SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND 

1. WILLIAMS JA:  The appellant was convicted after a trial on 3 June 2005 of one count of maintaining a sexual relationship with a female child under the age of 16 years who was under his care and five counts of unlawfully and indecently dealing with a female child under the age of 16 who was under his care.  The maintaining (count 1) was alleged to have been committed during the period 1 January 1999 to 1 October 2000.  The complainant child, M, was the appellant's natural daughter who was born in 1984.  The appellant was sentenced to four years imprisonment.

2. On 6 July 2005 the appellant lodged a notice of appeal containing as the only ground of appeal against conviction that the "verdict of the Jury does not accord with the evidence adduced and admitted at trial". That notice was delivered out of time and on 31 August 2005 this Court ordered that the time for appealing against conviction be extended until 31 August 2005.

3. In the written outline of submissions forwarded to the Court on behalf of the appellant the grounds of appeal were stated to be:

"(A)The learned trial judge erred in his directions to the jury by failing to or failing to adequately direct the jury;  

2. The verdict on each individual count was unsafe and unsatisfactory".  

On the hearing of the appeal no application was formally made to amend the grounds of appeal, but submissions from both counsel were directed to the grounds stated in the written submissions.  In the circumstances the Court will deal with the matter as if leave had formally been granted to add as grounds of appeal items (A) and (B) in the written submissions.

4. It is not irrelevant to note at this stage that the appellant was also charged with two sexual offences involving his daughter A, born in 1987. The appellant denied on oath committing those offences, and there was nothing in the evidence tending to support the evidence of A or suggesting that some improper relationship existed between them. The jury acquitted on those two counts.

5. The appellant and M's mother separated in about 1988 and M lived with her mother until about Christmas 1998. There were then tensions between M and her mother and she went to live with the appellant who at that time was in a relationship with another woman, J. Initially they lived at GM but shortly after M joined them they moved to P.

6. According to the evidence of M the first relevant incident (count 2) occurred in the early months of 1999. J was in bed asleep and the appellant and M were sitting on a couch at the bottom of that bed watching television. According to M the appellant put his hand down inside her pants, touched her vaginal area, asked her if that aroused her, and also touched her nipples. M's evidence was that J then stirred and asked what was going on. The appellant in evidence denied any such incident. J gave evidence of an occasion when she was in bed asleep at night and M was on the couch with the TV on. She was awoken by what she described as "sort of a combination of heavy walking and deep breathing". She said, "What's going on?" On her evidence M "just took off out of the bedroom" and "S [the appellant] went into the bathroom". In response to her question the appellant said, "Nothing. Go back to sleep".

7. The next incident (count 3) occurred a few months later. The appellant and M were home alone. That night, according to the appellant, he bought a carton of Fourex Gold for himself and four cans of Red Bear bourbon for M. They proceeded to drink that alcohol; M said they were "drinking to get drunk". She became sick and was throwing up on the lounge room floor. Her evidence was that she was then wearing a pink nightgown and underwear. According to M's evidence the appellant began giving her a back massage while she was lying on her stomach on the floor. Her evidence was "He ended up massaging my buttocks. He ended up putting his fingers down between my legs underneath my underwear. He was stroking me. He penetrated me with his finger".

8. The appellant in his evidence admitted the drinking episode and said they were watching a video. According to the appellant's evidence M was quite sick and screamed out that she was dying; in consequence he gave her "a bit of a pat on the back, or a bang on the back, and said, 'Welcome to the real world. You are not dying, you are only drunk'." He said that he cleaned up the vomit and "M went into my bed". His evidence was that he then also slept in that bed but denied anything happened between them.

9. Ultimately under cross-examination, but after giving some evasive answers, the appellant admitted that on that night he was naked in the bed; as he put it: "I have always slept naked".

10. The appellant and J separated in about June 1999 and the appellant, accompanied by M, moved to MO. According to the evidence of M the next relevant incident (count 4) occurred at MO between February and May 2000. The appellant and M were alone in the house drinking from a cask of wine; so much was agreed to by the appellant in his evidence. They were playing a game called "Sevens". Apparently if a person said anything with seven in it or a multiple of seven that person had to "skull [sic] your drink". According to M the game was played for about an hour and a half until she was quite drunk. As already noted the appellant admitted that the game was played and glasses of wine were being drunk. The only inconsistency between their evidence is that according to the appellant M had started drinking before he had arrived home.

