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McElligott v Boyce[2021] QCA 82

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

McElligott v Boyce & Ors [2021] QCA 82

PARTIES:

LORAIN RONDA McELLIGOTT

(appellant)

v

PETER GERARD BOYCE

(first respondent/not a party to the appeal)

ALAN WILLIAN CLARK

(second respondent/not a party to the appeal)

SIMONE ELIZABETH PEARCE

(third respondent/not a party to the appeal)

GEOFFREY JOHN BARR

(fourth respondent/not a party to the appeal)

TOBY ALEXANDER NIELSEN

(fifth respondent/not a party to the appeal)

RICHARD WINNALL HILL

(sixth respondent/not a party to the appeal)

DALE ANDREW DOYLE

(seventh respondent/not a party to the appeal)

DAVID MICHAEL STIMPSON

(eighth respondent)

HSBC BANK AUSTRALIA LIMITED

ABN 48 006 434 162

(ninth respondent)

AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED

ABN 11 005 357 522

(tenth respondent/not a party to the appeal)

ST GEORGE BANK

ABN 33 007 457 141

(eleventh respondent/not a party to the appeal)

SIMON CHRISTOPHER FISHER

(twelfth respondent)

LINDA CHRISTINE BLAIR

(thirteenth respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 5323 of 2020
SC No 5362 of 2019

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 11 May 2020 (Dalton J)

DELIVERED ON:

30 April 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

26 March 2021

JUDGES:

Morrison JA and Boddice J and Rafter AJ

ORDERS:

  1. Appeal dismissed.
  2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT – DISCLOSING NO REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION OR DEFENCE – where the appellant had been unable to formulate any reasonable cause of action against the respondents – where the respondents submit that the appellant circulated multiple statements of claim that were manifestly deficient – where the primary judge dismissed the proceeding on the grounds that the claims were vexatious and amounted to an abuse of process as there was no reasonable cause of action alleged – where the primary judge was correct to conclude that the appellant’s multiple statements of claim had not altered in any material respect since her initial statement of claim – whether the primary judge was correct to conclude that the proceeding should be dismissed in the exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 16(e), r 16(g), r 16(i), r 371(2)(a), r 371(2)(e), r 658

McElligott v Boyce & Ors [2011] QCA 117, cited
von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 681; [2005] QCA 109, cited

COUNSEL:

The appellant appeared on her own behalf
C M Hall (sol) for the eighth respondent
J A Hughes for the ninth respondent
B J Heath (sol) for the twelfth respondent
The thirteenth respondent appeared on her own behalf

SOLICITORS:

The appellant appeared on her own behalf
Hall Lawyers for the eighth respondent
DLA Piper Australia for the twelfth respondent
Carter Newell Lawyers for the twelfth respondent
The thirteenth respondent appeared on her own behalf

  1. [1]
    MORRISON JA:  I have read the reasons of Rafter AJ and agree with those reasons and the orders his Honour proposes.
  2. [2]
    BODDICE J:  I agree with Rafter AJ.
  3. [3]
    RAFTER AJ:  On 20 May 2019 the appellant filed a claim against 13 defendants, including the present respondents, David Michael Stimpson (“Mr Stimpson”), HSBC Bank Australia Ltd (“HSBC”), Simon Christopher Fisher (“Mr Fisher”) and Linda Christine Blair (“Ms Blair”).
  4. [4]
    On 11 May 2020 the learned primary judge dismissed the proceeding against the respondents on the grounds that the claims were vexatious and amounted to an abuse of process because there was no reasonable cause of action alleged.[1]
  5. [5]
    By notice of appeal dated 18 May 2020, the appellant has appealed against the order dismissing her claims against Mr Stimpson, HSBC, Mr Fisher and Ms Blair.

