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Wood v Registrar for the Supreme Court[2024] QCA 196

Wood v Registrar for the Supreme Court[2024] QCA 196

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Wood v The Registrar for the Supreme Court of Queensland [2024] QCA 196

PARTIES:

IAN ANDREW WOOD

(appellant)

v

THE REGISTRAR FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 8578 of 2024

SC No 15710 of 2023

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2024] QSC 116 (Martin SJA)

DELIVERED ON:

18 October 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

26 August 2024

JUDGES:

Mullins P and Flanagan JA and Kelly J

ORDERS:

  1. 1.
    The appeal against the order made by Martin SJA on 6 June 2024, which found the appellant guilty of contempt in the face of the court, is dismissed.
  1. 2.
    The appeal against the orders made by Martin SJA on 2 July 2024, punishing the appellant for contempt, is allowed but only to the extent of varying the orders as follows:
  1. a.
    Add to order 1, “to be suspended after serving 23 days’ imprisonment, for an operational period of two years on the condition that Ian Andrew Wood be of good behaviour for the duration of the operational period.  If Mr Wood fails to comply with that condition then he may be brought back to court, and the court may cancel the order of suspension imposed.  Mr Wood would then have to serve the balance of the sentence or such lesser term of imprisonment fixed by the court”.
  1. b.
    Substitute 23 days’ for two months in order 2.
  1. c.
    Order 4 is deleted.
  1. 3.
    Pursuant to s 159A of the Penalties and Sentences Act, it is declared that the 23 days served between 4 July 2024 to 26 July 2024 is taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentences.
  1. 4.
    The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

COURTS AND JUDGES – CONTEMPT – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – CONTEMPT IN FACE OF COURT – where the appellant was found guilty of committing contempt in the face of the court on 26 July 2023 and 2 August 2023 – where the appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that he had committed the alleged contempts – where the appellant contends that his conduct constituted honest criticism directed at a public purpose and did not interfere with the administration of justice – where the appellant had not put forward any evidence to discharge his evidentiary onus to raise the defence of truth, so as to trigger any requirement on the part of the respondent to disprove the appellant’s accusation – whether the primary judge erred in finding the appellant guilty of contempt

CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING PROCEDURE – CONCURRENT, CUMULATIVE AND ADDITIONAL SENTENCES – SENTENCES ON TWO OR MORE COUNTS – GENERALLY – where the appellant was found guilty of committing contempt in the face of the court on 26 July 2023 and 2 August 2023 – where the appellant was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment for the contempt on 26 July 2023, which was suspended for an operational period of two years – where the appellant was sentenced to two months’ actual imprisonment for the contempt on 2 August 2023 – where the primary judge ordered that the two sentences were to be served concurrently – whether the structure of the sentence, whereby the two months of actual custody was made concurrent with a wholly suspended sentence of four months, rendered it manifestly excessive

COURTS AND JUDGES – CONTEMPT – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – CONTEMPT IN FACE OF COURT – where the appellant was found guilty of committing contempt in the face of the court on 26 July 2023 and 2 August 2023 – where, on appeal, this Court found that the sentencing orders imposed in respect of those offences were manifestly excessive, such that the Court’s jurisdiction to re-exercise the sentencing discretion was engaged – where a change of the appellant’s circumstances had occurred following the imposition of the sentencing orders by the primary judge, in that during the initial appeal hearing, this Court had ordered a stay of the execution of the sentencing orders – where the stay of execution was necessary because, through no fault of his own, the appellant had not been provided with the appeal record books prior to the appeal hearing, such that he could not prepare for it – where the stay of execution resulted in the appellant being released into the community prior to the subsequent appeal hearing, with a substantial amount of time left to serve on his sentence – where, during the course of the subsequent appeal hearing, the appellant made an informal application for discharge of the remainder of his sentence – whether, having regard to the nature and purpose of the contempt jurisdiction, this Court should give weight to the appellant’s discharge application in re-sentencing him

Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), s 15, s 18, s 22, s 38, s 39

Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 92

Penalties and Sentences Act (Qld), s 144, s 145, s 146, s 147, s 148, s 155

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 926(4)

Attorney-General for New South Wales v Mundey [1972] 2 NSWLR 887, considered

Attorney General for State of Queensland v Colin Lovitt QC [2003] QSC 279, distinguished

Attorney General (Qld) v Mathews [2020] QSC 258, distinguished

Attorney-General (Vic) v Rich (1998) 102 A Crim R 389; [1998] VSC 41, considered

Attorney-General (Vic) v Rich [1998] VSC 45, considered

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chaste Corporation (No 7) (2015) 235 FCR 563; [2015] FCA 1103, cited

CJ v Flintshire Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ 393, considered

Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343; [2001] HCA 46, considered

Dubois v Rockhampton Regional Council (2014) 203 LGERA 117; [2014] QCA 215, cited

Ex parte Maher [1986] 1 Qd R 303, cited

Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238; [1983] HCA 2, considered

George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; [1990] HCA 26, applied

Gordon v Whybrow [1998] QCA 52, considered

Leicester City Council v Bamkin [2008] EWCA Civ 1216, considered

Parrington v The Queen [2004] SASC 342, applied

QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 419; [2023] HCA 15, applied

R v Butters; Fitzgerald (1971) 55 Cr. App. R. 515, cited

R v Dunbabin; Ex Parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 434; [1935] HCA 34, considered

R v Giordano (1982) 31 SASR 241, considered

R v Sapiano (1968) 52 Cr. App. R. 674, considered

R v Slaveski [2011] VSC 643, considered

R v Slaveski [2012] VSC 7, considered

R v Wood [2023] QCA 153, cited

Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland v Wood [2024] QSC 21, considered

The Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland v Wood (No 4) [2024] QSC 135, considered

Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 6) (2017) 356 ALR 238; [2017] FCA 1573, cited

Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) (1982) 31 SASR 116; [1982] SASC 6369, considered

Young v Registrar, Court of Appeal (No 3) (1993) 32 NSWLR 262, considered

COUNSEL:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf

M D Nicolson for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf

G R Cooper, Crown Solicitor, for the respondent

  1. [1]
    THE COURT:  On 6 June 2024, Martin SJA found the appellant guilty of contempt in the face of the court.[1]  The contempts were committed before Burns J on 26 July 2023 and 2 August 2023.  On 2 July 2024, Martin SJA made the following orders:[2]
  1. “1.
    For the contempts on 26 July 2023 the respondent is committed to prison for four months.
  1. 2.
    For the contempt on 2 August 2023 the respondent is committed to prison for two months.
  1. 3.
    The sentences are to be served concurrently.
  1. 4.
    The sentence of four months be suspended today for an operational period of two years on condition that the respondent be of good behaviour for the duration of the operational period.  If the respondent fails to comply with that condition then he may be brought back to court, and the court may cancel the order of suspension imposed.  The respondent would then have to serve the sentence or such lesser term of imprisonment fixed by the court.”

The effect of these orders is that the appellant is required to serve two months in actual custody.

  1. [2]
    On the same day, 2 July 2024, the appellant filed a notice of appeal against the order made on 6 June 2024 as well as an application for a stay of execution of the orders made on 2 July 2024.  The stay application came before Boddice JA on 4 July 2024.  The application was refused, primarily because any concern that the appellant may serve a substantial period of the two months’ term of imprisonment prior to the appeal being determined, could be overcome by an expedited hearing.
  2. [3]
    The appeal came on for hearing on 26 July 2024 before Bond JA, Wilson and Hindman JJ.  By this time, the appellant had already served 23 days of the two months’ term of imprisonment.  The appeal could not proceed on 26 July 2024 because, through no fault of the appellant, he had not received the appeal record and had been unable to prepare written submissions.  It was accepted by the respondent that, in those circumstances, it would be unfair to proceed with the hearing of the appeal.  The Court granted an adjournment of the appeal and a stay of orders 1 to 4 made on 2 July 2024 until 10.15 am, 26 August 2024.  The appellant was released from custody and has remained in the community since that adjournment.
  3. [4]
    The appeal was heard on 26 August 2024.  At the commencement of the hearing, the Court ordered that further execution of orders 1 to 4 made on 2 July 2024 be stayed until 10.00 am on the date notified to the parties by email by the Court of Appeal Registry as the date for the delivery of judgment in this appeal or earlier order.  Further, the appellant was directed to appear in person at the date and time notified for judgment delivery.
  4. [5]
    The appellant made an application for Flanagan JA to recuse himself.  This application was heard in accordance with the procedure identified in the decision of the High Court in QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.[3]  Flanagan JA refused the application.
  5. [6]
    When the Court resumed, the appellant made two further applications.  First, for Kelly J to recuse himself and, secondly, for Flanagan JA to be referred to the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) under ss 15, 18, 22, 38 and 39 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) (CCC Act).  The application, as identified by the appellant, was that “all of you … refer him to the CCC under suspected corruption”.[4]
  6. [7]
    Kelly J refused the recusal application.  When the Court resumed, the appellant applied to have Kelly J also referred to the CCC.  As discussed below at [98] to [102], the applications to have Flanagan JA and Kelly J referred to the CCC are misconceived.