11. Again as a result of the drinking M vomited; she said that she soiled the clothing she was wearing so she "ended up putting a robe on". According to her evidence the appellant then said, "Go to my bed". She did so. According to M's evidence the appellant, naked, then also got into that bed. Relevantly her evidence was that the appellant "ended up playing with my breasts, touching them, feeling them. He undid my robe. He sort of got on top of me and was sucking my nipples . . . he went down and was trying to lick me down there, trying to pull my legs apart . . . I could feel his penis against me. . . . I ended up saying, 'No, don't do this', and I think I rolled off the bed".

12. According to the appellant's evidence-in-chief M said she would clean up the mess and he went to bed; he denied any further contact with M during the night. It is not irrelevant to note that during cross-examination the appellant admitted that on numerous occasions after June 1999 he and M slept in the same bed, sometimes he being naked.

13. Whilst still living at MO, M's evidence was that the appellant and she regularly slept in the same bed and he would "often play with my bum" and "would often touch my breasts". She then gave evidence of a particular incident which became count 5 on the indictment. Her evidence was that the appellant was "playing with my breasts again. He ended up sliding a finger - sliding his hand down underneath my underpants. He was sliding his finger in and out of me".

14. The final count on the indictment involving M (count 6) was representative of what occurred after the parties moved to a house at B. She referred in particular to an occasion when he caressed her breasts and buttocks, then "slid a finger inside of me - inside my vagina, asked if that felt good".

15. The appellant in evidence-in-chief denied all the incidents at MO and B, but cross-examination could be said to have established a basis for a finding that M and he slept in the same bed on occasions at each of those places.

16. In addition to her evidence relevant to count 2, J gave evidence which the jury were entitled to accept as establishing that the appellant had an inappropriate sexual interest in M. She regularly observed the appellant, something like "once a fortnight", give M a "tweak. . . on the boob". The appellant, according to J, also made comments about the developing size of M's breasts. Finally, and of more significance, was her evidence in relation to an incident she observed in the dam on the property in P.

17. The evidence of J was that on an occasion she observed an incident from the veranda of the house which overlooked the dam. Relevantly she said:

". . .here's S and M in the dam and from here had nothing on, and she had actually straddled him, and to me that was - horrified - oh, go back inside, which I did.  Yeah, it just wasn't right.  . . .  She was straddling him from - you know, facing towards him.  I don't know what was happening or anything like that, it's just what I saw. . . There was a bit of movement, only the slight one, but M sort of - you know, when you're falling back from something and she was just all of a sudden moved forward again, but I don't know what was going on."

18. M gave evidence of regularly "skinny-dipping" in the dam with, amongst other people, the appellant. Relevantly her evidence was as follows:

"Yes, quite often he would grab me and hold me against him.  He'd like, try and touch my breasts, stuff like that, but because we were in a - well, in a dam I was quite often able to get away, swim away, preventing that type of thing happening.  . . .  I remember he sat me on his lap once and I could feel his erection, and he was grabbing me and I swam away.  . . . I just remember quite often skinny-dipping in the dam and being touched or felt up.  . . . He'd swim up and put his hand between my legs and then he'd swim away."

M expanded on the incident where she said the appellant "sat me on his lap" in the dam.  It appears that the appellant was standing on one leg and had his other leg raised up and she was then sitting on that raised leg. 

19. In the course of the summing up the following relevant passages appear:

"Now, in this case I will set out for you later on the elements of the offences, but no-one is suggesting that if you were to be satisfied on the complainants’ evidence that it was evidence which was accurate and reliable and of which you can be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, there is no dispute raised that you would find the defendant guilty on that basis.  Equally if you have a reasonable doubt about the complainants’ evidence, obviously you would acquit in relation to any count upon which you had such reasonable doubt.

I will explain the elements of the offences to you later on, but ultimately, as I think each of the lawyers has said to you, in this case the central question is an assessment of the credibility and reliability of the evidence that you have heard."

. . .