Background

  1. [6]
    The appellant said in her written submissions before the learned primary judge that her case concerns the wrongful winding up of her company on 14 October 2009 and resultant loss of assets.[2]  The appellant was the sole director and shareholder of Westwood Enterprises (Qld) Pty Ltd (“Westwood”).  The winding up application came before the Supreme Court on 14 October 2009.[3]  The Court ordered that Westwood be wound up and liquidators appointed.  Mr Stimpson was one of the liquidators.  The appellant subsequently made application to terminate Westwood’s winding up.  That application was dismissed on 17 July 2010.
  2. [7]
    On 23 December 2010 the appellant filed an application for an extension of time within which to appeal against the winding up order made on 14 October 2009.  On 3 June 2011 the Court of Appeal refused the application for extension of time.[4]
  3. [8]
    The appellant says that she became aware that valuers were providing false valuations to banks and that her complaints about that led to reprisals against her.  She says that the statutory demand which was the basis of the winding up of Westwood was “in retaliation for her whistle blower activities.”[5]
  4. [9]
    The appellant’s claim filed on 20 May 2019 sought, inter alia, recovery of land at 86 Beach Road, Maroochydore and “damages to compensate economic loss, personal loss, suffering and hardship of [her] and/or her descendants including compensation for damage to [her] company and business reputation and interests.”
  5. [10]
    On 16 October 2019 the appellant circulated a proposed amended statement of claim to the defendants.  The matter came before Mullins J (as her Honour then was) on 18 October 2019.  Her Honour pointed out that the appellant had not addressed the problems that were evident in the statement of claim filed on 20 May 2019 and there was no purpose to be served in allowing the appellant to file another version that was liable to be struck out.[6]  Mullins J ordered by consent that: (a) the statement of claim filed on 20 May 2019 be struck out; and (b) the appellant was given leave to replead on condition that any further proposed amended statement of claim be provided to the respondents on or before 4 pm on 31 January 2020.[7]
  6. [11]
    On 31 January 2020 the appellant circulated a further proposed amended statement of claim.[8]
  7. [12]
    The matter came before Boddice J on 27 February 2020.  The appellant indicated that she required further time in order to obtain legal representation.[9]  Boddice J made interlocutory orders to the effect that: (a) the appellant provide any further proposed statement of claim by no later than 30 March 2020; and (b) any application by the appellant for leave to file an amended statement of claim, and any application by the respondents for the claim to be struck out, be filed on 3 April 2020 and heard on 15 April 2020.
  8. [13]
    On 18 March 2020 the appellant filed a notice of appeal against the interlocutory orders made by Boddice J.  On 2 June 2020 the Court ordered that no further steps be taken in relation to that appeal.
  9. [14]
    On 30 and 31 March 2020 the appellant circulated further proposed amended statements of claim.
  10. [15]
    On 3 April 2020 HSBC filed an application for the appellant’s claim filed 20 May 2019 to be set aside or struck out.[10]  On the same date Mr Fisher filed an application for an order that the appellant’s claim be set aside.[11]  On 6 April 2020 Mr Stimpson filed an application for summary judgment or alternatively orders that the appellant’s claim be struck out.[12]
  11. [16]
    On 3 April 2020 the appellant circulated a further proposed amended statement of claim and draft damages schedule.[13]
  12. [17]
    On 8 May 2020 the appellant circulated another version of her claim and statement of claim.[14]

The hearing before the primary judge

  1. [18]
    The appellant’s written submissions before the primary judge accepted that “… while not every element of every cause of action against the defendants may not be fully evident at this point …” she expected that discovery and interrogatories would assist to “shape the pleadings”.[15]
  2. [19]
    The primary judge pointed out that the appellant’s statement of claim that had been circulated on 8 May 2020 was not much different to the one that had been struck out by Mullins J on 18 October 2019 or the one that had been circulated on 3 April 2020.[16]
  3. [20]
    The appellant responded, “So I believe it’s not necessarily the best case.  I have not been able to – in the time provided and with the amount of things that I’ve needed to try and do, which is including trying to find legal representation and other things and trying to do the relevant research to address these issues, I don’t believe the best case has been set forward.”[17]
  4. [21]
    The appellant said that she had conducted considerable research but had not had sufficient time to rework the statement of claim.  She said that she had spoken to lawyers and sought assistance.[18]
  5. [22]
    Mr Stimpson’s solicitor submitted that the appellant’s proposed further amended statement of claim was materially the same as previous versions.[19]  It was submitted that the appellant’s claim was fanciful and had no real prospect of success.[20]
  6. [23]
    Counsel for HSBC submitted that the appellant’s pleaded allegations were manifestly deficient.  It was submitted that the appellant had not pleaded any material facts that established the elements of a cause of action known to the law, or a chain of causation between anything done or not done by HSBC and any loss suffered by the appellant.[21]
  7. [24]
    It was submitted that the allegations against HSBC were very stale, the events having occurred at least 15 years earlier.  It was pointed out that the appellant had a lengthy period and a number of opportunities to formulate a cogent claim or to find a lawyer who could do so on her behalf.  It was also submitted that the appellant had made scandalous and unsupported allegations of serious misconduct and that it would be oppressive to allow the litigation to continue.[22]
  8. [25]
    Mr Fisher’s solicitor submitted that the appellant had six opportunities to articulate a claim but was unable to do so.[23]  It was submitted that the appellant had not delivered a pleading which corrected the manifest errors in previous versions of the statement of claim.[24]
  9. [26]
    Ms Blair, who represented herself, filed an affidavit supporting the applications for the appellant’s claim to be struck out.[25]

