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R v Chardon

[2020] QCA 277

 

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

 

CITATION:

R v Chardon [2020] QCA 277

PARTIES:

R
v
CHARDON, John William
(appellant/applicant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 263 of 2019

SC No 801 of 2018

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction & Sentence

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 9 September 2019; Date of Sentence: 11 September 2019 (Lyons SJA)

DELIVERED ON:

8 December 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16 April 2020

JUDGES:

Fraser and Mullins JJA and Applegarth J

ORDER:

The appeal against conviction and the application for leave to appeal against sentence are dismissed on the ground that the Court’s jurisdiction to determine the appeal and application ceased upon the death of the appellant.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHO MAY EXERCISE RIGHT – LEGAL PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE – where the appellant was found guilty after a trial of the manslaughter of his wife and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment – where the appellant filed a notice of appeal against conviction and an application for leave to appeal against sentence – where the appellant died after the appeal was heard but before judgment was delivered – where the executors named in the appellant’s will have indicated that they do not wish to pursue the appeal – where the solicitor and counsel who represented the appellant in his appeal seek leave to appear amici curiae – whether the appeal and application should be dismissed upon the ground that the Court does not retain jurisdiction to determine them after the appellant’s death or whether the Court should give judgment according to the merits of the conviction appeal

Criminal Code (Qld), s 668D, s 668E, s 669, s 671B, s 671D, s 672, s 672A

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 72, r 73

A reference by the Attorney General for the State of New South Wales under s 77(1)(b) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 re the conviction of Frederick Lincoln McDermott (2013) 231 A Crim R 183; [2013] NSWCCA 102, cited

Bell (Dec) v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 236, applied

Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84; [1991] HCA 9, cited

Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691; [1940] HCA 20, cited

Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197; [1988] HCA 32, cited

Pike v Pike [2015] QSC 134, cited

Quartermaine v The Queen [2002] WASCA 345, applied

R v Jefferies [1969] 1 QB 120, considered

R v Kearley (No 2) [1994] 2 AC 414, applied

R v Rimon (decd) (2003) 6 VR 553; [2003] VSCA 136, applied

R v Rowe [1955] 1 QB 573, considered

R v Smith [2004] 1 SCR 385; [2004] SCC 14, not followed

Roe (Dec) v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 218, applied

Sen v The Queen (1991) 30 FCR 173; [1991] FCA 296, applied

TWM v R [2018] NSWCCA 276, considered

Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; [1990] HCA 55, cited

COUNSEL:

A Glynn QC, with A J Kimmins and M L Longhurst, for the appellant/applicant

T A Fuller QC, with D Balic, for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Paddington Law for the appellant/applicant

Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. [1]
    THE COURT:  After a trial a jury found the appellant not guilty of murdering his wife, Novy Chardon, but guilty of manslaughter.  He was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.  The appellant filed a notice of appeal against conviction and an application for leave to appeal against sentence.  The appellant died after argument was heard and the Court had reserved its decision.  The solicitor for the appellant has supplied the Court with an affidavit exhibiting a copy of the death certificate for the appellant and the respondent has provided an affidavit exhibiting a copy of the “Life Extinct Form” for the appellant.  Those affidavits should be received.
  2. [2]
    Submissions made by the respondent and by counsel formerly retained by the appellant raise the question whether the appeal and application should be dismissed upon the ground that the Court does not retain jurisdiction to determine them after the appellant’s death or whether the Court should give judgment according to the merits of at least one ground of the conviction appeal.
  3. [3]
    The solicitor who formerly acted for the appellant obtained instructions from the appellant’s two adult daughters, who were named as executors in his will.  Initially they expressed the view that the Court should give judgment upon the merits.  After the Court invited submissions upon the question, on 23 November 2020 the solicitor swore an affidavit to the following effect.  The solicitor holds the wills of the appellant and Novy Chardon and acted as solicitor for the Chardon family for many years.  The executors named in the appellant’s will have withdrawn their instructions in relation to making further submissions and have indicated they will no longer act as executors.  They are the primary beneficiaries under the appellant’s will, together with the two children of the appellant and Novy Chardon, who are minors.  The estate of Novy Chardon has not been finalised.  The primary beneficiaries of her will are the appellant and their two children.  The solicitor had not spoken to those children about the appellant’s appeal or their parents’ estates.  He had been advised by one of the appellant’s adult daughters that the children would not speak with the solicitor or any lawyers because of the likely trauma involved.
  4. [4]
    The solicitor and counsel who had represented the appellant in his appeal seek leave to appear amici curiae to assist the Court by making written submissions of law.  Leave should be granted.
  5. [5]
    The respondent submits that s 668D of the Criminal Code (Qld) confers a right of appeal against conviction and (by leave) sentence which is personal to the person convicted and cannot be pursued after the death of that person by his or her executor or personal representative in the absence of statutory powers allowing pursuit of an appeal in such circumstances.  Notwithstanding the death of an appellant prior to judgment, a Crown Law Officer, upon consideration of any petition for the exercise of the pardoning power by his or her personal representatives, could refer the case to the Court of Appeal to be heard and determined “as in the case of an appeal by a person convicted” under s 672A of the Criminal Code, but the Court retains no jurisdiction to give a judgment upon the merits of an appeal after the death of the appellant: R v Rimon (decd),[1] Quartermaine v The Queen,[2] and Bell (Dec) v The State of Western Australia.[3]  The respondent also cites a decision to the same effect by the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.[4]
  6. [6]
    The respondent refers the Court to the decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Smith[5] that Canadian courts have a discretion to exercise jurisdiction to hear the appeal of an individual who has died pending the hearing of the appeal which “should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where the death of the appellant is survived by a continuing controversy which, notwithstanding the death of the individual most directly affected by the appeal, requires resolution in the interests of justice.”[6]  The respondent submits that if, contrary to its primary submission, the Court retains jurisdiction in the appeal brought by the appellant, it is not in the interests of justice for the Court to exercise that jurisdiction because the circumstances are unexceptional and there is no evidence of any significant consequences for those wishing to pursue the appeal.  That submission was prepared before the solicitor formerly acting for the appellant provided his affidavit which makes it clear that the executors named in the appellant’s will do not wish to pursue the appeal.
  7. [7]
    Counsel who formerly represented the appellant submit that the decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in TWM v R[7] indicates that the question whether a right of appeal in a criminal appeal abates upon the death of the appellant is unsettled.  With reference particularly to R v Smith and TWM v R, counsel submit that factors relevant to the question are the wording of the applicable legislation, whether death occurred before or after the appeal was heard, the nature of the relief sought or available if the appeal should be successful, whether there are identifiable rights, interests or liabilities of third parties (including the estate of the deceased) which might be impacted by the decision in the appeal, and whether it is in the interests of justice to determine the appeal.
  8. [8]