"In that sense it is a case that, on the prosecution case, comes down to whether you can be satisfied on that evidence of the complainant that what she is telling you is true in each case - that is, M or A respectively.

Now, because that's the case, you obviously need to scrutinise carefully the evidence of the complainants before you get to a position whereby you can say that you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt.  That’s perhaps particularly so in A's case because, whereas you have heard some evidence of J - which I will refer to later - in which J gives some evidence not of - not direct evidence of the offences charged, but gives some evidence of seeing something happen in the dam and some evidence of what the prosecution says is evidence of sexual interest in relation to M.  But there's no - that evidence doesn't go so far as A is concerned.  So, in this sort of case you have got to look carefully at the evidence of the complainants because ultimately you are being asked to convict the defendant upon their word. 

. . .

Matters which will concern you are the credibility and reliability of the evidence; that is, the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of their evidence.  Credibility concerns honesty.  Reliability may be a different matter.  A witness may be honestly believing what they are saying but might have a poor memory, otherwise be mistaken or just be telling you something that's not right.  What you need to be satisfied of, particularly in relation to evidence that you are going to use to convict the defendant, if that's what you were to do, would be - you would have to be satisfied that the evidence was evidence not only honestly given but reliable evidence; evidence that you can reliably act upon to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt."

. . .

"Now, of course, you need to be satisfied that each of those elements - each of those offences - sorry, in relation to any offence you have to be satisfied that each of the elements are satisfied but, as I said at the outset, this is really a case where if in relation to the charges you concluded that you were satisfied on the complainants' evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, then there is no real contest that you would be satisfied that the elements have been made out with respect to the relevant charge."

. . .

"However, this is a case, obviously, where the credibility and reliability of evidence is in issue.  If you were to get to a position in analysing the complainants' evidence, or one of them, that in relation to one of these charges you weren’t satisfied about the credibility of the witness, you weren't satisfied that she was being honest and had serious doubts about her credibility, then - indeed, even doubts about her credibility - then you are entitled to go through a process of reasoning of saying, "Well, look, I'm not satisfied about her credibility with respect to that incident", and that might cause you a doubt when assessing the overall credibility.  You might say, "I'm not sure whether I can believe her on some other count since I don't think she's being credible on this one."   I’m not saying you necessarily should do that, I am just saying that that's something that's open to you.  You shouldn't, however, say, well, because she's made out one of these counts against the defendant that that necessarily all the other ones are true.  But if you do have a - if you do reject her evidence with respect to one of the counts on the basis that she's not a credible witness on that count, you are entitled to have regard to that in assessing her overall credibility."

. . .

"Now, in this case, as I say, in addition to the evidence concerning those charged offences on the indictment you have also heard evidence from the complainant about other alleged incidents which she says sexual activity involving the defendant occurred. . . . Those instances are not the subject of any charges before you and you can use the evidence of them for one purpose only.  That is, if you accept the evidence, it shows, so the prosecution says, the true nature of the relationship between the defendant and the complainant, thus placing the alleged events the subject of the charges in their proper context.  You should have regard to the evidence of the incidents not the subject of the charges only if you find it reliable.  If you accept it, you must not use it to conclude that the defendant is someone who has a tendency to commit the type of offence with which he is charged."

. . .

"Now J also gave evidence about some of these uncharged acts.  In particular she referred to the tweaking, I think she referred to it - tweaking of the boob.  Again, that evidence can only be used for that limited purpose that I mentioned.   The evidence from her, if you accept it, in terms of its reliability, can be used to support, as it were, what the prosecution says about the relationship which sets the context for the charged events.  . . . What the witness J's evidence also does, the prosecution says, is that - and in this regard you remember that she gave evidence that she saw the two of them skinny dipping, with M straddling her father and some movement backwards and forwards, although she couldn't see what precisely was going on in the dam, and she also gave evidence about some comments that were made about - physical comments about M and the way she was developing and the like.  Insofar as you accept that evidence as reliable, the Crown asks you to draw an inference from the evidence that there was sexual interest shown by the defendant in M. 