The reasons of the primary judge

  1. [27]
    The primary judge referred to the long history of the matter commencing with the liquidation of Westwood in 2009.  Her Honour said that one of the striking things about the statement of claim that had been struck out and the subsequent versions that had been circulated is how similar they were.  Her Honour concluded that the appellant had not been able to adjust what was said in the statements of claim that had been circulated after October 2019.
  2. [28]
    The primary judge said that many of the appellant’s complaints should have been raised by Westwood, although it had been deregistered for many years.
  3. [29]
    The primary judge concluded that “fundamentally, I suppose, none of the statements of claim either filed or circulated in this matter really articulate proper causes of action against any of the eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth or thirteenth defendants.”  Her Honour considered that allowing the appellant further time to conduct research or obtain legal advice would not address the fundamental problems evident in the pleadings which had been filed and delivered.  Her Honour said, “The fundamental point is that the pleadings simply do not say which of the defendants did what actions, and why those actions amounted to a legal wrong against [the appellant].”
  4. [30]
    The primary judge was convinced that the proceeding ought to be brought to an end because the appellant had been unable to articulate the simple facts of who did what actions or made what omissions, which have amounted to a legal wrong against her.  Her Honour said that those aspects had been missing from the commencement of the proceeding and the further versions circulated after 18 October 2019 had not improved the position.
  5. [31]
    The primary judge concluded that the claims made in the proceeding are vexatious and amounted to an abuse of process.

The appellant’s submissions

  1. [32]
    The appellant’s notice of appeal contains 12 grounds of appeal.  The first five grounds are based on a contention that the Court erred in imposing a 28 day timeframe which the appellant could not comply with because of her disabilities.  The appellant contends in Grounds (vi), (vii) and (ix) – (xii) that the primary judge erred in various ways by not properly taking into consideration the “balance” of the rights of all parties and that the judgment is otherwise unsound.  The appellant seeks orders that any further action be suspended for six months due to her disabilities and medical conditions, and that other “reasonable adjustments” be made and the timetable altered accordingly.
  2. [33]
    The appellant’s written submissions commence with a request that the appeal be stayed for 12 months or until the Department of Justice and Attorney-General complies with anti-discrimination legislation, human rights legislation and international conventions.
  3. [34]
    The appellant submits that a self-represented litigant with disabilities is not able to meet standard deadlines.[26]  The appellant says that, because of her right to privacy, she has no obligation to release her personal medical information to the other parties.  She therefore says that “the assessment and ‘reasonable adjustment’ is best made by an authority independent to the parties and the judiciary.”[27]  However at the hearing before the primary judge the appellant relied on medical reports that set out her medical conditions.[28]
  4. [35]
    The appellant submits that despite multiple requests “at no point has any provision for a ‘reasonable adjustment’ been made or even attempted to have been made.”[29]
  5. [36]
    The appellant’s submissions raise issues concerning a defect in the statutory demand served on Westwood.[30]  This issue has been dealt with by the Court of Appeal in the appellant’s previous appeal.  The Court held that a defect in the statutory demand was not necessarily fatal in the absence of proof of substantial injustice.[31]
  6. [37]
    The appellant submits that the Department of Justice and Attorney-General, as a government funded service provider is required to make “reasonable adjustments” so that self-represented litigants with disabilities are not unduly disadvantaged in the presentation of their case.[32]
  7. [38]
    The appellant submits that the primary judge erred in concluding that her claim and statement of claim had not changed significantly and that she had failed to identify any cause of action.[33]

