R v Cooney; ex parte Attorney-General
[2008] QCA 414
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- Unreported Judgment
- Appeal Determined (QCA)
- R v Cooney; ex parte Attorney-General[2008] QCA 414
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R v Cooney; ex parte Attorney-General[2008] QCA 414
R v Cooney; ex parte Attorney-General[2008] QCA 414
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
PARTIES: | |
FILE NO/S: | SC No 1216 of 2007 |
Court of Appeal | |
PROCEEDING: | Sentence Appeal by A-G (Qld) |
ORIGINATING COURT: | |
DELIVERED ON: | 19 December 2008 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 17 October 2008 |
JUDGES: | McMurdo P, White AJA and McMeekin J Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made |
ORDER: | Appeal dismissed |
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – Attorney-General's appeal against an effective sentence of five years imprisonment with parole eligibility after two years – respondent pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in cocaine and ecstasy, one count of possession of ecstasy, one count of possession of cannabis and related summary charges – respondent supplied small amounts of cocaine to friends and acquaintances on request – respondent engaged in higher level trafficking on request of covert police officer – respondent's offending involved 42.9 grams of pure cocaine, 259.655 grams of pure MDMA and 109.740 grams of pure MDEA – trafficking occurred over four and a half month period – respondent owned successful marine fender business and made only a small profit from trafficking – respondent mature, family man who engaged in drug taking socially – whether sentence imposed manifestly inadequate Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), s 5(a), s 9(c), s 9(d) Drugs Misuse Regulation 1987 (Qld), Sch 1, Sch 2, Sch 3 Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295; [1994] HCA 49, cited R v Attard, unreported, Supreme Court, Qld, Helman J, Indictment No 465, 29 January 2001, cited R v Barton [2006] QCA 367, compared R v Burge [2004] QCA 161, compared R v Clarke (1996) 90 A Crim R 1; [1996] QCA 474, cited R v Duggan (1996) 87 A Crim R 558; [1996] QCA 218, compared R v Grima [2000] QCA 105, cited R v Oldfield [2004] QCA 435, cited R v Taylor [2006] QCA 459, compared R v Yates [2006] QCA 101, compared |
COUNSEL: | M J Copley for the appellant A J Kimmins, with Y Chekirova, for the respondent |
SOLICITORS: | Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the appellant Jacobson Mahoney for the respondent |
[1] McMURDO P: The respondent, Neville Ross Cooney, pleaded guilty on 14 April 2008 to one count of trafficking in the dangerous drugs cocaine, 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) and 3,4-methylenedioxyethylamphetamine (MDEA) between late June and mid-November 2006 (count 1); one count of possessing the dangerous drugs MDMA and MDEA in quantities exceeding two grams (count 2); and one count of possession of the dangerous drug cannabis sativa (count 3). He also pleaded guilty to some related summary offences. He was sentenced on 6 August 2008 to five years imprisonment in respect of each of the first two counts and to three months concurrent imprisonment in respect of the third. He was convicted but not further punished for the summary offences. His parole eligibility date was fixed at 6 August 2010, two years after his sentence.
[2] The appellant, the Attorney-General of Queensland, has appealed against that sentence contending it is manifestly inadequate. These are my reasons for refusing the appeal.
The sentencing proceeding
[3] Cooney was 37 years old at the time of his offending and 39 at sentence. In June 1988 he was convicted and fined for unlawfully taking shop goods. More relevantly, in December 2003 in the Brisbane Supreme Court he was fined $800 without conviction for possessing dangerous drugs and possessing dangerous drugs with a circumstance of aggravation. A few days later in the Brisbane Magistrates Court he was fined $150 without conviction for the related offence of possessing utensils or pipes used in connection with dangerous drugs.
[4] The present offences occurred between 27 June and 15 November 2006. At that time cocaine was listed in Sch 1 of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) and MDMA and MDEA in Sch 2. The maximum penalties were therefore 25 years imprisonment for count 1,[1] 20 years imprisonment for count 2[2] and 15 years imprisonment for count 3.[3]
[5] The circumstances of the present offences are as follows. An undercover police officer worked with an informant to purchase drugs at street level with a view to infiltrating a drug supply business, particularly targeting sales of cocaine in the Gold Coast area. The informant introduced Cooney to the undercover police officer at Hope Island on 28 June 2006. The police officer gave Cooney $7,000 in return for 26.004 grams of cocaine containing 21.219 grams of pure cocaine (81.6 per cent pure). The police officer was keen to make further contact with Cooney because of this high level of purity. They met on 12 August 2006 when Cooney indicated that "there was a lot of drugs, but that some of the boys got caught with it". They arranged to meet again but that was not effected until 18 October 2006 when they met at Paradise Point. Cooney supplied the police officer with 27.708 grams of cocaine with a purity of 7.508 grams (27.1 per cent pure) in return for $7,500.
