of the contract it is clear that the “work” – the stage production - was to be carried out primarily for Conrad. Indeed all that has been said above on the issue of negligence goes to confirm that. Conrad’s responsibility with respect to the defective trapeze apparatus is consistent with that conclusion.
  1. The WCB has conceded that Jupiters was a “principal” for purposes of s 47. There is nothing in the section to suggest that there may not be more than one principal for its purposes. For the reasons articulated herein the learned trial judge was correct in concluding that Conrad was also a principal for purposes of the section.
  1. This appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Appeal No 4571 of 1999

  1. Given the outcome of Appeal No 4482 of 1999 the WCB is obliged to indemnify both Jupiters and Conrad with respect to their liability to the plaintiffs.  However the rights inter se between Jupiters and Conrad may not be entirely academic and are in issue in this appeal.
  1. In light of the fact that the WCB at trial indicated it would indemnify Jupiters but not Conrad, the latter sought to rely upon a right to indemnity pursuant to the Management Agreement between it and Jupiters dated 16 May 1988. Given the finding that both Conrad and Jupiters are principals for purposes of s 47 the WCB is therefore obliged to indemnify both, regardless of the indemnity provision in the Management Agreement. It is for that reason that this appeal is now academic.
  1. The indemnity clause is 12.4.1 which relevantly is in these terms:

“[Jupiters] will indemnify and hold Conrad … harmless from and against all actions … damages and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, based upon, or arising out of, any occurrence or event happening in or about the Complex, or occurring in or connection with the operation thereof, unless it is ultimately determined that liability has in fact arisen, and that such liability was caused by the gross negligence or wilful misconduct of Conrad …”.

  1. It was found by the learned trial judge, and this was accepted by all parties, that pursuant to the Management Agreement all the employees who worked at the complex, with the exception of four members of senior management, were employees of Jupiters. However, they all worked under the control of the four Conrad employees and were paid by Conrad out of accounts operated by it as agent for Jupiters. Clause 4.5.1 of the Management Agreement provided that Conrad should supervise through its executive staff the hiring, discharging, promotion and work of all other operating and service employees of the complex. Clause 4.8 further provided that Conrad should not be liable to Jupiters for the failure to perform any duty imposed on it pursuant to the Agreement to the extent that such failure is due to the act or omission of any member of the executive staff or other employees of Jupiters, provided that Conrad has used reasonable diligence in hiring, discharge and supervision of the executive staff and the supervision through such executive staff of the hiring, discharge and supervision of other employees of the hotel.
  1. The learned trial judge made the following critical findings against the background of those provisions:

“In this case, Conrad has failed to use reasonable diligence in the supervision through the executive staff of the supervision of other employees of the hotel.  It failed to implement systems which ensured that all provisions of the Workplace Health and Safety Act were complied with and in particular that Mr Bowker and Mr Venker did not do work in breach of that Act.  The failure of supervision included a failure to identify the qualifications required when Mr Bowker and Mr Venker were first appointed.  … the lifting equipment failed because inadequately qualified and supervised personnel maintained and operated the system. … These matters amount to a failure by Conrad, in breach of the Management Agreement, to use its best efforts to comply with all legal requirements and of the reasonable diligence referred to in the proviso to clause 4.8 and of the duty to supervise referred to in clause 4.5.1.”

  1. Later the judgment recorded the trial judge was “satisfied that such behaviour by Mr Venker and Mr Bowker was grossly negligent.  In particular, their actions in disconnecting the limit switch, replacing the wire and hand swaging the connections showed a reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiffs given the magnitude of the risk of accident and injury.”
  1. In consequence of the findings that there was gross negligence and failure to comply with the contractual requirements to use reasonable diligence in supervising staff it was held that Conrad was disentitled to claim indemnity from Jupiters. It is those findings and that conclusion which are challenged on this appeal.
  1. Essentially it appears that the learned trial judge reasoned that Bowker and Venker were grossly negligent, that Conrad was vicariously liable for the negligence of Bowker and Venker, and that therefore Conrad was guilty of gross negligence. That does not appear to have been the case pleaded by Jupiters. The pleaded gross negligence was failure by Conrad through its executive staff to supervise the hiring and work of Jupiters’ employees. The learned trial judge does not appear to have addressed the question whether there was gross negligence in the hiring and supervision by Conrad’s executive staff of Jupiters’ employees such as Bowker and Venker. The reasons for judgment contain references to evidence that Conrad had put in place an extensive system of reporting and supervision and had taken extensive measures to comply with the requirements of the Workplace Health and Safety Act.  The issue which should have been addressed was whether or not in all the circumstances as found it could be said that Conrad was personally (as distinct from vicariously) guilty of gross negligence.
  1. A reading of clause 12.4.1 of the Management Agreement, convinces me that what must be established for Conrad to lose its right of indemnification is that direct gross negligence on its part caused the liability in question. Vicarious liability for an act of gross negligence by hotel employees would not of itself be sufficient.
  1. It is not necessary to consider in depth the meaning of “gross negligence” in the subject clause. Clearly more than mere negligence is involved and I would favour an approach along the lines of that adopted by Mance J in Red Sea Tankers Ltd v Papachristidis & Ors – The “Hellespont Ardent” [1997] 2 Ll L R 547 at 586 – 588.
  1. Given the evidence as to the extensive supervisory and reporting system Conrad put in place, and the unchallenged evidence as to the competence of the executive staff selected, a finding of direct gross negligence on the part of Conrad would not be justified. Further, the evidence does not support a finding that Conrad failed to use its best efforts to cause compliance with requirements of the Management Agreement such as to constitute a breach of that Agreement disentitling Conrad to the indemnity.
  1. In the circumstances this appeal should be allowed with costs to be assessed, and a declaration made that Jupiters is obliged to indemnify Conrad.

