Bradshaw v Bar Association of Queensland
[2012] QCA 322
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- Unreported Judgment
- Appeal Determined - Special Leave Refused (HCA)
- Bradshaw v Bar Association of Queensland[2012] QCA 322
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Bradshaw v Bar Association of Queensland[2012] QCA 322
Bradshaw v Bar Association of Queensland[2012] QCA 322
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Bradshaw v Bar Association of Queensland [2012] QCA 322 | |
PARTIES: | JAMES TODD BRADSHAW |
FILE NO/S: | Appeal No 5775 of 2012 |
Court of Appeal | |
PROCEEDING: | Application for Leave Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act |
ORIGINATING COURT: | |
DELIVERED ON: | 23 November 2012 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 8 November 2012 |
JUDGES: | Holmes and Muir and White JJA |
ORDERS: | 1. Application for extension of time within which to appeal granted. 2. Appeal dismissed. |
CATCHWORDS: | APPEAL – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – TIME FOR APPEAL – EXTENSION OF TIME – WHEN GRANTED – where applicant was a barrister – where applicant sought to appeal against an order of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“QCAT”) dismissing an application for a review of a decision of the respondent refusing to grant the applicant a local practicing certificate – where applicant did not file Notice of Appeal within the time limit set out in s 151 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act – where applicant seeks an extension of time within which to appeal – whether extension should be granted PROCEDURE – INFERIOR COURTS – QUEENSLAND – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – where applicant was a barrister – where applicant practised for in excess of 40 years without incident – where applicant found guilty in 2008 of unsatisfactory professional misconduct by the Legal Practice Tribunal – where respondent decided not to renew the applicant’s practising certificate – where applicant sought judicial review of decision – where application refused – where applicant faced further charges before the Legal Practice Tribunal in 2009, three of which were substantiated – where applicant then made further application for a practising certificate – where this application was refused – where applicant appealed decision – where appeal dismissed – where applicant re-applied for a practising certificate – where respondent refused application in late 2010 – where applicant provided with information notice outlining reasons for respondent’s refusal – where applicant applied to QCAT for a review of the decision – where QCAT upheld respondent’s decision – where QCAT was required to conduct “a fresh hearing on the merits” – where applicant submitted Tribunal erred in considering respondent’s reasons and determining the application on the basis that no error on the part of the respondent had been established – where applicant submitted he was not given a fair hearing by Tribunal – where applicant submitted Tribunal erred in relying on respondent’s submissions and accepting an information notice as complying with s 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act – whether Tribunal conducted “a fresh hearing on the merits” – whether applicant received a fair hearing – whether respondent failed to comply with s 27B – whether applicant should be granted a local practicing certificate Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 27B Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 51(4), s 51(8), s 51(9), s 468(4) Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 20(2), s 151 Bradshaw v Bar Association of Queensland [2009] QSC 226, considered Bradshaw v Bar Association of Queensland [2010] QSC 306, considered Legal Services Commissioner v Bradshaw [2008] QLPT 9, considered Legal Services Commissioner v Bradshaw [2009] QCA 126, considered Legal Services Commissioner v Bradshaw [2009] QLPT 21, considered |
COUNSEL: | The applicant/appellant appeared on his own behalf |
SOLICITORS: | The applicant/appellant appeared on his own behalf |
[1] HOLMES JA: I agree with the reasons of Muir JA and the orders he proposes.
[2] MUIR JA: Introduction The applicant, not having filed a Notice of Appeal within the time limited by s 151 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (the “QCAT Act”), seeks an extension of time within which to appeal against an order of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“QCAT”) made on 23 December 2011 dismissing an application for a review of the decision of the respondent on 17 November 2010 refusing to grant the applicant a local practising certificate.
The history of proceedings prior to the subject proceeding
[3] Before considering the merits of the present application, it is desirable to trace the history of earlier disciplinary proceedings involving the application. A knowledge of those proceedings assists in understanding the arguments advanced by the parties before the Tribunal and before this Court.
