Gittos v Surfers Paradise Rock & Roll Cafe Pty Ltd
[2009] QCA 306
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- Unreported Judgment
- Appeal Determined (QCA)
- Gittos v Surfers Paradise Rock & Roll Cafe Pty Ltd[2009] QCA 306
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Gittos v Surfers Paradise Rock & Roll Cafe Pty Ltd[2009] QCA 306
Gittos v Surfers Paradise Rock & Roll Cafe Pty Ltd[2009] QCA 306
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
PARTIES: | |
FILE NO/S: | |
Court of Appeal | |
PROCEEDING: | Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal) |
ORIGINATING COURT: | |
DELIVERED ON: | 13 October 2009 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 25 September 2009 |
JUDGES: | McMurdo P and Muir and Chesterman JJA Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made |
ORDERS: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | LIQUOR LAW – PENAL PROVISIONS – OFFENCES – OFFENCES RELATING TO REGULATION AND CONDUCT OF LICENSED PREMISES – where first respondent held an adult entertainment permit issued under Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) – where permit authorised the first respondent to provide "adult entertainment" within an approved area subject to various conditions – where Condition 114 provided the "approved area must be fully enclosed in a way that prevents a person outside the area from seeing inside the area" – where respondents charged with contravening Condition 114 – whether respondents failed to fully enclose the approved area in a way that "prevents" people outside from seeing inside Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), s 103E, s 103G, s 103H, s 109, s 226 Australian Builders' Labourers' Federated Union of Workers – (WA Branch) v J-Corp Pty Ltd (1993) 114 ALR 551, cited Devenish v Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd (1991) 172 CLR 32; [1991] HCA 7, cited Gamer's Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v Natwest Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 475, cited Peter Dixon & Sons Ltd v Henderson Craig & Co Ltd [1919] 2 KB 778, cited Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd v C S Wilson & Co Ltd [1917] AC 495, cited The Queen v Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141; [1980] HCA 26, cited |
COUNSEL: | J D Henry SC, with R W Frigo, for the applicant/appellant M J Byrne QC for the respondents |
SOLICITORS: | Legal Services Unit, Department of Treasury for the applicant/appellant Hopgood Ganim Lawyers for the respondents |
[1] McMURDO P: Subject to the following brief observations, I agree with Muir JA's reasons for granting the application for leave to appeal; allowing the appeal; setting aside the order made in the District Court; and, instead, ordering that the appeal to the District Court be dismissed.
[2] The first respondent, Surfers Paradise Rock and Roll Café Pty Ltd, held a permit to provide "adult entertainment" in an "approved area"[1] within premises known as the Crazy Horse Nightclub. Condition 114 of the permit provided:
"The approved area must be fully enclosed in a way that prevents a person outside the area from seeing inside the area."
The first respondent and its nominee, Mick Pickos, the second respondent, were summarily charged with breaching Condition 114. This appeal turns on the meaning of "prevent" in Condition 114 of the permit.
[3] Unlike the magistrate who initially determined these complaints, I do not consider that Condition 114 is absolute in its terms so that, regardless of context, a failure to prevent a person outside the approved area from seeing inside the area will infringe the condition. The meaning of the word "prevent" depends on and will vary with the context in which it is used and the prevailing factual circumstances. This is clear from its primary dictionary definition: "1. to keep from occurring; hinder".[2] This is also clear from the varying conclusions reached in case law as to the meaning of "prevent" in contexts different from the present: cf Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd v C S Wilson & Co Ltd;[3] Peter Dixon & Sons Ltd v Henderson Craig & Co Ltd;[4] R v Bell; Ex parte Lees;[5] Devenish v Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd;[6]Australian Builders' Labourers' Federated Union of Workers (WA Branch) v J-Corp Pty Ltd.[7]
[4] In the present context, it is clear that the word "prevent" in Condition 114 means more than hinder. It will ordinarily require that the holder of the permit ensure the approved area is fully enclosed in a way that keeps someone outside the area from seeing inside it. But Condition 114 does not make the respondents absolutely liable for every possible ingenious contrivance of others to defeat all reasonable efforts of the respondents to comply with the condition. That said, on the facts found by the magistrate with which the District Court judge appeared to agree, there could have been no reasonable doubt that the respondents had breached Condition 114 of their permit in failing to keep someone outside the approved area from seeing inside it.
