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- Warren v Queensland Law Society[2016] QCA 154
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Warren v Queensland Law Society[2016] QCA 154
Warren v Queensland Law Society[2016] QCA 154
COURT OF APPEAL
MARGARET McMURDO P
Appeal No 705 of 2016
SC No 683 of 2015
SC No 5840 of 2015
ALEXIA MARGARET WARRENAppellant
v
QUEENSLAND LAW SOCIETY INC
SHERRY JANETTE BROWN
WILLIAM THOMAS HOURIGAN
GLENN ASHLEY FORSTER
MICHAEL CRAIG DRINKWATER
DEBORAHE YUMIN MOLRespondents
BRISBANE
FRIDAY, 10 JUNE 2016
JUDGMENT
THE PRESIDENT: This appeal was filed on the 15th of January 2016 against orders made by Justice Martin in the Trial Division dismissing the appellant, Ms Alexia Warren’s appeal against the appointment of regulators under s 531 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), and from his Honour’s order granting the application by the respondent to this appeal, Queensland Law Society – rather, the – by the receivers, rather, for orders requiring Ms Warren to deliver up regulated property of her law practice and information required to access electronic devices.
The appellant was slow to progress the appeal according to the appeal timetable prepared by the Court Registry but, in any case, on the 5th of February 2016 the respondent, Queensland Law Society, wrote to the Registry advising that the Federal Circuit Court had made a sequestration order against Ms Warren under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). On the 18th of March 2016, the trustee for Ms Warren’s estate wrote to the respondent stating that his intention as trustee was to abandon this appeal, and to the extent that this required him to make an election to discontinue the appeal, he did so.
Ms Warren, however, lodged an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court order – sequestration order – to the Federal Court. On the 5th of April 2016 Justice Rangiah made orders that the appellant file and serve an amended notice of appeal in a form which complied with the Federal Court rules by 4pm on 29 April 2016, and file and serve any application for a stay of the sequestration order by 4pm on the 15th of April 2016, together with any supporting affidavits, and made ancillary orders.
It seems those orders may not have been complied with because on the 4th of May 2016 his Honour made further orders extending the time frames for the orders made on April 2016, and stating that in the event the appellant failed to comply with any of the 5 April 2016 orders as amended by the 4 May 2016 orders, then the appeal against the sequestration order would stand dismissed without further order, and the appellant would pay the costs of the appeal without further order. The appellant was also ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the 4th of May 2016. I am informed that those orders have not been complied with and so at the present time the appellant is an undischarged bankrupt.
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act states – relevantly states:
“(2)An action commenced by a person who subsequently becomes a bankrupt is, upon his or her becoming a bankrupt, stayed until the trustee makes election, in writing, to prosecute or discontinue the action.
(3)If the trustee does not make such an election within 28 days after the notice of the action served upon him or her by a defendant or other party to the action, he or she shall be deemed to have abandoned the action.
(4)Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, a bankrupt may continue, in his or her own name, an action commenced by him or her before he or she has become in respect of:
(a) any personal injury or wrong done to the bankrupt, his or her spouse or de facto partner or a member of his or her family; or
(b) the death of his or her spouse or de facto partner or a member of his or her family …”
The respondent contends that in light of the trustee’s election not to proceed with this appeal, the appeal should now be dismissed with costs. The appellant contends that her appeal comes within s 60(4) in that the wrong done to her by the respondent is a wrong of the kind covered by that subsection. She made many assertions from the bar table in the course of her lengthy submissions which were not supported by evidence, and which have been strenuously denied by counsel for the respondent. She referred to s 707(1) of the Legal Profession Act which relates to an Act entity under that Act not having civil liability for acts done honestly and without negligence. That provision does not seem to have any relevance to the threshold question which is whether s 60(4) applies to this appeal.
She is, clearly, distressed about her position and about the matters covered by this appeal. She claims that the respondent has systematically destroyed her professional practice and personal reputation. She claims that the person appointed by the receiver was not qualified to be a receiver. I should note she has also asked for more time to research the two cases relied on by Mr Reidy as supporting his contention that the matter does come within s 60(4).
This is the second time this matter has been mentioned before me. As I say, the appeal was started in January this year. She came prepared to argue the s 60(4) point and put material before me in respect of it. She has had adequate time to research the point. If she was, in fact, asking for an adjournment of the case for some time, which was by no means clear from her submissions, I refuse that application as I am not persuaded that it is warranted or would be fruitful.
She contends that this appeal, rather, than being dismissed should be stayed pending the outcome of a number of other matters that she has stated that she is pursuing, including a matter in the Trial Division, a QCAT matter and she also claims that she will pursue her rights in the Federal Court. The difficulty with Ms Warren’s submissions are that they do not answer the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act to which I have referred. She is an undischarged bankrupt. The trustee in bankruptcy has elected not to pursue this appeal.
The subject matter of the appeal, although, no doubt, something that has caused great personal distress to Ms Warren, is not a personal injury or wrong done to her no matter how much she might feel it is. That expression relates to personal injury matters and wrongs which relate to the person, such as defamation. The subject matter of this appeal is not in that category. See Cox v Journeaux [No 2] (1935) 52 CLR 713 at 721.
For these reasons, the only appropriate order is that this appeal be dismissed with costs. I so order. A transcript is required of today’s hearing.
Anything further?
MR REIDY: No, your Honour.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Adjourn the Court.