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Scriven v Queensland Rural and Industry Development Authority[2021] QCA 121

Scriven v Queensland Rural and Industry Development Authority[2021] QCA 121

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Scriven v Queensland Rural and Industry Development Authority [2021] QCA 121

PARTIES:

SAM CHESTER SCRIVEN

(applicant)

v

QUEENSLAND RURAL AND INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 10058 of 2019
SC No 11058 of 2018

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Extension of Time/Judicial Review

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2019] QSC 176 (Wilson J)

DELIVERED ON:

4 June 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

Heard on the papers

JUDGES:

Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Ryan J

ORDERS:

  1. The time allowed for the appeal against the judgment of 24 July 2019 be extended to 17 September 2019.
  2. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – TIME FOR APPEAL – EXTENSION OF TIME – WHEN GRANTED – where the delay was not extensive – where the applicant was without legal representation – whether to grant an extension of time

PRIMARY INDUSTRY – GENERALLY – FARM DEBT MEDIATION – where mediation occurred and no agreement was reached – where respondent approved an exemption certificate pursuant to s 52 of the Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) – where the applicant sought a review of the respondent’s decision pursuant to s 81 of the Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) – where the respondent’s decision was confirmed on review – where the applicant sought judicial review – where the application for judicial review was dismissed – whether the primary judge erred in refusing to admit additional evidence

PRIMARY INDUSTRY – GENERALLY – FARM DEBT MEDIATION – where the mediator was satisfied that adocument/information exchange had occurred sufficiently – where the applicant contended that there had not been sufficient disclosure – where a review decision maker found that the mortgagee had complied with s 21 of the Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) – whether the primary judge erred in misconstruing s 21 and s 22 of the Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) – whether the mortgagee took part in the mediation in good faith

Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld), s 21, s 22, s 32, s 38, s 49, s 52
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 20

COUNSEL:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf
M A Eade for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf
G R Cooper, Crown Solicitor for the respondent

  1. [1]
    THE COURT: The applicant is a farmer, who borrowed money from Rural Bank Ltd (the Bank). He defaulted in payment of his mortgage payments to the Bank, and there was a mediation conducted under the Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (the Act). The dispute, such as it was, was not resolved at the mediation, and in order to enforce its mortgage, the Bank required an “exemption certificate” from the respondent Authority. A certificate was granted by the Authority by a decision on 2 July 2018, which was confirmed by a further decision on 11 September 2018 (the Review Decision).
  2. [2]
    The applicant challenged the Review Decision under the Judicial Review Act1991 (Qld) (the JRA). In a detailed judgment, WilsonJ dismissed his application on 24 July 2019.[1] The applicant did not appeal against that judgment within the permitted time for doing so, and on 17 September 2019, he filed this application for an extension of time within which to appeal. His delay was not extensive, and he is without legal representation. It is fairly conceded for the respondent that he should have an extension of time if there is merit in his proposed appeal. For the reasons that follow, there is no merit in his proposed appeal.

The Act

  1. [3]
    The stated purpose of the Act is to provide an efficient and equitable way for farmers and mortgagees to resolve matters relating to farm business debts.[2] This is to be achieved by providing for mediation as a way, for farmers and mortgagees participating in good faith, to efficiently and equitably resolve matters relating to those debts, and by requiring a mortgagee, before taking action to enforce a mortgage securing such a debt, to offer mediation to the farmer and to take part in the mediation in good faith.[3] A mortgagee must not take enforcement action under a farm mortgage, where the Act applies, unless an exemption certificate is in force for the mortgage,[4] and an enforcement action that is taken by a mortgagee without that exemption has no effect.[5]
  2. [4]
    By s 21(1) of the Act, for the purposes of a mediation a farmer may give a notice to a mortgagee asking for copies of documents “related to the farm business debt and the farm mortgage”, with which the mortgagee must comply.[6] If a mortgagee fails to comply with the notice, or fails to make reasonable efforts to do so, the mortgagee will have failed to take part in the mediation in good faith.[7] A mortgagee complies with the notice by giving the farmer copies of documents in its possession or control relating to:
    1. (a)
      the farmer’s application for the farm business debt and farm mortgage, and any variation of the debt or mortgage; and
    2. (b)
      the contractual relationship between the farmer and the mortgagee, including any loan or mortgage documents; and
    3. (c)
      correspondence between the farmer and the mortgagee about changes to the farm business debt or the farm mortgage; and
    4. (d)
      the farmer’s default under the farm mortgage and any action taken by the mortgagee in relation to the default; and
    5. (e)
      any other matter prescribed by regulation.[8]
  3. [5]
    As we will discuss, at the heart of the applicant’s case is a contention that the Bank failed to comply with the applicant’s notice, by not providing copies of documents which the applicant alleged (but which the Bank denied) were relevant and held by the Bank.
  4. [6]
    A mediation under the Act is not open to the public.[9] Section 38 relevantly provides:

“(1)The following matters are not admissible in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding—

  1. (a)
    anything said or done during a mediation meeting;
  1. (b)
    a document prepared for the purposes of a mediation meeting;
  1. (c)
    a document prepared for the purpose of being given to a party to a mediation as required under section 21 or 22.
  1. (2)
    This section does not apply to—
  1. (a)
    a heads of agreement; or
  1. (b)
    a contract, mortgage or other document prepared to give effect to a heads of agreement; or
  1. (c)
    a summary of a mediation prepared under section 33; or
  1. (d)
    a proceeding or a part of a proceeding before QCAT that is not open to the public, including, for example, aproceeding started under section 82; or
  1. (e)
    a proceeding or a part of a proceeding that relates to—
  1. (i)
    violence or a threat of violence; or
  1. (ii)
    ongoing activity of a criminal nature being concealed; or
  1. (iii)
    the abuse of a child or another person.”
  1. [7]
    Section 32 prescribed the circumstances which mark the end of a mediation. One of them is where the parties have entered into a heads of agreement and the mediator is satisfied that there are no unresolved matters relating to the debt.[10] Another circumstance is where the parties have not entered into a heads of agreement, and the mediator is satisfied that the mediation has proceeded as far as it reasonably can and an agreement is unlikely.[11] In either of those circumstances, the mediation is deemed, for the purposes of the Act, to have been satisfactory.[12]
  2. [8]
    At the end of a mediation, the mediator must prepare a summary which states, amongst other things, whether, in the mediator’s opinion, the mediation was satisfactory and the parties participated in good faith.[13]
  3. [9]
    A mortgagee for a farm mortgage may apply to the respondent Authority for an exemption certificate, exempting the mortgagee from the obligation to offer mediation under the Act before taking enforcement action.[14] Section 49 states the grounds on which an exemption certificate may be issued. Relevantly here, the first of those grounds is that the farmer and the mortgagee took part in mediation, and the mediation “considered matters relating to the farmer’s default” and was satisfactory.[15]
  4. [10]
    On receipt of an application for an exemption certificate, the Authority must give a show cause notice to the farmer, inviting the farmer to make written representations as to why the certificate should not be issued.[16] The show cause notice must be accompanied by the mortgagee’s application.[17]
  5. [11]
    Section 52 requires the Authority to consider the application for an exemption certificate and any representation made in response to the show cause notice, and then to decide to approve or refuse the application. By s 52(2), the Authority must approve the application if satisfied that the farmer is in default under the farm mortgage and there is a ground, relating to the farmer’s default, to issue the exemption certificate.[18] If the Authority decides to approve the application, the Authority must give to the farmer what is called “an information notice” for the decision,[19] which is defined[20] to be a notice which states the decision, the reasons for it, the rights of review of the decision under the Act, how a review may be started, and how a stay of the operation of the decision may be applied for under the Act.
  6. [12]
    A person who must be given an information notice for such a decision may apply to the chief executive officer for a “internal review” of the decision.[21] The chief executive officer (or their delegate) must review the original decision before confirming, amending or substituting another decision for it.[22]

The issues between the applicant and the Bank

  1. [13]
    The Bank’s position was simply that it had lent money to the applicant and, upon the applicant’s default, become entitled to enforce the mortgage which secured its loan. The applicant’s position was not so clear.
  2. [14]
    At times, the applicant appeared to accept the essential facts of the Bank’s case. And in the hearing before WilsonJ, the applicant made this statement within his written submissions:[23]

“The Applicant does not challenge having entered into any loan agreement and mortgages, receiving funds pursuant to the loan agreement at his direction or request and otherwise being in default.”