The grounds of appeal

  1. [8]
    The appellant appeals against both the order made on 6 June 2024 and the orders made on 2 July 2024.  By his amended notice of appeal filed on 9 August 2024, he seeks orders that the orders of Martin SJA be set aside, as well as an order that “the matter including all evidence and transcripts be referred to the CCC for investigation”.
  2. [9]
    The appellant identifies six grounds of appeal in his amended notice of appeal.  At the commencement of the hearing, the President summarised these six grounds of appeal into the following five grounds, with which the appellant agreed:
  1. Lack of probative evidence to support the charges.
  2. The (appellant’s) conduct was honest criticism directed at a public purpose and did not interfere with the administration of justice.
  3. There was insufficient time for the appellant to prepare for the hearing of the application.
  4. Martin SJA did not give sufficient weight to the evidence relied on by the appellant to justify his allegations of corruption.
  5. The sentence is manifestly excessive.[5]

The Reasons

  1. [10]
    Martin SJA commenced by identifying the civil proceedings (before Burns J) in which the contempts were committed.  The appellant had filed a claim against Sibley Lawyers seeking damages in the amount of $11,000,000.00 for “Pure Mental Harm” and $500,000.00 for “Financial Loss”.  He had also filed a claim against Quinn & Scattini Solicitors seeking $16,000,000.00 for “Pure Mental Harm” and $500,000.00 for “Financial Loss”.  The defendants in each proceeding applied for an order striking out the claim.  The appellant applied to amend the claim and statement of claim to remove the claim for pure mental harm and replace it with claims for professional negligence and aggravated damages.
  2. [11]
    Martin SJA set out each of the particulars of contempt:[6]
  1. “[8]
    After the hearing commenced there was an objection by Mr Wood to Burns J hearing the application to strike out before hearing his application to amend. It was the position of those seeking an order striking out the claims that the amendments sought made no difference to their application. There was then some discussion about whether documents had been filed and whether those documents were in court. During a discussion between Burns J and Ms Gamble (appearing for each of the defendants), Mr Wood interrupted and the following exchange occurred:

‘MS GAMBLE: It should’ve been filed with his application, as far as I understand.

HIS HONOUR: So it’ll be in July.

PLAINTIFF: They weren’t filed because they haven’t been approved.

HIS HONOUR: Just be quiet.

PLAINTIFF: The amendments ---

HIS HONOUR: Just be quiet.

PLAINTIFF: ---haven’t been approved, so they’re not filed.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Wood.

PLAINTIFF: They’re on there for you to view.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Wood. Be quiet.

PLAINTIFF: I’m just astounded that the Supreme Court is so incompetent.’

  1. [9]
    The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the first of the particulars of contempt.
  1. [10]
    His Honour then started to make directions for the further hearing of the matter in order that all documents could be before him in the following week. There was some discussion about whether there was a proposed amended statement of claim available and the following exchange took place:

‘HIS HONOUR: I’ll set both applications down for hearing for one hour on Friday 4 August.

PLAINTIFF: Just completely unnecessary. A complete waste of the court’s time; because a High Court matter precludes their application from being heard, and it means you have to approve mine. So we could’ve just dealt with it, and it could be done by now.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Well, you could put ---

PLAINTIFF: But you want to be difficult.

HIS HONOUR: Just sit ---

PLAINTIFF: Because you’re obviously worried about ---

HIS HONOUR: Just sit down.

PLAINTIFF: --- going to prison.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Wood.

MS GAMBLE: I’m so sorry, your Honour. My instructing solicitor’s just informed me he’s out of the country on Friday.

HIS HONOUR: Well, you’ll have to get someone else to instruct you.

PLAINTIFF: I hope these people are worth spending the rest of your life in prison.’

  1. [11]
    The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the second of the particulars of contempt.
  1. [12]
    That was followed by this exchange:

‘HIS HONOUR: What did you say?

PLAINTIFF: I said, I hope these people are worth spending the rest of your life in prison, because that’s where you’re going under section 120 of the Criminal Code, “judicial corruption”; the benefit being to these people and you not hearing this application today. I’m – I have no doubt there have been a big discussion behind the scenes about you doing exactly what you’re doing. So you’re not actually acting impartially; you’re not acting fairly, and you’re not acting in an unwise [sic] matter. So enjoy prison.’

  1. [13]
    The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the third of the particulars of contempt.
  1. [14]
    His Honour then told Mr Wood that he would give him an opportunity to show cause why he shouldn’t be dealt with for contempt in the face of the court.
  1. [15]
    During discussions about that matter, Mr Wood told his Honour that he would file a ‘two and a half thousand-page affidavit proving that the court is corrupt, and I will take it to the High Court if necessary, and you will all be disrobed.’
  1. [16]
    The following exchange then took place:

‘HIS HONOUR: Fair enough. I will give you until Wednesday 10 am to show cause why I shouldn’t deal with you for contempt, and ---

PLAINTIFF: I file that as an affidavit, do I, your Honour?

HIS HONOUR: No. Just listen to me, please. What I’m wanting to do is give you an opportunity to withdraw the remarks you’ve made in court today. Now ---

PLAINTIFF: I’m – I have stated ---

HIS HONOUR: I suspect ---

PLAINTIFF: The court is corrupt.

HIS HONOUR: I suspect you ---

PLAINTIFF: The court is corrupt. I’m not withdrawing those statements, because they are factual and truthful.

HIS HONOUR: All right. You are to appear before me at 10 am next Wednesday.

PLAINTIFF: What was the date for the other hearing, your Honour?

HIS HONOUR: The other hearing will be the following Friday. Ms Gamble, it may not be appropriate for me to hear it, but I’ll see what happens on Wednesday.

MS GAMBLE: Thank you, your Honour.

PLAINTIFF: So do I file my two and a-half page affidavit before Wednesday, or do you just want it on the day?

HIS HONOUR: I’m giving you the opportunity to ---

PLAINTIFF: And I said, it’s a two and a-half – it’s already done up.

HIS HONOUR: I’m giving you an opportunity to withdraw your remarks, and if ---

PLAINTIFF: The court is corrupt.’

  1. [17]
    The statements by Mr Wood in bold constitute the fourth of the particulars of contempt identified in the applicant’s written submissions.
  1. [18]
    His Honour then went on to say that he would give Mr Wood an opportunity to withdraw his remarks and, if that did not occur, then it was likely that he would formulate a charge and that Mr Wood would be given time to respond to that charge.
  1. [19]
    Mr Wood replied as follows:

‘You do that, and when you falsely charge me, I’ll turn around and sue you because you haven’t acted in good faith.’

  1. [20]
    The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the fifth of the particulars of contempt.
  1. [21]
    Soon after that Mr Wood said:

‘I’ll sue you personally. Yeah, false imprisonment; false arrest; false accusation. You’ll go to prison for the rest of your life.’

  1. [22]
    The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the sixth of the particulars of contempt.
  1. Particulars of contempt – 2 August 2023
  1. [23]
    On 2 August 2023, the matter was called on before Burns J and the following exchange took place:

‘HIS HONOUR: The purpose of the hearing today is to give you an opportunity to withdraw your comments from the 26th of July.

APPLICANT: Actually, your Honour, I’m going to give you the opportunity to apologise to me for abusing your power as a Supreme Court judge, which is a crime under sections 92 and 92A of the Criminal Code. Now, as I’m sure you’re aware, the Court of Appeal handed down a decision on Friday last week which prevents you from holding me in contempt because you haven’t complied with the rules. So I’m going to expect an apology ---

HIS HONOUR: So is that a no?

APPLICANT: Yes, your Honour.’

  1. [24]
    The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the particular of contempt on 2 August 2023.”
  1. (citation omitted; emphasis in original)
  1. [12]
    After dealing with the nature of the originating application, which was brought pursuant to Chapter 20, Part 7, Division 3 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (UCPR), his Honour noted that contempt in the face of the Court is a form of criminal contempt.  Although it is a matter in the civil jurisdiction of the Court, the criminal standard of proof applies.  His Honour identified that he had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the elements which constitute a contempt of court.[7]
  2. [13]
    His Honour then dealt with the issue of whether the Registrar had proved that the appellant said what was alleged.  In this respect, his Honour referred to his previous decision in the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland v Wood [2024] QSC 21 (Admissibility Reasons), in which his Honour ruled that the affidavit of the Registrar was admissible for the purposes of proving that the appellant had made the statements alleged in the originating application.  This evidence consisted of the audio recordings of the proceedings before Burns J and the transcript of those proceedings based upon those audio recordings.  The appellant had applied to have all of the evidence of the Registrar “struck out along with any testimony that she has given in relation to that evidence based on section 92 of the 1977 Queensland Evidence Act”.  The appellant had objected to the evidence in the Registrar’s affidavit being received on the basis that s 92 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) had not been satisfied because the Registrar did not have personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in her affidavit.
  3. [14]
    His Honour refused the application primarily on the basis that s 92 was not relevant.  As explained by Martin SJA, the purpose of the Registrar exhibiting the transcripts and the audio recordings was not to prove that what was said and recorded was true, but merely that it was said.  While s 92 is a statutory exception to the hearsay rule, this rule has always permitted evidence of this kind because it is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.[8]
  4. [15]
    At Reasons [31], Martin SJA also noted that the appellant in cross-examination had agreed that the transcripts annexed to the Registrar’s affidavit contained the relevant statements.  The appellant did not challenge the accuracy of the transcripts.
  5. [16]
    His Honour considered the nature of the alleged contempt,[9] noting that in order to establish a contempt in the face of the court, an applicant must show that the impugned conduct interferes with – or tends to interfere with – the administration of justice.[10]  His Honour expressly recognised that the purpose of contempt proceedings is not to protect the judges of the court from fair, even trenchant, criticism.[11]
  6. [17]
    Martin SJA was satisfied that each of the appellant’s statements comprising the particulars of contempt in the originating application interfered with or tended to interfere with the administration of justice.[12]
  7. [18]
    His Honour observed:

“Mr Woods’ behaviour was not spontaneous.  On 26 July it was deliberate and repetitive, for example, the reference to sections of the Criminal Code and the statement made three times that ‘The court is corrupt’.  On 2 August, his answer had the hallmarks of a prepared statement with a further reference to the Criminal Code.”[13]

His Honour was therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the words set out in the originating application constituted contempt in the face of the court.

