R v SEC[2023] QCA 128

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. [1]
   MULLINS P:  I agree with Livesey AJA.
2. [2]
   FLANAGAN JA:  I agree with Livesey AJA.
3. [3]
   LIVESEY AJA: On 16 March 2023 the appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of indecent treatment of a child under 16, under care, contrary to ss 210(1)(a) (dealing) and 210(1)(b) (procuring) of the Criminal Code (Qld).^[1]
4. [4]
   There is only one ground of appeal; that the jury’s verdicts were unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence pursuant to s 668E(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld).
5. [5]
   The trial was a short one, lasting three days with three witnesses.
6. [6]
   The appellant did not give evidence.
7. [7]
   The complainant said that the offending occurred on one occasion whilst she and the appellant were alone on his sailing boat whilst it was moored at Maryborough, when the complainant was aged between 14 and 15 years, between October 2006 and June 2007.
8. [8]
   The appellant relies upon a number of inconsistencies arising from the evidence of the complainant surrounding the core allegations that he sexually interfered with his step‑daughter by licking her vagina (count 1) and procuring her to masturbate his penis (count 2).  The appellant contends that these demonstrate that the verdicts were unreasonable.
9. [9]
   The appellant submits that this is one of the rare cases where any benefit the jury may have had from seeing the complainant giving evidence cannot overcome the effect of major inconsistencies in the complainant’s sworn testimony on key issues.  It is submitted that, in all of the circumstances, this Court should be satisfied that the jury, acting rationally, ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt about guilt.
10. [10]
    For the reasons that follow, though there were some apparent inconsistencies in the evidence of the complainant, these were classically issues for the jury as the constitutional arbiter of fact.^[2]  It has not been demonstrated that the verdicts were unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence as s 668E(1) requires.
11. [11]
    The appeal should be dismissed.

The prosecution case

Overview of the case

12. [12]
    The complainant was born in January 1992.^[3]  The case for the prosecution was that the offending occurred in a context where there had been inappropriate sexual contact between the complainant and the appellant over many years.
13. [13]
    The appellant had commenced living with the complainant’s mother and her children in a house in a suburb of Melbourne in the year 2000.  They lived in that suburb until the end of 2005.  The appellant was working as an IT consultant, mostly from home using the internet.
14. [14]
    At the end of 2005 the appellant bought a sailing boat.  During 2006 the complainant, her mother and her brother commenced living with the appellant on the boat.  The complainant’s older sister had moved to live with her father.
15. [15]
    The appellant sailed the complainant and her family up the coast to Maryborough where they docked at the marina for between six and eight months, between October 2006 and June 2007.  At that stage the complainant’s mother was nursing at a hospital in Maryborough.
16. [16]
    They then sailed to Townsville where the complainant’s mother found another job in a hospital.  Whilst they lived in Townsville the appellant found employment in the Northern Territory.  The complainant and her mother and brother moved into an apartment in Townsville.  After a few months they moved to Cairns.  At that time the appellant was flying back from the Northern Territory to visit Cairns.
17. [17]
    During 2008 the complainant commenced boarding at a school in Cairns until 2009.  Whilst the complainant was boarding, the complainant’s mother and brother commenced living with the appellant in the Northern Territory.  During school holidays the complainant joined them.
18. [18]
    During 2013 the appellant and the complainant’s mother, the complainant and her then-boyfriend, holidayed in Japan for two weeks.
19. [19]
    By the end of 2013 the complainant was living in Brisbane.
20. [20]
    From the outset the prosecution made it clear that the Crown case depended on whether the jury accepted the evidence of the complainant beyond reasonable doubt.
21. [21]
    The complainant’s evidence was that the appellant’s offending commenced in Victoria when she was about eight years and it continued after the charged offending, whilst the family lived in Townsville.  She gave evidence about an incident in Cairns, as well as about offending in the Northern Territory.
22. [22]
    The complainant’s evidence about these other instances of sexual offending was, without objection from the defence, left to the jury as evidence showing the appellant’s sexual interest in the complainant and his preparedness to act upon it.
23. [23]
    The complainant gave evidence that at the end of 2012 she told her then boyfriend about the offending.  His evidence was that the complainant told him that the appellant “had sex with her on the boat on multiple occasions, especially when her mum was going away to work in Maryborough”.  His evidence was that he was told that the offending occurred when the complainant was aged between eight and 14 years.
24. [24]
    The complainant’s boyfriend reported the allegation to the complainant’s sister and eventually, in 2013, the complainant told her mother that she had been sexually interfered with by the appellant.  This occurred at a time when the complainant knew that her boyfriend had spoken with her sister.