  1. [15]
    However, the applicant also contended that the position between the parties was more complicated than would appear from those admissions. His case can be understood from this extract of an email which he wrote to the Bank on 2 November 2017:

“I have reason to believe that you, the Lender, may not have loaned any money to me, the Borrower, and that you may have breached the original agreement concerning the above-referenced account related to the alleged ‘loan’ or ‘loan of credit’.

Publicly available banking and finance publications indicate that, instead of the Lender lending the Borrower ‘cash or money’s worth’ according to relevant acts and statutes; there was merely an exchange of assets between the parties and not a loan of money from the Lender to the Borrower.

The Borrower acknowledge (sic) receipt of numerous statements of a ‘loan account’ provided by the Lender, however the Borrower has learned that the ‘loan account’, according to Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP), is only one part of the accounting record and that it is an asset account. That asset account records the Lender's acceptance and deposit of the Borrower’s ‘loan agreement’ as a debit item, but does not show the loan of money or provision of credit, as outlined in the loan contract, mortgage provisions, terms and conditions and other accompanying documents.

The asset account does not show any withdrawal from the assets of the Lender, as one would see should they make a loan of ‘cash or money's worth’ which they own.”

  1. [16]
    In another email to the Bank (dated 20 November 2017), the applicant sought to explain his case for the provision of documents from the Bank:

“My request for documents is based on very simple accounting principles.

The account statements you have provided show that the bank made debit and credit entries in two asset accounts only.

Your accounting department will agree that, under accounting rules using the double-entry method, there must be both an asset and aliability account to record correctly all credits and debits for every transaction associated with any loan facility.

I have seen no statements of the bank’s liability accounts and hence no record showing discharge of the bank’s original liabilities. I would expect the required matching credit items to be recorded in a bank asset account, but the account statements you have provided do not record the withdrawal of any bank assets sufficient to discharge the bank's original liabilities on either facility.

In order to ascertain whether Rural Bank has generated my loans and calculated the balances owing on each of my accounts accurately, all the credits and all the debits entered in both the asset and liability accounts need to be reconciled for each facility.

My counsel agrees that we must be able to calculate an accurate balance owing on each facility, and that requires full and correct accounting records for each facility.

You will agree that, without accurate accounting records that show evidence of adequate consideration by the bank, for example, even the validity of the contracts themselves cannot be assumed or presumed, as you appear to be doing at present. If Rural Bank does have such evidence, now would be the time to provide it to me in good faith.”

  1. [17]
    In essence, the applicant’s case appears to have been that there was not a recoverable loan made by the Bank to him, unless the Bank could demonstrate that the loan was made by drawing upon its “assets”. From this premise, he suggested, the Bank had to disclose its documents (if any) which recorded the means by which it was able to lend to the applicant that which its mortgage secured, being the documents described by him as “the Bank’s liability accounts”.
  2. [18]
    The applicant’s essential complaint, that there must have been a so-called “liability account” of which the Bank was required to provide documentation, is entirely misconceived. What mattered, between the applicant and the Bank, was that money had been lent to him, it was secured by a mortgage, and he had defaulted. If such documents existed in the records of the Bank (which the Bank denied) they could not have been relevant to the mediation. In particular, they could not have been relevant to any of the subjects in s 21(4).

The mediation

  1. [19]
    On 12 October 2017, the Bank served an Enforcement Action Notice and Mediation Information Package on the applicant. On 2 November 2017, the applicant wrote the first of his emails or letters seeking production of what he said were relevant financial records and documents. On 9 November 2017, the Bank sent to him copies of documents relating to the loan, including letters of offer, prior heads of agreement, and the bank statements (numbering 180) for the two loan facilities which were in arrears. At the same time, the applicant requested a mediation and nominated three preferred mediators. The applicant agreed to a mediation and chose Mr Nevison, who was the applicant’s first nominee.
  2. [20]
    On 24 January 2018, there was a mediation conference at which the parties were unable to reach any agreement. On 27 April 2018, after further discussions between the parties, Mr Nevison provided a summary of the mediation to the Authority, pursuant to s 33 of the Act. Mr Nevison there wrote that a “document/information exchange” had occurred sufficiently prior to the mediation to enable relevant settlement options to be considered. He recorded that the mediation had been adjourned to allow the applicant to consider an offer which had been made by the Bank, that the applicant had made a counter-offer which was not accepted by the Bank, and that the Bank had then indicated that it did not intend to continue with the mediation. He also recorded that the applicant did not agree with his summary of the mediation, contending that the Bank had not made full disclosure, and had not acted in good faith. MrNevison attached an email from the applicant dated 6 April 2018 which explained his case. The applicant there wrote:

“You were informed on several occasions that Rural Bank is withholding (concealing?) a critical bank liability account statement in my name, which I and my team members repeatedly requested. The accounting record of every bank loan requires this type of bank liability account to record the amount of "credit" (the 'substance' of every bank loan) immediately before it is disbursed.