Consideration

The appellant’s request for a stay of the appeal

  1. [39]
    There is no basis upon which the appellant’s own appeal should be stayed for 12 months or until the Department of Justice and Attorney-General complies with anti-discrimination and human rights laws, and international conventions.  The appeal was commenced on 18 May 2020 and the appellant filed a detailed outline of submissions on 3 August 2020.  The appellant has had ample time to prepare the appeal.

The appellant’s proposed amended statement of claim

  1. [40]
    An examination of the appellant’s statement of claim struck out by consent on 18 October 2019 and the final proposed version circulated on 8 May 2020 supports the primary judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s case had not changed significantly and failed to articulate proper causes of action against the respondents.  The appellant seemed to accept that her pleading was deficient when the proposition was put to her by the primary judge.[34]
  2. [41]
    The statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 consists of 322 paragraphs.  Under the heading “Whistle blower retaliation”, the appellant alleges that Mr Stimpson, HSBC and Mr Fisher, as well as other defendants except Ms Blair “were involved in these loose ‘property fraud networks’ and/or acted as ‘accomplices’ to ‘legalized property fraud.”[35]  The appellant says that the term “legalized property fraud” is used “to describe the way in which resources, structures, processes, and mechanisms within the legal system are recruited to ‘legalize’ a criminal activity, in this case – property fraud.”[36]  The same issue of “legalized property fraud” is raised in the proposed amended statement of claim.[37]
  3. [42]
    The appellant’s claims of “whistle blower reprisal” are almost identical in both pleadings.[38]
  4. [43]
    Mr Stimpson was appointed as one of the liquidators for the purpose of the winding up of Westwood.  In her statement of claim filed 20 May 2019, the appellant alleged that Mr Stimpson participated in “legalized property fraud” by “fraud on the court/abuse of process, accomplice property fraud, unconscionable conduct.”[39]  She also alleged that Mr Stimpson wrongly liquidated assets; failed in his duty to inform the Court of the disputed debt; provided the Court with false information and facilitated the property fraud against Westwood and the trust beneficiaries.[40]  The assertions made by the appellant in the version of the amended statement of claim circulated on 8 May 2020 are virtually identical.[41]
  5. [44]
    The appellant’s statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 alleged that HSBC participated in “legalized property fraud” by “breach of contract, accomplice property fraud, unconscionable conduct”.[42]  The appellant contended that when she first arranged finance with HSBC there was an agreement that she could draw down on the increased equity in a property after a planned restoration pending a “satisfactory” valuation.[43]  The appellant alleges that HSBC reneged on this agreement based on a “faulty valuation”.[44]  She also alleged that HSBC failed to protect her third party rights and was “an accomplice to whistle blower retaliation and property fraud.”[45]  The appellant’s proposed amended statement of claim is virtually identical.[46]
  6. [45]
    The appellant claimed that Mr Fisher’s involvement in “legalized property fraud” was based on “professional negligence, accomplice property fraud, unconscionable conduct.”[47]  In the statement of claim filed 20 May 2019, the appellant alleges that she engaged Mr Fisher on 15 October 2009 and provided a detailed description of the debt dispute.  She claimed that Mr Fisher failed to realise the deficiency in the statutory demand in that the warning statement had been omitted.[48]  The proposed amended statement of claim circulated on 8 May 2020 was virtually identical.[49]
  7. [46]
    In her statement of claim filed 20 May 2019, the appellant alleges that the property at 86 Beach Parade, Maroochydore was disclaimed by the liquidator and that under duress from the St George Bank she signed a contract for sale of the property to Ms Blair.  The appellant alleges that Ms Blair agreed to permit her to have time to try and buy the property back.  She also says that she is of the understanding that Ms Blair was agreeable to relinquishing the property upon payment of an amount that would cover the current loan and proper compensation of not less than $250,000.[50]  The appellant’s proposed amended statement of claim circulated on 8 May 2020 is virtually identical.[51]
  8. [47]
    It follows that the primary judge was correct to conclude that the appellant’s statement of claim had not altered in any material respect since her statement of claim had been struck out by consent on 18 October 2019 and that she had failed to articulate any proper causes of action.