The evidence of the complainant

25. [25]
    As mentioned, the charged offending occurred on the one occasion whilst the complainant, her mother and her brother were living with the appellant on the appellant’s boat when it was moored at Maryborough.  The appellant and the complainant were alone on the boat.  The complainant’s mother was working and her brother was visiting friends.
26. [26]
    The complainant’s evidence was that this incident was not isolated.  She said that on the boat there were “multiple incidents”:^[4]

    “You know, we were, there was a lot of time when I was on the boat by myself with him because [my brother] had made friends with the kids in town.  So he would go off and mum would be at work and just the two of us would be there.  And, again, there’s a – there’s a mix of memories in there but there’s some very distinct ones.  One especially was occurred in – he was in mum’s room at the back of the boat.  And I remember it really distinctly because he was smoking these tiny little cigars at the time and they smelt really bad.  So whenever he would smoke them or come back inside it stunk like burnt peanut butter and it was horrendous.”

27. [27]
    The complainant’s evidence regarding the offending commenced with the appellant calling her into the bedroom he shared with her mother at the stern of the boat.  He removed her pants and underwear and licked and touched her vagina, “putting his fingers into my vagina”.  The complainant said that the appellant then asked her to “help” him, by which she understood he meant that she was to masturbate him.  She did so and he ejaculated into a tissue which he put into the toilet.^[5]
28. [28]
    After describing the charged offending, the complainant said that the appellant went back outside the boat to smoke another cigar, “I just – I remember just because of the smell”.^[6]
29. [29]
    The prosecutor put to the complainant by way of a leading question that this was “the only incident you remember distinctly happening at Maryborough”,^[7] and she agreed notwithstanding that she had already said in her evidence that there were “multiple incidents” and that there were “a mix of memories in there but there’s some very distinct ones” on the boat.
30. [30]
    The complainant was then asked about an occasion with the appellant in Cairns, after he had come to visit from the Northern Territory.  The complainant said that she distinctly remembered one incident.^[8]  She explained recalling having just got a puppy.  The complainant said that her brother was at school and her mother was at work in Cairns.  The complainant said that she remembered being in the bathroom on her hands and knees on the bathmat and the appellant was having sex with her from behind.  She explained that this was penetrative sex.
31. [31]
    The complainant said that she remembered this as the first incident which had involved penetrative sex and that she found it quite traumatic.^[9]  In a revealing passage the complainant was asked about what happened after that event and she said:^[10]

    “I don’t remember specifics afterwards.  I just remember it being over and, like, he always just pretended like nothing was different afterwards, that nothing had happened.  And so we just went back to normal life.”