  1. [19]
    His Honour then considered whether the appellant had established any evidentiary basis so as to trigger a defence of truth.  After considering the relevant authorities and the appellant’s evidence, his Honour concluded:

“I can find nothing which supports or even hints at support for [Mr Wood’s] assertion of corruption.  Likewise there was nothing to suggest incompetence or breach of duty.  In these matters Mr Wood takes the view that if a judicial officer rejects his arguments, then that judicial officer is corrupt.  The fact that the Court of Appeal upheld a decision which was against him was simply further evidence, in his eyes, of corruption.”[14]

Penalty Reasons

  1. [20]
    Martin SJA first considered the relevant principles concerning punishment for contempt.  His Honour noted that the underlying rationale for every exercise of the contempt power is the necessity to uphold and protect the effective administration of justice.[15]  After referring to rr 930 and 931 of the UCPR, which deal with punishment and imprisonment for contempt, his Honour noted that these rules operate to increase the range of penalties available.  His Honour observed that these rules:

“… do not work to apply the conditions which regulate the making of orders under the Penalties and Sentences Act … in circumstances unrelated to the punishment of contempt.”[16]

  1. [21]
    His Honour noted, however, that the provisions of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (PSA) can provide guidance about the matters which may be taken into account when imposing a penalty for contempt in the face of the court, including the seriousness of the contempt proved, whether there had been any apology or public expression of contrition, the character and antecedence of the contemnor, general and personal deterrence, any mitigating factors, and denunciation of the contempt.
  2. [22]
    In considering the seriousness of the contempts proved, his Honour observed:
  1. “[8]
    The allegations of incompetence, corruption (both of the court and the judge), and criminal conduct, together with threatening the judge with legal action were calculated challenges to the authority of the court. The respondent’s conduct on 26 July was deliberately disruptive and disrespectful. The conduct on 2 August was purposeful. Mr Wood alleged abuse of power and criminal conduct for which he said the judge should apologise.
  1. [9]
    The objective seriousness of the contempt on 26 July can be measured by reference to the words used, the number of separate instances, the nature of the allegations and threats, and the deliberation with which they were delivered.
  1. [10]
    The objective seriousness of the contempt on 2 August can be measured by reference to the nature of the allegations and threats as well as the obvious forethought which had been given to the words used.
  1. [11]
    This offending was serious. The contempts were reprehensible and intolerable.”
  1. [23]
    As to general and personal deterrence, his Honour considered that there was a significant need for deterrence to feature in the penalty, both for the appellant personally and for others who might be minded to behave similarly.[17]
  2. [24]
    His Honour noted that in another matter, reference had been made to the appellant having been diagnosed with “bipolar”.  The appellant did not, however, raise this matter in the proceedings before Martin SJA.[18]
  3. [25]
    His Honour also took into account the appellant’s conduct in the course of the application.[19]  His Honour made extensive reference to comparable cases in determining the appropriate penalty.  His Honour drew a distinction between the appellant’s conduct on 26 July 2023 and his conduct on 2 August 2023:[20]

“While Mr Wood’s behaviour on 26 July 2023 is deserving of serious punishment it is also the first finding of contempt made against him. While provisions of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 such as s 9 do not apply in these circumstances, the principles they express may be borne in mind. To that end, I have come to the conclusion that the sentences I impose should recognise that the 26 July 2023 behaviour was the first to be the subject of an application for punishment for contempt. … The conduct on 2 August 2023 was of a different character. It was separated in time and it was an opportunity for Mr Wood to apologise (or purge his contempt) but he deliberately repeated his contemptuous behaviour.”

Ground 1:  Lack of probative evidence to support the charges

  1. [26]
    By reference to r 926(4) of the UCPR and s 92 of the Evidence Act 1977, the appellant submits that the affidavit of the Registrar filed in support of the application was wrongly admitted into evidence.  Rule 926(4) relevantly provides that an affidavit in support of the application must not contain evidence which the person making it could not give if giving evidence orally.  Section 92 deals with the admissibility of documentary evidence as to facts in issue and provides:
  1. “92
    Admissibility of documentary evidence as to facts in issue
  1. (1)
    In any proceeding (not being a criminal proceeding) where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement contained in a document and tending to establish that fact shall, subject to this part, be admissible as evidence of that fact if—
  1. (a)
    the maker of the statement had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement, and is called as a witness in the proceeding; or
  1. (b)
    the document is or forms part of a record relating to any undertaking and made in the course of that undertaking from information supplied (whether directly or indirectly) by persons who had, or may reasonably be supposed to have had, personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the information they supplied, and the person who supplied the information recorded in the statement in question is called as a witness in the proceeding.
  1. (2)
    The condition in subsection (1) that the maker of the statement or the person who supplied the information, as the case may be, be called as a witness need not be satisfied where—
  1. (a)
    the maker or supplier is dead, or unfit by reason of bodily or mental condition to attend as a witness; or
  1. (b)
    the maker or supplier is out of the State and it is not reasonably practicable to secure the attendance of the maker or supplier; or
  1. (c)
    the maker or supplier can not with reasonable diligence be found or identified; or
  1. (d)
    it can not reasonably be supposed (having regard to the time which has elapsed since the maker or supplier made the statement, or supplied the information, and to all the circumstances) that the maker or supplier would have any recollection of the matters dealt with by the statement the maker made or in the information the supplier supplied; or
  1. (e)
    no party to the proceeding who would have the right to cross-examine the maker or supplier requires the maker or supplier being called as a witness; or
  1. (f)
    at any stage of the proceeding it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, undue delay or expense would be caused by calling the maker or supplier as a witness.
  1. (3)
    The court may act on hearsay evidence for the purpose of deciding any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a), (b), (c), (d) or (f).
  1. (4)
    For the purposes of this part, a statement contained in a document is made by a person if—
  1. (a)
    it was written, made, dictated or otherwise produced by the person; or
  1. (b)
    it was recorded with the person’s knowledge; or
  1. (c)
    it was recorded in the course of and ancillary to a proceeding; or
  1. (d)
    it was recognised by the person as the person’s statement by signing, initialling or otherwise in writing.”
  1. [27]
    The Registrar’s affidavit exhibited the transcripts of the proceedings on 26 July 2023 and 2 August 2023, as well as two USB drives containing the audio recordings of those proceedings.  The admissibility of the Registrar’s affidavit was considered by Martin SJA in the Admissibility Reasons.  The appellant submits that as the Registrar did not have personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the affidavit, it should not have been admitted into evidence.  Martin SJA rejected this submission, observing:

“The purpose of exhibiting the transcript and the audio recordings is not to prove that what was said and recorded was true, but merely that it was said.  Section 92 is a statutory exception to the hearsay rule.  But, the hearsay rule has always permitted evidence of this kind because it is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.  That is what the applicant seeks to do by her affidavit.”

  1. [28]
    His Honour also made reference to s 95 of the Evidence Act and s 10 of the Recording of Evidence Act 1962 (Qld) and concluded that the two audio recordings “are evidence of what was recorded on those particular days”.[21]
  2. [29]
    The appellant submits, however, that because neither the recordings nor transcripts may be used to prove the truth of what was said, this precludes a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  This submission cannot be accepted.  The evidence of the recordings and transcripts of the recordings were admissible through the Registrar for the purposes of establishing that the words, the subject of the contempts, were spoken by the appellant before Burns J.  As noted at [15] above, the appellant accepted in cross-examination that the transcripts contained the statements made by him before Burns J.
  3. [30]
    The Registrar’s affidavit was properly admitted into evidence by Martin SJA.

Ground 2:  The conduct was honest criticism directed at a public purpose and did not interfere with the administration of justice

  1. [31]
    The essence of the appellant’s submission in relation to this ground is that Martin SJA erred by failing to find that the statements made by the appellant before Burns J were not contemptuous, but rather constituted honest criticism based on rational grounds directed to a public purpose.  The appellant asserts that in committing this error, his Honour failed to apply the relevant principles identified by the High Court in R v Dunbabin; Ex Parte Williams[22] and Gallagher v Durack.[23]
  2. [32]
    In Dunbabin, Rich J (with whom Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ agreed), in referring to the Court’s jurisdiction to punish for contempt, stated:[24]

“The jurisdiction is not given for the purpose of protecting the Judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals. It is not given for the purpose of restricting honest criticism based on rational grounds of the manner in which the Court performs its functions. The law permits in respect of Courts, as of other institutions, the fullest discussions of their doings so long as that discussion is fairly conducted and is honestly directed to some definite public purpose. The jurisdiction exists in order that the authority of the law as administered in the Courts may be established and maintained.”

  1. [33]
    To similar effect are the observations of Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Brennan JJ in Gallagher v Durack:[25]

“The law endeavours to reconcile two principles, each of which is of cardinal importance, but which, in some circumstances, appear to come in conflict. One principle is that speech should be free, so that everyone has the right to comment in good faith on matters of public importance, including the administration of justice, even if the comment is outspoken, mistaken or wrong-headed. The other principle is that ‘it is necessary for the purpose of maintaining public confidence in the administration of law that there shall be some certain and immediate method of repressing imputations upon Courts of justice which, if continued, are likely to impair their authority’.”

(citation omitted)

  1. [34]
    The appellant also referred to the decision of Hope JA in Attorney-General (NSW) v Mundey.[26]  The contempt committed in Mundey was constituted by statements made outside of court, after the conclusion of a criminal trial in which Mundey was convicted of malicious damage.  Hope JA observed:[27]

“… it is certainly not every such criticism that amounts to contempt, and the boundary between what is and what is not contempt involves questions of degree, and therefore uncertainty.  Some matters are clear.  Thus, it is clear that if ‘any Judge … were to make a public utterance of such character as to be likely to impair the confidence of the public, or of suitors or any class of suitors in the impartiality of the Court in any matter likely to be brought before it, any public comment on such an utterance, if it were a fair comment, would, so far from being a contempt of Court, be for the public benefit’: R. v. Nicholls[28].”

(citation in original)

  1. [35]
    The appellant further relies on the following statement of Hope JA:[29]

“The law of contempt does not punish people for ideas or views; it is the communication of those ideas in circumstances which lead, or may lead, to an interference with the administration of justice that creates the offence.  A statement made to a dozen people would normally have little effect upon the administration of justice, although the effect may depend upon who those people are.”