[5] I agree with the orders proposed by Muir JA.
[6] MUIR JA: Introduction
The first respondent, at material times, held an adult entertainment permit in respect of premises known as the Crazy Horse Nightclub in Surfers Paradise issued under Part 4, Division 13A of the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) ("the Act").[8] The permit authorised the first respondent to provide "adult entertainment" as defined in s 103E of the Act within an area of the first respondent's premises approved under the Act subject to conditions "prescribed under a regulation or imposed by the chief executive".[9] Condition 114 of the permit provided:
"The approved area must be fully enclosed in a way that prevents a person outside the area from seeing inside the area."
[7] The second respondent, at material times, was the nominee in respect of the permit under s 109 of the Act.
[8] A complaint and summons dated 11 January 2007 issued under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) charged the first respondent with contravening Condition 114 on 25 March 2006. The second respondent was charged with the same contravention under a similarly worded complaint and summons.
[9] Particulars of each complaint alleged that:
"At the time of the Investigators (sic) inspection the approved area was not fully enclosed in a way that prevents a person outside the area from seeing inside the area."
[10] Other complaints and summonses also dated 24 January 2007, issued against each of the respondents, alleged similar contraventions of Condition 114 of the permit on 13 May 2006. Section 226 of the Act makes it an offence to contravene a condition of a licence or permit issued under the Act.
[11] The matters were heard in the Magistrates Court on 4 July 2007, 31 October 2007 and 1 November 2007. On the latter date, the learned Magistrate found the respondents guilty of the charges.
[12] The respondents appealed against their convictions pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) and the learned District Court judge who heard the appeals allowed them and set aside the convictions. The appellant seeks leave to appeal pursuant to s 118 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld).
The Magistrate's reasons
[13] The Magistrate referred to the evidence of five investigators called by the prosecution. They were the appellant, Mr Gittos, and investigating officers, Messrs Hayes, Matthews, Cipriano and Ms Jamison. Messrs Gittos, Hayes and Matthews gave evidence in respect of the March offence and Messrs Gittos, Cipriano and Ms Jamison gave evidence in respect of the May offence. No evidence was lead on behalf of the respondents.
[14] The Magistrate summarised and quoted relevant evidence of each of the prosecution witnesses as follows:
"Mr Gittous[10] and Mr Hayes gave evidence that they saw a naked woman from the arcade just outside the sliding door entrance to the Crazy Horse, it is the arcade there. Mr Matthews in cross-examination said that he did not see a naked woman when the curtain was closed. Mr Gittous was quite clear under cross-examination that he could see beyond the curtain into the lap dance room …
On the first occasion, that is in March, he could see through the glass panel of the chequered plate door which is shown in Exhibit 6, minus the posters on the glass. He said in cross-examination at page 48, 'The female that approached the curtain … - 'on the 13th of May was quite clearly unclothed prior to drawing back the curtain.' '
Later at line 28, 'I saw people in there and I formed the opinion that they were naked.' In re-examination, he said, 'I could both see into the approved area from the area both through the window of clear glass and also I could see into the approved area when the chequered plate doorway was open.'
He was asked, 'Could you see into that area when the lace curtain was closed?' 'Yes, I could.' 'What could you see?' 'I could see a number of people inside the lap dance room.' Mr Hayes at page 72, on a visit in March said, 'You could see naked females in the area and it was obvious that as patrons were going in there' – and then it goes on.
Mr Hayes at page 72, 'When the curtain was closed what could you see?' 'I could see the outline of females, naked females.' 'You could see through that curtain and see the females behind that curtain.' In respect of the May matter, Mr Cipriano said that he could see through the lace curtain and the ladies were naked…
He was standing on the footpath area in what I would describe as the arcade. Ms Jamison repeatedly said that she definitely saw a naked female behind the curtain in May after being pressed quite a bit during cross-examination..."
[15] The Magistrate found the prosecution witnesses credible. He said:
"… my overall impression of their evidence is that they were witnesses of truth, particularly in my [estimation?] of being able to observe naked women, whatever number that is, on the occasions in question."
