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R v Gray[2011] QCA 362
R v Gray[2011] QCA 362
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
PARTIES: | |
FILE NO/S: | DC No 475 of 2010 |
Court of Appeal | |
PROCEEDING: | Sentence Application |
ORIGINATING COURT: | |
DELIVERED ON: | 13 December 2011 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 28 November 2011 |
JUDGES: | Margaret McMurdo P, Chesterman JA and Mullins J Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made |
ORDER: | Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused. |
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the applicant was charged with two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed and in company (counts 1 and 2), and one count of child stealing (count 3) – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of assault occasioning bodily harm in company – where the applicant pleaded not guilty to counts 2 and 3 – where the applicant was convicted on counts 1 and 2 – where the applicant was found not guilty of the further circumstance of aggravation, that he was armed – where the applicant was sentenced on count 1 to two and a half years’ imprisonment with a parole release date of 15 April 2012, requiring the applicant to serve one-third of the head sentence in custody – where the applicant was sentenced on count 2 to 18 months’ imprisonment – where the applicant contends that the sentences were manifestly excessive – where the applicant had no prior criminal history and had promising rehabilitative prospects – whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive R v Campbell [2009] QCA 95, considered R v Salmon; ex parte Attorney-General of Queensland [2002] QCA 262, considered |
COUNSEL: | J McInnes for the applicant S P Vasta for the respondent |
SOLICITORS: | Legal Aid Queensland for the applicant Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent |
[1] MARGARET McMURDO P: I agree with Chesterman JA that leave to appeal against sentence must be refused.
[2] The effective sentence, two and a half years imprisonment with parole after 10 months, was unquestionably a heavy penalty for two offences of assault occasioning bodily harm in company committed by a 21 year old with no prior criminal history and with promising rehabilitative prospects. I also note that references tendered on his behalf supported his counsel's contention at sentence that this behaviour was out of character.
[3] But as Chesterman JA explains, general deterrence was an important factor in this case. The community expects disputes over child custody and access to be determined by the courts in the best interests of the child, not settled by fights in public streets. Here the complainant was set upon by three men, including the applicant. Both the male complainant and the completely innocent two year old child were injured. Fortunately, those injuries were not serious but, as the primary judge identified, they could well have been. The violent episode has understandably traumatised the child. The primary judge rejected the defence contention that the other two males involved were passing strangers acting spontaneously. This finding meant that the applicant did not extensively cooperate with the administration of justice despite his plea of guilty prior to trial to assaulting the male complainant in company but without the circumstance of aggravation that he was armed. The primary judge also found the assault on the male complainant involved substantial protracted violence; was premeditated; and the applicant acted in a pack and in a cowardly manner, putting not only the male complainant's wellbeing at risk but also the safety of the toddler.
[4] A substantial penalty was required to deter such conduct and to show the community's and the court's disapprobation of it. Despite the considerable mitigating features, a period of actual custody was warranted. The sentence imposed, though heavy, was not manifestly excessive.
[5] I agree with Chesterman JA's proposed order.
[6] CHESTERMAN JA: The applicant was charged on indictment with two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed and in company, and one count of child stealing. When arraigned on count 1 he pleaded guilty to assault occasioning bodily harm in company. He pleaded not guilty to counts 2 and 3. After a three day trial in the District Court at Southport, the applicant was, on 16 June 2011, acquitted on the count of child stealing but convicted on counts 1 and 2 of assault occasioning bodily harm in company. He was found not guilty of the further circumstance of aggravation, that he was armed.
[7] He was sentenced on count 1 to two and a half years’ imprisonment with a parole release date of 15 April 2012, requiring him to serve 10 months, or one-third of the head sentence, in custody. On count 2 he was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment.
[8] The applicant has applied for leave to appeal against his sentences on the sole ground that they are manifestly excessive.
[9] The assaults occurred at about 9.00 pm on 26 December 2009. The applicant, the woman with whom he then lived, and two other men waited for and set upon the complainant who was the father of the child the subject of count 3. He was pushing the child in a stroller along the footpath of a suburban street near his home. The child was two years and three months old and living with the complainant who had substantial grounds for thinking that the mother could not provide a suitable home for her. The applicant’s partner was the mother. She and the complainant had cohabitated some years earlier.
