Dupois v Queensland Police Service
[2024] QCA 230
To print this judgment please return to the case and click on the PDF icon
next to the
case name. For court use, a full PDF copy is required or preferred.
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
Please Note: You are about to print a copy of the onscreen
version of
this judgment. For court use, a full PDF copy of the judgment is required or preferred. Please
return to
the case for PDF printing options.
- Unreported Judgment
- Appeal Determined (QCA)
- Dupois v Queensland Police Service[2024] QCA 230
- Add to List
Dupois v Queensland Police Service[2024] QCA 230
Dupois v Queensland Police Service[2024] QCA 230
[2024] QCA 230
COURT OF APPEAL
BOND JA
BODDICE JA
WILSON J
Appeal No 2979 of 2024
SC No 4348 of 2023
SC No 5226 of 2023
CHARLES DUPOIS Appellant
v
QUEENSLAND POLICE First Respondent
MAGISTRATE STROFIELD Second Respondent
MAGISTRATE PREVITERA Third Respondent
BRISBANE
WEDNESDAY, 20 NOVEMBER 2024
JUDGMENT
BOND JA: The Court indicated to the parties here present that the appellant’s email of 18 November 2024, which is exhibit 1 before the Court today, would be treated as a further application for adjournment by the appellant. The application was opposed by the respondents.
The Court has had regard to the unreported judgment of Mullins P of 23 September 2024 and my unreported judgment of 28 October 2024, which dealt with previous adjournment applications by the appellant.
In the present circumstances where the appellant has advanced no evidence beyond his assertions in his email of 18 November 2024 and
- (a)the appellant had the benefit of the additional time which I gave him in the directions hearing of 17 May 2024;
- (b)the appellant agitated the issue of an adjournment before Mullins P on 23 September 2024 and again before me on 28 October 2024, obtaining about a six-week adjournment from Mullins P and failing before me; and
- (c)no challenge has been advanced to those two decisions and no new evidence provided,
I conclude that an adjournment should not be granted, and the hearing should proceed.
BODDICE JA: I agree.
WILSON J: I agree.
BOND JA: The Court orders that the informal adjournment application is refused.
…
BOND JA: Turning now to treating exhibit 1 as a recusal application addressed to me. … I will proceed to rule on the application. I treat the email, which is exhibit 1, as an informal application to me that I should recuse myself. The appellant’s email contends that Mullins P, Morrison JA and I, have a clearcut bias, “towards him”. I take it that he means “against him.”
If his case is that of actual bias, then the test is that explained recently in Karamaroudis v Queensland Police Service [2023] QCA 217 at [182]-[183]. The allegation would be a grave one. Making it good would require proof that I have, in fact, approached the issues concerning the appellant with a closed mind or have so prejudged them that I was “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented.” The appellant advances no evidence of actual bias. If his argument is founded on actual bias, I reject it.
The test for recusal for apparent bias is the well-known Ebner test, as explained by the High Court in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; and, QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 419.
The question is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the questions I am required to decide. Two steps are required. First, the identification of what it is said might lead me to decide the case other than on its legal and factual merits. Second, there must be articulated a logical connection between that matter and the feared departure from deciding the case on its merits.
The appellant has not advanced any explanation why that test might be met. Perhaps he relies on the fact that, like Mullins P and Morrison JA, I have recently ruled against him. In my case, the recent ruling was that on 28 October 2024, I ruled against his adjournment application in relation to the present hearing. However, it is well established that the fact that a Judge has ruled against the litigant in one proceeding, does not of itself, raise a reasonable apprehension that the Judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the further proceeding involving the litigant: see Day v Woolworths Group Limited [2021] QCA 42, per Henry J, with whom Mullins JA (as the President then was) and Williams J agreed at [135] and [141].
There is no basis to think that my rejecting his application for an adjournment might lead me to decide the respondent’s summary dismissal applications or if those applications fail, the appellant’s appeal, otherwise than on their respective legal and factual merits.
I refuse to recuse myself from the hearing today.
…
BOND JA: For the following reasons, I conclude that the respective applications of the first and second respondents for summary dismissal of proceeding 2979 of 2024 should succeed.
On 12 February 2024, Morrison JA summarily dismissed two appeals by the appellant from orders made by judges of the trial division. In so doing, his Honour was exercising the jurisdiction conferred on a single judge of appeal by s 44(1) of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld). His Honour’s reasons (see Dupois v Queensland Police [2024] QCA 13) reveal why he exercised the jurisdiction summarily to dismiss the two appeals. I adopt as correct the summary expressed by the second respondent in his written submissions at paragraphs 9 to 11, namely (footnotes omitted):
- “9.In comprehensive reasons for judgment, Morrison JA concluded that:
- (a)the two appeals ought to be dismissed for want of prosecution: Reasons, [37)-[ 47];
- (b)both notices of appeal ought to be struck out because they failed to comply with rule 747(l)(b) of the UCPR by failing to state, briefly and specifically, the grounds of appeal: Reasons, [48]-[51];
- (c)the notices of appeal contained allegations of state of mind of the primary judge or allegations of corruption or conspiracy, without referring to the basis for saying so: Reasons, [52]-[53];
- (d)the notices of appeal contained scandalous grounds: Reasons, [54]-[60];
- (e)the notices of appeal contained pointless grounds: Reasons, [61]-[77];
- (f)appeal 4348/23 was vexatious: Reasons, [78]-[115];
- (g)appeal 5226/23 was vexatious: Reasons, [116]-[168];
- (h)the appeals ought to be dismissed for reasons that included: (1) the serious defects in the formulation of the grounds, (2) the refusal of the appellant to properly particularise or articulate his case, (3) the appellant's contumelious conduct in refusing to comply with the court's directions as to the preparation of the appeals, (4) the unconscionable delay when seen in light of the refusal to prepare the cases and (5) the outrageous nature of the allegations of corruption: Reasons, [169].