Now, two things before I go further on that: first of all, you have to accept the reliability of the evidence, and in that regard obviously you need to compare it to the other evidence you have heard.  Now, you have to consider that in relation to the dam incident, for example, that whilst you heard evidence from the complainant about incidents in the dam, the description given by the complainant and the description given of what this witness saw isn't precisely the same, and you would have to consider the differences and whether that affects whether or not you will accept the evidence.

In relation to the tweaking, I don't think the complainant, you will remember, gave any evidence about boob tweaking."

. . .

"If you are satisfied about the evidence of sexual interest, then that is part of the evidence that you can have regard to when you are assessing the credibility and reliability of the complainants' evidence and the defendant's evidence."

. . .

"[The defendant's counsel] reminded you that even if you had difficulty in accepting the defendant's evidence, then before you could convict you should look at the complainants' evidence carefully and he says when you do that you will be left with more than a reasonable doubt."

. . .

"[Counsel for the prosecution] said that the case comes down to whether you can be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of what the girls say.  He invited you to take into account the evidence of the context, and in relation to the evidence of the complaint and what the defendant said about the inconsistencies he said they were matters which would not give you a reasonable doubt."

20. Those extensive quotations from the summing up have been cited because of specific submissions addressed to the Court on the hearing of the appeal. The summing up must, of course, be read as a whole, and the quoted passages should not be regarded as the only portions of the summing up relevant to the deliberations of the jury with respect to the evidence.

21. In the written outline of argument (prepared by counsel but not counsel who appeared on the hearing of the appeal) it was contended that given the evidence in this case a "strong, strident, and repeated warning [should] have been made by the Learned Trial Judge in his summing up about the dangers inherent in convicting the Appellant on the uncorroborated evidence of the Complainant." As was conceded by counsel on the hearing of the appeal there is no authority supporting the proposition that any warning required need be "strident" or "repeated". If a warning is required then it is sufficient if it is given in clear, precise terms and with the apparent endorsement of the trial judge.

22. In this case it was said there was an error in the summing up because the jury was not instructed that sexual interest by the appellant in the complainant was not corroboration. Such a direction may have been called for if the jury was instructed that some evidence could amount to corroboration; in those circumstances there may well be an obligation to make clear to the jury what could, and could not, constitute corroboration. But in the present case, understandably, the learned trial judge did not use the term corroboration at all. He merely told the jury that if they accepted the evidence of J they could conclude that that evidence demonstrated an inappropriate sexual interest by the appellant in M and that if they so concluded then that provided background context in which the detailed evidence of M had to be considered, and they could find some support for the evidence of M in that evidence given by J. The learned trial judge did not err in failing to direct the jury in the terms contended for by counsel for the appellant.

23. Then it was submitted that the learned trial judge erred in not specifically warning the jury about acting on the uncorroborated evidence of M. That submission must be considered in the light of s 632 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) which relevantly provides:

"(1)A person may be convicted of an offence on the uncorroborated testimony of 1 witness. . .

 (2)On the trial of a person for an offence, a judge is not required by any rule of law or practice to warn the jury that it is unsafe to convict the accused on the uncorroborated testimony of 1 witness."

However, as pointed out by the High Court in Robinson v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 162 that does not mean that a warning is not required to be given where a warning is necessary to avoid a perceptible risk of miscarriage of justice arising from the circumstances of a particular case.  When considering whether or not a warning is called for, or whether a miscarriage of justice has been established because a warning was not given, it is appropriate to bear in mind the summation by Keane JA (with whom the other members of this Court agreed) of the applicable principles in R v TN [2005] QCA 160; relevantly there it was said after referring to Carr v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 314:

"Three points of present relevance are made in this passage.  The first is that in most cases a warning is not a necessary aid to the jury's performance of its function of assessing the evidence.  The second point is that the basis for the giving of a warning is the "special knowledge, experience or awareness" of the judge (actual or inherited).  The third point . . . is that the giving of the warning is a matter of necessity to avoid a miscarriage of justice.  If the warning is not necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice it need not be given.

It is to be emphasised that it is not sufficient to establish that a miscarriage of justice has occurred or that a verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, that a comment or a warning might have been given as a matter of prudence so that the trial would be "more fair".  It is only where the necessity for a warning has arisen that a failure to give the warning will ground a claim that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.  In my view, in the present case, no occasion arose for the giving of a warning as a direction necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice.  The "dangers", if any, of acting upon the evidence of the complainant were equally obvious to the jury; there is no special judicial knowledge to be brought to bear in the assessment of the reliability of the complainant's evidence; and there was no other aspect of the case which bore upon the assessment of the evidence of which a judge, but not a jury, would be aware."