The initial credit balance in the concealed account was $800,000 and was my asset.

Continuing concealment of that accounting record by Rural Bank frustrated the mediation process. As a result of this ongoing concealment, a “relevant settlement option” in my favour was not able to be properly considered.

[The Bank’s representatives] claim to “not know” whether the requested bank liability account exists or not is deceptive and misleading.

Please note in your summary that I do wish the mediation could continue but that that will not be possible without full disclosure by the bank of all vital bank accounting records bearing my name.”

The Review Decision

  1. [21]
    The question for the Authority was whether the Bank had established a ground for an exemption certificate according to the terms of s 49(1)(a). More particularly, the question was whether “the mediation … was satisfactory”. As we have noted, the term “satisfactory” has a defined meaning, by which this mediation had been satisfactory if it had proceeded as far as reasonably possible and the Bank had participated in good faith.
  2. [22]
    The decision maker correctly identified the relevant ground under s 49.[24] He referred to the contention by the applicant that the original decision of the Authority had erroneously considered two allegations made by the applicant, described as the “(i) concealment of the missing bank Liability account; and (ii) making false and misleading entries in the disclosed Asset account.”
  3. [23]
    The decision maker referred to the further contention for the applicant that the failure by the Bank to provide the Bank’s “liability account statements” constituted a lack of good faith. The decision maker considered that the Bank had complied with its obligation to provide documents in relation to the farm business debt and mortgage.[25] He referred to the fact that although s 21(7) of the Act provides that a mortgagee’s failure to comply, or to make reasonable efforts to comply, with a request for documents will constitute a failure to take part in the mediation in good faith, the Bank had complied with its requirements.[26] The decision maker said that the allegations of the lack of disclosure by the Bank and its defective accounting practices were “irrelevant in the administration of [the Act].” Consequently, the decision maker concluded the mediation had been satisfactory in the relevant sense, and the grounds for an exemption had been established. In the terms of s 52(2) of the Act, the decision maker was expressly satisfied that the applicant was in default under the farm mortgage, no Enforcement Action Suspension Certificate was in force and that the ground under s 49(1)(a) was “evident”.[27]

The application for judicial review

  1. [24]
    The respondent did not dispute that the Review Decision was a decision to which the JRA applied and that the applicant was a person aggrieved within the meaning of s 20(1) of that Act.
  2. [25]
    The application for judicial review was made upon several grounds. It was alleged that the decision had been induced or affected by fraud by the Bank, in representing that it had disclosed all relevant documents.[28] It was alleged that the decision maker had breached the rules of natural justice and had failed to observe the required procedures in the making of the decision.[29] It was said that the decision was not authorised by the enactment in which it was purportedly made.[30]
  3. [26]
    However each of those grounds was based upon the premise that the Bank had withheld documents from the mediation which it had been obliged to provide under s 21 of the Act.
  4. [27]
    There was a further contention that the individual who made the Review Decision was not qualified to do so, so that he did not have jurisdiction to make the decision.[31] That contention was made upon the mistaken premise that the decision maker had to be listed on the register of mediators, which the respondent was required to keep under s 76 of the Act.
  5. [28]
    At the hearing before Wilson J, the applicant sought to adduce evidence which was not before the decision maker. None of this material was evidence that related to the position between the applicant and the Bank. Rather, the material largely consisted of copies of academic papers and published articles and speeches on subjects such as “How money is created by the central bank and the banking system”. It also included a copy of an extract from the Australian Accounting Standards Board on the subject of “Disclosures in Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial Institutions”. The applicant submitted that the documents were relevant to show the fraud which he had alleged, and as confirmation of the “fundamental bank accounting facts” asserted in his submissions. They were also said to be relevant to his case of bias on the part of the decision maker, by which he was denied natural justice. The judge ruled that the evidence in no way substantiated the allegation of fraud, and more generally was of no assistance or relevance in relation to any of the issues raised by the application for judicial review.[32]
  6. [29]
    The applicant sought to tender another document which had not been before the decision maker, which was an email from the mediator to the parties dated 15 February 2018.[33] This was sent after the mediation conference had occurred, at which, it would appear, the mediator had asked the parties to provide any documents relevant to the applicant’s request for further disclosure by the Bank. The mediator wrote in this email:

“It appears to me that the issues now raised by you relate to the very existence of the liability alleged to be due by you to Rural Bank. Your request is, in effect, for further documents that evidence the source of the monies that have been lent to you.