[16] The respondents argued that "prevent" in Condition 114 meant "hinder" and that as vision into the licensed area from outside, although not completely impossible, was hindered, the charges had not been proved. The Magistrate rejected the argument. He held that in order to comply with the requirements of the permit, the licensed area "must be fully enclosed in a way that prevents a person outside the area from seeing inside the area. … this makes it quite clear that 'prevent' is absolute."
The Judge's reasons on appeal from the Magistrate's decision
[17] The learned District Court judge said in the course of his reasons, "I respect the Magistrate's findings of fact". He went on to explain that:
"The material facts are these: the approved area where the adult entertainment was taking place was enclosed by a curtain and a chequered plate door which had a window in it. This door was on a hinge such that it would open when required and then close automatically. The window had been covered over by 13 May 2006. The curtain was made of a lace type material which, as the Magistrate found, was not opaque.
Leading up to these enclosures there was a corridor. In order to see into the approved area one had to walk from the corridor past a sliding door which was open at all times. When one passed the sliding door one would walk a couple of paces up to the chequered plate door. From that point one was only a few paces away from the curtain.
As of 25 March 2006 one could see into the approved area if the chequered plate door was open. Also one could see through the window of the chequered plate door, although, as I have pointed out, that was not possible on 13 May 2006.
Now, I have said that one could see into the approved area. That was possible, of course, if the curtain was moved to one side. It was also possible, however, to see through the curtain itself. That is what the Magistrate found and that finding should not be disturbed, in my opinion, but it is at this stage of the case, in my view, where difficulty arises.
… it is difficult to determine on the evidence the degree to which one could see through the curtain. The witnesses, which is not unexpected, gave varying accounts. Ms Jameson (sic), for instance, seems to suggest that the curtain provided little or no obstruction to visibility, but, in my opinion, the case should not be approached on that basis." (emphasis added)
[18] His Honour turned to a consideration of the meaning of the word "prevent" and said:
"The Magistrate was of the view that it meant totally stopping visibility. His Honour might well be right, but, with respect, I take a different view. … I think the word 'prevent' is difficult to classify.
…I think it must mean something less than that applied by the Magistrate. It is no easy task to state precisely what the word means, but I think it means that there is a requirement to fully enclose the approved area in such a way that makes it very improbable that a person outside can see inside the approved area."
[19] His Honour noted that "it first must be appreciated that it was possible to see into the approved area … [and also] possible to so enclose the area such that it is extremely unlikely, if not impossible, for people to see in." His Honour concluded that these matters were not "determinative". He identified his task as follows:
"…I have to apply my understanding of what 'prevents' means. I then have to ask myself whether I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants, given the circumstances of the present case, failed to fully enclose the approved area in a way that prevented a person outside from seeing inside the area.
Now, it is the position, in my opinion, that the appellants may well have committed offences. That, of course, is not the test. Applying the above stated test to the circumstances of this case – and those circumstances were fully discussed in argument – I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants on the relevant dates failed to fully enclose the approved area in a way that prevented persons outside the area from seeing inside the area."
[20] His Honour observed that he had respected the Magistrate's assessment of the witnesses but had concluded:
"… that whilst one could see through the curtain, the view through the curtain was not as clear as it would have been without the curtain. However, determining what exactly could be seen is a matter of degree. This is where doubts in my mind have arisen as to whether offences were committed and, of course, it is not simply a matter of what the curtain obscured.
One has to have regard to all the evidence. That is, the evidence about the chequered plate door, the layout of the approach to the premises and the accounts of the witnesses as to the lack of clarity about objects behind the curtain and so on.
Because of these factors doubts, as I say, have arisen in my mind as to whether offences were committed. Thus, applying the relevant standard of proof, I am not satisfied offences were committed."
The respondents' principal arguments
[21] Counsel for the respondents sought to support the judge's conclusions in two ways. It was submitted that in determining the meaning of "prevent" it was necessary to look at the context in which the word is used in the permit and find the "meaning(s) best suited to the statutory document as a whole".[11] It was said that the configuration of venues such as those under consideration was relevant, and in particular, the necessity for them to "have points of entry and exit" through which persons would need to be able to see when entering and leaving. Counsel also referred to the plan of the subject premises and submitted that it was impossible or nearly so, to devise an entry for the premises which would be practicable and render completely impossible vision from outside the premises to inside the licensed area. The alleged difficulties centred around the need to be able to open doors to permit patrons and others to come and go.
