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- Storry v Office of Fair Trading[2021] QCA 255
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Storry v Office of Fair Trading[2021] QCA 255
Storry v Office of Fair Trading[2021] QCA 255
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Storry v Office of Fair Trading [2021] QCA 255 |
PARTIES: | VENETIA LOUISE STORRY (applicant) v OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | Appeal No 13106 of 2021 QCATA No 109 of 2020 |
DIVISION: | Court of Appeal |
PROCEEDING: | Application for Leave Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act |
ORIGINATING COURT: | Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal at Brisbane – [2021] QCATA 127 (Senior Member Aughterson and Member Paratz) |
DELIVERED ON: | 26 November 2021 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 22 November 2021 |
JUDGES: | Sofronoff P |
ORDER: | Application for leave to appeal refused. |
CATCHWORDS: | ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – where the Office of Fair Trading made four separate directions concerning the freezing of certain trust accounts and the appointment of a receiver – where the proceeding arose out of the affairs of a real estate agency of which the applicant’s father was the principal and which was subsequently taken over by the applicant – where it emerged during the hearing that the receivership over the applicant’s own account had ended – where the point of the proceeding appears to be personal vindication – where a person is seeking to agitate the correctness of an administrative decision for the third time, something special must be shown to justify such a course – where it is material to notice that, as Boddice J observed in his reasons, when he dismissed the application for judicial review, that the applicant had previously commenced and then abandoned proceedings for judicial review – where this is, therefore, actually an attempt by the applicant to relitigate the propriety of these decisions for the sixth time – whether leave to appeal should be granted Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 150 Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 334; [2007] HCA 42, cited |
COUNSEL: | The applicant appeared on her own behalf B Cramer (sol) for the respondent |
SOLICITORS: | The applicant appeared on her own behalf Crown Law for the respondent |
- [1]The applicant seeks leave pursuant to s 150 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Appeal Tribunal Act 2009 to appeal a decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Appeal Tribunal. Leave can only be granted on a question of law. Moreover, in a case in which there have been two concurrent findings of fact, leave should not be granted in the absence of special reasons such as plain injustice or clear error. This has been said to be a principle of long standing.[1]
- [2]The Office of Fair Trading made directions under s 42 of the Agents Financial Administration Act 2014 on 4 September 2018, 12 October 2018, 8 November 2018 and on 14 December 2018. These decisions concerned the freezing of certain trust accounts and the appointment of a receiver. The applicant sought review of these decisions in QCAT.
- [3]According to the reasons of the member who heard the application, the proceeding arises out of the affairs of a real estate agency of which the applicant’s father was the principal and which was subsequently taken over by the applicant.[2] Mr Storry died in August 2018.
- [4]In July 2018, an auditor engaged by the applicant to audit Mr Storry’s trust account reported certain errors in the transactions appearing in Mr Storry’s trust account. These matters were reported to the Office of Fair Trading, who is the respondent to this application, which then made a direction to Westpac to freeze operations on the account. The respondent then appointed a receiver over the account. As a result of this appointment, the direction to freeze the account was withdrawn and henceforth, by reason of the appointment, only the receiver could operate the account. These were two of the decisions which the applicant sought to review in QCAT, one of them having been withdrawn. In the meantime, the applicant purchased her father’s business and conducted the agency by means of a licence issued to a company controlled by her. She caused the company to open a trust account, to which I shall refer, for convenience, as the applicant’s trust account. The respondent then issued a direction to Westpac that no operations be permitted on the applicant’s trust account without the written approval of the Chief Executive. Shortly afterwards, the respondent appointed a receiver to this account also. The respondent then withdrew its previous direction freezing this account and replaced it with a direction that the account only be operated by the receiver. The freezing order, which has been withdrawn, was one of the four decisions which was the subject of the application to QCAT. The fourth decision for review in QCAT was the direction that the account only be operated by the receiver.
- [5]The application to QCAT was commenced on 21 December 2018 and was heard on 26 March 2020. After a detailed review of the facts, Member Kanowski dismissed the application. The applicant appealed to the Appeal Tribunal which dismissed the appeal. Due to an apparent uncertainty about the appropriate proceeding, the Appeal Tribunal dealt with the matter as an appeal and also as an application for leave to appeal. Whatever be the correct process, the Tribunal dismissed it and nothing turns upon this technicality.
- [6]It should also be mentioned that while the appeal to the QCAT Appeal Tribunal was pending the applicant sought judicial review of the four decisions in the Supreme Court. Boddice J dismissed the application. On 2 March 2021 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from that decision.
- [7]Upon the hearing of this application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the QCAT Appeal Tribunal’s decision, I asked the applicant what was the legal interest she had in seeking to review a decision that concerned a bank account which she did not own, as a trustee or beneficially. It became apparent that her real interest was a personal interest to vindicate her father’s reputation. However, an interest of that kind is not a legal interest that can form the basis for a legal proceeding like this one. The applicant lacks standing to challenge those decisions and always did so.
- [8]As to the decision concerning the applicant’s own account, it emerged during the hearing that the receivership of her account has ended. Boddice J found as much.[3] The decision freezing the account in the first place was withdrawn long ago. There would, therefore, be no utility in an appeal against a decision not to set aside these decisions. Again, the point of the proceeding appears to be personal vindication. A person is entitled to pursue such a purpose and many cases are litigated for only such a reason. However, when a person is seeking to agitate the correctness of an administrative decision for the third time, as I have said, something special must be shown to justify such a course. There is nothing of that kind shown here. It is material to notice that, as Boddice J observed in his reasons, when he dismissed the application for judicial review, that the applicant had previously commenced and then abandoned proceedings for judicial review. This is, therefore, actually an attempt by the applicant to relitigate the propriety of these decisions for the sixth time.[4]
- [9]For these reasons I refuse leave to appeal.
Footnotes
[1]Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 334 at [5].
[2]Storry v Department of Justice and Attorney-General – Office of Fair Trading [2020] QCAT 94 at [4]‑[7].
[3]Storry v Chief Executive of Office of Fair Trading, 15 July 2020, page 3 line 13.
[4]These challenges were the abandoned application, application before Boddice J, appeal against decision of Boddice J, application to QCAT, appeal to QCAT Appeal Tribunal and, now, appeal to the Court of Appeal. There has also been an application for an interlocutory injunction in relation to these decisions, dismissed by Flanagan J.