[6] They met next on 26 October 2006 at Earnest where Cooney's marine fender business was located. He was accompanied by his work colleague and neighbour, Petro Zago. In return for $7,500, Cooney gave the police officer a plastic bag containing 27.133 grams of which 14.244 grams was pure cocaine (52.5 per cent pure). They discussed future sales of ecstasy tablets.
[7] They met later that day at Paradise Point. Cooney gave the police officer a sample beige-coloured tablet weighing 0.234 grams and containing 0.0106 grams of pure MDMA (43.9 per cent pure). Cooney said he could supply 3,000 tablets at $15 a tablet.
[8] They met again on 13 November 2006 at Paradise Point. Cooney said that about 100,000 MDMA tablets had arrived in transit to Townsville. The next day, they met at Zago's home, which was in the same street as Cooney's. The police officer gave Cooney $15,000 in return for a bag containing 1,000 pink tablets weighing 244.643 grams of which 24.219 grams was pure MDEA (9.9 per cent pure) and 49.662 grams was pure MDMA (20.3 per cent pure). The police officer asked for a further 4,000 tablets the next day. Cooney agreed and they arranged to meet. The next day, 15 November 2006, Cooney gave Zago a white shopping bag filled with drugs. At 6.30 am police officers executed a search warrant at Cooney's house where they found about 5 grams of cannabis, which was for Cooney's personal use (count 3). Police then searched Zago's house where they found Cooney's shopping bag containing over 4,000 tablets with a total weight of 975.968 grams of which 85.510 grams was pure MDEA (8.76 per cent purity) and 209.759 grams was pure MDMA (21.49 per cent purity). Cooney's possession of the drugs in the shopping bag constituted count 2. The history of the dealings between the police officer and Cooney constituted count 1.
[9] In all, Cooney's offending involved 42.9 grams of pure cocaine, 259.655 grams of pure MDMA and 109.740 grams of pure MDEA to a covert police operative for a total of $37,000.[4] He was a user of drugs but not an addict. He claimed his profit was only $1,700. Had he not been apprehended, he expected to make a $3,000 profit on his last sale.
[10] Cooney took part in an electronically recorded interview with police during which he made admissions. He said that his profit from selling drugs was a modest cut of the money he received and he was "spooked" by the size of the last transaction.
[11] An analysis of his finances indicated that his identified expenditure exceeded his source income by $110,248.44 during a period which included the period for the trafficking.
[12] The prosecutor at sentence emphasised the following matters. Cooney had pleaded guilty at the committal proceedings and co-operated with the authorities. He was a mature man with some relevant criminal history and he was a significant player in the trafficking enterprise for monetary reward. He was a successful legitimate business owner who attempted to play down his role in the drug trade. He was trafficking, not to feed his own addiction, but for purely commercial reasons. His drug trafficking fell at the high end of the trafficking chain and demonstrated that he had easy access to a variety of drugs. A sentence of nine years imprisonment was appropriate.
[13] Mr Kimmins, who appeared for Cooney at sentence and with Ms Chekirova on this appeal, tendered a psychological report from Ms Jacqui Yoxall, who saw Cooney on 28 March 2008. She reported that Cooney had supplied the following information. He lived with his wife and two children aged seven and three and was self-employed in a marine fender manufacturing and installation business. He employed two staff. He was born in New Zealand and had a functional and happy upbringing. He moved to the Gold Coast with his parents when he was 10 years old and has lived there since. He left school at 14 to take up an apprenticeship as a coach and motor body trimmer. His life was detrimentally affected by his father's unexpected death from legionnaire's disease when he was 21 years old. He has built up his present successful marine business with the assistance of his wife. It enabled them to provide their children with a prosperous, functional and stable lifestyle. After the death of his father he began to use cannabis on a daily basis and ecstasy and alcohol on weekends. His drug use did not affect his ability to work and function during the week. He and his wife had been involved in the social use of cocaine since he was 33 years old. He became involved in trafficking because friends in "high places" asked him to obtain cocaine for them. The first time he supplied drugs to someone he did not know was when he supplied the drugs involved in the present offences to the covert police officer. He had been honest with the police about his behaviour. Since his arrest in December 2006 he and his wife had ceased all use of illicit substances, all association with users of illicit drugs and all involvement in drug trafficking. He has also worked voluntarily with Meals on Wheels, one day each week.
