R v Corr; ex parte Attorney-General
[2010] QCA 40
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- R v Corr; ex parte Attorney-General[2010] QCA 40
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R v Corr; ex parte Attorney-General[2010] QCA 40
R v Corr; ex parte Attorney-General[2010] QCA 40
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
PARTIES: | |
FILE NO/S: | |
Court of Appeal | |
PROCEEDING: | Sentence Appeal by A-G (Qld) |
ORIGINATING COURT: | |
DELIVERED ON: | 5 March 2010 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 5 February 2010 |
JUDGES: | McMurdo P, Muir JA and Douglas J Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made |
ORDERS: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – respondent pleaded guilty to doing grievous bodily harm with intent to disable and to rape – complainant was a two and a half year old child of the respondent's friend – respondent punched and dropped the complainant before penetrating the complainant's anus with a sharp object and abandoning the child – complainant suffered life threatening injuries – respondent initially failed to make frank admissions but cooperated with the police – respondent has no prior like offending – respondent has made some efforts at rehabilitation – respondent was sentenced to nine years imprisonment and a serious offence declaration was made – whether sentence failed to reflect the gravity of the offences and gave too much weight to factors in mitigation – whether sentence failed to take into account general deterrence and denunciation – whether sentence manifestly inadequate Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 669A(1) R v TK [2004] QCA 394 , considered R v J [1998] QCA 143, considered R v G; ex parte A-G (Qld) [1999] QCA 84, considered R v Lacey; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2009] QCA 274, considered |
COUNSEL: | A Moynihan SC for the appellant D Shepherd for the respondent |
SOLICITORS: | Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the appellant Legal Aid Queensland for the respondent |
[1] McMURDO P: The respondent pleaded guilty in the Maroochydore District Court on 15 October 2009 to doing grievous bodily harm with intent to disable (count 1) and rape (count 2). The complainant in both counts was the same two and a half year old child. On each count, the respondent was sentenced to nine years imprisonment and a serious violent offence declaration was made. He will have to spend 7.2 years in prison before becoming eligible for parole.[1] Five hundred and twenty days spent in pre-sentence custody were declared as time served under the sentence. The appellant, the Attorney-General of Queensland, appeals against that sentence contending that it was not the proper sentence because it failed to reflect adequately the gravity of the offences; failed to sufficiently take into account general deterrence and the importance of denunciation and gave too much weight to factors in mitigation.
[2] The respondent was 22 at the time of the offences and 24 at sentence. He had no relevant criminal history although his record was not entirely unblemished. In 2003, he was discharged absolutely for contravening a direction or requirement under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). He had some traffic history, including a 2007 entry for driving under the influence of liquor with a blood alcohol concentration of .132. His lack of relevant prior offending is especially surprising in light of the horrific nature of the present offences.
The agreed schedule of facts
[3] The prosecutor at sentence tendered an agreed schedule of facts which contained the following information.
[4] The respondent had known the complainant's mother for about three years. They went out for a short time until the respondent broke off the relationship. They remained friends, but when she formed another relationship in about February 2008, he reacted adversely and sent her threatening SMS messages. Their friendly relationship resumed a few months later.
[5] On the evening of 11 May 2008, they had a minor disagreement by SMS text messages about when it was appropriate to discipline the complainant. The respondent considered the mother was not giving him sufficient clarification on this issue.
[6] On 12 May 2008, the respondent and the mother communicated by text message. He joined her, the complainant who was in a stroller, and the mother's female friend. They lunched together. At about 2.15 pm they went to a doctor's surgery where the complainant had an appointment. The respondent became annoyed with the mother and the complainant who were playfully pulling faces at each other in the waiting room. He left the doctor's surgery and sent the mother this text message: "Have fun with your stupid kid hope someone else can put up with his bullshit." In the meantime, the complainant and his mother kept the medical appointment.
[7] The respondent subsequently returned to the doctor's surgery and hugged the mother. He then walked with the mother, her friend and the complainant to a shop in Aerodrome Road, Maroochydore. The mother left the child, in the stroller, with the respondent whilst she and her friend went into the shop. The complainant was dressed in long blue track pants, a long sleeved shirt, white socks and a nappy.