[22] In this regard it was said in the written submissions of counsel for the respondents that:
"Brief view into the area must be contemplated from outside the area at some point as it would be impossible to physically pass from outside to inside without first being able, albeit briefly, to see. Clearly patrons and staff must be able to access the area at some point."
[23] Having regard to these considerations, it was submitted that the definitions in the Macquarie and Shorter Oxford English dictionaries which give "hinder" as a meaning of "prevent" should be applied, rather than "absolute prevention". A strict construction was to be favoured, as non-compliance gives rise to a criminal offence.
[24] The other substantive argument advanced was that as the subject area was "configured as inspected and as approved" it was therefore "enclosed" in the "way" approved. The submission continued along these lines. The purpose of Condition 114 was to ensure that the premises were not altered from the approved configuration, at least in a way which allowed a person outside to see inside. The words "enclosed in a way" refer to the way the subject area was approved and constructed rather than to simply the question of vision into the area from outside.
Consideration of the meaning of "prevent"
[25] Section 103H of the Act relevantly provides:
"Approved area to conform with requirements
Before the chief executive approves an area as an approved area, the chief executive must be satisfied the area conforms, or will conform, with this Act and the following requirements while adult entertainment is being provided in the area –
(a)The area must be fully enclosed in a way that prevents a person outside the area from seeing inside the area;…"
[26] I think it obvious that Condition 114 picks up the terminology of s 103H(a) and that a purpose of the requirement that a licensed area be fully enclosed as described is to keep from the view of persons outside the area approved for adult entertainment any acts or things within the licensed area. No doubt the Legislature considered it necessary to impose such a requirement in order to shield minors, and adults not voluntarily attending such premises, from exposure to conduct which many in the community regard as offensive, degrading and/or morally corrupting.
[27] The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary gives as meanings of "prevent":
"3. To stop, keep, or hinder from doing something.
4. To provide beforehand against the occurrence of (something); to preclude, stop, hinder.
…
7. To use preventive measures."
[28] To "hinder" a person from seeing into an area is to impede or obstruct that person's vision within the area. That is not something to which s 103H or Condition 114 is directed. It would not make much sense for s 103H or Condition 114 to merely hinder vision into licensed adult entertainment areas. As the degree of hindrance required is not specified, the requirement could be met, for example, by a glass door or wall which, when looked through, distorted human forms, but enabled the viewer to clearly appreciate the nature of the activities under observation. Also, a requirement that vision be hindered rather than stopped would be singularly lacking in certainty and thus difficult to apply and enforce.
[29] Consequently, there is good reason to give "prevent" in s 103H and Condition 114 what I consider to be its more normal meaning in everyday speech of "stop from" or "keep from".
[30] Whether premises are fully enclosed in a way that prevents a person outside from seeing inside is a question of fact to be determined by reference to the physical conditions existing at the relevant time. Evidence by persons of what, if anything, could be seen by them when looking in from outside is of obvious relevance to the determination of the question. Where seeing from the outside to the inside of a licensed area is not completely impossible, it may be arguable in some circumstances that "a person outside" is nevertheless prevented "from seeing inside" for the purposes of the condition. I do not apprehend, however, that any particular difficulty in deciding such a question arises on the facts of this case. Nor do I accept the argument advanced by counsel for the respondents that the difficulties in stopping persons outside a permit area from seeing inside were so great and so manifest as to require the adoption of the respondents' construction. In my view there will normally be no great difficulty in configuring the entrance to premises so as to stop persons outside from being able to see inside a permit area. The fact that there may be difficulties in achieving compliance in individual cases is hardly a matter relevant to the construction of Condition 114 or s 103H.
Consideration of the respondents' contentions as to the purpose of Condition 114
[31] The argument that the purpose of Condition 114 is to ensure that the premises are not altered from the approved configuration and that it is sufficient that the licensed area is enclosed in the way approved by the Chief Executive, cannot be accepted. Condition 114 is directed to preventing a person outside the licensed area from seeing inside it. Its focus is not on the structure of the subject premises in the form approved or otherwise. The respondent's argument requires the plain meaning of many of the words of the condition to be ignored and for other words to be inserted in their place.