  1. [36]
    The appellant refers to this passage to submit that his statements before Burns J occurred in circumstances where there were few people present in the court.  The appellant’s submission fails, however, to distinguish between the present contempt – which was a contempt in the face of the court – with the contempt considered by Hope JA.
  2. [37]
    The appellant has failed to establish that Martin SJA erred by failing to have regard to the principles outlined above.  The short answer to the appellant’s submissions is that his Honour expressly had regard to these principles.  His Honour set out the relevant passages from Dunbabin and Gallagher v Durack.[30]
  3. [38]
    His Honour also referred to Contempt,[31] where the learned author stated:

“… if the impropriety alleged against the court or judge is true, the wrong is surely committed by the court or judge, not by the person who seeks to expose it.  In such circumstances, the court or judge is responsible for the diminution in public confidence and respect for the administration of justice.  In this context, it is not apparent why the defence of justification should be conditioned upon proof of a distinct requirement that the publication was for the public benefit or in the public interest.”

  1. [39]
    His Honour also made specific reference to the observations of Rich J in Dunbabin quoted at [32] above and observed:[32]

“What is obvious from all these discussions is that a statement that is fair or reasonable or honest or made in good faith will usually not be contemptuous. And it follows that, if a respondent fairly demonstrates, through some credible evidence, the truth of the statement, then that will usually require the applicant to prove beyond reasonable doubt the absence of truth and so on.”

  1. [40]
    It must therefore be accepted that Martin SJA appreciated the principles discussed in Dunbabin and Gallagher v Durack.  The real difficulty for the appellant is the objective seriousness of the nature of the allegations made by him before Burns J.  This was in circumstances where there was no evidence to support the appellant’s allegations.  This is further discussed below in relation to ground 4.

Ground 3:  There was insufficient time for the appellant to prepare for the hearing of the application

  1. [41]
    In support of this ground, the appellant refers to the decision of this Court in R v Wood,[33] where it was observed that in relation to contempt proceedings a person is entitled to be informed in writing of the precise details of the alleged contempt.  The appellant submits that he was not informed of the precise nature of the contempt in sufficient time prior to the hearing of the application.[34]
  2. [42]
    The submission cannot be accepted.  A chronology of the proceedings in set out in paragraph 3 of the Registrar’s Outline of Argument filed 23 July 2024.  The originating application, which provided the particulars of each contempt, was filed on 12 December 2023.  The appellant filed an application to set aside or strikeout the originating application on 8 February 2024.  This application was heard and dismissed by Martin SJA on 15 February 2024.  When the originating application came before his Honour on 19 February 2024, the appellant made an application to strikeout the evidence of the Registrar which resulted in the delivery of the Admissibility Reasons on 22 February 2024.  A further application to set aside stay or obtain summary judgment in relation to the originating application was filed by the appellant on 8 May 2024.  This application was heard by his Honour on 13 May 2024, and dismissed on 17 May 2024.  Thereafter, the originating application, in which the appellant gave oral evidence, was heard on 27 May 2024, with the Reasons delivered on 6 June 2024.
  3. [43]
    When one has regard to this chronology, it is apparent that this ground is without substance.

Ground 4:  Martin SJA did not give sufficient weight to the evidence relied on by the appellant to justify his allegations of corruption

  1. [44]
    As correctly observed by Martin SJA, the evidentiary onus was on the appellant to raise the defence of truth before any requirement on the part of the Registrar, to disprove the appellant’s accusations, was triggered.[35]
  2. [45]
    Martin SJA identified the evidence given by the appellant:[36]

“Mr Wood gave evidence orally and by way of affidavit.  His affidavit referred to 16 separate court appearances – two in the Magistrates Court, eleven in the District Court and three in the Supreme Court (including a Court of Appeal matter).  With respect to each of them, he identifies the date of the hearing, the judicial officer involved and alleges that the judicial officer ‘engaged in judicial corruption for the benefit of’ identified parties.  Those parties include: the Director of Public Prosecutions, the police, the State of Queensland, particular solicitors and firms of solicitors, Crown Law, and other judicial officers.  With respect to each of those allegations a transcript of either the proceeding, or the decision in the proceeding, is exhibited.”

  1. [46]
    His Honour noted that the appellant did not suggest that any of this evidence was relevant to the statements directed at Burns J personally.[37]
  2. [47]
    His Honour, having considered each of the relevant transcripts, concluded as follows:[38]

“I can find nothing which supports or even hints at support for his assertion of corruption.  Likewise there was nothing to suggest incompetence or breach of duty.  In these matters Mr Wood takes the view that if a judicial officer rejects his arguments, then that judicial officer is corrupt.  The fact that the Court of Appeal upheld a decision which was against him was simply further evidence, in his eyes, of corruption.”

His Honour further concluded that there was no evidence of corruption and that there was no rational basis for any of the inferences sought to be drawn by the appellant.[39]

  1. [48]
    The appellant has not identified any proper basis for challenging his Honour’s conclusions.  Importantly, in the course of the hearing of the appeal, it became apparent that the appellant’s allegations of “judicial corruption” only arose in the context of matters in which he was unsuccessful.  For example, he complained that both at first instance and in this Court in the matter of Wood v Robertson O'Gorman Solicitors Pty Ltd,[40] the failure of the Court (as alleged by the appellant) to properly apply the decision of the High Court in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways[41] could only be understood as evidencing judicial corruption.  No allegation of “judicial corruption” has been made by the appellant in relation to matters in which he had been successful.  The appellant’s allegations of corruption therefore appear to be based on a mistaken belief that the only possible explanation for him being unsuccessful in litigation is not the strength or otherwise of his arguments, but rather judicial corruption.  In this respect, the appellant made the following concession in the course of the appeal:

“… my friend here just made an admission that I have a misunderstanding of what judicial corruption is.  So he’s admitted that I am mistaken in my belief that the court is corrupt.  Therefore he can’t find me guilty of contempt because even the Crown admits that I misunderstand the law.  And if I have a mistaken or a wrongheaded view of the facts, [I] can’t be held guilty for contempt.”[42]

Ground 5:  The sentence is manifestly excessive

  1. [49]
    In submitting that the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive, the appellant seeks to draw a distinction between his statements made on 26 July 2023 and those made on 2 August 2023.  The statement made on 2 August 2023 is set out at [11] above by reference to [23] of the Reasons.  No part of this statement raised any allegation that Burns J was corrupt, which was one of the allegations made by the appellant on 26 July 2023.  The allegation made on 2 August 2023 concerned an abuse of power said to arise from Burns J not complying “with the rules” in dealing with the appellant for contempt.  In the statement made on 2 August, the appellant refers to a decision of this Court, which is a reference to R v Wood.[43]  In that case, the Court identified the entitlement of a person to be given precise details of an alleged contempt.  The allegation of abuse of power should therefore be understood in this context.
  2. [50]
    An examination of the Penalty Reasons shows that Martin SJA appreciated both the relevant context and the fact that the appellant did not repeat any allegation of judicial corruption on 2 August.  His Honour, however, considered that the objective seriousness of the contempt on 26 July could be measured by reference “to the words used, the number of separate instances, the nature of the allegations and threats, and the deliberation with which they were delivered”.[44]  His Honour considered that the conduct on 2 August was “purposeful”[45] and reflected “obvious forethought”.[46]  His Honour correctly observed that the conduct on 2 August alleged abuse of power and criminal conduct for which Burns J should apologise.[47]
  3. [51]
    The appellant seeks to establish that the sentence is manifestly excessive by reference to comparable cases, including Registrar of the Supreme Court v Moore-McQuillan,[48] R v Ogawa,[49] Attorney General for State of Queensland v Colin Lovitt QC,[50] and Attorney General (Qld) v Mathews.[51]
  4. [52]
    His Honour, in considering the appropriate penalty, had regard to a number of authorities, including Moore-McQuillan and Ogawa, as well as Dow v Attorney-General[52] and Attorney-General (Vic) v Rich.[53]  While the contempt in Rich was more serious than the present case, a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment was imposed.  Martin SJA also referred to R v Slaveski[54] in which the contemnor had made remarks similar to those made by the appellant.  A sentence of two months’ imprisonment was imposed, which was not disturbed on appeal.
  5. [53]
    The sentences imposed in Lovitt and Mathews do not establish that the present sentence is manifestly excessive.  In Lovitt, the relevant remarks, which were made in court, were not addressed to the magistrate but were overheard by a number of journalists present in the courtroom.  The remarks were made by senior counsel in the course of a trial.  Although Chesterman J ultimately imposed a fine of $10,000, it is evident from the judgment that his Honour gave consideration to a term of actual imprisonment:[55]

“Given the nature of the contempt and its implications for the magistrate and the Magistrates Court in general and the status of the respondent the contempt is very serious.  The parties asked  me not to determine penalty at this stage but rather to hear submissions after I publish my findings in relation to the contempt.  That course will be followed.  I indicate that given the serious nature of the contempt it is my opinion, subject to hearing the submission of counsel, that the respondent should be punished by the imposition of a very substantial fine or, perhaps, by a short term of imprisonment.”

  1. [54]
    Mathews is relevantly distinguishable on the basis that it was not a contempt in the face of the court.
  2. [55]
    While the sentence imposed cannot be considered manifestly excessive by reference to comparable cases, the structure of the sentence, whereby the two months of actual custody was made concurrent with a wholly suspended sentence of four months, potentially renders it so.  This is because a possible outcome is that prior to being dealt with for the suspended sentence of four months, the appellant may have served the whole of the sentence of actual custody of two months.  Such an outcome was considered by Lord Parker CJ in R v Sapiano:[56]

“… it is wrong because in many circumstances it just will not work. The nine months suspended might only result in imprisonment in, say, the last three months of the period of suspension, by which time the nine months, the subject of the immediate imprisonment, might well have been served.

This is clearly a wrong sentence, and in all the circumstances the Court has come to the conclusion that the better course, rather than make it a case of nine months and nine months concurrent, would be to give a suspended sentence of eighteen months on each count concurrent, but suspended for three years.”

