Ettridge v Sharples
[2002] QCA 395
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- Unreported Judgment
- Ettridge v Sharples[2002] QCA 395
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Ettridge v Sharples[2002] QCA 395
Ettridge v Sharples[2002] QCA 395
COURT OF APPEAL
DAVIES JA
HELMAN J
JONES J
Appeal No 2308 of 2002
TERRY PATRICK SHARPLESFirst Respondent
(Plaintiff)
and
DESMOND J O'SHEASecond Respondent
(First Defendant)
and
PAULINE HANSON'S ONE NATIONNot a Party
(Second Defendant)
and
DAVID WILLIAM ETTRIDGEApplicant
BRISBANE
DATE 30/09/2002
JUDGMENT
DAVIES JA: On 11 March 2002 Mr Ettridge filed in this Court a purported application described as an "application to set aside judgment". Although it is not entirely clear it seems as if the judgment which he seeks to set aside is the judgment of this Court cited Sharples v. O'Shea & Hanson [2000] QCA 23 delivered on 10 March 2000.
The orders sought by him are:
"1.That an extension of time be granted.
- That this appeal be allowed.
- That the decision in Sharples v O'Shea & Anor [2000] QCA 23 (18 February 200) Be set aside, or alternatively a decision in favour of the Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party.
- That the decision in Sharples v O'Shea & Anor [1999] QSC 190 (18 August 1999) be dismissed as an Abuse of Process, or alternatively a decision in favour of Paul Hanson's One Nation Party.
- That costs be awarded against Terry Patrick Sharples, the First Respondent/Plaintiff or his indemnifier for this Appeal the primary case (2) and appeal to the Appeals Court. (3) At actual costs, or on Solicitor and client basis."
The reference to the decision of 18 August 1999 is a decision of the trial judge the appeal against which this Court dismissed in its judgment of 10 March 2000. The decision of the learned trial Judge was one setting aside a decision of the Electoral Commissioner made on 4 December 1997 and deciding instead that Pauline Hanson's One Nation was not entitled to be registered as a political party in Queensland as it did not satisfy the requirements of section 70 of the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld).
Mr Ettridge was not a party to the proceeding before a learned primary judge, or the appeal to this Court. He was, it seems, however, one of only three members of Pauline Hanson's One Nation, an unincorporated entity which was represented at trial and at the appeal by Ms Hanson.
There is apparently another matter which Mr Ettridge sought to bring before the Court and that was a subpoena issued by him, or purportedly issued against Anthony Abbott, a Minister in the Federal Government. I set aside that subpoena last week, but if there had been any basis for the substantive application which he makes and which I have set out, I would have been prepared to set aside my order and re-hear the application for the subpoena today if Mr Ettridge had wished, but the question is whether there is any basis for permitting the principal application by Mr Ettridge to proceed.
As already mentioned, judgment in that was given by this Court on 10 March 2000 and that judgment was perfected. An application for special leave to appeal against that judgment to the High Court was made but later abandoned.
There is a long standing principle of law which has been stated in the following terms:
"Once an order disposing of a proceeding has been perfected by being drawn up as the record of a court, that proceeding apart from any specific and relevant statutory provision is at an end in that court and is in its substance, in my opinion, beyond recall by that court. It would, in my opinion, not promote the due administration of the law or the promotion of justice for a court to have power to reinstate a proceeding of which it has finally disposed."
Bailey v. Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529 at 530; DJL v. The Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226 at [32] to [38]. There is no possible basis for departing from that principle here.
The application by Mr Ettridge, in effect seeking a re-hearing of the appeal to this Court is therefore, in my opinion, incompetent. I would strike it out. It follows that the order setting aside the subpoena should not in turn be set aside.
HELMAN: I agree.
JONES J: I agree.
DAVIES JA: The application by Mr Ettridge is struck out.
...
DAVIES JA: The application is struck out with costs.