32. [32]
    The complainant described incidents occurring in the Northern Territory.  One involved the appellant waking her at night and showing her pornography while she was in her pyjamas, sitting on his lap.  The complainant said that the appellant was touching her vagina.  She said that this was “one incident in particular, I remember”^[11].
33. [33]
    The complainant was then asked about an incident while she was living in Cairns.  She explained that was suspended from boarding school because she had alcohol in the cupboard of her room.  The complainant said that she had to stay with a friend for a night until the appellant flew down and met with her.  They stayed at a hotel for a couple of days “while the school sorted out what would happen”.^[12]
34. [34]
    The prosecutor asked the complainant whether she and the appellant were in the hotel room for a couple of days, and she said they were.  She was asked whether anything happened.  She said nothing physical happened but that the appellant propositioned her to give him a “blow job or to suck his penis, however you want to word it, because he noticed that I had got my tongue pierced while I’d been at boarding school”.^[13]  According to the complainant, the appellant said that this would “feel really good” and that this was why girls got their tongues pierced “so it feels better for boys”.  The complainant said that she refused and said, “That’s disgusting”.  She said that this occurred in 2008, 2009.^[14]
35. [35]
    The complainant was not asked whether her mother had also travelled to Cairns following the incident at the boarding school.
36. [36]
    The complainant was asked about when she first revealed the appellant’s misconduct.
37. [37]
    Initially she described telling her mother over the telephone.  The complainant said that she told her mother that the appellant had “sexually abused me when I was a kid”.  The complainant said that she told her mother that it had “started when I was around eight and went all the way through until I left home”.  The complainant described her mother flying down to come and see her in Brisbane.^[15]
38. [38]
    The complainant clarified that this was not the first person she had told, she had told her boyfriend when they were still together, before they broke up in 2013.  The complainant explained that she told her boyfriend “basically the same thing”:^[16]

    “So I told him because I used to have panic attacks and was not in a very good headspace, and he would always ask me what’s wrong. And then one day I told him that, yeah, I was sexually abused as a child, … eventually he asked me who it was and wanted to know details, and I said it was [the appellant] but didn’t give him a lot of details.”

39. [39]
    The complainant said that she told her boyfriend that the appellant used to touch her “or something like that, but, yeah, nothing specific that I recall”.^[17]
40. [40]
    The complainant then described telling her sister after her boyfriend had messaged her sister.  It was after this that the complainant told her mother.^[18]

The cross-examination of the complainant

41. [41]
    Under cross-examination the complainant was challenged about various matters.  She was asked about her police statement in which she had described “lots of things” happening in Victoria.  She was asked whether she told police that something occurred with the appellant once a week.  Her answer was that something occurred once or twice a week.^[19]
42. [42]
    The complainant was also challenged with the proposition that she could have moved to live with her father had she wanted to do so.  She agreed that she did not move to live with her father even though her account was that her step-father was molesting her once or twice a week.
43. [43]
    The cross-examiner asked the complainant about the time she spoke with her boyfriend, suggesting that her boyfriend had threatened to break up their relationship if she did not explain what was going on.  The complainant disagreed but admitted that her boyfriend had said that “it wasn’t working for him … he wanted to know what was wrong”.^[20]
44. [44]
    The cross-examiner then challenged the complainant about what she had said to her boyfriend.  It was put to the complainant that she had told her boyfriend that the appellant had “sexually interfered with you on numerous occasions whilst you were on the boat in Maryborough”.  The complainant agreed with that, after which she was challenged with the proposition that she had only described one incident that occurred at Maryborough in her evidence.  She agreed with that proposition.
45. [45]
    The cross‑examiner put to the complainant that she had told a police officer that she did not remember anything else happening on the boat in Maryborough.  To this the complainant said that she did not have any specific memories and that there was nothing that she could recall off the top of her head at that time.  She disagreed with the proposition that she could not say that anything else had happened at Maryborough.  When the complainant attempted to say that she believed that there were other occasions, the cross-examiner interrupted:^[21]

    “No, no, not what you believe.  Not what you believe.  Very easy to believe things when it suits you.  You told the police that you had no recollection of any other incidents at Maryborough? --- I believe that’s what I said, yeah.”