[8] When the mother came out of the shop 15 minutes later, she could find neither her child nor the respondent. She looked in a neighbouring store. She rang the respondent's mobile phone which he answered, but she could not understand what he was saying. She phoned him again but got no answer. She saw him running away from her in a southerly direction. She caught up with him. He told her that there had been a car accident. He ran north along Aerodrome Road and down a driveway between shops, two doors south of the shop the mother had visited. She followed him. She found the complainant lying in the back corner of a yard behind the nearby shops. He was in a garden bed between the side of a shed and a fence and he was covered in bark and sticks. His face was bloody and he was unconscious. The half-folded stroller was nearby. The mother picked up her child and carried him down the driveway. She phoned for an ambulance. She placed her child on the ground and noticed that his pants and nappy were lower than normal down his hips. The respondent said the child was a victim of "a hit and run". He told the mother's friend that he was pushing the child in the stroller, doing wheelies, when the pram went onto the road; the child fell out of the pram. Then he said the child was hit by a car.
[9] A paramedic arrived at 3.44 pm. He noted that the complainant was crying and agitated and in an altered state of consciousness. He had a swollen and closed left eye. His airway was blocked by pieces of woodchip or bark which could not be fully removed because the child bit on the paramedic's forceps. He had a large spongy contusion to the middle of the forehead; swelling to the left cheekbone; and two deep lacerations under his chin on the right hand side.
[10] The complainant was taken to Nambour Hospital at 4.15 pm where he was treated for partial airway obstruction with possible hypoxic brain injury. He was later transported to the Royal Children's Hospital in Brisbane for head injury management where he was "paralysed, sedated and ventilated". Four lacerations were sutured. He had bruising to his eyelids, upper chest and back, face and head, and an "F" shaped bruise on his left clavicle and also on his stomach, just below the umbilicus.
[11] On 14 May 2008, he developed a fever. A CT scan showed air and fluid in his abdomen. During the performance of a laparotomy to stem the source of the air and fluid, doctors found a punched out perforation to the anterior rectal wall accompanied by a linear laceration to the anus. A colostomy was performed to bypass the perforation. Paediatric specialist, Dr Crawford, considered that the complainant had "suffered a penetrating anal injury producing rectal perforation resulting in life threatening peritonitis and the need for a de-functioning colostomy. The presence of rectal perforation suggest[ed] that the anal penetration was with a sharp object."
[12] The respondent initially gave the following account to a police officer. He had trouble controlling the stroller and it went onto the road where it was struck by a car. The complainant half-hit the road. He took the child and the stroller down the driveway and laid him on the ground. He later walked away from the mother because he could not face her. When he returned with her to the complainant, the child was lying face down. The police officer noticed the stroller was undamaged.
[13] Later that evening, the respondent took part in a formal police interview. He initially maintained his original account, adding that the stroller connected with the corner of a shop. He denied throwing or hitting the complainant.
[14] Police took him to the scene and questioned him further. He added the following. The complainant fell out of the stroller and hit his head on the roadway. When he picked the complainant up, the complainant "kicked him in the head and in the nuts". He reacted by throwing the complainant onto the floor and the complainant hit his head on the side wall. The respondent "also sort of fell". He picked the complainant up but the child kicked the respondent in the eye and the respondent dropped the child who fell onto a piece of sharp timber. The child continued to struggle and when the child kicked the respondent "in the nuts" the respondent threw him against the wall. He said he "got the shits" and "just clicked out". The last thing he did was to hit the complainant in the head, punch him and drop him onto the ground into the tree near the shed at the back of the shop. He took the complainant down the driveway, not to assault him but to quieten him down. Some of the marks on his hands were from punching the complainant. He hit the complainant twice and threw him twice. At one time he picked him up to quieten him and pat his back. The child kept screaming and struggling and again kicked the respondent in "the nuts" so the respondent let him go and punched him in the face near the eye on the way down. The respondent first said that the child landed on his side on recently cut wood branches and a fairly sharp stake. But he then said that the child landed face down on a piece of timber. He began to go blue. The respondent left and got the mother. He denied putting any bark or other material into the child's mouth.
The prosecutor's submissions at sentence
[15] The prosecutor emphasised that nowhere in the respondent's account of his offending to police did he mention how the child had a sharp object inserted into his anus, rupturing his rectum. This injury was not detected until serious symptoms developed some days later.