[14] Ms Yoxall opined that Cooney's likelihood of re-offending was low because of the changes he had made to his life since his arrest. She considered that Cooney was aware of the gravity of his offending and was remorseful. She described him as "psychologically resilient" and as someone who lived a responsible, conservative and law-abiding existence in all aspects of his life apart from his personal drug use.
[15] I must observe at this point that Ms Yoxall's last statement is patently inconsistent with Cooney's present offending. This went well beyond personal drug use to involvement as a customer supplying others with cocaine, MDMA and MDEA from a source well above street level for modest commercial gain.
[16] Mr Kimmins tendered a number of references. One confirmed that Cooney had been working at Meals on Wheels, Gold Coast, for one day a week on a voluntary basis since 24 November 2006 (shortly after his arrest). Approximately 15 references attested to Cooney's sound professional and personal reputation and that his involvement in the current offending was out of character. Mr Kimmins also tendered a large number of urine drug analyses supporting the submission that Cooney was no longer a drug user.
[17] Mr Kimmins disputed the prosecution claim that Cooney had received unexplained income of $110,000 over the period of the trafficking. The report referred to by the prosecutor concerned a much longer period of time than the period of the trafficking. A proceeds of crime application brought by the Crime and Misconduct Commission against Cooney was ultimately settled for $79,000. Mr Kimmins suggested that, despite that settlement, the judge should not infer that the $79,000 was profit from the trafficking charged in count 1.
[18] Mr Kimmins next tendered a copy of Cooney's interview with police after his arrest. He emphasised that Cooney told police the first name of his supplier and gave details of the money he made from each of the supplies to the police officer. These totalled $1,700 with the possibility of another $3,000 on the last anticipated supply. He told police that he was not otherwise involved in the commercial sale of illegal drugs. He committed the offences only when importuned by the undercover police officer. He had no knowledge of and was surprised by the high purity of the cocaine in the first instance.
[19] Mr Kimmins emphasised that Cooney had co-operated with police and pleaded guilty at a very early stage. He has known since November 2006 that he would be going to jail for his offending. He has sold his house and made arrangements to support his wife and children whilst in prison. Mr Kimmins submitted that an effective head sentence of between four to six years imprisonment was appropriate, significantly ameliorated by an early parole recommendation or suspension to take into account his early plea of guilty. His ultimate submission was that a sentence of five years imprisonment with parole eligibility after 15 to 18 months should be imposed.
[20] The learned judge's sentencing remarks included the following observations. The financial analysis referred to by the prosecutor should not be regarded as being devoted solely to income Cooney received from the sale of drugs. His criminal history was "not at all significant for the purposes of this offence". Cooney was not a street dealer or a courier and was not trafficking to support his habit, although he was a drug user. There was no evidence that Cooney knew of the high level of purity of the cocaine involved in the first transaction in June 2006. There was no evidence of any commercial dealings to anyone other than the undercover police officer although there were some supplies to others on a non-commercial basis. His Honour considered that R v Barton,[5] where a seven year sentence was imposed for trafficking, was of limited assistance. After referring to the authorities set out by Holmes JA in R v Yates,[6] his Honour noted that a range of imprisonment from "four years, perhaps up to six years", was applicable in this case. His Honour adverted to Cooney's early plea of guilty, co-operation with the police and his family's circumstances and concluded that a sentence of five years imprisonment with parole eligibility after two years was appropriate.
The contentions on appeal
[21] Mr M J Copley, who appears for the appellant, the Attorney-General of Queensland, did not contest any of the judge's findings, but contended that five years imprisonment was a manifestly inadequate penalty for the present offence of trafficking. The maximum penalty was 25 years imprisonment.[7] The comparable cases of R v Taylor[8] and R v Barton[9] demonstrated the manifest inadequacy of this sentence. He argued that the appeal should be allowed and a sentence of seven and a half years imprisonment substituted for count 1 with a parole eligibility date fixed after three years on 6 August 2011.