[4] The applicant was found guilty on 10 July 2008 of unsatisfactory professional conduct by the Legal Practice Tribunal constituted by White J.[1] The Tribunal ordered, amongst other things, that the applicant undertake within the next 12 months not less than 10 hours of compulsory professional development approved by the respondent in the areas of ethics and practice management in addition to the compulsory professional development requirements of the respondent. Prior to this determination, the applicant had practised for in excess of 40 years without any blot on his professional record.
[5] On 6 October 2008, the respondent decided not to renew the applicant’s practising certificate. The applicant sought judicial review of that and other decisions. On 9 December 2008, an appeal from the decision of the respondent under s 69 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (the “LPA”) came before Fryberg J. After substantial argument, the applicant withdrew the appeal.
[6] On 15 May 2009, the applicant’s application for an extension of time within which to appeal against that decision was refused with costs by the Court of Appeal.[2]
[7] On 13 August 2009, Douglas J dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the respondent made on 6 October 2008 not to renew the applicant’s practising certificate.[3]
[8] On 8 September 2009, the Legal Practice Tribunal constituted by Fryberg J and two panel members heard five charges brought by the Legal Services Commissioner against the applicant. The first of the five charges was that the applicant had failed to lodge tax returns for the years ended 30 June 1999 to 30 June 2005 inclusive, conduct for which he was convicted of offences against the Taxation Administration Act in April 2008. The Tribunal found that charge and two others proven.[4]
[9] A further application for a practising certificate was made by the applicant and refused by a decision communicated to the applicant in a letter dated 11 November 2009. An appeal against the respondent’s decision was dismissed by Byrne SJA on 20 August 2010.[5]
[10] The applicant once more reapplied to the respondent for a local practising certificate. The respondent refused the application on 17 November 2010 and provided the applicant with an information notice pursuant to s 51(4) and s 51(8) of the LPA. It, as required by the LPA, set out the reasons for the respondent’s decision (the “Respondent’s Reasons” or the “Reasons”). The applicant applied under s 51(9) for a review of the decision. Under s 20(2) of the QCAT Act the hearing was “by way of a fresh hearing on the merits”. The Tribunal directed that the appeal be determined on the papers and both parties lodged written submissions with the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted in its reasons that the applicant filed no substantive affidavits “but, rather, several sets of submissions which are wide-ranging”.
[11] The applicant, in response to the respondent’s contention that leave to appeal was required, applied for leave. The respondent’s contention was wrong.[6] The parties accepted that in order to resolve the application for an extension of time and, if necessary, the appeal, the Court should hear the parties’ arguments on the merits of the appeal.
This application
[12] In the proposed Notice of Appeal exhibited to an affidavit of the applicant sworn on 8 June 2012, the applicant stated the following grounds of appeal:
“A.The Plaintiff did not receive a fair hearing before the Respondent or QCAT.
B.The Tribunal erred in not making a ruling in response to the information provided.
C.The Tribunal applied the wrong test and thereby relied on the decision of Byrne J when it was not an appropriate authority, when it had little persuasive benefit.
D.The Tribunal erred in relying on the Respondent’s submissions and accepting an information notice as complying with 27(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act.
E.The Tribunal erred in failing to consider or adequately consider the Appellant’s submission.”
[13] Those grounds were expanded on in the applicant’s written Outline of Argument and in his oral submissions on the hearing before this Court.