46. [46]
    Later in the cross-examination the complainant was challenged with the fact that it took her some considerable time to make a complaint to police.  It was suggested to her that she did so in order to “maintain credibility” with her family.  The complainant answered that it was “more because I was embarrassed and ashamed and didn’t know if I wanted to go through this whole process”.^[22]
47. [47]
    The cross-examiner then moved to examples of positive contact between the complainant and the appellant, notwithstanding the claimed instances of sexual offending.  She was asked about an occasion when she was living at Mission Beach and the appellant and her mother came on holidays to visit.  They were making arrangements for the complainant’s wedding to her boyfriend.
48. [48]
    It was put to the complainant that at around this time the appellant had given her a diamond necklace.  She agreed that she had been given a diamond necklace but that this was before, after her graduation.  She agreed that she was intending to wear it at the wedding.  She agreed that, at one stage, she was wearing the diamond necklace regularly.
49. [49]
    The cross-examiner asked the complainant about contact between the complainant and the appellant using various social media and email.  She was asked about contacting the appellant for a job reference.  As it was put to the complainant, “So you saw fit to ask the man who you said had molested [you] over many years to provide you with a reference: is that right?--- Yeah.”^[23]
50. [50]
    Toward the end of the cross-examination the complainant was taxed with the proposition that in a previous statement given to police on 10 October 2018 she had said that the appellant had had sex with her whilst they lived in Victoria.  It was put to her that this was inconsistent with her evidence.  The complainant implicitly agreed with the fact of the inconsistency and explained, “when I said sex in the statement, I was referring to sexual acts, yeah”.^[24]
51. [51]
    Undeterred, the cross-examiner pressed the complainant with the proposition that she had been referring to acts of penile penetration.  The complainant had told police that whilst they lived in Victoria the appellant had said to her, “there is no risk of you getting pregnant as I’ve had a vasectomy and it is the safest sex you can have”.  The complainant disagreed, explaining that what she had described to police were instances where the appellant had been trying to convince her to have sexual intercourse involving penile penetration.
52. [52]
    The complainant disagreed with the proposition that she was telling lies.^[25]

Other witnesses

53. [53]
    The complainant’s mother gave evidence and referred to traveling with the appellant to Cairns and staying with the complainant and the appellant when the complainant was suspended from boarding school.^[26]
54. [54]
    The complainant’s former boyfriend gave evidence that he threatened to end his relationship with the complainant if she did not tell him what was wrong with her.^[27]

The appellant’s contentions on appeal

55. [55]
    The appellant submitted that the entirely uncorroborated nature of the complainant’s allegations required that particular attention be given to the complainant’s evidence and the existence of flaws such as inconsistencies in that evidence.
56. [56]
    The appellant contended that there were two major inconsistencies which, together with other defects in the complainant’s evidence, ought to have led a jury acting rationally to have held a reasonable doubt about the appellant’s guilt.  The two main issues relied upon to demonstrate that the jury’s verdicts were unreasonable were:

    1. 1.
       The complainant told police that the two charged offences were the only sexual offending against her by the appellant that she recalled in the eight months the complainant and her family lived on the sailing boat at Maryborough.  By contrast, at the trial the complainant said in evidence that the appellant had sexually interfered with her on numerous occasions on the boat.
    2. 2.
       The complainant first told police that whilst they lived in Victoria there had been no penile intercourse involving the appellant.  In the second police statement, however, the complainant said that the appellant had sex with her during this period.  In addition, by the time of the trial, the appellant’s evidence was that the first penetrative sex that she remembered with the appellant took place at a house in Cairns.
57. [57]
    There were other problems which the appellant said arose on the complainant’s evidence and the Crown case which were relied upon as demonstrating that the jury’s verdicts were unreasonable.  In addition to the two main issues just mentioned, the appellant highlighted:

    3. 3.
       Significant inconsistencies between the evidence of the complainant regarding the complaint made to her boyfriend when compared with her later accounts.
    4. 4.
       Inconsistency between the complainant’s evidence and the evidence which her former boyfriend gave about the way in which her complaint to him had come about.
    5. 5.
       The complainant’s evidence about the proposition she said the appellant made to her at a hotel in Cairns involved a lie by admission because the complainant did not reveal that her mother had also been present in Cairns on that trip.  Alternatively, there was an inconsistency between the complainant’s recollection and her mother’s evidence that she was also in Cairns, which should have resulted in a real doubt about the complainant’s reliability as a witness.
    6. 6.
       The complainant and her mother had accepted that the complainant could have, at any time, stopped living in the same accommodation as the appellant and commenced living with her father, sister and older brother in Victoria.
    7. 7.
       During and after the alleged offending the complainant admitted initiating and maintaining personal contact with the appellant, including occasions when she chose to be alone with him for significant periods.
    8. 8.
       The evidence led in the Crown case concerning the confrontation of the appellant by the complainant’s mother showed, according to the complainant’s mother, that the appellant seemed unaware of the allegations and reacted with upset disbelief.
58. [58]
    The appellant emphasised that this was a case where it had been necessary for what he described as “Robinson/Longman type directions” to be given in the course of summing‑up.^[28]
59. [59]
    In addition, the appellant relied upon what he argued was an accumulation of issues involving the complainant’s evidence which had been specifically addressed by the trial judge in the course of his summing-up:

    “Here, when I was referring to the elements, you will recall that I said the Crown case rises or fall on your acceptance beyond reasonable doubt of the evidence of the complainant as to the alleged offending. [The complainant] is the critical witness in this case. You will need to scrutinise her evidence with great care before arriving at a conclusion of guilt. That is not to say that you cannot act on her evidence. But you may only do so if you are convinced of its truthfulness and accuracy, bearing in mind the following matters which may have some effect upon her reliability. In this regard, I refer to:

    • The lack of specificity and detail in the complainant’s evidence as to the other sexual offending by the defendant before and after the charged acts; the complainant’s disclosures about the alleged offending to [the complainant’s former boyfriend], her mother, and what she said she told her sister;
    • There is the complainant’s inconsistent statements regarding whether the defendant committed penile vaginal sexual intercourse against her at [the suburb in Melbourne], and the inconsistent statements regarding the sexual conduct on the boat at Maryborough;
    • You will need to consider the complainant’s evidence as to the uncharged allegation in the hotel room in Cairns, given her mother’s evidence as to having attended in Cairns on that occasion with the defendant;
    • You have the inconsistency between the complainant’s evidence and that of [the complainant’s former boyfriend], regarding the circumstances surrounding the disclosure to him in 2012/2013, in particular his evidence that the disclosure was made following him threatening to end the relationship unless he was given an explanation for why she was becoming distant during intimacy, and you have the complainant’s evidence on that issue;
    • You have the evidence of behaviour by the complainant during and after the alleged offending – the evidence that she continued to live with the defendant and her mother, particularly before and during the sailing trip on the [appellant’s sailing boat], when she could have relocated to her biological father as her sister had done, and you have the evidence of the complainant maintaining contact and communication with the defendant after the alleged offending.”
60. [60]
    Ultimately the appellant’s submissions amounted to the proposition that there were so many factual issues and problems with the complainant’s evidence that, if the jury faithfully followed the directions given to them, it was not open to the jury to ignore these matters and they could not have made a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The respondent’s contentions

61. [61]
    After addressing each of the suggested inconsistencies, the respondent submitted that whether the evidence established inconsistencies was a matter for the jury.  Even if inconsistencies were established, these did not compel the jury to find that the complainant was so lacking in credibility and reliability that the jury was precluded from properly convicting the appellant.
62. [62]
    The respondent submitted that the matters relied on to establish reasonable doubt were all brought to the attention of the jury by extremely experienced criminal trial counsel, whether in cross-examination or a detailed closing address.
63. [63]
    Whilst the jury was urged to accumulate these matters and to conclude that the complainant was not only a witness without credit or reliability but a “liar”, their decision-making was a matter entirely for them.  The jury was entitled to reason to guilt from the available evidence and convict the appellant.