    Counsel submit that the Court could dismiss all of the grounds of the conviction appeal and the sentence application except the first ground of the conviction appeal, which contends that the verdict of the jury should be set aside as unreasonable and not being supported having regard to the evidence.  If that ground succeeded the appropriate order would be that the conviction be set aside and a verdict of acquittal be entered.  Counsel submit that it is in the interests of justice for the Court to exercise the jurisdiction they submit has survived notwithstanding the death of the appellant.  They refer to the possible impact of the conviction for manslaughter in the administration of the estates of the appellant and Novy Chardon in consequence of the “forfeiture rule” which excludes a person who unlawfully kills another person from any benefit under the will or intestacy of the victim,[8] the seriousness of the charge of which the appellant was convicted, the seriousness of the consequences of the conviction for third parties, including children, the sentencing remarks by the trial judge describing the seriousness of the impacts of the offence of which the appellant was convicted, and that the giving of the judgment would not inappropriately impose upon the limited resources of the Court.  Counsel submit that in these circumstances the Court should determine the first ground of the conviction appeal and deliver judgment.
  9. [9]
    The Court’s jurisdiction to hear appeals and its powers in such appeals are entirely statutory.  The relevant provisions are in chapter 67 of the Criminal Code.  In a case of this kind, the rights of appeal are created by the provisions in  s 668D that a “person convicted on indictment … may appeal to the Court … against the person’s conviction … and … against the sentence passed on the person’s conviction.”[9]  Section 668E(1) provides that the Court on “any such appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if it is of opinion that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable, or can not be supported having regard to the evidence, or that the judgment of the court of trial should be set aside on the ground of the wrong decision of any question of law, or that on any ground whatsoever there was a miscarriage of justice, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal”.  If the Court is of the opinion that the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, the proviso in s 668E(1A) empowers the Court to dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice actually occurred.  Section 668E(2) provides that if an appeal against conviction is allowed, then subject to special provisions of the chapter, the Court shall quash the conviction and direct a judgment and verdict of acquittal.
  10. [10]
    Under s 669, on an appeal against a conviction on indictment, the Court on its own motion or on the application of the appellant may order a new trial if it considers that a miscarriage of justice has occurred and it can be more adequately remedied by an order for a new trial than by any other order the Court is empowered to make; and if the Court orders a new trial and the appellant is not granted bail the order is taken to be a warrant for the appellant’s detention under the Corrective Services Act 2006.  Section 671D(1) confers an entitlement upon the appellant, “notwithstanding that the appellant is in custody”, to be present if the appellant desires it at the hearing of the appeal.  If an appeal is upheld and the appellant is entitled to have a conviction quashed by order of the Court, s 672(1) empowers the Court, on application on behalf of the Crown “at any time before the release of such appellant”, to direct a stay of execution of the order quashing the appellant’s conviction.
  11. [11]
    In relation to a sentence appeal, s 668E(3) provides that if the Court finds that some other sentence was warranted in law and should have been passed the Court must “quash the sentence and pass such other sentence in substitution therefor”, and in any other case the Court must dismiss the appeal.
  12. [12]
    The evident purpose of the provisions for appeals against conviction in chapter 67 is to supply a remedy to a person whose conviction involves a miscarriage of justice.  That purpose is implemented in part by imposing upon the Court an obligation to decide in each appeal against conviction which of an acquittal or a new trial is the more appropriate remedy for a miscarriage of justice found to have been suffered by the convicted person, a remedial choice that would be artificial in a case in which the appellant has died.  Other provisions we have mentioned assume that the appellant is the person who was convicted of the offence.  The provisions of the chapter concerning appeals against conviction appear to be consistent only with the right of appeal and the Court’s power to determine such an appeal not surviving the death of the person who was convicted.
  13. [13]
    The provisions concerning appeals against sentence seem consistent with the same conclusion.  Upon the death of an appellant who was sentenced to imprisonment (as in this case), the statutory remedy of quashing the sentence and passing a different sentence in substitution therefor would be meaningless; the right of appeal against a sentence of imprisonment and the Court’s power to make orders in such a case could not survive the appellant’s death.
  14. [14]
    In R v Rowe[10] a prisoner who had been convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment died after he had commenced an appeal but before it was heard.  His widow applied to the court to allow the appeal to proceed.  Counsel instructed by the widow argued that she had an interest in being the widow of an honest man and not of a man who had been convicted.  He also argued that the conviction against her husband affected her chances of employment and her position among her friends.  Lord Goddard CJ, giving the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal (constituted by Lord Goddard CJ, Hilbery and Pearce JJ), held that the court could not allow a widow or an executor or administrator of a deceased person to appeal unless they could show a legal interest, such as in a case in which, if the conviction were quashed, the estate of the deceased would benefit by the recovery of a fine paid by the deceased.  What was described by the court as the “sentimental interest” of the widow in having her husband’s name cleared was insufficient; there was “nobody affected now by the judgment of the court because the judgment was a sentence of imprisonment and the prisoner [had] died”.[11]  The application for leave to appeal was therefore refused.