[14] The following is an extract from the reasons for the respondent’s decision set out in the information notice:
“5.The reasons the [respondent] is not satisfied that [the applicant] is a fit and proper person to hold a local practising certificate are:
a.[the applicant] failed to lodge personal income tax returns in a timely way for each of the 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 tax years (‘the returns’);
b.[the applicant] failed to provide the [respondent] with an adequate explanation for his failure to lodge the returns in a timely way as requested by the [respondent] by its letters of 20 February 2009 and 2 April 2009;
c.[the applicant] failed to provide the [respondent] with documentation relevant to his explanation for his failure to lodge the returns as requested by the [respondent] by its letters of 22 May 2009 and 2 April 2009;
d.[the applicant] failed, in his application for a local practising certificate, to disclose details of five complaints made against him as a legal practitioner as listed in the schedule (‘the complaints’);
e.[the applicant] failed to provide proper details of the complaints when requested to do so by the [respondent] by its letters of 20 February 2009 and 2 April 2009;
f.By sending a letter of 19 July 2009 to solicitors Miller Harris [the applicant] engaged in conduct which fell short of that expected of a reasonably competent legal practitioner;
g.[the applicant] failed, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a written notice from the Legal Services Commission dated 24 November 2008;
h.On 3 May 2006 by letter to Mr Williams, a litigant, and client of solicitors Miller Harris, [the applicant] communicated directly with an opponent’s client;
i.By [the applicant’s] letter of 3 March 2009 to the [respondent] he asserted that in proceedings before Fryberg J. on 9 December 2008 (being proceedings 10774 of 2008) his Honour had expressed the view that [the applicant] should be entitled to recommence practice, when no such opinion or view had been expressed by Fryberg J in the proceedings;
j.In an application to the Court of appeal for an extension of time to appeal a decision of the Legal Practice Tribunal, where [the applicant] acted on his own behalf both before the Tribunal and in the Court of Appeal, [the applicant] demonstrated incompetence in that:
i.He contended that orders made against him in the Tribunal of 10 July 2008 were not ‘final orders’ when no reasonably competent barrister could fail to appreciate that the orders were in fact, and in law final orders;
ii.He did not prepare and cause to be put before the Court of Appeal a proper record of the proceedings before the Tribunal when any reasonably competent barrister would appreciate that the Court of Appeal could not proceed without a proper record;
iii.He made submissions inconsistent with his filed application for an extension of time to appeal and his draft notice of appeal in support when any reasonably competent barrister would appreciate that only submissions properly in support of the application before the Court could be of assistance to the Court.
k.[the applicant] failed to comply with an Order of the Legal Practice Tribunal made on 10 July 2008 that he undertake within the next 12 months of the Order not less than 10 hours of compulsory professional development approved by the [respondent] in the areas of ethics and practice management in addition to the compulsory professional development requirements of the [respondent].
l.[the applicant] falsely represented in a letter to the [respondent] dated 6 September 2010 (which enclosed his application dated 3 September 2010) that he had complied with the Order of the Legal Practice Tribunal of 10 July 2008 when he had not so complied.”
Consideration of ground C of the Notice of Appeal
[15] It is convenient to commence a consideration of the grounds argued by the applicant with ground C. Perhaps the argument most emphasised on the hearing was that the Tribunal had erred in considering the Respondent’s Reasons and in determining the application on the basis that no error on the part of the respondent had been established. It was submitted, correctly, that the Tribunal was required to conduct “a fresh hearing on the merits” and that the Tribunal was required to make its own determination having regard to the evidence properly brought before it.
[16] The applicant’s argument in this regard was based on the discussion in paragraphs [22]–[52] inclusive of the Tribunal’s reasons, of the Respondent’s Reasons, and on the following concluding paragraphs of the Tribunal’s reasons:
“[63]I am satisfied that the [respondent’s] contentions, in the Notice, were not stated in terms which are inappropriate or extravagant but, rather, in appropriately dispassionate terms, in reliance upon facts which are not contradicted, and amply supported.
[64]It will be apparent from these Reasons that I am not persuaded that the [respondent’s] decision was wrong in any respect, or not properly made. Indeed, the [respondent’s] decision was entirely justified. [The applicant’s] application must be dismissed.”
[17] It was appropriate for the Tribunal to discuss and rule on the merits of the Respondent’s Reasons when considering the merits of the application. The applicant’s written submissions to the Tribunal contained a detailed critique of the matters set out in paragraph 5 of the Respondent’s Reasons. The respondent’s submissions to the Tribunal also canvassed the matters in paragraph 5 of those reasons and responded to the applicant’s arguments in relation to them.
[18] That the Tribunal understood that the hearing was by way of a fresh hearing on the merits appears from paragraph [2] of the reasons where it is said:
“… It is to be decided in accordance with the QCAT Act and, for that purpose, this tribunal has all the functions of the [respondent]. The review is a fresh hearing, on the merits. This Tribunal’s powers are identified in s 24 of the QCAT Act: to confirm or amend the decision, or set it aside and substitute its own decision or return it to the decision making body for reconsideration.”