[16] The prosecutor tendered photographs which showed the injuries to the child and confirmed the viciousness of the attack upon him. This Court has viewed these photographs. The prosecutor invited the judge to infer that the sharp object which was used to make the "F" bruise on the abdomen was subsequently used to penetrate the child's anus after the respondent removed the child's long pants and nappy. He submitted that denunciation and general deterrence were predominant factors in sentencing for this "wicked attack on a defenceless child". The violence perpetrated was "sustained, repeated and gross". The respondent abandoned the child in a place where he may not have been discovered until after he had died. He did not make frank admissions so that the medical authorities concentrated on treating potential massive head injuries from a car accident rather than the internal rectal injuries. The respondent had intentionally inflicted grievous bodily harm on "a two-year old for behaving as two-year olds do", apparently after losing his temper.
[17] The prosecutor tendered victim impact statements provided by the parents of the complainant. These provide some insight into the dreadful consequences of the respondent's offending, not only for the young complainant but also for his parents, extended family and network of friends.
[18] The prosecutor agreed with the judge's observation that the rape offence was an episode of violence rather than of sexual gratification. He submitted that an effective sentence of between 10 and 12 years imprisonment should be imposed. If a sentence of less than 10 years was imposed, the case was so extraordinarily violent that a serious violent offence declaration must be made.
Defence submissions at sentence
[19] Defence counsel made the following submissions. The respondent had no prior convictions for violent conduct. Although he was initially untruthful, he made admissions to the police and cooperated. The committal proceedings involved only witness statements without cross-examination. He pleaded guilty at an early time.
[20] Defence counsel tendered a report from psychiatrist Dr Michael Beech who examined the respondent on 8 May 2009, and reports from Dr Michael Walsh, the respondent's general practitioner, and psychiatrist, Dr Bob Anderson, who were both treating him before this offending.
[21] Dr Walsh stated that he had treated the respondent for about four years during which time the respondent revealed concern for his mental state, in particular as to his anger and impulse control, alcohol abuse, drink driving behaviours, excessive Coca-Cola consumption, reduced empathy and occasional auditory and visual hallucinations. He had reacted adversely to a friend's death in October 2007.
[22] Dr Anderson noted the respondent's early drug abuse which increased his likelihood of developing subsequent psychotic illness. He considered that the respondent's condition could improve if he ameliorated his intake of Coca-Cola, alcohol and marijuana. He considered the respondent should be further monitored before being placed on a lifetime treatment of anti-psychotic medication.
[23] Dr Beech recorded that the respondent expressed remorse and regret for his offending and remained concerned about its psychological and emotional effects on the complainant. The respondent stated that he hated himself for his offending. Dr Beech considered the respondent was of low average intelligence. He noted that the complainant's mother stated that, when she commenced a relationship with another man, the respondent sent her text messages which included that he hoped the complainant would go missing. He noted that another witness stated that, a week before the offences, the respondent had said that he hated the complainant's mother; he also said something like "she better watch her back, her boy is going to go missing soon, and I'm going to kill it". Another witness gave a statement to similar effect. After considering the material from Dr Walsh and Dr Anderson, Dr Beech concluded that, at the time of the offences, the respondent was not affected by any significant mental illness or natural mental infirmity. His family history suggested he may have a bipolar disorder, although that was far from clear. He had a significant personality disturbance associated with alcohol and drug use, disruptive behaviour and mood lability. The most likely conclusion was that, in an irritable state, he was easily frustrated by a screaming child and he responded aggressively out of temper.
[24] Defence counsel emphasised the following matters. Whilst in custody, the respondent completed a range of vocational and personal development courses. He tendered certificates to that effect. The respondent's offending was a single intense episode over a short period. The respondent continued to have the support of his family. His parents were in court with him. He therefore had real prospects of rehabilitation. The complainant had subsequently recovered well from his dreadful injuries and now had normal bowel control. The prosecutor accepted this. The appropriate sentence was between six and nine years imprisonment. A serious violent offence declaration was not warranted because of the absence of any previous convictions for violence and this isolated episode, although extremely violent, occurred over a short period of time.