  15. [15]
    In R v Jefferies,[12] the court (Sachs and Widgery LJJ and Lyell J) reached a similar conclusion.  The widow and executrix of an applicant for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence under the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 sought leave to continue the application after the applicant had died before the application was heard.  The court refused her application by applying a general principle that “whenever a party to proceedings dies, the proceedings must abate, unless his personal representatives both have an interest in the subject-matter and can by virtue of the express terms of a statute (or from rules of court made by virtue of jurisdiction given by a statute) take the appropriate steps to have themselves substituted for the deceased as a party to the proceedings”.[13]
  16. [16]
    The court held that “not only the wording of section 3 of the Act of 1907 but the general tenor of the statute as a whole is such as to make the right of appeal strictly personal to the ‘person convicted’”.[14]  The same may be said about s 668D and the general tenor of chapter 67 of the Criminal Code.  (In that case the court also considered that there were no applicable provisions expressly allowing the personal representatives of a deceased appellant to become substituted for the deceased as the appellant.  We will return to this point.)
  17. [17]
    The House of Lords rejected a challenge to Jefferies in R v Kearley (No 2).[15]  The  Criminal Appeal Act 1968 provided for appeals against conviction and sentence by a person who had been convicted of an offence.  Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle (with whose reasons Lords Templeman, Ackner, Mustill and Nolan agreed) observed that “as a pure matter of construction untrammelled by authority I should have had little hesitation in concluding that a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal under Part I of the Act of 1968 was personal to the convicted person”, R v Jefferies had stood unchallenged for 26 years, it had been accepted in a subsequent decision as an accurate statement of the law, and it “accords entirely with the natural construction of the relevant sections and, in my view, accurately states the law”.[16]
  18. [18]
    In Sen v The Queen[17] the Full Court of the Federal Court (Morling, Neaves and Foster JJ) referred to Rowe, Jefferies, and a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal[18] which followed those decisions in a case in which the appellant died after his appeal was heard but before judgment in the appeal.  Section 24(1)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) conferred jurisdiction to “hear and determine … appeals from judgments of the Supreme Court of a Territory”.  That provision was construed as giving a right of appeal only to a party to the proceeding giving rise to the judgment.  The Full Court held that the appeal in that case should be dismissed because it abated when the appellant died after his notice of appeal against convictions and sentences had been filed; even if the deceased appellant’s father were the executor and administrator of his estate, it could not be said that he had any legal interest in the subject matter of the appeal.  The Full Court adverted to the possibility that an order against an appellant under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1983 (ACT) (which was not relevant in that case) could give an appellant’s executor or administrator such an interest as would prevent the appeal abating and also noted that there was “no suggestion in the present case that the outcome of the appeal will have any effect on the appellant’s estate”.
  19. [19]
    The Victorian Court of Appeal (Winneke P, Vincent and Eames JJA) applied R v Jefferies and R v Kearley (No 2) in R v Rimon (decd).[19]  Section 567 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) conferred a right of appeal against conviction and sentence (with leave) upon “a person convicted”.  An applicant for leave to appeal died whilst his application was extant.  Winneke P, who delivered the judgment of the Court, noted that in similar circumstances the Court had dismissed such applications without reasons for the decisions.  The Court regarded it as clear that an appeal by a convicted and sentenced person was “personal to that person and cannot be pursued by that person’s executor or personal representative”.[20]
  20. [20]
    Three other Australian decisions are to the same effect:
    1. (a)
      In Quartermaine v The Queen[21] the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that applications for leave to appeal against convictions and sentences must be taken to have abated on the death of the applicant, which occurred before those applications were heard and determined; the rights to appeal and to seek leave to appeal were exercisable “by the person convicted on indictment” and no provision expressly enabled such an appeal or application to be pursued by another if the appellant or applicant died before the matter was heard and determined.
    2. (b)
      In Bell (Dec) v The State of Western Australia[22] the Western Australian Court of Appeal held that the appellant’s right of appeal against sentence was “a personal, statutory right”, no statutory provision extended it to any other person, and on his death “no-one has standing to conduct the appeal against his sentence of imprisonment, whether for or on behalf of the appellant or otherwise”.
    3. (c)
      In Roe (Dec) v The State of Western Australia[23] the Western Australian Court of Appeal cited Bell and held that on the proper construction of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) the appellant’s appeal against his conviction abated upon his death.
  21. [21]