24. Counsel for the appellant pointed to a number of matters in support of the proposition that in the circumstances of this particular case a stronger warning about convicting on the evidence of M alone was required. Reference was made to the fact that M continued to occupy the same bedroom as the appellant after the alleged molestation commenced, that such use of the same bedroom occurred after the move to MO when other adults were in the home from time to time, that with respect to count 2, J was close by and could easily have been alerted by the complainant to what was happening, that on two occasions M was quite drunk but was nevertheless able to give a detailed account of the alleged molestation, that for a period whilst at P, M kept a diary but made no reference in it of sexual molestation, and that the first complaint was made about four years after the last incident and well after M had returned to live with her natural mother.

25. With respect to a number of those matters there was evidence from M explaining her conduct. For example, the principal purpose of her keeping the diary was to record events concerning the breakdown of the relationship between the appellant and J. She had come to regard J as her mother and saw in that relationship an environment in which she was happy. The absence of any reference in the diary to sexual molestation is thus readily explicable; but it also should be noted that the prosecution was able to point to one, albeit vague, reference therein to possible distrust of her father.

26. All but one of the matters referred to by counsel for the appellant were alluded to in the course of the summing up. All were essentially matters requiring an understanding of human nature generally within the knowledge and province of a jury. In order to appreciate the implications of those matters for purposes of the trial one did not need any special knowledge or experience such as that gained by a trial judge over many years of presiding at trials of this type.

27. The matter not specifically dealt with in the summing up was the delay in making a complaint and the fact that the complainant had been living away from the appellant for some time before doing so. But the judge was restrained by s 4A(4) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld) in dealing with that topic.  In the circumstances it was probably better for him to say nothing and leave it to the common sense of the jury to make what they would from the failure of M to make a complaint to her mother at an earlier time.

28. M was obviously at relevant times a troubled young girl. She was the product of a broken home who lived with her mother until age about 14 when tensions developed between them. Most parents, and the average juror, would have some understanding of what was then occurring. M subsequently moved in with her father and his partner. She found comfort in that relationship. In those circumstances it is not difficult for an ordinary person to understand the competing emotions which would have arisen when the appellant began interfering with her sexually. Whilst her evidence needed to be scrutinised carefully, and the honesty and reliability of her evidence was of critical importance, she did not become a suspect witness simply because she continued to display a somewhat unnatural closeness to her father.

29. The jury was clearly directed that it was necessary to scrutinise carefully the evidence of M and that it was only if they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of its honesty and reliability that there was a basis on which they could convict the appellant. The jury was also directed that there was some evidence from J which, if accepted, supported the complainant's evidence that the appellant had an inappropriate sexual interest in his daughter.

30. The fact that the jury returned verdicts of not guilty on the two counts involving A is to my mind a further demonstration that appropriate warnings were given and that those warnings were appreciated by the jury. There was nothing at all in the evidence tending to support the allegations made by A and, perhaps because of her age, her evidence was less detailed than that of M and there were more obvious inconsistencies in it. The verdicts of not guilty were clearly understandable given the warnings contained in the summing up.

31. It follows in my view that the jury was appropriately directed.

32. With respect to the ground of appeal that the verdict on each count was unsafe and unsatisfactory counsel made the following submissions. The verdict on count 2 "defies reason and common sense" because it "cannot be reasonably accepted that the accused would indulge in such conduct with his de facto lying asleep beside or close to the Complainant and the Accused, capable of waking up or being woken up at any time." Such a submission is in truth contrary to human experience. The conduct involved mere touching and clearly the conduct itself was not likely to disturb the appellant's sleeping partner. The appellant took a risk that M would not immediately wake the partner and make a complaint, but that does not make the incident an affront to reason and common sense.

33. With respect to counts 3 and 4 the submission was that an intoxicated girl would not be able to remember the actual sequence of events and conversations such as were contained in the evidence of M. Again human experience suggests that persons adversely affected by alcohol are often able to recall the detail of events, particularly of incidents which were of some importance to the affected person.