  1. [56]
    The orders made on 2 July 2024 are set out at [1] above.  It is apparent from the structure of the sentence that Martin SJA did not intend the appellant, under any circumstances, to serve more than four months’ imprisonment.  This is reflected in his Honour wholly suspending the sentence of four months and ordering that that sentence and the sentence of two months be served concurrently.
  2. [57]
    Rule 930 of the UCPR provides that, in punishing an individual for contempt, the Court may make an order that may be made under the PSA.  Rule 930(4) also permits the Court to make an order for punishment on conditions, including the suspension of punishment during good behaviour.  The issue is whether his Honour could make an order under the PSA in which the two months’ imprisonment was made concurrent with a wholly suspended sentence of four months.
  3. [58]
    Section 155 of the PSA deals with concurrent sentences.  It provides:
  1. “155
    Imprisonment to be served concurrently unless otherwise ordered
  1. Unless otherwise provided by this Act, or the court imposing imprisonment otherwise orders, if—
  1. (a)
    an offender is serving, or has been sentenced to serve, imprisonment for an offence; and
  1. (b)
    is sentenced to serve imprisonment for another offence;
  1. the imprisonment for the other offence is to be served concurrently with the first offence.”
  1. (emphasis added)
  1. [59]
    Suspended sentences are dealt with in Part 8 of the PSA.  The main operative provisions are ss 144 and 145.
  2. [60]
    Section 144 empowers a court, where it has sentenced an offender to imprisonment for 5 years or less, to order that the whole or part of a sentence is suspended.  Section 145 deals with the effect of such an order, and provides:
  1. “145
    Effect of suspended imprisonment
  1. An offender for whom an order under section 144 is made has to serve the suspended imprisonment only if the offender is ordered to do so under section 147.”
  1. (emphasis added)
  1. [61]
    The use of the language “to serve the suspended imprisonment only if they are ordered to do so under s 147”, suggests that (at least insofar as it concerns the point at which the suspended sentence is initially imposed on the offender) an offender does not “serve” their term of imprisonment where it has been suspended.
  2. [62]
    Section 147 is the provision which allows a court to order that where an offender commits another offence during the operational period of their suspended sentence,[57] the offender may serve the whole or part of the term of imprisonment.  It provides:
  1. “147
    Power of court mentioned in s 146
  1. (1)
    A court mentioned in section 146(2), (2A), (4) or (6) that deals with the offender for the suspended imprisonment may—
  1. …
  1. (b)
    order the offender to serve the whole of the suspended imprisonment; or
  1. (c)
    order the offender to serve the part of the suspended imprisonment that the court orders.
  1. (2)
    The court must make an order under subsection (1)(b) unless it is of the opinion that it would be unjust to do so.
  1. (3)
    In deciding whether it would be unjust to order the offender to serve the whole of the suspended imprisonment the court must have regard to … [a list of various factors].”
  1. [63]
    Section 148 provides:
  1. “148
    Imprisonment to be served immediately
  1. If, under section 147(1), the court orders the offender to serve imprisonment, then, unless the court otherwise orders, the imprisonment must be served—
  1. (a)
    immediately; and
  1. (b)
    subject to the Bail Act 1980, section 33, concurrently with any other imprisonment previously imposed on the offender by that or another court.
  1. [64]
    Sections 147 and 148 support an interpretation that an offender only “serves” the whole or part of their suspended sentence when ordered to do so under s 147.  It is only when such an order is made in relation to a suspended sentence that an offender “is serving” or “has been sentenced to serve” imprisonment for an offence for the purposes of s 155.  This interpretation is consistent with the general approach of courts, which is to avoid “mixing up” an actual and suspended sentence to be served concurrently,[58] as this avoids the outcome identified by Lord Parker CJ in Sapiano.
  2. [65]
    In Gordon v Whybrow,[59] Fitzgerald P and Davies JA, in considering s 155, observed:

“As earlier noted, the applicant’s periods of imprisonment were made cumulative. An order to that effect was permissible under s. 156 of the Penalties and Sentences Act, and cumulative sentences are often imposed for separate offences committed at significantly different times. However, the general starting point, which is to be found in s. 155 of the Penalties and Sentences Act, is that sentences are to be concurrent.

For s. 155 to operate, an offender sentenced for a further offence must already be serving, or have been sentenced to serve, imprisonment for another offence. Section 148 of the Penalties and Sentences Act takes the statutory scheme a step further. Sub-section 148(b) provides that, subject to a presently irrelevant consideration, a suspended sentence of imprisonment which is ordered to be served, must unless the court otherwise orders, be served ‘concurrently with any other imprisonment previously imposed on the offender by that or another court’.

After convicting the applicant of the offence committed on 29 July 1997, the magistrate ordered her to serve the whole period of the suspended sentence of imprisonment imposed on 15 August 1996, next sentenced the applicant to imprisonment for a further three months for the offence of which she had just been convicted, i.e., that committed on 29 July 1997, then ordered that the sentences be served cumulatively. The sequence took the sentences outside the literal terms of sub-s. 148(b), but brought them within s. 155. Whichever section applied, the sentences were required to be served concurrently, unless otherwise ordered.”

  1. [66]
    In Parrington v The Queen,[60] the offender had been convicted of multiple charges, including drink driving and resisting arrest.  At first instance, a magistrate had sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment.  The offender appealed, arguing that the sentence should have been suspended.  White J considered s 38 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), which relevantly provided:
  1. “(1)
    Where a court has imposed a sentence of imprisonment upon a defendant, the court may, if it thinks that good reason exists for doing so, suspend the sentence on condition that the defendant enter into a bond —
  1. (a)
    to be of good behaviour; and
  1. (b)
    to comply with the other conditions (if any) of the bond.
  1. (2)
    A sentence of imprisonment may not be suspended under this section where the sentence is to be served cumulatively upon another term of imprisonment, or concurrently with another term then being served, or about to be served, by the defendant.
  1. (2a)
    However, if the period of imprisonment to which a defendant is liable under one or more sentences is more than three months but less than one year, the sentencing court may, by order —
  1. (a)
    direct that the defendant serve a specified period (being not less than one month) of the imprisonment in prison; and
  1. (b)
    suspend the remainder on condition that the defendant enter into a bond of a kind described in subsection (1) that will have effect on the defendant's release from prison.”
  1. [67]
    His Honour then stated:

“30 [The Crown’s counsel] submitted that s 38(2) operated to prevent the suspension of all or any of the sentences of imprisonment which the Magistrate had imposed, as each was cumulative upon the others. My initial view was that that submission was correct. It seemed to me that it would have been possible for the Magistrate to suspend the whole of the four months of imprisonment only in the event that he had invoked the use of s 18A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act. As already noted, the Magistrate did not do this.

31 However, on reflection, I do not think that that is the correct construction of s 38(2). Rather, all s 38(2) operates to preclude is suspension of a sentence which will only commence to be served at a prospective date. That is to say, s 38(2) precludes a court from determining, at the time of sentencing, that a sentence should, at some time in the future, be suspended. Thus, s 38(2) would, in the circumstances of this case, have precluded the Magistrate from ordering one term of imprisonment to be served, but suspending the other two terms which he had imposed. But where the suspension of all three sentences is contemplated, s 38(2) has no application. It has no application because, in that circumstances, there is no sentence upon which another is actually to be served cumulatively.

32 There are a number of considerations which suggest to me that that is the preferable construction. In my opinion, a key to the understanding of s 38(2) is that it uses the words ‘served’ in different places with two different meanings. The expression ‘where the sentence is to be served cumulatively’ must mean ‘where the sentence is ordered to be served cumulatively’. However, when s 38(2) refers in the penultimate and last lines to ‘another term then being served or about to be served’ it is referring to a sentence actually being served at the time of the suspension and to one which is actually to be served in the near future. In other words, s 38(2) operates when a person who is, or who will actually be, in custody receives a further sentence of imprisonment. It is the sentence which is cumulative ‘upon’ a period actually spent in custody which cannot be suspended. Where there is no such period, s 38(2) has no application. Construed in this way, s 38(2) can be read as resolving the uncertainty which had existed prior to its enactment: see R v Peterson (1978) 18 SASR 124; Dermis v Symons (1979) 22 SASR 429.

33 I therefore reject [the Crown’s counsel]'s submission as to the effect of s 38(2) in this case. It was open to the Magistrate to suspend all of the sentences which he had imposed. Section 38(2) did preclude an order that one of the sentences be served, and the others suspended. However, it was open to the Magistrate pursuant to s 38(2a) to suspend service of part of the total period of imprisonment which would be served as a result of his orders.”

(emphasis added)

  1. [68]
    White J’s observations, particularly at paragraph 32, albeit in a different statutory context, support the above construction of s 155.  The error in the structuring of the sentence permits this Court to re-exercise its inherent jurisdiction in punishing the appellant for contempt.  In re-exercising this discretion, it is also necessary to have regard to the appellant’s oral application for discharge made in the course of the hearing of the appeal.
  1. [69]
    During the course of the appeal hearing, after making submissions as to why he believed the primary judge’s sentence was manifestly excessive, the appellant stated:

“Now, should your Honours uphold the finding of guilt, I would also submit that [the] 23 days’ imprisonment that I’ve already served is sufficient. There should be no order as to costs; no financial penalty. Twenty-three days’ imprisonment is more than enough.”

  1. [70]
    The appellant’s submission that he has already served sufficient time in custody may be properly understood as an implicit oral application for discharge.  An order for discharge would ordinarily follow a formal application.  In any event, there is no need for an application for discharge to be made; it is within the inherent power of the Court to make an order for discharge of its own motion.[61]  In the circumstances, having regard to the appellant’s status as a self-represented litigant, the statement set out above constitutes an application for a discharge of the remainder of his sentence, even though he has been found guilty of contempt.
  2. [71]
    As the Court is re-exercising its inherent jurisdiction in terms of the appropriate punishment for the contempt, the Court may have regard to the appellant’s oral application for discharge in determining the appropriate sentence.
  3. [72]
    This Court has all the powers of the court at first instance in respect of contempt proceedings, including the power to order a discharge of sentence.  While the rules of the UCPR do not restrict this Court’s inherent jurisdiction in contempt proceedings,[62] r 931(2) expressly provides that where a contemnor is imprisoned for a term, the Court has the power to order that they be discharged from prison before the end of the term.
  4. [73]
    The Court’s power to order a discharge of sentence is based on considerations of clemency.[63]  It generally must be shown that there has been a change in circumstances since the sentence was initially imposed.[64]  In Young v Registrar, Court of Appeal (No 3),[65] Kirby P (as his Honour then was) identified that the exercise of the discharge power based on considerations of clemency is not unqualified.  His Honour, in refusing the contemnor’s application for discharge in that case, observed:

“… Against the background of the authorities cited, and in its context, the discharge power must be seen as normally directed to the provision of clemency to the imprisoned contemnor. It will usually be applicable only where the contemnor shows remorse. Ordinarily, some new considerations, which were not before the court which imposed the sentence, will have to be demonstrated in order to authorise the later court, of co-equal authority, to discharge the contemnor from prison short of the term originally imposed. Thus, in King v President, Councillors and Ratepayers of the Shire of Gisborne … Nathan J rejected an application for discharge before the expiry of a term of imprisonment for contempt. He found that the applicant was broken, distressed, and destitute. But that he did not demonstrate remorse or contrition, and could show no new factors warranting interference with the sentence originally imposed.