The appellant’s remaining grounds of appeal

  1. [48]
    By Ground (vi) the appellant contends that the learned primary judge erred by “not properly take into consideration the ‘balance’ of the rights of all the parties eg ‘allegations hanging over their head’ vs the injustices inflicted on the plaintiffs including their right to have their case properly presented and heard.”  It is apparent that the appellant had a lengthy period to formulate her case since commencing the proceeding on 20 May 2019.  There is no basis for concluding that the deficiencies in the appellant’s case were capable of being rectified.
  2. [49]
    By Ground (vii), the appellant contends that the learned primary judge erred in not granting her request for a six month adjournment or hearings to be scheduled in accordance with a timetable.  The appellant’s written submissions before the primary judge stated that her disabilities were such that she would be disadvantaged unless “reasonable adjustments” were made.  The appellant proposed that she complete and file an amended claim and statement of claim by mid-June 2020.  The appellant proposed that the strike out applications be heard separately and spaced one month apart commencing in mid-June 2020.[52]  Once again, delaying the proceeding would not have resulted in the appellant being able to improve her claims.  Furthermore, the proposed staggered hearings of the strike out applications would have unnecessarily prolonged the matter.  There is no merit in this ground.
  3. [50]
    In Ground (viii), the appellant contends that HSBC and the ANZ Bank “failed to comply with their own Model Litigants Guidelines.”  The appellant’s submission is that ANZ and HSBC refused to enter into mediation and argued over the issue of wrongdoing rather than the quantum of her claim.[53]  The appellant does not identify the model litigant guidelines that are said to apply to HSBC and does not identify how any breach could constitute a cause of action.  There is no merit in this ground.
  4. [51]
    In Ground (ix), the appellant contends that the learned primary judge erred by having regard to the “long history of proceedings”.  The history of the proceedings was clearly a matter that the learned primary judge was entitled to take into account in determining the applications made by the respondents.  There is no merit in this ground of appeal.
  5. [52]
    By Ground (x), the appellant contends that the learned primary judge erred in hearing the application by Ms Blair together with the applications by the other respondents because Ms Blair’s case “was in relation to breach of promise/promissory estoppel and separate and different” from the other cases.  There was no error in the learned primary judge hearing Ms Blair’s application, together with the applications by the other respondents.  There is no merit in this ground of appeal.
  6. [53]
    By Ground (xi), the appellant contends that the judgment of the learned primary judge is unsound because the respondents, Mr Stimpson, HSBC and Mr Fisher, failed to provide any evidence of the appellant’s failure to demonstrate a cause of action.  The respondents were not required to produce evidence of the appellant’s failure to establish a cause of action and there is no merit in this ground of appeal.
  7. [54]
    By Ground (xii), the appellant contends that the learned primary judge erred because the appellant alleged “civil fraud” and “property fraud”, and at no point in time did Mr Stimpson, HSBC, ANZ or Mr Fisher indicate the “elements they deemed were absent”.  The appellant also contends that the relevant respondents did not indicate why the circumstances or relationship were not relevant to her claim or adequately justify why she should be deprived of the opportunity of further discovery.  This ground does not reveal any error in the reasoning of the learned primary judge.  The respondents were not obliged to identify any deficiencies in the appellant’s allegations.  The occasion for further discovery did not arise because the appellant’s pleaded case did not disclose any cause of action.