- 10.His Honour observed:
- As to the last point [outrageous nature of the allegations of corruption], it will be evident from the forgoing reasons that the appellant has an entrenched method of accusatorial advocacy which consists of characterising every adverse result as being the product of corruption on the part of judicial officers. The appellant has not shown that there is any basis for those allegations.
- 11.His Honour referred to observations of this Court in Karamoudis v Queensland Police Service in which a self-represented litigant also made ‘wild and outrageous’ assertions of judicial corruption without identifying any foundation. There, the Court concluded that the appellant, in making unjustified and outrageous allegations of judicial corruption, ‘abuses his right to address the courts’. Justice Morrison concluded in the present case that the applicant's approach was ‘similar and equally flawed’.”
On 11 March 2024, the appellant commenced proceeding 2979 of 2024 by filing a notice of appeal from the orders of Morrison JA. The filing of that document was misconceived. The only appropriate recourse for the appellant in respect of his dissatisfaction with the orders of Morrison JA, sitting as a single judge of appeal, was to advance an application to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 44(4) of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 for review or discharge of the orders made by Morrison JA.
On 19 April 2024, the first respondent filed an application to dismiss the proceeding thereby commenced. On 7 May 2024, the second respondent filed a similar application. The third respondent notified that she intended to abide the orders of the court and did not seek to be heard, save in respect of any proposed orders which might be adverse to her. Her Honour advised that she did not press for any order in respect of her own costs of the proceeding, regardless of the outcome.
On 17 May 2024, I held a directions hearing in respect of the future conduct of the appeal and the applications by the respondent to dismiss the appeal. During that hearing, the appellant confirmed that his position was that he wanted the appeal to be heard in October 2024, and that he opposed having to deal with the respondents’ applications before that day. Ultimately, I made timetabling orders leading up to a hearing date on 8 October 2024, at which time I thought that the Court of Appeal, and not a single judge of appeal, could be apprised of both the summary dismissal applications and the appeal.
On 28 August 2024, the appellant requested the hearing date in 8 October 2024 be vacated. That request was opposed by the respondents, and the appellant’s application for adjournment came on before Mullins P on 23 September 2024. On that date, having received and considered evidence, including medical evidence, Mullins P was persuaded to adjourn the 8 October 2024 hearing date to today’s date, 20 November 2024.
The appellant was not satisfied with that outcome and subsequently requested an adjournment of the hearing date listed for today. The first and second respondents opposed any adjournment, and the court required the appellant to bring a formal application for adjournment.
On 28 October 2024, I heard the appellant’s formal application for adjournment. He had sought to support his application by reference to medical evidence, some of which had been relied on before Mullins P and some of which was new. The respondents objected to the admissibility of the evidence absent the appellant calling the medical practitioners concerned, which the appellant did not. I upheld the objection and then refused the application for an adjournment. During the course of argument, the appellant told me that if his adjournment application was refused he would simply not participate in the hearing on 20 November 2024. The orders made by Mullins P and by me on the adjournment applications by the appellant were also orders for which s 44(4) of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 provided the sole avenue for recourse in the event of a party being dissatisfied with such orders: see Di Iorio v Wagener [2016] QCA 346, at [14]-[15]. The appellant has not advanced any such applications in respect of either the decision of Mullins P or my decision.
Two days ago, on 18 November 2024, the appellant emailed the registry in the following terms:
“This is a courtesy email to reconfirm that due to advise of medical practitioners and my treating Trauma Clinic Pyscholgist and treating Psychiatrist who have all accepted that I am at the point of a very serious mental breakdown also confirmed by Beyond Blue that I should have a 6 month break!
Unfortunately as Justice Bond and Justice Mullins who have zero medical experience are more interested in supporting cases that are being impeded against me and all those that take the opportunity to disadvantage me whilst I am unwell.
I stated before Justice Bond that I am unable for genuine medical grounds to not proceed with the matter this coming week regarding Justice Morrison who publicly defamed me and called me a liar when I have at all times told the truth!
It was even worst when both Justices instead of assisting a self represented litigant that is genuinely unwell which goes completely against all of the requirements and mandatory obligations of the Judiciary to further punish me for making an application to delist the hearing to another date due to my mental state formerly diagnosed PTSD!