…

It was clear to me that Mr Young did not really accept the judgment of the Court. He continues, in his own mind, to believe that what he did was designed to ensure the safety of his son, and that this justified his conduct. Unfortunately for him, that belief is not consistent with the finding of the Court which convicted and sentenced him for contempt. I appreciate that there are limits to which the conscience of an individual may be pushed to accept error when the individual still believes that he is right. But if contrition and true acknowledgment of error are the primary established grounds for the exercise of the discharge power, Mr Young has not evinced the requisite emotions to enliven the exercise of that power.

Upon this footing… I do not believe that we would be warranted to order discharge.”[66]

(emphasis added)

  1. [74]
    In CJ v Flintshire Borough Council,[67] Wilson LJ set out a list of questions which a court may ask itself to guide its exercise of the discharge power:[68]
  1. “(i)
    Can the court conclude, in all the circumstances as they now are, that the contemnor has suffered punishment proportionate to his contempt?
  1. (ii)
    Would the interest of the State in upholding the rule of law be significantly prejudiced by early discharge?
  1. (iii)
    How genuine is the contemnor’s expression of contrition?
  1. (iv)
    Has he done all that he reasonably can to demonstrate a resolve and an ability not to commit a further breach if discharged early?
  1. (v)
    In particular has he done all that he reasonably can (bearing in mind the difficulties of his so doing while in prison) in order to construct for himself proposed living and other practical arrangements in the event of early discharge in such a way as to minimise the risk of his committing a further breach?
  1. (vi)
    Does he make any specific proposal to augment the protection against any further breach of those whom the order which he breached was designed to protect?
  1. (vii)
    What is the length of time which he has served in prison, including its relation to
  1. (a)
    the full term imposed upon him and
  1. (b)
    …
  1. (viii)
    Are there any special factors which impinge upon the exercise of the discretion in one way or the other?”[69]
  1. [75]
    This list is not exhaustive.[70]  Lord Justice Wilson was clear that “the success of an application for an order for early discharge does not depend on favourable answers to all the questions”.[71]  However, his Lordship held that in order to grant a discharge, the first question “probably needs an affirmative answer”, the second “will surely require a negative answer”, and that an affirmative answer to the third “will usually … be necessary but may not be sufficient”.[72]
  2. [76]
    In the present case, through a change of circumstances brought about through no fault of his own, the appellant, having served 23 days in actual custody, has remained in the community since 26 July 2024.  As observed at [3] above, the only reason the appeal could not proceed on 26 July 2024 was because, through no fault of his own, he had not received the appeal record.  The adjournment of the appeal necessitated the appellant being released from custody, as he would have served the whole of his two-month sentence before the appeal could be determined.
  3. [77]
    It has long been recognised, generally in the context of bail pending appeal, that it is undesirable that a person be returned to custody following a period in the community.  In R v Giordano,[73] King CJ, with whom Zelling and Matheson JJ agreed, observed that “[t]here are practical reasons … why courts should exercise extreme caution about the grant of bail pending appeal”, and that one such reason was that “[the Court] should not be placed in the invidious position … of the dismissal of the appeal having the effect of returning to prison a person whose circumstances may have changed greatly during a period of liberty on bail pending appeal”.  This view was endorsed by Thomas J in Ex parte Maher,[74] and endorsed by the High Court in United Mexican States v Cabal.[75]  In Doggett v The Queen,[76] when deciding to grant bail to the appellant pending his appeal to the High Court, Callinan J observed that:[77]

“Of course, bail may not always be in the interest of an applicant after conviction. His circumstances may change whilst he is on bail. A return to incarceration after an unsuccessful appeal and at a time when all or most of his actual term of imprisonment would have been served may have far worse psychological and other consequences for a prisoner than uninterrupted service of his sentence. No doubt few applicants would believe that but it is, nonetheless, likely to be so in many cases.”

  1. [78]
    A difficulty in the present appeal is that the appellant has not sought to purge his contempt or offered an apology.  He was given an opportunity to apologise before Burns J.  He refused to do so.  Nor was any sign of remorse or contrition evident before Martin SJA or during the course of the appeal.  Courts have not, ordinarily, been willing to order a discharge in circumstances where this has not occurred, even if there were extenuating circumstances.[78]
  2. [79]
    It is uncertain whether the appellant is capable of “purging” his contempt in the present case.  In CJ v Flintshire Borough Council, the Court drew attention to the difficulties attended with purging contempt where there has been breach of a prohibitory order, as opposed to a failure to comply with a mandatory order.  Lord Justice Wilson stated:

“Speaking for myself, I regard the terminology of ‘purging’ a contempt as not particularly helpful, at any rate in the present context. To purge a contempt would in my view ordinarily mean to atone for a contempt, eradicate it or cleanse it of its previous ill-effect. Although a person committed to prison for breach of a mandatory order to do an act … may reasonably be said to purge his contempt if he thereupon does the act or causes it to be done, the notion is less easily applied to an act which amounts to the breach of a prohibitory order and which, once done, cannot be undone.”

  1. [80]
    Lord Justice Sedley agreed, considering that “contrition sufficient to purge a breach of a prohibitory order is much more elusive and, many people might think, not really the business of the courts.  Their task is completed, subject to any appeal, at the moment of sentence.”
  2. [81]
    In Contempt (Federation Press, 1st ed, 2023), Professor Rolph disagreed with the Court’s reasoning in CJ v Flintshire Borough Council, stating:

“With respect, the better view is that all forms of contempt should be able to be purged. What constitutes sufficient purging will depend upon the particular circumstances of the given contempt. A contemnor should be encouraged so far as possible to comply with his or her legal obligations or to undo the consequences of his or her contempt. Adopting this approach to purging contempt would seem to further the end of promoting respect for the administration of justice.”

  1. [82]
    On the reasoning in CJ v Flintshire Borough Council, it might be thought that the appellant is not capable of “purging” his contempt in the present case because the offending conduct cannot be “undone”.  The only thing he can do on this basis is to apologise to the Court for his conduct and withdraw his remarks.  However, irrespective of whether the appellant is capable of purging his contempt by apologising to the Court (or if, as CJ v Flintshire Borough Council suggests, purging and apologising are in fact distinct concepts), it cannot be denied that the appellant’s continuing refusal to apologise to the Court is a factor which would weigh against granting the application for discharge.
  2. [83]
    The appellant’s failure to apologise is, however, only one, albeit an important factor, in considering the appropriate sentence.
  3. [84]
    The appellant’s conduct in the present case should be viewed in the prism of the object of the law of contempt: to vindicate the Court’s authority and to maintain the administration of justice.[79]
  4. [85]
    In Gallagher v Durack, while acknowledging that the “authority of the law rests on public confidence” such that it “should not be shaken by baseless attacks on the integrity or impartiality of courts or judges”, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Brennan JJ also recognised that:

“However, in many cases, the good sense of the community will be a sufficient safeguard against the scandalous disparagement of a court or judge, and the summary remedy of fine or imprisonment ‘is applied only where the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the ordered and fearless administration of justice and where the attacks are unwarrantable’.”

(citation omitted)

  1. [86]
    As observed at [48] above, the appellant conceded in the course of the appeal that he could well be mistaken as to his understanding of what constitutes “judicial corruption”.  It is apparent that the appellant suffers from a fundamental misconception that any adverse outcome in litigation is only explicable by reference to “judicial corruption”.  There is no rational explanation as to why the appellant holds this belief, which is prima facie illogical and irrational.  While there is no evidence as to the appellant’s mental state, Martin SJA did make reference to a possible underlying bipolar disorder.  The appellant’s concession, while not constituting an apology, does assist in understanding why the appellant has failed to apologise.
  2. [87]
    Having regard to the confidence expressed by the High Court in the “good sense of the community” in Gallagher v Durack, it is probable that any reasonable person who considers the appellant’s statements constituting the contempt, would recognise that such statements were baseless and misconceived.  This is not to minimise or excuse the appellant’s conduct in committing the contempt; it is, however, a fact to which this Court may have regard in determining whether it should give weight to the appellant’s discharge application when exercising its re-sentencing discretion.
  3. [88]
    The present case may be distinguished from Young v Registrar, Court of Appeal (No 3).  The contemnor’s conduct in that case was very different from that of the appellant.  It involved a wilful and defiant breach of an order permitting Mr Young limited rights of access with his child and awarding custody to the child’s mother.  In breach of that order, Mr Young abducted the child from the custody of his mother and fled to United States for several years.  The mother discovered Mr Young and the child there and brought the child back to Australia.  Upon Mr Young returning to Australia, following a complaint by the mother, he was charged with contempt.  President Kirby remarked on the nature of that offending as follows:

“[Mr Young] was found to have breached most seriously the orders of the Supreme Court. That breach defied the authority of the Court. It did so in an area where human emotions are at their strongest. Its consequence was to deprive his son and the son's mother of contact for many years. Such behaviour is intolerable in a society governed by the rule of law. Against this background, it cannot be said that the time served by Mr Young in prison is sufficient in his case to uphold the authority of the law, and that any further punishment would be futile and inhumane.”

