Xtreme Caravans Pty Ltd v Li[2024] QCA 150

[2024] QCA 150

COURT OF APPEAL

BOND JA

DALTON JA

BROWN JA

Appeal No 6303 of 2024

DC No 969 of 2024

XTREME CARAVANS PTY LTDApplicant

ACN 102 549 324

v

JUNMING LIRespondent

BRISBANE

WEDNESDAY, 21 AUGUST 2024

JUDGMENT

BOND JA:  The present applicant (Xtreme) had assembled a caravan for the present respondent (Mr Li).  They were in dispute over competing claims concerning relatively small amounts of alleged debt owed in connection with that and a related transaction, and as to whether Xtreme should return possession of the caravan to Mr Li in advance of the final resolution of those claims.

Mr Li filed an originating application in the District Court, which sought orders, the effect of which would be that he would pay $17,734.20 into Court by way of undertaking as to damages, Xtreme would be required to return the caravan to Mr Li and the debt dispute would be transferred to the Magistrates Court for final resolution together with pleadings.

Ultimately, at the hearing of the originating application on 26 April 2024, it was common ground between the parties that the dispute between them should be resolved by the application of orthodox principles concerning interlocutory injunctions.  Xtreme’s legal representative conceded that Mr Li had established that there was a serious question to be tried, and that the caravan should be returned.  The only issues pressed by Xtreme in opposition to the orders sought were that:

1. (a)
   Mr Li should be required to offer the usual undertaking as to damages in addition to paying moneys into Court; and
2. (b)
   the amount paid in should be $22,000 and not $17,734.20.

I observe parenthetically that there was no material dealing with Mr Li’s financial position, which suggested that he would be unable to pay any amounts that might be adjudicated against him in the Magistrates Court.

In oral argument, the primary Judge intimated firmly her acceptance of the first proposition, that is subparagraph (a) above, and her rejection of the second proposition, that is subparagraph (b) above.  The intimation was not resisted by Xtreme’s legal representative, nor did he seek reasons for the rejection of his submission.

Thus, upon Mr Li giving the usual undertaking as to damages, the primary Judge ordered Mr Li to pay $17,734.20 into the Magistrates Court at Brisbane by way of an undertaking as to damages under r 264 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) and ordered Xtreme to release Mr Li’s caravan to him once that had occurred.  Her Honour made other orders and directions, the effect of which was that the proceeding would be transferred to the Magistrates Court where pleadings would be required.

Since then, Mr Li has paid the $17,734.20 into Court and Xtreme has returned possession of the caravan.  Xtreme is happy to engage with Mr Li in the Magistrates Court concerning the competing debt claims, but now contends that it is dissatisfied with having had to return the caravan and with the amount of the security which Mr Li was required to pay.  It says that this Court should set aside the relevant parts of the orders made by the primary Judge, and then order Mr Li not to dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of the caravan until the earlier of either trial, or Mr Li increasing the amount paid into Court by the order of $1,050.69 ($898.23 for interest from the date of the invoice which had claimed $17,734.20 up to and including 19 June 2024 plus interest accruing at $2.42 per day thereafter which to today’s date amounts to $152.46, calculated at 63 days x $2.42).

Xtreme needs leave to appeal pursuant to section 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) because the interlocutory orders, of which Xtreme is dissatisfied, relate to property that has a value less than the Magistrates Court jurisdictional limit.

In order to obtain leave, it is necessary but not sufficient that Xtreme persuade this Court that there is an error to be corrected, which if corrected, will justify the order which Xtreme seeks in this Court.  But Xtreme would also need to demonstrate some additional reason for this Court to exercise its discretion in Xtreme’s favour.  Whilst there is no hard and fast rule as to what that reason might be, this Court has previously stated that tests which provide useful guidance as to the nature of the requisite additional consideration include that leave is necessary to correct a substantial injustice, that the proposed appeal raises an important point of law or principle and that the proposed appeal raises a question of general or public importance: see Robertson v Robertson [2024] QCA 92 at [23] and the cases there cited.

On the question of leave, counsel for Xtreme submitted to this Court that he had advanced a reasonable argument of error and that it was one which should be regarded as important.  He drew this Court’s attention to cases which suggest that in an analogous fact situations, the party in Xtreme’s position should not be required to release the chattel unless the full amount of the moneys which the party in Xtreme’s position contended was secured – by the possession of the chattel – together with interest, was secured.  It may be observed that the way in which he framed this argument was not advanced below and the cases on which he relies were not drawn to the primary judge’s attention.

By this application, Xtreme seeks to increase the amount of security for Magistrates Court proceeding by only a little over $1,000.  It seeks to persuade this Court that there is an error by the primary Judge to be corrected by advancing legal arguments not advanced before the primary Judge and complaining about lack of reasons.  That there is a reasonable argument for an error to be corrected may be accepted.  However, it is difficult to see how Xtreme’s decision to advance this application is consistent with its obligations under UCPR r 5.  Given the way in which Xtreme was content to frame the case before the primary Judge, there is no good reason why this Court should intervene in the orders which were made.  No substantial injustice was established.

In my view, leave to appeal should be refused and Xtreme should be required to pay the cost of the application.

DALTON JA:  I agree with Justice Bond.  An additional point was raised at the oral hearing of this appeal that no reasons were given by the Judge below (except in relation to costs).  There is no doubt that the Court below ought to have given reasons.  It is not necessary to run an appeal in this Court to establish that proposition.  That this is an additional reason why the appeal proposed might succeed adds nothing to the failure of the applicant to demonstrate a point of public importance or a substantial injustice.

BROWN JA:  I agree with both Justice Bond and Justice Dalton.

BOND JA:  I agree with Justice Dalton’s additional remarks.

BOND JA:  The order of the Court is:

1. 1.Leave to appeal refused.
2. 2.The applicant must pay the respondent’s cost of the application.

Adjourn the Court.