Summary

  1. The following are the orders made:
  1. Appeal 4481 of 1999: Appeal allowed.  Vary the judgment so that it provides that the first defendant is liable to contribute 10% of the plaintiff’s damages and the second defendant is liable to contribute 90% of the plaintiff’s damages.  Dismiss the respondent’s notice of contention. Order the respondent second defendant pay the appellant’s costs to be assessed.
  1. Appeal 4482 of 1999: Appeal dismissed.   Order the appellant first defendant to pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed.
  1. Appeal 4571 of 1999: Appeal allowed.  Declare that the appellant/second defendant is entitled to be indemnified by the respondent/third defendant to the full extent of any liability which the appellant/second defendant has arising out of the plaintiff’s claim.  Order the respondent third defendant to pay the appellant’s costs to be assessed.

Footnotes

[1] AV Jennings Construction Pty Ltd v Maumill (1956) 30 ALJ 100, 101; Martin v Stratman (1994) Aust Torts Reports par 81-262; Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492; Williams v Government Insurance Office (NSW) BC9504454, Appeal No 40208 of 1992, 6 April 1995.

[2]  (1985) 59 ALJR 492.

[3] The Laws of Australia – Torts, 33.11 [19] “Assessment of Contribution”.

[4] Sherras v Van der Maat [1989] 1 Qd R 114 at 118.

[5] Collins v Hertfordshire County Council [1947] KB 598; The Miraflores v The Abadesa (Miraflores v Livanos) [1967] 1 AC 826, 845.

[6]  (1985) 59 ALJR 492 at 494.

[7]  (1978) 1 NSWLR 649, 656.

[8]  (1992) Aust Torts Reports par 81-169.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    James Thane Pty Ltd v Conrad International Hotels Corporation; Conrad International Hotels Corporation v Workers' Compensation Board; Conrad International Hotels Corporation v Jupiters Limited

  • Shortened Case Name:

    James Thane Pty Ltd v Conrad International Hotels Corporation

  • MNC:

    [1999] QCA 516

  • Court:

    QCA

  • Judge(s):

    McMurdo P, Thomas JA, Williams J

  • Date:

    14 Dec 1999

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
A.V. Jennings Construction Pty Ltd v Maumill (1956) 30 ALJ 100
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1956) 30 ALJ 100
Bridges & Salmon Ltd v The "Swan"(Owner) [1968] 1 LL.L.R. 5
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1968] 1 LL.L.R. 5
Cite 2 - [1968] 1 LL.L.R. 5
Cite 3 - [1968] 1 LL.L.R. 5
Clarke Equipment Credit of Aust Ltd v Kiyose Holdings Pty Ltd (1989) 21 NSWLR 160
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1989) 21 NSWLR 160
Clarke Equipment Credit of Aust Ltd v Klyose Holdings Pty Ltd (1989) 21 NSWLR 60
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1989) 21 NSWLR 60
Collins v Hertfordshire County Council (1947) KB 598
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1947) KB 598
Evans v Port of Brisbane Authority & Ors (1992) ATR 81-169
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) ATR 81-169
Evans v Port of Brisbane Authority & Ors (1992) Aust Torts Reports 81-169
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) Aust Torts Reports 81-169
Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd (1978) 1 NSWLR 649
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1978) 1 NSWLR 649
Cite 2 - (1978) 1 NSWLR 649
Martin v Stratman (1994) Aust Torts Reports par 81-262
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1994) Aust Torts Reports par 81-262
Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1985) 59 ALJR 492
Cite 2 - (1985) 59 ALJR 492
Cite 3 - (1985) 59 ALJR 492
Podresek v Australian & Steel Pty Ltd (1989) 59 ALJR 492
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1989) 59 ALJR 492
Red Sea Tankers Ltd v Papachristidis & Ors - T he "Hellespont Ardent" [1997] 2 Ll L R 547
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1997] 2 Ll L R 547
Sherras v Van Der Maat[1989] 1 Qd R 114; [1987] QSC 453
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1989] 1 Qd R 114
Smit International Singapore Pty Ltd v Kurnia Dewi shipping SA [1997] 1 Ll L R 552
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1997] 1 Ll L R 552
Cite 2 - [1997] 1 Ll L R 552
The Miraflores and the Abadesa (1967) 1 AC 826
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1967) 1 AC 826

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Bilson v Vatsonic Communications Pty Ltd [2024] QDC 422 citations
Bilson v Vatsonic Communications Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 171 1 citation
Carey-Schofield v Hays Specialist Recruitment (Australia) Pty Ltd [2024] QSC 602 citations
Hirst v Nominal Defendant[2005] 2 Qd R 133; [2005] QCA 651 citation
QNI Resources Pty Ltd v North Queensland Pipeline No 1 Pty Ltd [2017] QCA 2971 citation
Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd (in liq) v Queensland Nickel Sales Pty Ltd[2018] 3 Qd R 133; [2017] QSC 3055 citations
Theden v Nominal Defendant [2004] QSC 3101 citation
1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.