Young v Crime and Corruption Commission
[2021] QCA 256
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- Unreported Judgment
- Young v Crime and Corruption Commission[2021] QCA 256
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Young v Crime and Corruption Commission[2021] QCA 256
Young v Crime and Corruption Commission[2021] QCA 256
[2021] QCA 256
COURT OF APPEAL
MULLINS JA
Appeal No 1461 of 2018
SC No 12210 of 2017
GREGORY RAYMOND YOUNG Applicant
v
CRIME AND CORRUPTION COMMISSION Respondent
BRISBANE
FRIDAY, 26 NOVEMBER 2021
JUDGMENT
- [1]MULLINS JA: Mr Young brought Proceeding No BS 12210 of 2017 in the Trial Division against the respondent. His claim and amended statement of claim were struck out by Martin J. Mr Young appealed against that order in Appeal No 1461 of 2018. That appeal was dismissed with costs by the Court of Appeal on 13 September 2019: Young v Crime and Corruption Commission [2019] QCA 189 (the reasons).
- [2]Mr Young had alleged that the respondent failed to respond appropriately to a series of complaints which he made to the respondent about the Gold Coast City Council which employed him for nearly 10 years until May 2005 when he was summarily dismissed. He pleaded that his complaints of misconduct and offences by the Council’s employees were not properly investigated by the respondent. He claimed the respondent owed a duty of care to him in responding to his complaints which it breached and the respondent owed a fiduciary duty to him which it also breached.
- [3]The reasons explain why Mr Young was misconceived in bringing his claim against the respondent. McMurdo JA (with whom Fraser and Morrison JJA agreed) summed up the position in the reasons at [17] as follows:
“The fundamental flaw affecting the entirety of Mr Young’s case was a misapprehension that the CCC has a duty to serve and protect the interests of individuals in that way, rather than to serve the public interest.”
- [4]Mr Young’s application to the High Court for special leave to appeal was refused on the basis the proposed appeal would have no realistic prospect of success: Young v Crime and Corruption Commission [2019] HCASL 397.
- [5]Mr Young brought an application before McMurdo JA on 18 September 2020 seeking a different outcome from the dismissal of his appeal on the basis of r 668(1)(b) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). That application was dismissed on the basis there were no newly discovered facts to engage the operation of r 668: Young v Crime and Corruption Commission [2020] QCA 205. At the same time as dismissing that application, McMurdo JA ordered that Mr Young was not to file any further application in the Court of Appeal in Appeal No 1461 of 2018 without the leave of a judge of the Court.
- [6]Mr Young applied for leave to bring another application pursuant to r 668(1)(b) that was heard by Fraser JA on 30 October 2020. Mr Young was seeking an injunction against the respondent, or one or more of its officers, requiring a referral to the Minister for Local Government or an order by the Supreme Court referring to the Minister for resolution pursuant to s 120 and s 121 of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) of a complaint the applicant lodged with the Commission after the appeal was concluded. Fraser JA dismissed the application for reasons similar to those given by McMurdo JA for dismissing Mr Young’s first application under r 668(1)(b) and also for other reasons, including that the provisions of the Local Government Act on which Mr Young relied did not confer power on the Court to require the Minister to conduct an inquiry or make a determination of the kind Mr Young contemplated and for other discretionary considerations: Young v Crime and Corruption Commission [2020] QCA 237.
- [7]Mr Young now wishes to bring another application against the respondent, but this time in reliance on r 667(2)(d) of the UCPR. In compliance with the order of McMurdo JA made on 18 September 2020, Mr Young filed an application on 18 November 2021 applying to the Court for leave to file an application to apply for orders in Appeal No 1461 of 2018 pursuant to r 667(2)(d). The factual matter which appears to have prompted the application is a submission made by Mr Horton QC to the Parliamentary CCC Committee on 21 October 2021 which Mr Young erroneously characterises as “breakthrough findings”. That submission made in the context of an inquiry by a Parliamentary Committee in no way affects the reasons of this Court for dismissing Mr Young’s appeal.
- [8]If Mr Young were granted leave, he seeks three orders in the proposed application. The first order is that the order made by this Court in Appeal No 1461 of 2018 be set aside. Rule 667(2)(d) does empower the Court to set aside an order at any time, if the order does not reflect the Court’s intention at the time the order was made. The order made by the Court dismissing Mr Young’s appeal reflects the Court’s intention expressed in the reasons which explained why Mr Young’s appeal had to be dismissed. Nothing in the material provided by Mr Young for the purpose of this leave application provides any basis for the Court to consider exercising the power under r 667(2)(d).
- [9]The second order sought by Mr Young in the proposed application seeks the Court’s endorsement of his agreement that there be no further litigation by him against the respondent. There is no existing proceeding in this Court that justifies the consideration by the Court of such an order. The third order sought by Mr Young is in similar terms to that rejected by Fraser JA on 30 October 2020. For the reason that Fraser JA gave that the relevant provisions of the Local Government Act do not confer power on the Court to make the order that Mr Young seeks, it is not appropriate for Mr Young to apply to the Court for such an order.
- [10]The respondent’s submissions make the point that Mr Young’s present application represents a refusal to accept the Court’s dismissal of his appeal and an attempt to reargue a matter which has been finally determined. I agree with those observations. It is not necessary, however, to make a finding that Mr Young’s application is an abuse of process, in order to dispose of the leave application. The leave application does not succeed, because the application for which leave is sought is doomed to fail.
- [11]Mr Young served his application for leave on the respondent which has appeared, made submissions and sought costs on a standard basis. There is no reason that costs should not follow the event. I consider the point has been reached where any further leave applications brought by Mr Young in Appeal No 1461 of 2018 should be made without notice to the respondent. The making of such an order is not meant to encourage Mr Young to bring further leave applications. In fact, Mr Young has stated that he does not intend to bring any further applications.
- [12]I therefore make the following orders:
- Application filed on 18 November 2021 dismissed with costs.
- Any further application for leave made to a judge of the Court in Appeal No 1461 of 2018, in order to comply with the order of McMurdo JA made on 18 September 2020, must be made without notice to the respondent, unless a judge of the Court otherwise orders.