    In TWM v R[24] the question raised in this proceeding was not adverted to by Fullerton and Davies JJ.  In a concurring judgment N Adams J observed that the applicant was still alive when the appeal was heard, no more steps were required of him to prosecute his appeal, and for that reason “it may well be the case that the general principle that a convicted person’s right of appeal abates on death does not apply in such a matter.”  No authority was cited.  After mentioning that neither the Crown nor any person representing the applicant had been afforded an opportunity to be heard on the question whether the Court retained jurisdiction, N Adams J concluded that it was not necessary or appropriate for her to determine that question.  That decision is therefore not an authority upon the point.
  22. [22]
    In R v Smith the Canadian Supreme Court departed from the English decisions that have been followed in Australian intermediate appellate courts.  There is a difficulty in reconciling chapter 67 of the Criminal Code with the Canadian approach that there is a discretion to exercise jurisdiction in an appeal after the death of the appellant.  The High Court has repeatedly drawn a clear distinction between jurisdiction and power.[25]  Australian courts are generally obliged to exercise their jurisdiction when it is regularly invoked[26] and the Court’s powers in an appeal under chapter 67 of the Criminal Code are not discretionary.  Adoption of the Canadian approach in this jurisdiction would require a principled explanation of the source of a discretion whether to exercise a jurisdiction that survived the death of an appellant and the source of the factors with reference to which that discretion is to be exercised, neither of which is to be found in the Criminal Code.
  23. [23]
    Rowe and Sen left open the possibility that the statutory provisions considered in those cases might prevent an appeal from abating upon the death of the appellant if the appellant’s personal representatives had a legal interest in the subject matter of the appeal.  The more recent decision by the House of Lords in Kearley and the decisions by Australian intermediate appellate courts in Rimon, Quartermaine, Bell, and Roe support the construction of chapter 67 of the Criminal Code that the right of appeal and the Court’s powers to determine any such appeal do not survive the death of the person who was convicted and sentenced.  Strictly speaking, however, it is not necessary in this case to express a concluded view upon that issue.
  24. [24]
    The forfeiture rule is the only suggested basis for thinking that the appellant’s personal representatives might have a legal interest of the kind adverted to in Rowe and Sen as possibly preventing abatement of the appeal upon the appellant’s death.  The sentence imposed upon the appellant is irrelevant to that topic.  As to the conviction appeal, a conviction is not a criterion of the operation of the forfeiture rule and nor does an acquittal operate as an estoppel precluding reliance upon the forfeiture rule in a civil proceeding.[27]  The forfeiture rule is incapable of giving the appellant’s personal representative a legal interest in the subject matter of his appeal or his application.
  25. [25]
    It is not necessary to decide whether there is any procedural mechanism by which the appellant’s personal representatives might become a party to the conviction appeal or the sentence application if, contrary to our conclusion, they might have a legal interest in the subject matter of the proceeding in this Court.  Section 671B(1) of the Criminal Code empowers the Court, “if it thinks it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice”, to take procedural steps that are then set out and are followed  by a general power to “exercise in relation to the proceedings of the Court any other powers which may for the time being be exercised by the Supreme Court on appeals or applications in civil matters, and issue any warrant or other process necessary for enforcing the orders or sentences of the Court.”  The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) include rules allowing any further step in a civil proceeding in which a party has died to be taken only with the leave of the Court and in accordance with its directions, and the Court may order someone else to be included or substituted as a party for a person who has died.[28]
  26. [26]
    There is room for debate whether the catch-all at the end of s 671B(1) is so expressed as to encompass those rules.  In this case it is necessary to observe only that s 671B(1) could not justify a conclusion that a right of appeal under the Criminal Code or the powers of the Court in such an appeal survive the death of an appellant if the appellant’s personal representatives do not have a legal interest in the subject matter of the appeal; the procedure under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules itself applies in civil cases only where the right in issue survives the death of the party seeking to enforce the right.[29]
  27. [27]
    As the respondent submitted, a remedy is available (albeit only at the discretion of the executive) for a person who is adversely affected by the conviction of a person who dies before that person’s appeal against the conviction is determined.  In our opinion, in such a case the Court retains power under s 672A of the Criminal Code to hear and determine a case referred to it by the Crown Law Officer: see A reference by the Attorney General for the State of New South Wales under s 77(1)(b) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 re the conviction of Frederick Lincoln McDermott,[30] in which Bathurst CJ (Hall and Button JJ agreeing) held that the similar statutory provisions in New South Wales empowered the Minister to refer the conviction of a deceased person to the Court of Criminal Appeal and required the Court to determine the reference notwithstanding the death of the convicted person.
  28. [28]
    The appropriate order is to dismiss the appeal against conviction and the application for leave to appeal against sentence on the ground that the Court’s jurisdiction to determine the appeal and application ceased upon the death of the appellant.