The judge's sentencing remarks
[25] In sentencing the respondent, the learned judge made the following observations. The respondent had entered a timely plea of guilty. He was 22 years of age at the time of his offending and 24 at sentence. He had no relevant criminal history.
[26] In his 15 years as a judge, he had "not come across an episode of violence towards a child which is so horrific and so shocking". After reciting the chilling facts and listing the injuries suffered by the complainant, the judge noted that although the respondent made some limited admissions he had never fully told the truth. The treating doctors were not aware of what was potentially the most serious life threatening injury caused to the child during this horrendous episode of violence. The respondent violently penetrated the child's anus with some form of sharp object producing rectal perforation resulting in life threatening peritonitis and the need for a defunctioning colostomy. The respondent used a sharp fine-ended object to mark the child in two places with a "F" shape.
[27] The prosecutor's description of the offending as "a wicked attack on a defenceless child, and sustained repeated violence of an horrendous nature" was justified. There were chilling factors. The offending occurred over a 15 minute period in broad daylight in a public place. It demonstrated a complete lack of control. It involved sustained and repeated violence. Had the mother not seen the respondent running away, the secluded nature of the site where the child was placed meant that he may not have been located and could have died. The respondent's deliberate dishonesty misled the medical practitioners and delayed treatment for the most serious injury.
[28] While the respondent seemed to have some form of bipolar disorder, it did not contribute to his offending. The respondent lacked insight and continued to claim that he could not remember details of his offending, including what actually occurred in relation to the penetrating injury to the child's anus. The victim impact statements were tragic, but criminal courts were not courts of emotion. He was required to sentence according to law. Having regard to the cases to which he had been referred by counsel, the judge determined that in each case a sentence of nine years imprisonment was appropriate with a serious violent offence declaration. The judge also declared time spent in pre-sentence custody as time served under the sentence.
The submissions in this appeal
[29] Mr Moynihan SC, on behalf of the appellant, emphasised the following aspects. The maximum penalty for each offence was life imprisonment. A sentence of nine years imprisonment with a serious violent declaration did not sufficiently recognise the horrific nature of the offending. It did not give sufficient weight to general deterrence and denunciation and did not adequately punish the respondent for his actions. These offences were more than a momentary loss of control. They involved an intention to both physically and sexually assault the complainant in a terrible breach of trust. The respondent left the defenceless child in a secluded area after a deliberate, vengeful and protracted attack on him. He used an offensive sharp weapon to anally rape the child and to mark him with an F. He showed callous disregard for the child by abandoning him in an unconscious state and failed to disclose the trauma to his anus. This case was similar to R v TK,[2] where a sentence of 16 years imprisonment was imposed. This Court should allow the appeal and substitute a sentence of at least 16 years imprisonment. Although a lesser sentence was sought at first instance, the nine year sentence imposed was so inadequate that this Court should not be bound by the prosecutor's request at sentence: R v Watson; ex parte A-G (Qld).[3]
[30] Counsel for the respondent's contentions are as follows. At sentence, the prosecutor submitted, and the judge accepted, that the offence of rape was not a sexual offence but one of violence. The appellant now sought to improperly categorise the rape offence as sexual in nature. TK should be distinguished for that reason. He especially emphasised two cases as supporting the sentence imposed: R v J[4] and RvG; ex parte A-G (Qld).[5] The nine year sentence with a serious violent offence declaration was appropriate and close to the sentence requested by the prosecution at sentence. He urged the Court to refuse the appeal.
Conclusion
[31] I do not accept the respondent's contention that a rape offence is necessarily less serious and deserving of a lesser penalty if it can be categorised as an offence of violence rather than one giving sexual gratification. The appropriate sentence for an offence of rape will vary depending on the particular relevant circumstances pertaining in each case. But the appropriate sentence will not necessarily depend on whether the offending involved an aggressive violent act, sexual gratification, or as is often the case, a combination of both. In this instance, the rape offence was a terrible violation of a vulnerable two year old child in the respondent's care. It caused life-threatening injuries. It is a grave example of the serious offence of rape.