[10] The mother disputed the complainant’s assessment that she could not provide satisfactory living arrangements for their daughter. She wished to regain custody of the child. To that end she went to the complainant’s house on Christmas Day and asked to take the child. The complainant refused. The next day the child was forcibly taken from the complainant’s possession.
[11] Count 1 was the charge of assaulting the complainant. Count 2 was an indirect assault on the child who was injured in the altercation between the applicant, his co-offenders and the complainant. The acquittal on count 3 appears to have been explained on the basis that the child was taken by her mother and not by the applicant or one of the other men.
[12] The evidence at the trial showed that the applicant, two other men and a woman, presumably the child’s mother, confronted the complainant as he walked his daughter near his home. He retreated from them and they followed. He stopped a passing car and asked the female driver for assistance. She declined to give it but as she drove off observed three men and a woman running towards the complainant. The applicant abused the complainant for not allowing the child to spend part of Christmas Day with her mother. The complainant ran for home. The wheels of the stroller struck a kerb causing the child to be thrown head first on to a concrete driveway, cutting her forehead and grazing her knees. The complainant was then attacked by the three men who pushed him to the ground where they kicked and punched him. His evidence was that two of the attackers (though not the applicant) were armed with batons. It was the circumstance of aggravation, being armed, which the jury rejected. During the attack the child was taken. There is evidence that one of the male assailants took her but also evidence that the woman did. The jury was directed to acquit on count 3 if they found the woman took the child.
[13] The complainant sustained grazes and bruises to his buttocks, back, scalp, shoulder, left shin and forehead. The force needed to cause these injuries was moderate to severe.
[14] The applicant did not give evidence but called the child’s mother in his defence. She said that she had spoken to the complainant on Christmas Day and he had agreed that she could have the child the following evening. She said that she and the applicant went to the complainant’s home on Boxing Day night. They encountered the complainant who ran away. Two other men, passers by, involved themselves gratuitously in the fight between the applicant and the complainant. The extreme unlikelihood of that sequence was conceded on the appeal.
[15] In addition to calling that improbable evidence the applicant’s counsel subjected the complainant to a demeaning cross-examination in which he was bullied, his previous convictions for dishonesty were brought out, and he was labelled a “smarmy conman”. On appeal it was submitted that the jury was not prepared to act on the complainant’s uncorroborated testimony.
[16] In passing sentence the learned trial judge said:
“You ambushed [the complainant] and bashed him. The crime was committed on a suburban street in the evening. … It is clear that you did not like him. He had the care of [the] child and he was not prepared to allow her to have the child overnight at Christmas.
I accept [the complainant’s] evidence that he was concerned about the environment provided by [the mother] and that [she] had not … shown much interest in her child until this particular day. …
I am satisfied that two other men involved were with you … and that they came with you for the purpose of a violent confrontation. There is the flavour of planning and retribution in the offending. The suggestion that there was a spontaneous attack in combination with some passing strangers was ridiculous.
[The] baby was hurt in the initial tussle. The jury was satisfied that that was a foreseeable result of your assault … . … Fortunately the injury suffered by [the child] was minimal, but your conduct that night put her at risk of serious harm. …
It was apparent … that you intended to violently assault [the complainant]. It was a protracted beating. He was punched and kicked all over his body and his head. For the most part, he was curled up on the ground in an effort to protect his face and internal organs. Some of the injuries he suffered were the result of severe force. … he is still dealing with some residual physical effects. Even worse has been the traumatic impact … for [the complainant] [and] … his little girl.
…
You say that you are now remorseful. You have written an apology to [the complainant]. I heard no evidence of remorse in an interview that you gave to police in 2009. Further, the conduct of your defence involved a shabby attack upon the character of the complainant. I accept that you are now sorry that the baby was hurt, although you maintained a denial of criminal responsibility for that injury.
This was only one episode, but it involved substantial and protracted violence. There is the aspect of premeditation. You acted in a pack and it was cowardly behaviour. You targeted a man who was blameless. You risked the safety of a baby to get him, and the injuries … suffered were substantial. The potential for tragedy for both [the complainant] and his daughter was very real. You created that danger.