[22] Mr Kimmins emphasised the following matters. An Attorney-General's appeal can only succeed if the sentencing judge erred in legal principle or manifest inadequacy is demonstrated: Everett v The Queen.[10] On the facts found by the judge, the sentence imposed was within the appropriate range. Cooney was supplying friends and acquaintances who were known users in a small way for a modest profit. He had a legitimate, successful mainstream business which supported him and his family. Police did not find any of the usual paraphernalia of a full-time drug trafficker in his house. He gave police the first name of his drug supplier. He attempted to co-operate with police in the way contemplated by s 13A Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). He participated in interviews with police officers after he was charged but the prosecuting authorities decided he had no new information to help them. Cooney's participation in the further interviews and his willingness to offer himself as a witness, even if not ultimately of use to the authorities, was a significant mitigating factor and such a rare feature that it should be particularly recognised by a significant moderation of the sentence imposed. Taylor was not referred to below. In any case Taylor and Barton were more serious than Cooney's offending. R v Yates[11] and the cases to which it refers of R v Clarke,[12] R v Attard,[13] R v Oldfield,[14] R v Duggan,[15] R v Grima[16] and R v Burge[17] all supported the sentence imposed. Mr Kimmins submitted that the appeal should be dismissed.
Discussion and conclusion
[23] A useful starting point in determining this appeal is to consider the cases relied upon by Mr Copley and Mr Kimmins. In Taylor, this Court did not set aside the effective head sentence imposed at first instance of seven years and four months imprisonment for trafficking in cocaine, methylamphetamine, MDMA and methyldioxyamphetamine; 11 counts of supplying a dangerous drug; and two counts of possession of a dangerous drug. At the time of his offending, Taylor was 21 years old and an addict. He had a minor previous drug history. He sold drugs for a total of $38,500, similar to the $37,000 involved in the present case. Taylor supplied cocaine in one ounce and half ounce amounts, as well as other drugs, to an undercover police officer and was a significant dealer in cocaine. He was able to obtain the drugs at short notice, usually the same day. The total quantity of pure unlawful drugs involved in the offending does not emerge from this Court's reasons. A psychological report suggested that Taylor was an intelligent young man who was making steps towards rehabilitation. This Court considered that Taylor was realistic in not challenging the head sentence which would have been eight years imprisonment but for four months spent in custody and unable to be declared as time already served. This Court fixed Taylor's parole eligibility date at two and a half years from the date of sentence to reflect his prospects of rehabilitation.
[24] In Barton, the applicant pleaded guilty to trafficking in the Sch 1 drug, methylamphetamine; seven counts of supplying methylamphetamine; one count of possession of pseudoephedrine for use in connection with producing dangerous drugs and related summary offences. She was 24 at the time of her offending and had a minor drug-related criminal history. She trafficked 26.608 grams of pure methylamphetamine with an average purity of 22 per cent to a covert police officer over seven transactions for $14,700. She committed some of these offences whilst on bail. She was sentenced to an effective term of seven years imprisonment with parole eligibility after two years and three months. Barton, like Taylor, was an addict at the time of her offending. She did not contend that her sentence was manifestly excessive but invited this Court to receive new evidence about the true extent of her addiction at the time of her offending. This Court noted that the sentence was towards the high end of the range, but observed that trafficking in methylamphetamine, a drug which causes great social evil, was most serious. This Court determined, however, that the sentence did not adequately recognise Barton's impressive and apparently successful efforts at rehabilitation since the birth of her baby, and the need for a lengthy period of intense community supervision and control under a parole order to continue her rehabilitation. This Court substituted a very early parole eligibility date after 18 months of the seven year sentence.
[25] Taylor and Barton establish that the effective head sentences imposed there of seven to eight years imprisonment were not manifestly excessive, but they do not clearly demonstrate to me that the head sentence of five years imprisonment in this case, which turns on different facts, was therefore manifestly inadequate.