[32] The cases emphasised by the respondent's counsel, J and G, are not at all helpful in determining the proper sentence in this difficult and dreadful case. Although both J and G involved horrible injuries inflicted on defenceless young children, they did not involve the offences of the kind committed by the respondent which were both punishable by life imprisonment. J, who was sentenced to an effective term of five years imprisonment, committed an offence of grievous bodily harm (without intent), an offence carrying a maximum term of imprisonment for 14 years, and a count of assault occasioning bodily harm, an offence carrying a maximum term of imprisonment for seven years.
[33] In G, the offender was sentenced to six years imprisonment for an offence of torture, which carried a maximum penalty of 14 years. The Attorney-General appealed against that sentence contending that a serious violent offence declaration should have been made and G applied for leave to appeal, contending that an early parole recommendation should have been made. G was 25 years old and the de facto partner of the mother of the 18 month old complainant. He became angry when the child defecated in the bath. On about five such occasions he put faeces into the child's mouth. On a few occasions he held the child's head under water and punched him in the chest, winding him. He once kicked the child in the bottom so hard that the child travelled some distance before landing on his face suffering bruising and two black eyes. G also admitted pulling the child's penis so hard that it caused skin to tear away from the pelvis. G had no prior convictions and suffered learning difficulties. He pleaded guilty at an early time and obtained counselling prior to his sentence. He had a good work history. This Court noted that the offending conduct, whilst intentional and extended over a two month period, did not involve serious permanent injuries. This Court declined to interfere with the sentence imposed at first instance. By contrast, in the present case, the respondent intentionally caused grievous bodily harm and raped the complainant child.
[34] Of the various cases to which this Court has been referred, the closest factually is, as Mr Moynihan submits, TK. Unfortunately, the learned sentencing judge, who based his careful decision on the cases to which counsel referred him, was not informed of TK's case.
[35] TK pleaded guilty to one count of assault occasioning bodily harm with a circumstance of aggravation and two counts of rape. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment for the assault and 16 years imprisonment for each count of rape, with declarations that those rape offences were serious violent offences. He was 24 at sentence and 22 at the time of his offending. He was the boyfriend of the complainant's mother. He had no relevant criminal history although he had been placed on probation for property and drug offences in the past.
The 21 month old female victim lived mainly with her father and his mother, but spent some days each week with her mother, TK's girlfriend. Some time after the child had been in TK's sole custody, the mother returned to find blood on the child's thighs. TK pointed to a small cut to her vagina and then rode off on his bike. The child was not crying and did not seem to be in pain. The mother later saw blood on the outside of the child's nappy. When she undid the nappy, she found a great deal of blood, including clots and a piece of skin hanging out of the vagina. The mother at first tried to conceal the extent of the child's injuries but ultimately the child was taken to hospital.
She was anaesthetised and examined. Her labium minora and majora were bruised and there was a transection through the posterior vaginal hymen with a tear extending to the vaginal wall and posterior fourchette. Her vagina contained a large amount of fresh blood. A one centimetre tear to the upper part of her vagina could not be sutured but pressure was applied to stop the haemorrhage. She had a lax anus with a small two to three millimetre tear in the posterior wall. She had six discrete lesions consistent with burns on her left arm. Her injuries were consistent with recent forceful penetration with a blunt object to both the vagina and anus by a penis or similar sized object and were inconsistent with digital penetration. The tear in the upper part of the vagina was consistent with deep penetration. The burns were consistent with cigarette burns.
TK felt the mother paid too much attention to the child. The offences occurred when TK was heavily abusing cannabis. Although the sentencing proceeding was adjourned to obtain a psychiatric report, TK's counsel did not ultimately tender any such material. TK accepted at sentence the prosecution allegation that the rapes of the child were penile, not digital.
In the application before this Court, he was self-represented. He contended that the rapes were digital and that his lawyers at sentence were incompetent. This Court noted that TK's offending:
"was a sexual act of extreme violence perpetrated upon a 21 month old in the care of [the] offender for the purpose of seeking revenge on the mother, with serious injuries to the child. In those circumstances, it matters little whether the weapon used was a penis, a finger or fingers or some other object."[6]
After referring to R v C,[7] R v Daphney;[8] R v Luke[9] and R v Eather,[10] this Court concluded that the 16 year sentence, whilst a heavy penalty for a young man, was not manifestly excessive. The Court noted that the serious injuries to the child meant that her long term physical and mental prognosis was unknown; the offences of rape were within the worst category of those offences.