The approach of the appeal court

64. [64]
    This Court must conduct an independent review of the record and determine whether the evidence was such that it was open to a jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the offences with which he was charged.^[29]  When undertaking that review it is necessary to proceed on the assumption that the evidence of the complainant was assessed by the jury as being both credible and reliable.^[30]
65. [65]
    Importantly, the appeal court must examine the record to see whether, notwithstanding the jury’s acceptance of the complainant as both credible and reliable, there exist inconsistencies, discrepancies or some other form of inadequacy or whether, in light of other evidence in the case, the appeal court is satisfied that the jury, acting rationally, ought nonetheless to have entertained a reasonable doubt about proof of guilt.^[31]
66. [66]
    As the High Court explained in a passage frequently cited from M v The Queen:^[32]

    “In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced.  It is only where a jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred.  That is to say, where the evidence lacks credibility for reasons which are not explained by the manner in which it was given, a reasonable doubt experienced by the court is a doubt which a reasonable jury ought to have experienced.  If the evidence, upon the record itself, contains discrepancies, displays inadequacies, is tainted or otherwise lacks probative force in such a way as to lead the court of criminal appeal to conclude that, even making full allowance for the advantages enjoyed by the jury, there is a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted, then the court is bound to act and to set aside a verdict based upon that evidence.”

67. [67]
    Whilst this Court must proceed on the basis that the criminal standard of proof is “designedly exacting”,^[33] to set aside a jury’s verdict on the ground that it is unreasonable is “a serious step, not to be taken without particular regard to the advantage enjoyed by the jury over a court of appeal which has not seen or heard the witnesses called at trial”.^[34]

The determination of the appeal

The two main issues

68. [68]
    It is convenient to commence with what the appellant described as the two main issues with the complainant’s evidence.
69. [69]
    The first issue concerned whether the complainant had been inconsistent in describing the two charged offences as the only sexual offending against her on the boat at Maryborough.  It will be recalled that in her evidence at trial the complainant referred to the appellant interfering with her on numerous occasions on the boat.
70. [70]
    When the complainant’s evidence is reviewed as a whole, it is capable of being viewed as containing no relevant inconsistency.  It is capable of being viewed as evidence that the complainant particularly remembered the charged offending and that, though there were other incidents, she could not bring to mind specific memories of other offending whilst on the boat at Maryborough.
71. [71]
    In this respect it is pertinent to observe that the cross‑examiner, who otherwise mounted a sustained challenge to the complainant’s evidence, did not directly challenge the complainant’s evidence about the charged conduct, nor the reason given by the complainant for why she remembered it.  Her evidence regarding the cigars smoked by the appellant before and after the offending might well have been regarded by the jury as supporting the complainant’s evidence as to why the charged offending remained clear in her memory.
72. [72]
    The apparent inconsistency regarding the second main issue, whether the complainant had previously said that she had penetrative sexual intercourse with the appellant in Victoria, appears clearer.  However, this too was a matter explained by the complainant.  When the inconsistency was squarely put to her in cross-examination, her evidence was that she was only referring to “sexual acts”, not to sexual intercourse of the kind she described occurring later in Cairns.
73. [73]
    In addition, the complainant explained that the statement she attributed to the appellant regarding his vasectomy was made in a context where he was attempting to encourage her to have penetrative sex, which she resisted.
74. [74]
    Whilst these apparent inconsistencies emerge on a reading of the complainant’s evidence, it was quintessentially a matter for the jury as to whether they were prepared to accept her explanations, having regard to the way in which she gave her evidence before them.  Those explanations were not so inherently improbable or incredible that they could not be accepted by the jury as the ultimate arbiters of fact in this trial.