[26] In Yates the applicant pleaded guilty to trafficking in both cannabis and methylamphetamine (then a Sch 2 drug); three counts of supplying methylamphetamine; one count of supplying heroin; one count of possession of methylamphetamine; one count of possession of lysergide; one count of possession of cannabis and related summary charges. She was sentenced to an effective term of four and a half years imprisonment suspended after 15 months with an operational period of five years. As in the present case, Yates offended in response to requests from a covert police operative. Yates' mother[18] was more heavily involved in the trafficking business than Yates. The police officer paid Yates $7,200 for drugs weighing 60.179 grams, of which 21.91 grams was pure methylamphetamine and $1,350 for three grams of powder which was 1.739 grams of pure heroin. She boasted to the police officer that she had sold $118,250 worth of drugs during her mother's absence. After reviewing a large number of cases, this Court determined that Yates' head sentence of four and a half years imprisonment was not excessive but varied the sentence by suspending it after nine months imprisonment because she was more at risk of harm whilst in custody than an ordinary prisoner. The cases referred to at [23] – [28] of Yates on which Mr Kimmins relies, particularly Clarke, Attard and Burge (where head sentences of five years imprisonment or less were imposed for trafficking in a Sch 1 drug) and the case of Yates itself, are, for various reasons, distinguishable from the present offending. Like Taylor and Barton, they are of limited assistance in determining the sentencing range in the present case.
[27] I have also reviewed single judge sentences for drug trafficking in cocaine, MDMA and MDEA through the Queensland Sentencing Information Service ("QSIS").[19] But I have been unable to find any case closely comparable to the combination of mitigating and exacerbating circumstances existing in the present case.
[28] The judge sentenced Cooney on the following generous but unchallenged factual basis. He was a mature man who had previously been dealt with leniently by the courts for possession of cannabis and possession of methylamphetamine with a circumstance of aggravation. He had a successful, legitimate marine fender business which provided him, his wife and family with an affluent lifestyle. He was at the time of his offending using unlawful dangerous drugs for his personal use. He obtained these drugs from a source well up the chain from street level dealing for his friends and acquaintances who had similar drug-use habits. It was through those acquaintances that he was introduced to the covert police operative who initiated the present offending. He was apparently easily able to access significant quantities of unlawful dangerous drugs. In all, he trafficked in 42.9 grams of pure cocaine, 259.655 grams of pure MDMA and 109.740 grams of pure MDEA for $37,000[20] over a four and a half month period, but Cooney's profit was only $1,700 with the prospect of a further $3,000 profit had the last transaction been completed.
[29] Cooney pleaded guilty at the committal proceeding and co-operated in significant ways with the police investigation. His arrest brought home to him the serious consequences of his offending. On the material placed before the sentencing court, it appears he will be unlikely to put at risk the welfare of his wife and children and his own liberty and prosperity by re-offending in the future.
[30] The sentence imposed would have been well within range had the offending related solely to trafficking in the Sch 2 drugs MDMA[21] and MDEA: see R v McAway.[22] It is relevant that Cooney also trafficked in 42.9 grams of the Sch 1 drug cocaine so that the maximum penalty for count 1 was 25 years imprisonment.[23]
[31] As the primary judge noted, it is impossible to find a directly comparable set of facts when reviewing sentences for similar offences. The unusual combination of facts accepted by the sentencing judge makes it difficult to establish a clear sentencing range for Cooney's offending from other decided cases. Those to which this Court has been referred and those single judge decisions I have reviewed from QSIS show that the sentences imposed for trafficking in cocaine, MDMA and MDEA vary greatly, depending on the relevant exacerbating and mitigating factors. The unusual feature of this case is that, on the unchallenged facts found by the primary judge, although Cooney was a mature man with some relevant but minor criminal history who was able to access significant amounts of cocaine, MDMA and MDEA from a source well up from street level, his involvement in the actual trafficking business was peripheral. He was a customer who did not make a living through drug trafficking. He supplied friends and acquaintances, like the undercover police officer, for a modest profit. He funded his affluent middle class lifestyle, not from drug trafficking but from his successful marine fender business. He pleaded guilty at the very early committal stage and co-operated with the authorities. There are good reasons to think that he is unlikely to re-offend.