While acknowledging that this issue was raised by you prior to the mediation in your correspondence with the Bank, copies of which have now been provided to me, and generally an issue was raised at the commencement of the mediation about unsatisfactory disclosure by the Bank, the mediation proceeded on the basis that the discussion concerned the fact that there was a debt due to the Bank and the negotiations related to how that debt should be repaid, including any compromise the Bank was prepared to make with respect to the balance alleged to be currently due. At no stage during the mediation, or at the conclusion of the day, was I left with the impression that it was your position that there was a continuing challenge to the existence of a debt due, or a continuing requirement for further proof of that fact. Certainly there may have been reservations from your perspective as to the extent of the quantum of the debt as a consequence of accretions of interest and an asserted failure by the Bank to have been more proactive in recovery which the Bank rejected on the basis that latitude had been given in an attempt to support you, and generally at your request for further time accommodation.

Having regard to the above, and to the extent that it may be inferred that I should conclude that Rural Bank has not acted in good faith with respect to disclosure of documents, I cannot so conclude. The documents disclosed are the usual documents I would expect to see to evidence the existence of a loan.

The Heads of Agreement circulated under cover of my email dated 31 January 2018 encapsulates the negotiated proposal for compromise of the debt due by you to Rural Bank.

If your position is that the Bank has not established to your satisfaction that a debt exists then you should carefully consider whether it is in your best interests to enter into the Heads of Agreement or not. This was certainly not the position I understood that you and those advising you were ventilating at mediation. Informed advice should be taken on this issue.

If the Heads of Agreement is not entered into both parties will be restored to the position they were in prior to the mediation. You will have your rights to contest the existence of the debt. Rural Bank will have its rights to enforce recovery of the debt. Each party must exercise their own free will and judgment as to the course and options they elect to take. Perhaps trite to say, but in the exercise of that free will and judgment each party must accept responsibility for the decision they make.”

The applicant sought to tender that email as evidence of an erroneous reasoning in the mediator’s interpretation of s 21 and s 22 of the Act, an error which was said to have then infected the reasoning of the decision maker. Her Honour upheld the respondent’s objection to the admission of the document, on the grounds that it was irrelevant, and also inadmissible pursuant to s 38 of the Act.

  1. [30]
    A further evidentiary issue which arose involved the application of s 38 of the Act. The respondent had provided to the Court every document upon which it relied in making its decision. However at the commencement of the hearing itself, counsel for the respondent identified documents which had been provided to the Court incorrectly, because they were confidential as a consequence of s 38. This erroneously disclosed material[34] had been provided by the Bank to the mediator on a without prejudice basis, setting out the terms upon which the Bank was prepared to settle the dispute and its reasons for doing so. The judge held that the material was inadmissible, because of s 38 of the Act, and that in any event, because it was irrelevant.[35]
  2. [31]
    The primary judge rejected each of the suggested grounds for judicial review. It is convenient to discuss her Honour’s reasons for doing so, to the extent that they are now relevant, when considering the grounds of the proposed appeal.