[19] The Tribunal did not limit itself to a consideration of the correctness of the Respondent’s Reasons. The Tribunal considered the background to the respondent’s refusal to renew the applicant’s practising certificate. It noted that paragraphs 5(a)–(j) of the Respondent’s Reasons were identical to those which resulted in a similar refusal a year earlier and which were considered by Byrne SJA in his decision of 20 August 2010. The Tribunal, implicitly, accepted the respondent’s submission that as Byrne SJA’s decision was given less than one month before the subject application for a practising certificate, the Tribunal “could reasonably expect [the applicant] to attempt, at least, to demonstrate that his situation is materially different to the circumstances addressed by Byrne SJA” rather than re-arguing “the matters which had previously been rejected by Byrne SJA and other judges”.
[20] In relation to other grounds challenged by the applicant, the primary judge observed that it was “difficult to reach any conclusion but that [the applicant] remains unable to accept” previous findings of other judges “… made after a close examination of the surrounding circumstances and events, and have never been shown to be wrong”.
[21] Paragraph [29] of the reasons deals with the applicant’s submissions in respect of grounds 5(d) and (e) of the Respondent’s Reasons. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant:
“…has done nothing in his submissions to address, or attempt to dispel the apparent continuing effects of, the adverse conclusions drawn by Byrne SJA: that he has ignored, or only responded incompletely, to many requests from the [respondent] (over a lengthy period) for information; that he has failed to satisfactorily explain his unwillingness to assist the [respondent] to perform its statutory function; and, that his responses to the [respondent] lacked candour.”
[22] Paragraphs [30] and [31] of the reasons deal with the continued reliance by the applicant on “… his contention that at a previous hearing Fryberg J has made comments to the effect that he should recommence practice, and be permitted to do so”. That matter will be addressed in more detail later. Perusal of the Tribunal’s reasons makes it apparent that it was not merely looking to endorse or reject the Respondent’s Reasons, but to form its own view of the merits of the Reasons and of the applicant’s challenge to them.
[23] Grounds 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the application to QCAT were discussed in paragraphs [54]–[62] of the Tribunal’s reasons. There is nothing in the discussion in those paragraphs which suggests that the Tribunal was pursuing a mistaken approach to the determination of the application. Referring to evidence of lack of apparent comprehension on the part of the applicant “of the nature or outcome of proceedings, or knowledge of proper procedural steps” the Tribunal observed:
“[62]Their occurrence serves, instead, to aggravate a reasonable concern that the knowledge and understanding which might be expected to accompany [the applicant’s] long vocational experience have for some reason abated, or evaporated. That conclusion is cemented by his failure, in the present application, to properly address that history, and the concerns arising from it.”
[24] Consequently, when regard is had to the whole of the Tribunal’s reasons and not merely to paragraphs [63] and [64], it is quite apparent that the Tribunal conducted a fresh hearing on the merits as required. I should add that the Tribunal did not rely on the decision of Byrne SJA as contended by the applicant. It had regard to it, as was appropriate, in order to evaluate aspects of the applicant’s conduct referred to in the Respondent’s Reasons. It was necessary also for the Tribunal to consider Byrne SJA’s reasons in order to address the respondent’s submissions. The respondent submitted that as the applicant had appealed unsuccessfully against the decision of 19 October 2009 (which was based on reasons similar to the Reasons), Byrne SJA’s conclusion that the respondent’s reasons for refusing to grant a practising certificate justified a lack of satisfaction that the applicant was a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate was a matter properly able to be taken into account by the Tribunal.
[25] This ground was not made out.
Consideration of grounds A, B and E
[26] It is convenient to deal with these grounds together.
[27] The applicant was given a fair hearing by the Tribunal. It is apparent from the reasons, which comprise 64 paragraphs, that the applicant’s arguments and the evidence bearing on them were carefully considered. The Tribunal considered the fairness of the hearing received by the applicant from the respondent and concluded:
“It is also apparent from the history of the consideration of [the applicant’s] application for a practising certificate within the Bar Association that it has been steady, careful and fair in its deliberations of [the applicant’s] applications, and his circumstances.”