Footnotes

[1]  (2003) 6 VR 553.

[2]  [2002] WASCA 345.

[3]  [2015] WASCA 236.

[4] Prosecutor v Rasim Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-A, Decision on the Outcome of the Proceedings, 29 June 2010.

[5]  [2004] 1 SCR 385; 2004 SCC 14.

[6]  [2004] 1 SCR 385 at 390 (Binnie J).

[7]  [2018] NSWCCA 276.

[8]  See Pike v Pike [2015] QSC 134 at [10] – [23] and the authorities there cited.

[9]  Leave is required in relation to certain appeals against conviction and all appeals against sentence.

[10]  [1955] 1 QB 573.

[11]  [1955] 1 QB 573 at 575.

[12]  [1969] 1 QB 120.

[13]  [1969] 1 QB 120 at 124.

[14]  [1969] 1 QB 120 at 124.

[15]  [1994] 2 AC 414.

[16]  [1994] 2 AC 414 at 422.

[17]  (1991) 30 FCR 173 at 174 – 175.

[18] Re Collins (1973) 41 DLR (3d) 232.

[19]  (2003) 6 VR 553.

[20]  (2003) 6 VR 553 at 553 [4].

[21]  [2002] WASCA 345 at [3] (Parker and Hasluck JJ and Olsson AUJ).

[22]  [2015] WASCA 236 at [9] (McLure P, Buss and Mazza JJA agreeing).

[23]  [2017] WASCA 218 (Buss P and Mazza and Beech JJA).

[24]  [2018] NSWCCA 276 at [74].

[25]  See, for example, Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84 at 136; NH v Director of Public Prosecutions (2016) 260 CLR 546 at 580 – 581 [68] (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559 at 590 [64] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ); and Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256 at 263 [5] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ).

[26]  See, for example, Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 at 238 (Brennan J) and Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 559 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ).

[27]Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 at 710 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ); see also Australian Communications and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 352 at 371 [32] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ); Wiedenhofer v Commonwealth (1970) 122 CLR 172 at 175 – 176 (Gibbs J); and Harvey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 220 A Crim R 186 at 188 – 189 [10] – [11] (McMurdo P) and at 194 – 195 [32] (Boddice J, White JA agreeing).

[28]Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, rr 72 and 73.

[29]  See New South Wales Technical and Further Education Commission v Fines (1993) 32 NSWLR 385 at 387 (Mahoney JA) and at 391 – 392 (Handley JA, Sheller JA agreeing).

[30]  [2013] NSWCCA 102; see in particular at [17] – [21].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    R v Chardon

  • Shortened Case Name:

    R v Chardon

  • MNC:

    [2020] QCA 277

  • Court:

    QCA

  • Judge(s):

    Fraser JA, Mullins JA, Applegarth J

  • Date:

    08 Dec 2020

  • Selected for Reporting:

    Editor's Note

Litigation History

EventCitation or FileDateNotes
Primary Judgment[2018] QSCPR 1702 Oct 2018Application for no-jury order refused: Boddice J.
Primary Judgment[2019] QSCPR 401 May 2019Application to exclude evidence of a previous domestic violence incident and evidence sought to be led pursuant to the Tripodi principle refused: Douglas J.
Primary Judgment[2019] QSCPR 930 Jul 2019Application to exclude alleged confession allowed: Lyons SJA.
Primary Judgment[2019] QSCPR 1013 Aug 2019Application to exclude evidence of accused attempting to obtain a gun and/or procure hitmen refused: Lyons SJA.
Primary Judgment[2019] QSCPR 1102 Sep 2019Application by the Crown to cross-examine the defendant in relation to his previous convictions and other allegations of bad character; application refused: Lyons SJA.
Primary JudgmentSC801/18 (No citation)09 Sep 2019Date of conviction of manslaughter.
Primary JudgmentSC801/18 (No citation)11 Sep 2019Date of sentence of 15 years' imprisonment.
Notice of Appeal FiledFile Number: CA263/1904 Oct 2019Appeal against conviction; application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Appeal Determined (QCA)[2020] QCA 27708 Dec 2020-

Appeal Status

Appeal Determined (QCA)
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