The grounds of appeal

  1. [32]
    The respondent’s submissions helpfully distil the suggested errors by the primary judge to the following:
    1. (a)
      refusing to admit its evidence material that was not before the decision maker and which the applicant contends proves the existence of the “liability account”;[36]
    2. (b)
      misconstruing s 38 of the Act in not admitting into evidence the mediator’s email to the parties dated 15 February 2018;[37]
    3. (c)
      construing s 21 and s 22 in the Act so that they did not require the so-called “liability account” to be disclosed by the Bank;[38]
    4. (d)
      finding that there was evidence that the “liability account” did not exist.[39]
  2. [33]
    As to (a), the judge was plainly correct in refusing to admit material which the respondent’s decision maker had not seen and which was, in any event, irrelevant. As we have discussed, none of this material could have affected the existence and extent of the debt owed by the applicant to the Bank, his default or the Bank’s entitlement to enforce its mortgage for that default. Material which was not before adecision maker may be admitted into evidence in an application for judicial review, where it is probative of a case of an unreasonable exercise of power, a breach of natural justice, a want of jurisdiction or fraud.[40] Most of those grounds were alleged by the applicant. However none of the material could have supported the applicant’s case in any respect.
  3. [34]
    As to (b), there was no apparent error by the primary judge in excluding the email from the mediator dated 15 February 2018, which we have set out above. It is unnecessary to consider s 38, because, in any case, the document had no probative value for any of the suggested grounds for judicial review. The decision maker had not seen the email, so that his decision could not have been affected by it. Further, the apparent suggestion by the applicant that the email was evidence of some misconduct on the part of the mediator was not only irrelevant but baseless.
  4. [35]
    The applicant’s contentions as to the non-production of the so-called “liability account” may be considered together. Contrary to the applicant’s argument, it was not the judge’s finding that there existed a “liability account”. Her Honour expressly declined to consider that factual question, noting that the decision maker had made no finding on whether the liability account existed.[41]
  5. [36]
    Any “liability account” would have lacked any relevance for the mediation, as we have discussed. It would have been irrelevant to “the contractual relationship between the farmer and the mortgagee”,[42] and it would not have fallen within any other paragraph of s 21(4).
  6. [37]
    Something should be said about s 22, which requires the farmer to give the mortgagee documents and up to date information in certain respects, including information about the farmer’s assets and liabilities.[43] Clearly, s 21 imposes no corresponding obligation upon the Bank.

Conclusion and orders

  1. [38]
    The entirety of the applicant’s case proceeds upon a misconception of the legal relationship between the applicant and the Bank, which infects the applicant’s interpretation of the Act under which the subject decision was made. His proposed appeal has no merit. In the circumstances of this case, where for many years the applicant has persisted in arguments of this kind, it is preferable that time be extended for his appeal, and that the appeal itself be dismissed.
  2. [39]
    For these reasons, it will be ordered that:
  1. The time allowed for the appeal against the judgment of 24 July 2019 be extended to 17 September 2019.
  2. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Footnotes

[1] Scriven v Queensland Rural and Industry Development Authority [2019] QSC 176 (the Judgment).

[2] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 3(1).

[3] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 3(2)(a), (b).

[4] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 12(1).

[5] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 12(2).

[6] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 21(3).

[7] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 21(7).

[8] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 21(4).

[9] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 37(1).

[10] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 32(a).

[11] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 32(b)(ii).

[12] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 7(a), (b).

[13] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 33(1)(c).

[14] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 48(1).

[15] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 49(1)(a).

[16] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 50(1), (2).

[17] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 50(4).

[18] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 52(2), save where a so-called enforcement notice suspension certificate has been issued (which was not the case here).

[19] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 52(5).

[20] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) Schedule 1.

[21] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 80(1).

[22] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 81(1).

[23] Applicant’s “Oral Submissions Summary”, p 2 [11].

[24] Reasons of the decision maker [64].

[25] Reasons of the decision maker [67].

[26] Reasons of the decision maker [68].

[27] Reasons of the decision maker [73].

[28] Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) s 20(2)(g).

[29] Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) s 20(2)(a), (b).

[30] Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) s 20(2)(d).

[31] Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) s 20(2)(c).

[32] Judgment [25].

[33] Exhibited a SCS-I to the applicant’s affidavit filed 12 November 2018.

[34] Exhibited as SJC-18 to an affidavit of the applicant filed 12 November 2018.

[35] Judgment [37].

[36] Proposed notice of appeal at [6]-[9].

[37] Proposed notice of appeal at [14]-[18].

[38] Proposed notice of appeal at [10]-[11], [19]-[27].

[39] Proposed notice of appeal at [12]-[13].

[40] Chandra v Webber (2010) 187 FCR 31; [2010] FCA 705 at [40]-[45].

[41] Judgment [148].

[42] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 21(4)(b).

[43] Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) s 21(1)(b).

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Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Scriven v Queensland Rural and Industry Development Authority

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Scriven v Queensland Rural and Industry Development Authority

  • MNC:

    [2021] QCA 121

  • Court:

    QCA

  • Judge(s):

    Fraser JA, McMurdo JA, Ryan J

  • Date:

    04 Jun 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.
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