[32] Undoubtedly, Cooney deserved a heavy penalty to deter him and others from engaging in such anti-social behaviour. There is nothing smart or glamorous about trafficking in these drugs which have significant human and social cost. Those who do so can expect lengthy jail terms. Barton, Taylor, Yates and the cases discussed in Yates suggest that the appropriate range in this case was a head sentence of between five and seven years imprisonment, with parole eligibility after serving two or two and a half years imprisonment to reflect Cooney's plea, co-operation with the authorities and prospects of rehabilitation.
[33] The end result is that the appellant has failed to persuade me that the sentence, though as lenient as it could be in all the circumstances, was manifestly inadequate. It follows that I would refuse the Attorney-General's appeal against sentence.
[34] WHITE AJA: I have read the reasons for judgment of the President and agree that the Attorney-General’s appeal against sentence should be refused for the reasons which she gives.
[35] I agree with the President that the comparable cases to which the court was referred suggest a range of head sentence of between five and seven years. The primary Judge took a view of the evidence which was generous to the respondent because this was, on any view, a serious flouting of the prohibition on dealing in dangerous drugs. Even so, no error in his approach is discernable and the sentence imposed was not manifestly inadequate.
[36] Although the respondent has some history of disregarding the law, albeit in a relatively minor fashion, and has admitted to the psychologist that he has used prohibited drugs for over a decade and a half there can be confidence that the sentence imposed will, in all likelihood, have a strong personal deterrent effect upon him. There is also some prospect that it will deter some of his social associates with whom he shared his predilection for this form of law breaking.
[37] McMEEKIN J: I have read the reasons for judgment of the President and White AJA. I agree that the Attorney-General’s appeal against sentence should be refused for the reasons which they give.
Footnotes
[1] Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), s 5(a); Drugs Misuse Regulation 1987 (Qld), Sch 1.
[2] Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), s 9(c); Drugs Misuse Regulation 1987 (Qld), Sch 2, Sch 3.
[3] Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), s 9(d); Drugs Misuse Regulation 1987 (Qld), Sch 2, Sch 3.
[4] Not including the amount involved in the final unconcluded transaction.
[5] [2006] QCA 367.
[6] [2006] QCA 101 at [23] – [28].
[7] Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), s 5(a); Drugs Misuse Regulation 1987 (Qld), Sch 1.
[8] [2006] QCA 459.
[9] [2006] QCA 367.
[10] (1994) 181 CLR 295; [1994] HCA 49.
[11] [2006] QCA 367.
[12] (1996) 90 A Crim R 1; [1996] QCA 474.
[13] Unreported, Supreme Court, Qld, Helman J, Indictment No 465, 29 January 2001.
[14] [2004] QCA 435.
[15] (1996) 87 A Crim R 558; [1996] QCA 218.
[16] [2000] QCA 105.
[17] [2004] QCA 161.
[18] York v R [2005] HCA 60; (2005) 79 ALJR 1919.
[19] R v Laurence Charles Brown, Supreme Court, Qld, Byrne SJA, Indictment No 374 of 2008, 31 October 2008; R v William Sualauvi Betham, Supreme Court, Qld, Dutney J, Indictment No 666 of 2006, 28 May 2008; R v Robert John McGraw, Supreme Court, Qld, Fryberg J, Indictment Nos 472 and 735 of 2008, 17 September 2008; R v Benjamin Michael Matthews, Supreme Court, Qld, Byrne J, Indictment No 274 of 2007, 26 September 2007; R v Michael Craig Rogers, Supreme Court, Qld, McMeekin J, 12 February 2008; R v Casey Jeremy Desouza, Supreme Court, Qld, Byrne J, Indictment No 31 of 2004, 18 June 2004; R v Glen Paul Courtney, Supreme Court, Qld, Mullins J, Indictment No 482 of 2004, 27 September 2004; R v Jason Dale Edmondson, Supreme Court, Qld, Dutney J, Indictment No 67 of 2006, 23 March 2007; R v Jason Alexander Kozionas, Supreme Court, Qld, Douglas J, 1 May 2007.
[20] Not including the amount involved in the final unconcluded transaction.
[21] MDMA has been a Sch 1 drug since 1 July 2008 following the Drugs Misuse Amendment Act 2008 (Qld), Act No 4 of 2008 and Drugs Misuse Amendment Regulation (No 1) 2008 (Qld), SL No 144 of 2008.
[22] [2008] QCA 401 and the cases reviewed there at [11]-[18].
[23] Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), s 5(a); Drugs Misuse Regulation 1987 (Qld), Sch 1.