[36] In determining the present appeal, this Court "may in its unfettered discretion vary the sentence and impose such sentence as to the Court seems proper".[11]TK is of some assistance in determining the proper sentence in this case but, unfortunately, neither counsel provided that assistance to the sentencing judge. It does not assist the administration of justice when cases relied upon as comparable in an Attorney-General's appeal against sentence are not placed before the sentencing judge by the prosecutor. Sentencing proceedings are not intended to be dress rehearsals for an Attorney-General's appeal against sentence under s 669A(1) Criminal Code. The effect of R v Lacey; ex parte A-G (Qld)[12] is not to make such appeals anything other than exceptional and extraordinary.[13]
[37] TK is, however, even more serious than the present case. In TK, the offending not only involved two dreadful rapes of a 21 month old girl, but also a quite separate incident on a different occasion when TK burnt the baby with a cigarette. In TK, the child's physical injuries seem to be even worse that in the present case. It was unclear whether she would have ongoing serious physical injuries whereas here it is common ground that the child has physically recovered. TK had a more significant criminal history and, unlike the present respondent, had previously been placed on probation. TK's cooperation with the administration of justice was more limited than that of the present respondent; and his insight into and remorse for his offending was less than that of the present respondent.
[38] Consistency in sentencing is an important aspect of this Court's function in determining appeals against sentence. But consistency in sentencing is not a synonym for certainty in sentencing. No two cases will have precisely the same combination of exacerbating and mitigating factors. There is never just one correct sentence for an offence. The appropriate sentence in a particular case will usually fall with a range. The determination of an Attorney-General's appeal against sentence requires this Court to consider all relevant factors, both exacerbating and mitigating, in fixing the proper sentence. TK is of assistance in determining the proper sentence in this case, but it does not demonstrate that this sentence must, or even should, be 16 years imprisonment.
[39] The respondent unquestionably committed two very serious examples of the offences to which he pleaded guilty, grievous bodily harm with intent and rape. The maximum penalty for each offence was life imprisonment. It was indeed fortunate that his actions constituting each count did not result in death or permanent physical harm to the complainant, a vulnerable two and a half year old child in his care. Of particular concern is the element of sadism accompanying both offences and the respondent's desire to hurt the child's mother by hurting the innocent and vulnerable child. There are significant mitigating factors in the present case. Although not unreservedly, the respondent cooperated with the authorities in the administration of justice and to a more significant degree than TK. The respondent was relatively immature when he offended. He had no relevant prior convictions. He has made some efforts at rehabilitation whilst in custody. He has some insight into the horror of his offending and its effect on the complainant and has expressed remorse. He has the support of his family so that there are prospects of rehabilitation after he has served a lengthy period of imprisonment. Importantly, he pleaded guilty at an early time. After taking into account these exacerbating and mitigating features and the closest comparable case to which this Court has been referred, namely TK, I consider that a sentence of 12 years imprisonment best balances the gravity of the offences and the need for general deterrence and denunciation on the one hand, with the mitigating factors and the desirability for and prospects of rehabilitation on the other.
[40] I would allow the appeal, set aside the sentence of nine years imprisonment on each count and, instead, substitute a sentence of 12 years imprisonment on each count. The respondent is declared to be convicted of a serious violent offence on each count. Under s 159A Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), it is declared that 520 days spent in pre-sentence custody between 30 May 2008 and 15 October 2009 is deemed time already served under the sentence.
[41] MUIR JA: I agree with the reasons of the President and with her proposed orders.
[42] DOUGLAS J: I also agree with the reasons of the President and with her proposed orders.
Footnotes
[1] Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 182.
[2] [2004] QCA 394.
[3] [2009] QCA 279, [30].
[4] [1998] QCA 143.
[5] [1999] QCA 84.
[6] Above, [29].
[7] [1998] QCA 207.
[8] [1999] QCA 69.
[9] [1987] CCA 9; CCA No 342 of 1986, 4 March 1987.
[10] (1994) 71 A Crim R 305.
[11] Criminal Code, s 669A(1) and R v Lacey; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2009] QCA 274.
[12] See fn 11.
[13] Above [148].