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- R v Booth[2005] QCA 30
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R v Booth[2005] QCA 30
R v Booth[2005] QCA 30
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
PARTIES: | |
FILE NO/S: | |
Court of Appeal | |
PROCEEDING: | Appeal against Conviction |
ORIGINATING COURT: | |
DELIVERED ON: | 18 February 2005 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 7 February 2005 |
JUDGES: | McMurdo P, McPherson JA and Jerrard JA |
ORDER: | Appeal against Conviction dismissed |
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – OBJECTIONS AND POINTS NOT RAISED IN COURT BELOW – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – PARTICULAR CASES – where appellant tried by jury on three counts of indictable offences - where trial judge directed the jury that a reasonable doubt is a doubt which they find to be reasonable – whether trial judge erred in directing the jury to this effect CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – OBJECTIONS AND POINTS NOT RAISED IN COURT BELOW – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – PARTICULAR CASES – where trial judge refused a request to direct the jury that if they were left in doubt as to where the truth lay, the verdict should be not guilty – where trial judge subsequently gave further directions to the effect that a rejection of part or all of the appellant’s evidence did not necessarily mean that the prosecution had succeeded – whether trial judge erred in giving these directions CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – TESTS – WHETHER JURY WOULD HAVE RETURNED SAME VERDICT – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – where appellant contended that evidence from co-accused which was unavailable at trial was now available on appeal – where appellant did not call co-accused as a witness during trial – where no statement by co-accused indicative of appellant’s innocence put before court – whether the jury would have acquitted appellant if co-accused’s evidence supporting appellant had been before it at trial Green v R (1971) 126 CLR 28, applied |
COUNSEL: | The appellant appeared on his own behalf |
SOLICITORS: | The appellant appeared on his own behalf |
[1] McMURDO P: I agree with Jerrard JA that the appeal against conviction should be dismissed for the reasons he gives.
[2] McPHERSON JA: For the reasons given by Jerrard JA, which I have read and with which I agree, this appeal must be dismissed.
[3] JERRARD JA: On 19 August 2004 William David Booth, known as Dave Booth, was convicted by a jury on three charges. These were of entering the dwelling of Wayne Charles Roberts on 17 August 2003 with the intent to commit an indictable offence, robbing Mr Roberts that day while armed with an offensive weapon and when in the company of another, and of unlawfully assaulting Mr Roberts that day whilst so armed and in company. Mr Booth’s co-offender, one Andre Timothy Bonne, had also pleaded not guilty before the jury at what was to be the start of their joint trial, but changed his plea to guilty on all three counts after the lunch adjournment, and before the Crown opened its case. He was given bail, and the jury were told that the matter involving Mr Bonne had been adjourned. On 20 August 2004 both offenders were sentenced to four years imprisonment on the robbery count, and to concurrent three year terms on the others. Mr Booth has appealed against his conviction on three separate grounds.
Ground 1
[4] The first is that the learned trial judge erred in directing the jury to the effect that a reasonable doubt is a doubt which they find to be reasonable. The learned judge had directed the jury in the following terms.
“Before you can convict an accused, you must be satisfied of their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That phrase “reasonable doubt” is one that you will have all heard at some time in the past. It is a phrase that should be readily understood by you. It is not a term of art and it has got no technical meaning. It bears its ordinary everyday meaning. That is, a doubt which you as a jury find reasonable. If at the end of your deliberations you find yourself with a doubt as to the accused’s guilt, provided that doubt is a reasonable one, you will have a reasonable doubt and you would have to find the accused not guilty. It would not be enough if you thought the accused probably was guilty. You must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused on a particular charge, then it is your sworn duty to find the accused guilty of that charge. If you are not so satisfied, then it is equally your sworn duty to find the accused not guilty of that charge.”
[5] That direction contained the relevant critical proposition stated in Green v R[1], that a reasonable doubt is a doubt which the particular jury entertain in the circumstances; the people on the jury themselves set the standard of what is reasonable in the circumstances. That proposition was described by this Court as a helpful observation in R v Holman [1997] 1 Qd R 373 at 378, and repeated by this Court in R v Irlam; ex parte A-G[2], in R v Punj[3], and R v Kidd[4]. A direction in essentially similar terms is suggested in the Queensland Supreme and District Court Bench Book at 57.1. The learned trial judge was accordingly quite correct in directing the jury in terms which have been approved by the High Court, subsequently repeated and approved by this Court a number of times in the last decade, and which accord with the direction suggested in the Bench Book. That direction was cited with apparent approval in R v Irlam. That ground of appeal must fail.
Ground 2
[6] The second ground of appeal was that the learned trial judge erred in not directing the jury to the effect that if they be left in doubt as to where the truth lies, the verdict should be not guilty. That ground of appeal reflected the course of the trial before the jury, in which the complainant Wayne Roberts gave evidence describing an attack on him at the same time by both Mr Booth and Mr Bonne, whereas Mr Booth gave evidence admitting his presence when Mr Bonne attacked Mr Roberts, but denying having taken any part in the attack by Mr Bonne. The learned trial judge had refused, when requested, to direct the jury that if the jurors were left in doubt as to where the truth lay, the verdict should be not guilty. Had the trial judge adhered to that position, that would have resulted in an error of law. That point was settled in R v George [1980] Qd R 346 at 347. In that case the Court of Criminal Appeal cited with approval decisions of the Victorian and New South Wales Courts of Criminal Appeal, which emphasised the desirability in cases in which evidence is led for the defence in contradiction of evidence called by the Crown, of a direction that if the jury is left in doubt as to where the truth lies the verdict should be not guilty.
[7] The learned judge did give the jury further directions, at the request of Mr Booth’s counsel, directing them that if they rejected Mr Booth’s evidence or part of it, that did not necessarily mean that the prosecution had succeeded. The re-direction continued:
“You must still consider all the rest of the evidence in the trial that you do accept and see whether that satisfies you of the accused’s guilt. By that I mean that if you reject the accused’s evidence, then you still obviously have to look at Mr Robert’s evidence and see whether that satisfies beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt. You do not just say ‘I reject the accused’s evidence, therefore what Mr Roberts is saying must be true.’ If you reject the accused’s evidence, then you still have to consider all the rest of the evidence and see whether that satisfies you of the accused’s guilt.”