[32] The argument is not supported by s 103H, which requires the Chief Executive, before approving "an area as an approved area" to be satisfied that the area to be approved will conform, inter alia, with requirement (a) "while adult entertainment is being provided in the area." In other words, requirement (a) may be satisfied by the subject area being "fully enclosed" as described only when adult entertainment is being provided in it.
Consideration of the Judge's reasons
[33] The learned judge did not disturb the Magistrate's findings as to what could be seen inside the licensed area from outside. His express findings in that regard are emphasised in paragraph [17] above. On these findings, the respondents' breached Condition 114, properly construed, and the respondents' appeals, should have been dismissed.
[34] What the judge understood "prevent" to mean is far from clear. At one point he defined it in terms of making it "very improbable that a person outside can see inside the approved area". In later discussion he implicitly regarded as relevant the extent or degree of visibility from outside. In that regard he probably had in mind the evidence of what could be seen through the curtain. If that was the case, his Honour seemingly ignored his conclusion, in effect, that the Magistrate's findings of fact, which included a finding that it was possible to see through the curtain, should not be disturbed. Having embarked on a consideration of the extent to which it was possible to see through the curtain, he made no findings in that regard.
[35] The licensed area was in the same premises as the Crazy Horse Nightclub. The nightclub area and the licensed area shared a common entry off a public walkway. A patron wishing to enter the licensed area proceeded off the walkway through a sliding glass door into an entry lobby, through a hinged door into another small area on the other side of which was the entry into the licensed area. At relevant times that entry was screened by a curtain. Entry into the nightclub was via stairs at the left of the small area.
[36] The evidence of Messrs Hayes and Matthews was that at the time of their visit to the premises on 25 March 2006 persons outside the premises could see into the licensed area from outside through "the glass panel of the chequered plate door". That was a reference to what I have described as the hinged door. Their evidence was to the effect that they could see through the glass panel and the curtain at the entrance to the licensed area into that area and that their view into the licensed area from outside was enhanced when the curtain was moved to enable entry or egress. The evidence was that the glass panel in the door was covered after 25 March 2006 and before 13 May 2006. Accordingly, whether there was a breach of Condition 114 on the later date depends on what could be seen through or around the curtain when the hinged door was open. The evidence concerning the curtain's transparency and what could be seen when it was drawn aside to permit access or egress may be summarised as follows.
[37] Mr Gittos said in evidence-in-chief that looking through the curtain he "could see two or three females inside." In cross-examination, in response to it being put to him that it was impossible to see "beyond that white curtain anyone other than someone wearing a white garment … and then all that's visible is the white garment?" he said, "No. That's not correct. I was able to see beyond that curtain in its drawn condition and when it was drawn back, I was certainly able to have an unobstructed view into the room." He said that on 25 March 2006 he saw the curtain being drawn back and could "quite clearly see into the lap dancing room," where he saw three naked women.
[38] Later in his cross-examination, in relation to what he was able to make out through the curtain, he said, "I could make out objects of people inside that room … I couldn't accurately see whether they were clothed..." The cross-examiner returned to the same point later and elicited the concession that it was difficult "to make out any detailed nakedness if … the curtain is closed." It was put to him that, "you cannot see a naked person behind that lace curtain whether the lights are on or off" and he responded, "Well, I would disagree with that. I saw people in there and I formed the opinion that they were naked." He elaborated that he formed the opinion that a woman approaching him on the other side of the curtain was naked before his opinion was verified when the curtain was drawn back.[12]
[39] Mr Hayes said that on his visit to the premises on 25 March 2006, when he had looked from outside the foyer of the premises, naked females could be seen in the licensed area when the curtain was opened to enable access to patrons. He said also that he could "see the outline of … naked females … through that curtain …"
[40] In cross-examination, he verified that when the curtains were pulled back, "You [could] certainly see the benches where the patrons [were] seated" and that females could also be seen. It was put to him that unless a person was wearing white they could not be seen on the other side of the curtain by a person standing in the foyer area. He responded, "… I disagree with that because certainly on the night in question I could see through that very thin white curtaining." In response to the proposition, "Well, you say you saw naked women much more clearly when that curtain was pulled aside?" he said, "Yeah, absolutely".