[28] There is no reason to doubt the correctness of that finding. This Court was not directed to any evidence which could support allegations of unfairness on the part of the respondent or the Tribunal. Rather, there was evidence which supported the contrary conclusion.
[29] The above remarks are also sufficient to dispose of ground E, which was not expanded on in oral or written submissions. The applicant has no valid complaint concerning the consideration of his submissions by the Tribunal, whether in terms of comprehensiveness or carefulness.
Consideration of ground D
[30] The applicant submits that the Tribunal erred in relying on the respondent’s submissions and accepting an information notice as complying with s 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld). Section 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act provides:
“27BContent of statement of reasons for decision
If an Act requires a tribunal, authority, body or person making a decision to give written reasons for the decision (whether the expression ‘reasons’, ‘grounds’ or another expression is used), the instrument giving the reasons must also—
(a)set out the findings on material questions of fact; and
(b)refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.”
[31] The applicant did not address this ground orally. In his written submissions, he stated:[7]
“4.The heading is reasons for decision, which are clearly inadequate. Sadly this submission has been ignored and the [respondent] will continue to defy section 27 B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954.
5.I do not intend to argue this point as it is so obvious when the last disciplinary matter was resolved by Fryberg J where he stated that I should be supervised by counsel approved by the [respondent] for 12 months when I next get my certificate. Not one word about that order and why the [respondent] refuses to follow it. Need I say more.”
[32] The words after “obvious” in paragraph 5 would appear to be making a separate point unrelated to this ground.
[33] It does not appear to me that the respondent failed to comply with s 27B. The alleged deficiencies in the Respondent’s Reasons were not identified. The Reasons are comprehensive. The findings on questions of fact are set out in paragraph 5. Those paragraphs refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.
[34] If I am wrong in this conclusion, a finding that the Respondent’s Reasons failed to comply with s 27B would not assist the applicant. He was afforded natural justice by the respondent. The matters relied on by the respondent for its decision are clearly stated and the applicant had no difficulty in addressing them. No further particularity was sought before the Tribunal and none was necessary or desirable.
[35] By virtue of s 51(4) of the LPA, the respondent could not grant or renew a local practising certificate unless satisfied that the applicant was “a fit and proper person to hold the certificate”. It was not so satisfied. The relief the applicant sought from QCAT was that he “be declared a fit and proper person to practice” and that the respondent “be ordered to issue [him] with a Practising Certificate on the condition that [he] not commence practise until [he was] professionally insured”. The matters discussed elsewhere in these reasons show that the Tribunal did not err in denying that relief. Any non-compliance with s 27B, had it been demonstrated, would have had no bearing on the Tribunal’s decision.
Miscellaneous complaints
[36] I now propose to consider some other challenges to the Tribunal’s decision which did not appear to come within any of the applicant’s grounds of appeal.
[37] Paragraph 5i of the Reasons states:
“By [the applicant’s] letter of 3 March 2009 to the [respondent] he asserted that in proceedings before Fryberg J. on 9 December 2008 (being proceedings 10774 of 2008) his Honour had expressed the view that [the applicant] should be entitled to recommence practice, when no such opinion or view had been expressed by Fryberg J in the proceedings…”
[38] In his submissions to the Tribunal, the applicant addressed this reason as follows:
“Byrne J put this in context of a self-represented litigant interpreting through rose-tinted glasses. The significance is of course that [the respondent] was represented at that hearing by counsel and there was a transcript available. As in the statement they assert was false but ultimately the very core of the renewed application then obviously if for no other reason [the respondent] would canvass His Honour’s remarks as it was a Supreme Court judge expressing the very decision they were required to review.”
[39] Later in the submission, the applicant stated:
“The conviction by Fryberg J in September 2009 on the lesser charge and in December 2009 positive orders involving ‘when [the applicant] next receives his practising certificate’. Fryberg J is a wordsmith and did not say ‘if’…”
[40] The Tribunal dealt with these matters as follows:
“[30]His response to Reason 5(i) is particularly troubling. [The applicant] continues, in his submissions, to rely heavily on his contention that at a previous hearing Fryberg J has made comments to the effect that he should recommence practice, and be permitted to do so. This, again despite strong adverse comments about that claim by both Douglas J and Byrne SJA, who said:
[66][The applicant’s] claim that Fryberg J had recommended that he should be entitled to recommence practice also had potential to call his competence into question.