Conclusion and orders

  1. [55]
    The appellant has been unable to formulate any reasonable cause of action against the respondents.  The appellant has not pleaded any material facts that could establish the elements of causes of action against the respondents or a chain of causation between anything said to have been done by the respondents and any loss suffered by the appellant.  The Court has the power to prevent an abuse of its processes by bringing baseless proceedings to an end: von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Company Limited.[54]  The learned primary judge was correct to conclude that the proceeding should be dismissed in the exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process.  Moreover, as her Honour observed, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 r 16(e), (g), (i), r 658 and r 371(2)(a) and (e) would probably confer a power to bring the proceeding to an end.
  2. [56]
    I propose the following orders:
  1. Appeal dismissed.
  1. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Footnotes

[1] The primary judge also dismissed the appellant’s claim against Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (tenth defendant) but there is no appeal against that order.  The appellant’s claim against St George Bank (eleventh defendant) was dismissed by consent.

[2] AB 114.

[3] AB 1080 – 1090.

[4] McElligott v Boyce & Ors [2011] QCA 117.

[5] Statement of Claim filed 20 May 2019 at para 282 (d), at AB 72.

[6] Transcript of proceedings, 18 October 2019 at AB 1106 ll 8-15.

[7] AB 1110 ll 1-20.

[8] AB 501 – 564.

[9] Transcript of proceedings, 27 February 2020 at AB 1117.

[10] AB 109 – 110.

[11] AB 111 – 113.

[12] AB 107 – 108.

[13] AB 708 – 795.

[14] AB 623 – 707.

[15] AB 117.

[16] AB 1062 ll 20-25.

[17] AB 1062 ll 33-37.

[18] AB 1063 ll 12-20.

[19] Outline of submissions for the eighth defendant, para 9 at AB 121.

[20] Outline of submissions for the eighth defendant, para 12 at AB 121.

[21] Outline of submissions for the ninth defendant, para 34 at AB 126.

[22] Transcript of proceedings, 11 May 2020 at AB 1069 ll 1-15.

[23] Transcript of proceedings, 11 May 2020 at AB 1071 ll 15-30.

[24] Supplementary submissions for the twelfth defendant at para 12, AB 146.

[25] AB 606 – 622.

[26] Appellant’s outline of submissions at para 1.

[27] Appellant’s outline of submissions, footnote 1.

[28] Report of Dr Pathmanathan dated 24 November 2019, exhibit 6 at AB 798-799 and Report of Dr Peter Hodgkinson dated 24 March, exhibit 7 at AB 801.

[29] Appellant’s outline of submissions at para 2.

[30] Appellant’s outline of submissions at para 7(f).

[31] McElligott v Boyce & Ors [2011] QCA 117 at [12].

[32] Appellant’s outline of submissions at para 22.

[33] Appellant’s outline of submissions at para 33(a) and (b).

[34] AB 1062 – 1063.

[35] Statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 at para 55.

[36] Statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 at para 51.

[37] Proposed amended statement of claim circulated 8 May 2020 at paras 91-92; AB 651 – 652.

[38] Statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 at paras 137-145, AB 39 – 40; proposed amended statement of claim circulated 8 May 2020 at paras 131-139, AB 657 – 658.

[39] Statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 at para 56; AB 28.

[40] Statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 at paras 305-309; AB 74.

[41] Proposed amended statement of claim circulated 8 May 2020, paras 420-425; AB 691 – 692.

[42] AB 28.

[43] Statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 at para 147; AB 40.

[44] Statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 at para 154; AB 40.

[45] Statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 at paras 162-165; AB 41.

[46] Proposed amended statement of claim circulated 8 May 2020, paras 147-159; AB 658 – 660.

[47] Statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 at para 56; AB 28.

[48] Statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 at paras 310-312; AB 74 – 75.

[49] Proposed amended statement of claim circulated 8 May 2020 at paras 426-428; AB 692 – 693.

[50] Statement of claim filed 20 May 2019 at paras 318-322; AB 75 – 76.

[51] Proposed amended statement of claim circulated 8 May 2020 at paras 498-502; AB 702 – 703.

[52] Appellant’s written submissions dated 14 April 2020; Exhibit 9 at AB 805 – 810.

[53] Appellant’s outline of submissions, para 31(a).

[54] [2005] 1 Qd R 681.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    McElligott v Boyce & Ors

  • Shortened Case Name:

    McElligott v Boyce

  • MNC:

    [2021] QCA 82

  • Court:

    QCA

  • Judge(s):

    Morrison JA, Boddice J, Rafter AJ

  • Date:

    30 Apr 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.
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