  1. [89]
    In contrast, while it cannot be denied that the appellant’s conduct constituting the contempt was, as described by Martin SJA, “reprehensible and intolerable”, it did not have as serious an effect as Mr Young’s conduct.  Having regard to how utterly misconceived the appellant is in his views as to what constitutes “judicial corruption”, and the likelihood that a reasonable person would consider such assertions baseless, the effect on the administration of justice and the Court’s authority is somewhat lessened.
  2. [90]
    A number of cases have considered applications for discharge in circumstances analogous to the present.
  3. [91]
    In Leicester City Council v Bamkin,[80] the English Court of Appeal considered an application for discharge by a contemnor, where she been committed to prison for repeatedly breaching an injunction.  She had a recent history of alcohol abuse and appeared to have a predisposition to alcoholism.
  4. [92]
    Despite the fact that her sentence of imprisonment was not manifestly excessive, the Court made an order for discharge.  Relevantly, Lord Justice Sedley stated:

“It is clearly in the interests of everybody, Ms Bamkin, the public and the court, that if a way can be found of enabling Ms Bamkin to have her liberty without continuing to be a public nuisance, that course should be taken.

…

It is, however, like all contempt sentences, able to be remitted if the contemnor shows a genuine intention to purge the contempt. I would be surprised, speaking for myself, if, were the matters that Ms Mansfield has been able to put before us today to be proved to the judge’s satisfaction, a judge to whom application was made for discharge were not to look favourably upon that application. It is in nobody’s interests to keep Ms Bamkin in prison for any longer than is necessary and in everybody’s interests that if she can be helped to turn the corner she should be helped by the courts and by society to do so.”[81]

(emphasis added)

  1. [93]
    In Von Doussa v Owens (No 3),[82] the contemnor made two separate applications to the Court for a discharge, about one month apart.  The contemnor had refused to answer questions put to him by an inspector which he was legislatively compelled to answer; he continued to refuse even when ordered to do so by the Court.  Despite this, the Court (by majority) eventually ordered his discharge, on the basis that he had been sufficiently punished and there was no reason in punishing him further.
  2. [94]
    In the first judgment, King CJ (with Zelling and Wells JJ agreeing) refused the application for discharge, holding that:

“…The Court must do what it can to prevail upon the applicant to see the matter in a clearer light and to comply with his legal obligation. It gives no pleasure to this Court to see an otherwise law-abiding citizen confined to prison. … But it must be emphasized that the situation is entirely of the applicant's own making. His continuing defiance of the law leaves open to us only one course, however unpleasant, which in the circumstances which he has created is consistent with the court's duty to uphold the law.”[83]

  1. [95]
    In the second judgment, nearly a month later, a differently constituted court (Mitchell J, with Wells J agreeing; Zelling J dissenting) ordered by majority that the applicant’s sentence be discharged.  At this time, there had been a change of circumstances in that the inspector had lodged his interim report, which dealt with the matters that were the subject of his earlier questions.  The majority therefore held that there was no real purpose in continuing the applicant’s imprisonment, and that the time already served was sufficient punishment.
  2. [96]
    Taking the above authorities into account, this Court would ordinarily be reluctant to order a discharge of the appellant’s sentence in circumstances where he has failed to apologise.  As observed at [86] above, however, the appellant has conceded that he could well be mistaken as to his understanding as to what constitutes “judicial corruption”.
  3. [97]
    There has been a change in the appellant’s circumstances arising from the delay in the hearing of this appeal.  The appellant has been in the community since 26 July 2024.  There is no suggestion that he has failed to comply with the good behaviour bond imposed on him by Martin SJA.  In light of the appellant having already served 23 days in custody, it is appropriate to structure a sentence that does not require him to return to prison to serve any further time at present.

The second order sought in the amended notice of appeal

  1. [98]
    As already observed, the appellant seeks the following order in his amended notice of appeal:

“That the matter including all evidence and transcripts be referred to the Crime and Corruption Commission for investigation.”

While the order sought does not expressly identify the “matter”, “evidence”, or “transcripts” which should be referred to the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC), it may be assumed that these are all referable to the proceedings before Martin SJA.

  1. [99]
    The duty to notify the CCC of corrupt conduct arises under s 38 of the CCC Act, which provides:

“Duty to notify commission of corrupt conduct

  1. (1)
    This section applies if a public official reasonably suspects that a complaint, or information or matter (also a complaint), involves, or may involve, corrupt conduct.
  1. (2)
    The public official must notify the commission of the complaint, subject to section 40.”
  1. [100]
    “Public official” is defined in Schedule 2 to the CCC Act and means:
  1. “(a)
    the ombudsman; or
  1. (b)
    the chief executive officer of a unit of public administration, including the commissioner of police; or
  1. (c)
    a person who constitutes a corporate entity that is a unit of public administration; or
  1. (d)
    the inspector of detention services under the Inspector of Detention Services Act 2022.”

This definition of “public official” does not encompass a State court.  No duty, on the part of this Court, arises under s 38 of the CCC Act to refer a complaint to the CCC.

  1. [101]
    Even assuming, for present purposes, that a State court is a “public official”, the duty to notify under s 38 only arises if the public official “reasonably suspects that a complaint, or information or matter involves, or may involve, corrupt conduct.”  The use of the term “reasonably suspects” in s 38, consistent with the decision of the High Court in George v Rockett,[84] “requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person”.  The appellant has failed to establish the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce a state of mind in a reasonable person that the matter before Martin SJA involves, or may involve, corrupt conduct.
  2. [102]
    It follows that the order sought in the amended notice of appeal, as well as the orders seeking the referral of Flanagan JA and Kelly J to the CCC, should not be made.

Disposition

  1. [103]
    The following orders should be made.
  1. 1.
    The appeal against the order made by Martin SJA on 6 June 2024, which found the appellant guilty of contempt in the face of the court, is dismissed.
  1. 2.
    The appeal against the orders made by Martin SJA on 2 July 2024, punishing the appellant for contempt, is allowed but only to the extent of varying the orders as follows:
  1. a.
    Add to order 1, “to be suspended after serving 23 days’ imprisonment, for an operational period of two years on the condition that Ian Andrew Wood be of good behaviour for the duration of the operational period.  If Mr Wood fails to comply with that condition then he may be brought back to court, and the court may cancel the order of suspension imposed.  Mr Wood would then have to serve the balance of the sentence or such lesser term of imprisonment fixed by the court”.
  1. b.
    Substitute 23 days’ for two months in order 2.
  1. c.
    Order 4 is deleted.
  1. 3.
    Pursuant to s 159A of the Penalties and Sentences Act, it is declared that the 23 days served between 4 July 2024 to 26 July 2024 is taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentences.
  1. 4.
    The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Footnotes

[1] The Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland v Wood (No 3) [2024] QSC 116 (Reasons).

[2] The Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland v Wood (No 4) [2024] QSC 135 (Penalty Reasons).

[3]  (2023) 97 ALJR 419; [2023] HCA 15.

[4]  Transcript of Proceedings, 26 August 2024, 1-6, lines 3–4.

[5]  Transcript of Proceedings, 26 August 2024, 1-10, lines 11–33.

[6]  Reasons, [7]–[24].

[7]  Reasons, [27].

[8]  Admissibility Reasons, [10].

[9]  Reasons, [32]–[38].

[10]  Reasons, [33] citing Lewis v Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682 at 688.

[11]  Reasons, [36] citing R v Dunbabin; ex parte Williams (1935) CLR 434 at 442–3.

[12]  Reasons, [48].

[13]  Reasons, [49].

[14]  Reasons, [67].

[15]  Penalty Reasons, [3].

[16]  Penalty Reasons, [5], citing Dubois v Rockhampton Regional Council (2014) 203 LGERA 117 at [75]–[76].

[17]  Reasons, [17].

[18]  Penalty Reasons, [19].

[19]  Penalty Reasons, [23].

[20]  Penalty Reasons, [38]–[39].

[21]  Admissibility Reasons, [16].

[22]  (1935) 53 CLR 434.

[23]  (1983) 152 CLR 238.

[24]  (1935) 53 CLR 434, 442.

[25]  (1983) 152 CLR 238, 243.

[26]  [1972] 2 NSWLR 887.

[27]  [1972] 2 NSWLR 887, 910.

[28]  (1911) 12 CLR 280, 286.

[29]  [1972] 2 NSWLR 887, 916.

[30]  Reasons, [36]–[38].

[31]  Reasons, [58].

[32]  Reasons, [60].

[33]  [2023] QCA 153, [5].

[34]  Appellant’s Outline of Argument, paragraph 2.

[35]  Reasons, [62].

[36]  Reasons, [63].

[37]  Reasons, [64].

[38]  Reasons, [67].

[39]  Reasons, [72].

[40]  [2022] QSC 24; [2022] QCA 201.

[41]  (1964) 112 CLR 125.

[42]  Transcript of Proceedings, 26 August 2024 1-35, lines 39–44.

[43]  [2023] QCA 153.

[44]  Penalty Reasons, [9].

[45]  Penalty Reasons, [8].

[46]  Penalty Reasons, [10].

[47]  Penalty Reasons, [8].

[48]  [2007] SASC 447.

[49]  [2011] 2 Qd R 350.

[50]  [2003] QSC 279.

[51]  [2020] QSC 258.

[52]  [1980] Qd R 58.

[53]  [1998] VSC 41; [1998] VSC 45.

[54]  [2011] VSC 643; [2012] VSC 7.

[55]  [2003] QSC 279, [67].

[56]  (1968) 52 Cr. App. R. 674.

[57]  See PSA, s 146(1)–(2A).

[58] R v Butters; Fitzgerald (1971) 55 Cr. App. R. 515, 521.

[59]  [1998] QCA 52, pages 8–9.

[60]  [2004] SASC 342.

[61] In re Davies (1888) 21 QBD 236.

[62] Dubois v Rockhampton Regional Council (2014) 203 LGERA 117 at [71]–[73] (Muir JA).  It is within this Court’s inherent jurisdiction to order a discharge for contempt: see Young v Registrar, Court of Appeal (No 3) (1993) 32 NSWLR 262, 282.

[63] Young v Registrar, Court of Appeal (No 3) (1993) 32 NSWLR 262, 282.