[67][The applicant] characterised his false claim that Fryberg J had made such a recommendation as, at worst for him, an ‘exaggeration’. His conduct is not, he submits, capable of sustaining an adverse view of his professional competence.
[68]Misunderstandings that conform with an observer’s preferred outcome are common enough: people often hear what they want to hear. Due allowance must be made for that tendency. Moreover, [the applicant] was arguing his own case in litigation vital to his professional future. In such circumstances he might not have brought to his self representation that [detachment] and judgment to be expected of a barrister. Even so, the claim that Fryberg J had recommended that he be granted a certificate could fairly be regarded as raising a serious question about his capacity to grasp what happens in court. Coupled with events before the Court of Appeal, it was open to the BAQ Council to entertain substantial reservations about [the applicant’s] professional competence, after allowing for the inevitable stresses and difficulties of self representation.
[31]Despite this [the applicant] says, in his submissions to this Tribunal: ‘I have been prevented from practising since 6 October 2008 and all my disciplinary matters are history where the final order of Fryberg J in December 2009 stated ‘when [the applicant] next gets his Practising Certificate’.”
[41] It is apparent from the transcript of the proceedings before Fryberg J that his Honour gave no recommendation or even intimation as to the likely further outcome of a fresh application by the applicant for a practising certificate. Much of the hearing before his Honour was concerned with the question whether the appeal before him was an appeal in the strict sense under which the applicant would have no right to rely on evidence which was not before the respondent when it made its decision. That issue was resolved against the applicant. Argument on the merits of the application took place but, eventually, the applicant withdrew the appeal with a view to making a fresh application to the respondent. Shortly before he did so, Fryberg J observed “Anything that happens in the future is between you and the [respondent]”.
[42] Counsel for the respondent submitted that the explanation proffered to this Court by the applicant of his observations in respect of Fryberg J’s “recommendation” did not coincide with the explanation given to the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, it was submitted that the applicant still appeared to cling to the erroneous position that Fryberg J had recommended that he return to practise. In fact, there is not a great deal of difference between that and the assertion that “the last disciplinary matter was resolved by Fryberg J where he stated that I should be supervised by counsel approved by the [the respondent] for 12 months when I next get my certificate”. No such thing was stated or implied; quite the contrary. The Tribunal was entitled to find the applicant’s “response to Reason 5(i)… particularly troubling”. It revealed an inability on the part of the applicant to confront reality or, if this is not so, demonstrated a willingness to misrepresent and distort facts materially relevant to disciplinary proceedings.
[43] Reason 5(k) was that the applicant had failed to comply with White J’s order of 10 July 2008 that he undertake not less than 10 hours compulsory professional development approved by the respondent within the next 12 months. The Tribunal dealt with that matter in paragraphs [46] to [49] of its reasons. The discussion concluded with the observation:
“[49]The terms of White J’s order are clear. It would have been a straightforward matter for [the applicant] to comply with them, and to establish compliance to the [respondent]. This is, again, a matter in which he appears, either wilfully or through a lack of comprehension and focus upon what is being asked of him, to be unable to address a matter which is central to the relief he seeks.”
[44] In his submissions to the Tribunal, the applicant said that he was led to believe from the fact that an earlier information notice made no reference to the failure to complete the ordered professional development and from his not having received a response to a letter of 19 March 2009[8] that the respondent accepted that he had satisfied the order. The applicant did not submit that he had strictly complied with the order. He did, however, state:
“I have stated to the Court of Appeal that I did not appeal White J’s order… because I considered that I had completed the order at the Palm Cove Conference.”
[45] The Conference preceded the making of the order, which plainly imposed a future requirement and it is apparent from the applicant’s letter to the respondent dated 27 May 2009 that he appreciated this.