[41] Mr Matthews said that on 25 March 2006, looking from a public alleyway outside the premises, he saw through the glass window in the entrance door from the front foyer of the premises a woman wearing only a pair of stilleto heeled shoes "walking from one side of the room to the other". At the time, there was a "light type material curtain that was pulled back."
[42] Asked if he had seen a naked woman inside the licensed area when he was standing outside and the curtain was drawn, he responded, "No, I'd have to say I didn't." He later volunteered, "You can see silhouettes through that curtain" and that, "for all intensive (sic) purposes you couldn't make out who was who."
[43] Ms Jamison, in evidence-in-chief, swore that on her visit to the Crazy Horse on the evening of 13 May 2006 she was able to see from a tiled area at the front door of the premises, a naked female giving a lap dance in the lap dancing room. She said that the lace curtain at the door of the room "was closed but it was transparent … you could see through it". In cross-examination, she described in considerable detail what she had seen. It also emerged that in an earlier statement she had said that she could see directly into the lap dancing room from the "footpath/walkway outside the front entrance to the premises when the front door was opened." Cross-examined at great length about what she had seen and was able to see behind the curtain, she reaffirmed on a number of occasions that she did see, clearly, a naked female through the curtain which she described as "very transparent". In relation to Ms Jamison's evidence of what could be seen through the closed curtain, the Magistrate said, "My general impression of her as a witness was that she was a witness of truth on that essential issue."
[44] Mr Cipriano said that on his visit in the evening of 13 May 2006, when standing on the pedestrian pathway at the front of the premises, he could see, through the lace curtain, naked women performing lap dances in the licensed area. He confirmed that when the lace curtain was drawn back to enable patrons to enter the licensed area, what was occurring within "was even more clear". His evidence was unshaken during a relatively brief cross-examination.
[45] There was thus ample evidence to justify the Magistrate's implicit conclusion that the licensed area, at relevant times, was not "fully enclosed in a way that prevents a person outside the area from seeing inside the area." Sight from outside to inside was possible through the curtain. Such sight, restricted only by the breadth of the gap between the curtain and the wall, was also possible when the curtain was moved to one side to permit access or egress.
[46] The condition does not contain any relaxation or qualification justifying the proposition advanced by counsel for the respondents that it could not be construed to apply to what could be seen when a door or curtain was opened to enable entry or departure from a licensed area. As the Magistrate pointed out, there is no particular difficulty in arranging an entry to premises in such a way as to prevent a person outside the premises from viewing the interior when an entry door or curtain is opened. In many situations a simple free-standing screen will serve that purpose.
Conclusion
[47] Other matters were argued on behalf of the appellant in support of the appeal. In view of the foregoing, however, it is unnecessary to address them. Leave to appeal is appropriate as the principal question to be decided concerns the construction of a condition likely to be found in all adult entertainment permits. Also, the construction of the condition is relevant to the construction of s 103H of the Act. As the above discussion shows, the appellant has established an error in the determination of the District Court judge.
[48] I would give leave to appeal, allow the appeal, set aside the order made by the District Court on 16 March 2009, and in lieu order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed. The respondents should pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to the District Court and of this appeal.
[49] CHESTERMAN JA: I agree with the orders proposed by Muir JA and with the reasons given by his Honour for those orders.
Footnotes
[1] Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), s 103E.
[2] Macquarie Dictionary.
[3] [1917] AC 495 at 513-514, Lord Dunedin.
[4] [1919] 2 KB 778 at 786.
[5] (1980) 146 CLR 141 at 147-148, Gibbs J (as he then was).
[6] (1991) 172 CLR 32 at 45-46, Mason CJ.
[7] (1993) 114 ALR 551 at 557-559, Lockhart and Gummow JJ.
[8] This and other references to provisions of the Act are to the Act as it was at the time of the subject offences.
[9] Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), s 103G.
[10] The applicant's name was misspelt in the transcript of proceeding at first instance.
[11] Gamer's Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v Natwest Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 475 at 484.
[12] Record 62.