The other suggested problems in the Crown case

75. [75]
    It is next convenient to address the other suggested problems with the Crown case.  The impression given by the complainant’s former boyfriend in examination‑in‑chief was that he had been told by the complainant that there were regular occasions of sexual interference by the appellant “every time her mum left the boat to go on shift” at the hospital.^[35]  His evidence was that the complainant had told him that there were rapes or sexual assaults which were “oral and … penetrative”, which occurred “definitely on the boat”.^[36]
76. [76]
    This evidence is relied on to demonstrate an inconsistency with the complainant’s evidence that she could only clearly recall the charged offending.
77. [77]
    In a sense this suggested problem dovetails with the earlier issue regarding the way in which the complainant described the number of occasions of sexual offending on the boat at Maryborough.  If anything, by the time of the trial there was greater consistency between the account of the complainant and what she had apparently told her former boyfriend some years before.  The complainant’s evidence about “multiple incidents” has already been addressed.  That is to say, that there were a number of occasions of offending, even though only the charged offending stood out in the complainant’s memory.
78. [78]
    Again, that is precisely the kind of criticism which it was open to the jury to consider and evaluate and, ultimately, reject in favour of accepting the complainant’s account.
79. [79]
    The suggested inconsistency between the complainant and her former boyfriend about whether he had threatened to end their relationship at the time she revealed the offending is of no moment.  It is unremarkable that two people in a domestic relationship would have a slightly different recollection of the circumstances in which an important conversation came to light.  This suggested problem provides no reason to doubt the complainant’s evidence.
80. [80]
    Similarly, the suggested inconsistency between the evidence of the complainant and her mother as to whether her mother was present in the hotel in Cairns at the time that the appellant is said to have propositioned the complainant goes nowhere.  It was not an issue which was squarely addressed in the evidence of the complainant or of her mother.  For example, it was never suggested to the complainant that her mother was also in Cairns.  It was never suggested to the complainant’s mother that there were no occasions when the complainant and the appellant were alone in the hotel together.  This suggested problem provides no reason to doubt the complainant’s evidence.
81. [81]
    Whilst the complainant might well have had an opportunity to live with her father in Victoria, and while she might well have initiated what appears to be friendly personal contact with the appellant, these matters represent no impediment to an acceptance of the complainant’s evidence.
82. [82]
    As is now well-recognised, there is no standard way in which a victim of predatory child sexual abuse should react to the perpetrator of that abuse.  This Court ought be careful to avoid preconceptions about the way in which those affected by abuse should or may react to it.  The reaction of a victim to the perpetrator necessarily and invariably depends on the evidence at trial concerning the facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, what the evidence reveals about the personalities of those involved.  As the complainant described it, after the incidents of abuse affecting her, life returned to normal.
83. [83]
    Whilst the matters raised by the cross-examiner with the complainant were appropriately raised, it was a matter for the jury to consider and evaluate the complainant’s response to each of them.  The complainant’s evidence was not damaged or undermined by the cross-examination on these matters and the jury could reasonably have viewed the complainant as both credible and reliable notwithstanding what was suggested.
84. [84]
    As may be obvious from the jury’s verdict, the appellant’s apparent response to the confrontation with the complainant’s mother was not thought to represent any impediment to a finding of guilt.
85. [85]
    The jury might well have reasoned that there may have been many reasons why the perpetrator of the sexual abuse of a child would react in the way she described, including with upset disbelief.  The jury might well have reasoned that the appellant reacted in the way described because he had long ceased to think that the complainant would ever reveal his offending to anyone.

Viewing the suggested issues and problems as a whole

86. [86]
    When these various suggested issues and problems are viewed as a whole, having regard to the whole of the trial record, it remains the position that the jury was entitled to accept the complainant’s account of events, as well as her explanations concerning the suggested inconsistencies.
87. [87]
    A reading of the transcript with the benefit of the appellant’s submissions does not demonstrate any basis for this Court to entertain reasonable doubt, still less any reason to consider that the jury must have entertained reasonable doubt, about the appellant’s guilt.  None of the matters raised, whether individually or collectively, represent an insuperable obstacle to proof of the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
88. [88]
    These were factual issues which were matters for determination by the jury as the arbiter of fact in this trial.  This was a case where hearing the complainant’s evidence, and seeing the way she gave her evidence and explained suggested inconsistencies under cross-examination, is likely to have performed an important part of the fact-finding undertaken by the jury when evaluating both the credibility and the reliability of the complainant in this case.

Conclusion

89. [89]
    In these circumstances, the appellant has failed to establish that the jury’s verdicts are unreasonable.
90. [90]
    The appeal should be dismissed.