[46] The applicant advanced a different argument in his written and oral submissions before this Court. Those submissions were not entirely clear. As I understood them, they were to the effect that the applicant did make an unspecified attempt to complete the 10 hours professional development. Although he did not appeal against White J’s order, he telephoned a named person at the Legal Services Commission and was told that he no longer worked there, that the file had been put away and that as far as the Commission was concerned the matter was finalised. He then telephoned a registrar at a court. He was unable to remember the person to whom he spoke or even the court. He was told by the registrar that any breach of an order was a matter for the Legal Services Commission. This telephone call appears to have been equated by the applicant with an attempt to bring the matter concerning White J’s order “back before the court”.
[47] None of the applicant’s submissions cast doubt on the correctness of the Tribunal’s observations and findings in relation to this issue.
[48] Reason 5 contained a series of allegations connected with the applicant’s failure to lodge personal income tax returns in a timely way for each of the 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 income tax years. The Tribunal’s reasons discuss these matters at length and refer to the reasons of Byrne SJA with respect to identical matters in an earlier information notice. The reasons note that the decision of Byrne SJA was handed down less than one month before the application for a practising certificate which gave rise to the present proceeding and that the applicant had not demonstrated “that his situation is materially different to the circumstances addressed by Byrne SJA”. The Tribunal stated, in effect, that Douglas J, Byrne SJA and Fryberg J had each concluded in separate proceedings that the applicant had deliberately disregarded his obligations under the income tax legislation for all of the years in question except 1999. The Tribunal stated in that regard:
“[27][The applicant] nevertheless seeks, in his submissions here, to dispute that conclusion and invites a ‘clear ruling’ about it. It is difficult to reach any conclusion but that he remains unable to accept these previous findings, which have all been made after a close examination of the surrounding circumstances and events, and have never been shown to be wrong. This is, as the [respondent] again submits and I accept, part of a broader pattern of [the applicant] misstating, or being apparently unable to comprehend, events in connection with proceedings in which he has been directly involved.”
[49] Before this Court, the applicant emphasised that his failure to lodge income tax returns had never actually, or even potentially, caused any loss to the revenue and he had suffered as a result of his convictions and fine of $5,000. The submissions, the accuracy of which may be accepted, did not in any way falsify the Tribunal’s finding and there is no reason to think that the Tribunal did not have these considerations in mind when contemplating the nature of the conduct identified in ground 5.
[50] The applicant’s Outline of Argument, in addition to making submissions in relation to the matters discussed above, made brief submissions on each of the other sub-paragraphs in paragraph 5 of the Respondent’s Reasons, including paragraphs (d) and (e). It was alleged in those paragraphs that the applicant failed in his application for a practising certificate to disclose details of the five complaints against him as a legal practitioner listed in the schedule to the Reasons. It was further alleged that he failed to provide proper details of the complaints when requested to do so by the respondent in its letters of 20 February 2009 and 2 April 2009. There is nothing in the applicant’s written submissions in this regard which casts doubt on the Tribunal’s findings. The same may be said of the balance of his written and oral submissions which have not been specifically addressed above. Much of those submissions, whilst commenting on various paragraphs of the Respondent’s Reasons, were not directed to showing error on the part of the Tribunal.
[51] The applicant has not succeeded in showing that any of his proposed grounds of appeal are meritorious. I would grant an extension of time within which to appeal and order that the appeal be dismissed.
[52] WHITE JA: I have read the reasons for judgment of Muir JA where his Honour sets out the extensive background and consideration of these matters concerning the applicant. I agree with his Honour’s reasons and the orders which he proposes.
Footnotes
[1] Legal Services Commissioner v Bradshaw [2008] QLPT 9 at [46].
[2] Legal Services Commissioner v Bradshaw [2009] QCA 126.
[3] Bradshaw v Bar Association of Queensland [2009] QSC 226.
[4] Legal Services Commissioner v Bradshaw [2009] QLPT 21.
[5] Bradshaw v Bar Association of Queensland [2010] QSC 306.
[6] Legal Profession Act, s 468(4).
[7] Applicant’s Outline of Argument for Appeal filed 13 July 2012.
[8] Referred to as a letter of 29 March 2009 in the applicant’s submissions to QCAT.