[64] Young v Registrar, Court of Appeal (No 3) (1993) 32 NSWLR 262, 283.

[65]  (1993) 32 NSWLR 262.

[66] Young v Registrar, Court of Appeal (No 3) (1993) 32 NSWLR 262, at 282.

[67]  [2010] EWCA Civ 393.

[68]  Which has since been cited with approval in Australia: ACCC v Chaste Corporation (No 7) [2015] FCA 1103, [40].  See also Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 6) (2017) 356 ALR 238.

[69]  [2010] EWCA Civ 393, [21].

[70] ACCC v Chaste Corporation (No 7) [2015] FCA 1103, [39].

[71]  [2010] EWCA Civ 393, [22] (emphasis in original).

[72]  [2010] EWCA Civ 393, [22].

[73]  (1982) 31 SASR 241, 242.

[74]  [1986] 1 Qd R 303, 310.  See also Hanson v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) (2003) 142 A Crim R 241; [2003] QCA 409, [6].

[75]  (2001) 209 CLR 165, 181.

[76]  (2001) 208 CLR 343.

[77]  The passage quoted comes from the transcript of the bail application: Doggett v The Queen [2000] HCATrans 667, page 39, lines 1615–1621.

[78] Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) (1982) 31 SASR 116, 117–118.

[79]  See, for example: Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98, 107; Lewis v Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682, 693.

[80]  [2008] EWCA Civ 1216.

[81] Leicester City Council v Bamkin [2008] EWCA Civ 1216, [11] and [13].

[82]  (1982) 31 SASR 116, 119.

[83] Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) (1982) 31 SASR 116, 118.

[84]  (1990) 170 CLR 104, 112.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Wood v The Registrar for the Supreme Court of Queensland

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Wood v Registrar for the Supreme Court

  • MNC:

    [2024] QCA 196

  • Court:

    QCA

  • Judge(s):

    Mullins P, Flanagan JA, Kelly J

  • Date:

    18 Oct 2024

  • White Star Case:

    Yes

Litigation History

EventCitation or FileDateNotes
Primary Judgment[2024] QSC 11606 Jun 2024Orders finding respondent guilty of contempt: Martin SJA.
Primary Judgment[2024] QSC 13502 Jul 2024Orders punishing respondent for contempt: Martin SJA.
QCA Interlocutory Judgment[2024] QCA 12704 Jul 2024Application for stay refused: Boddice JA.
QCA Interlocutory JudgmentCA 8578/24 (No citation)26 Jul 2024Appeal adjourned and orders of 2 Jul 2024 stayed: Bond JA, Wilson and Hindman JJ.
Appeal Determined (QCA)[2024] QCA 19618 Oct 2024Appeal against findings of guilt dismissed; appeal against orders punishing for contempt allowed and appellant resentenced; appellant committed to prison for four months, suspended after 23 days for two years, and 23 days' imprisonment, to be served concurrently, with 23 days declared as time served: Mullins P, Flanagan JA and Kelly J.
Application for Special Leave (HCA)File Number: B64/202414 Nov 2024Application for special leave to appeal filed.
Special Leave Refused (HCA)[2025] HCADisp 1806 Mar 2025Special leave to appeal refused: Gordon and Beech-Jones JJ.

Appeal Status

Appeal Determined - Special Leave Refused (HCA)

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
ACCC v Chaste Corporation (No 7) [2015] FCA 1103
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] FCA 1103
Cite 2 - [2015] FCA 1103
Cite 3 - [2015] FCA 1103
Attorney-General (NSW) v Mundey [1972] 2 NSWLR 887
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1972] 2 NSWLR 887
Cite 2 - [1972] 2 NSWLR 887
Cite 3 - [1972] 2 NSWLR 887
Cite 4 - [1972] 2 NSWLR 887
Attorney-General (Vic) v Rich [1998] VSC 41
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1998] VSC 41
Cite 2 - [1998] VSC 41
Attorney-General (Vic) v Rich [1998] VSC 45
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1998] VSC 45
Cite 2 - [1998] VSC 45
Attorney-General (Vic) v Rich (1998) 102 A Crim R 389
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1998) 102 A Crim R 389
Attorney-General v Lovitt [2003] QSC 279
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QSC 279
Cite 2 - [2003] QSC 279
Cite 3 - [2003] QSC 279
Attorney-General v Mathews [2020] QSC 258
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QSC 258
Cite 2 - [2020] QSC 258
Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1986) 161 CLR 98
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chaste Corporation (No 7) (2015) 235 FCR 563
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2015) 235 FCR 563
CJ v Flintshire Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ 393
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] EWCA Civ 393
Cite 2 - [2010] EWCA Civ 393
Cite 3 - [2010] EWCA Civ 393
Cite 4 - [2010] EWCA Civ 393
Cite 5 - [2010] EWCA Civ 393
Dermis v Symons (1979) 22 SASR 429
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1979) 22 SASR 429
Doggett v R [2001] HCA 46
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] HCA 46
Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 208 CLR 343
Cite 2 - (2001) 208 CLR 343
Doggett v The Queen [2000] HCATrans 667
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] HCATrans 667
Dow v Attorney-General [1980] Qd R 58
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1980] Qd R 58
Dubois v Rockhampton Regional Council [2014] QCA 215
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCA 215
Dubois v Rockhampton Regional Council [2014] 203 LGERA 117
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] 203 LGERA 117
Cite 2 - [2014] 203 LGERA 117
Cite 3 - [2014] 203 LGERA 117
Ex parte Maher [1986] 1 Qd R 303
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1986] 1 Qd R 303
Cite 2 - [1986] 1 Qd R 303
Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1983) 152 CLR 238
Cite 2 - (1983) 152 CLR 238
Cite 3 - (1983) 152 CLR 238
Gallagher v Durack [1983] HCA 2
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1983] HCA 2
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1964) 112 CLR 125
George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 170 CLR 104
Cite 2 - (1990) 170 CLR 104
George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1990] HCA 26
Gordon v Whybrow [1998] QCA 52
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1998] QCA 52
Cite 2 - [1998] QCA 52
Hanson v Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] QCA 409
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QCA 409
Hanson v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) (2003) 142 A Crim R 241
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 142 A Crim R 241
High Court said in United Mexican States v Cabal (2001) 209 CLR 165
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 209 CLR 165
In re Davies (1888) 21 QBD 236
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1888) 21 QBD 236
Leicester City Council v Bamkin [2008] EWCA Civ 1216
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] EWCA Civ 1216
Cite 2 - [2008] EWCA Civ 1216
Cite 3 - [2008] EWCA Civ 1216
Lewis v Judge Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 153 CLR 682
Cite 2 - (1984) 153 CLR 682
Parrington v The Queen [2004] SASC 342
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2004] SASC 342
Cite 2 - [2004] SASC 342
QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] HCA 15
Cite 2 - [2023] HCA 15
QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 419
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2023) 97 ALJR 419
Cite 2 - (2023) 97 ALJR 419
R v Butters; Fitzgerald (1971) 55 Cr App R 515
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1971) 55 Cr App R 515
Cite 2 - (1971) 55 Cr App R 515
R v Dunbabin; Ex parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 434
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1935) 53 CLR 434
Cite 2 - (1935) 53 CLR 434
Cite 3 - (1935) 53 CLR 434
R v Dunbabin; Ex Parte Williams [1935] HCA 34
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1935] HCA 34
R v Dunbabin; ex parte Williams (1935) CLR 434
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1935) CLR 434
R v Ogawa[2011] 2 Qd R 350; [2009] QCA 307
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [2011] 2 Qd R 350
R v Peterson (1978) 18 SASR 124
1 citation
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Cite 1 - (1978) 18 SASR 124
R v Sapiano (1968) 52 Cr App R 674
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1968) 52 Cr App R 674
Cite 2 - (1968) 52 Cr App R 674
R v Slaveski [2011] VSC 643
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2011] VSC 643
Cite 2 - [2011] VSC 643
R v Slaveski [2012] VSC 7
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2012] VSC 7
Cite 2 - [2012] VSC 7
R v Wood [2023] QCA 153
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QCA 153
Cite 2 - [2023] QCA 153
Cite 3 - [2023] QCA 153
R. v Giordano (1982) 31 SASR 241
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1982) 31 SASR 241
Cite 2 - (1982) 31 SASR 241
R. v Nicholls [1911] 12 CLR 280
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1911] 12 CLR 280
Registrar of the Supreme Court of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan [2007] SASC 447
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [2007] SASC 447
Registrar of the Supreme Court v Wood [2024] QSC 21
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QSC 21
Cite 2 - [2024] QSC 21
Registrar of the Supreme Court v Wood [No 3] [2024] QSC 116
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QSC 116
Cite 2 - [2024] QSC 116
Registrar of the Supreme Court v Wood [No 4] [2024] QSC 135
2 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QSC 135
Cite 2 - [2024] QSC 135
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 6) (2017) 356 ALR 238
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (2017) 356 ALR 238
Cite 2 - (2017) 356 ALR 238
Thunder Studios Inc (California) v Kazal (No 6) [2017] FCA 1573
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [2017] FCA 1573
Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) (1982) 31 SASR 116
4 citations
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Cite 1 - (1982) 31 SASR 116
Cite 2 - (1982) 31 SASR 116
Cite 3 - (1982) 31 SASR 116
Cite 4 - (1982) 31 SASR 116
Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) [1982] SASC 6369
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [1982] SASC 6369
Wood v Robertson O'Gorman Solicitors Pty Ltd [2022] QSC 24
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QSC 24
Wood v Robertson O'Gorman Solicitors Pty Ltd [2022] QCA 201
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QCA 201
Young v Registrar, Court of Appeal (No 3) (1993) 32 NSWLR 262
6 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1993) 32 NSWLR 262
Cite 2 - (1993) 32 NSWLR 262
Cite 3 - (1993) 32 NSWLR 262
Cite 4 - (1993) 32 NSWLR 262
Cite 5 - (1993) 32 NSWLR 262
Cite 6 - (1993) 32 NSWLR 262

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
R v Edwards [2025] QCA 123 3 citations
1

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