34. With respect to counts 5 and 6 it was submitted that the evidence of other adults in the house at the time did not support the complainant's evidence. That is true, but it does not mean that the complainant's evidence is thereby rendered suspect. If other people are in the vicinity the perpetrator of incidents such as those in question here often take steps to ensure that the conduct in question is not observed by others.

35. Having regard to the whole of the evidence I am not persuaded that the verdicts were unsafe and unsatisfactory. The summing up was adequate in the circumstances, and the jury was clearly entitled to accept the evidence of the complainant as being honest and reliable. In those circumstances they were entitled to convict.

36. It follows that the appeal against convictions should be dismissed.

37. JERRARD JA:  In this appeal I have read the reasons for judgment of Williams JA and I agree with His Honour that the appeal should be dismissed.

38. ATKINSON J:  I agree with Williams JA that the appeal should be dismissed and with his Honour’s reasons for doing so. 

39. The appellant’s written submissions argued that the judge should have warned the jury that it was dangerous to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant. As noted by Williams JA, these submissions were not written by counsel who appeared on the hearing of the appeal. Reference was made to categories of witnesses who might attract such a warning including “accomplices, children giving evidence under oath, alleged victims of sexual assault and persons of bad character.”

40. The conjunction of such a disparate group of witnesses is most unfortunate and the stereotypical thinking which lies behind it is no longer acceptable. It is based on the erroneous reasoning demonstrated, for example, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council when their Lordships held:^[1]

“The rule requiring a warning to be given to a jury of the danger of convicting on uncorroborated evidence applies to accomplices, victims of alleged sexual offences and children of tender years.  It will be convenient to refer to these categories as ‘suspect witnesses’.”

“It is precisely because the evidence of a witness in one of the categories which their Lordships for convenience have called ‘suspect witnesses’ may be of questionable reliability for a variety of reasons, familiar to generations of judges but not immediately apparent to jurors, that juries must be warned of the danger of convicting on that evidence if not corroborated; in short because it is suspect evidence.”

41. The generations of judges of whom they spoke were, at that time, all middle-aged or elderly gentlemen. It is most unlikely that they were more well informed about children and victims of alleged sexual offences than the collective experience of the members of the community who make up juries.^[2]  As Spigelman CJ observed in R v Johnston:^[3]

“There is no doubt that the criminal courts do have a body of experience that is not shared by the ordinary juror.  For many years it was thought that practice with respect to warnings about complainants in sexual assault cases reflected such superior experience.  It is now clear that the practice in fact reflected the limitations on the experience of judges, who were almost invariably male. 

The inadequacies of the practice in this regard led to legislative intervention.”

42. His Honour then referred to the New South Wales legislation added by the Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981 (NSW) including s 405C which is in similar terms to s 632 of the Criminal Code 1899 in Queensland.  The Chief Justice referred with approval to the following commentary on the New South Wales amendments:^[4]

“The ‘dangerous to convict’” warning is based upon a presumption that rape or sexual assault complainants are particularly prone to lying …  The effect of s 405C will be to leave it to the discretion of the judge to comment, when appropriate, upon the weight to be given to the evidence of the particular witnesses.  …  It is stressed that the present practice is regarded as being grossly offensive to women and is discriminatory.”

43. Any common law requirement for a warning has likewise been removed by statute in Queensland. Section 632 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) provides:

“632Corroboration

(1)A person may be convicted of an offence on the uncorroborated testimony of 1 witness, unless this Code expressly provides to the contrary.

(2)On the trial of a person for an offence, a judge is not required by any rule of law or practice to warn the jury that it is unsafe to convict the accused on the uncorroborated testimony of 1 witness.

(3)Subsection (1) or (2) does not prevent a judge from making a comment on the evidence given in the trial that it is appropriate to make in the interests of justice, but the judge must not warn or suggest in any way to the jury that the law regards any class of persons as unreliable witnesses.”

44. Accordingly it is no longer the law that children or victims of alleged sexual offences belong to any class of ‘suspect witnesses’.^[5]  Such ugly stereotypes no longer form part of the law of Queensland.