So instead of the court showing compassion and understanding they intentionally decided to punish me further by granting 3rd party costs which were discretionary!
Furthermore, regarding the criminal appeal the court also granted costs to legal parties (3rd party costs) involving matters which are not covered under the law of immunity.
This is an offence against the tax payer in which I will play no role in!
It’s clear that the court had a premeditated agenda to impede all my legal rights to assist their associates not in accordance to law but in accordance to protect those that have broken the law which is not me!
I respectfully advise as stated in court that in due course these matters will be heard as they have never been heard before any court via a claim and statement of claim when the time comes!
Finally, I also request that Justice Bond, Mullins and Morrison have no further dealings in any of my matters due to clear cut bias toward me!
I will not be replying any further but will comply to my requirements that I have been forced to do!”
At the commencement of the hearing today, the appellant was called but, as foreshadowed by him in the adjournment application in October and by his email, the appellant did not appear.
The court established that the parties had an opportunity to consider the terms of his email of 18 November 2024. Despite the failure of the appellant to appear and the absence of any formal application for adjournment, the court was prepared to treat the email as an informal application for adjournment. The respondents opposed the grant of any adjournment. For reasons earlier expressed, the court determined not to grant an adjournment.
Again, despite the fact that the appellant failed to appear and made no formal application for recusal, out of an abundance of caution I treated the request advanced in the penultimate paragraph of his email as an application to me that I should recuse myself from the hearing today. The respondents opposed the application. Having considered the question, and for reasons which I then expressed orally at the commencement of the hearing, I dismissed the application and refused to recuse myself.
The hearing before this court then proceeded to consider the respondents’ summary dismissal applications, the court having indicated that it would hear those applications first and, in the event they failed, would then proceed to hear the appellant’s appeal. The timetabling orders, which I made on 17 May 2024, required the respondents to file their outline of submissions addressing both the appeal and the application by 31 May 2024, and for the appellant to file and serve his reply submissions, if any, by 14 June 2024. Submissions have been received from the respondents, but no submissions responding to the summary dismissal applications were ever filed by the appellant.
Essentially, the respondents advanced two submissions in support of their applications.
The first submission was that the “appeal” was incompetent because the only jurisdiction capable of being invoked by the appellant was the jurisdiction conferred on this court by s 44(4) of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991. That submission must be accepted. Nevertheless, when a Court of Appeal is dealing with a litigant in person complaining of the decision of a single judge of appeal, the Court of Appeal might often be prepared to treat the “appeal” as an application to discharge or vary pursuant to s 44(4) despite the irregularity. However, as both respondents have contended, during the directions hearings on 17 May 2024, the appellant was apprised of the problem with the form of his proceeding and expressly determined to press ahead, relying only on what he said was his right of “appeal”. The legal flaws in the form of the appellant’s proceeding having been drawn to his attention in a fair and timely way, the appellant’s wrongheaded determination to proceed without seeking to remedy the problem in the form of his proceeding is fatal to his proceeding. His proceeding is incompetent. I would uphold the first submission.
The second submission proceeded on the basis that the court was prepared to treat the appeal as an application to vary or discharge the orders made by Morrison JA pursuant to s 44(4) despite the irregularity. On such an application, the appellant would be required to demonstrate error in the well-known House v The King standard: see Di Iorio v Wagener [2016] QCA 346 at [28], and Vaughan v Jilek [2023] QCA 195 at [10]. The respondents’ contentions were, first, that the notice of appeal and outline of argument filed by the appellant in support of the appeal should be regarded as a vexatious abuse by the appellant of his right to address the courts; and second, the appellant had not arguably identified error by Morrison JA in any relevant sense.
Both of these contentions must be accepted, and for the reasons developed by the respondents in their written submissions before this court.
As to the former contention, I find:
- (a)both of the appellant’s documents are prolix, irrelevantly argumentative and scandalous;
- (b)both documents contain numerous scandalous allegations concerning adverse intent by judicial officers, including by Morrison JA. They continue the “entrenched method of accusatorial advocacy”, which Morrison JA correctly criticised;
- (c)the appellant’s approach to the judgment of Morrison JA contains the same flaws as Morrison JA identified in the approach which the appellant took to the judgments of the judges of the trial division;
- (d)the documents are, as the respondents contended, an abuse by the appellant of his right to address the courts.
As to the latter contention, I find:
- (a)it was necessary for the appellant to demonstrate that Morrison JA erred in fact or law, erred by taking into account irrelevant considerations, erred by failing to take into account relevant considerations, or that the outcome was unreasonable or plainly unjust so that this court should be prepared to infer error even though no specific error could be identified;
- (b)the appellant has not identified any coherent proposition of error on any of those bases. The scandalous assertions of bias and adverse intent advanced against Morrison JA without any evidentiary basis must be disregarded.
In the event that I had been prepared to treat the appellant’s “appeal” as an application to this court pursuant to s 44(4) of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991, I would have upheld the second submission advanced by the respondents.
Accordingly, I would make the following orders:
- (a)the notice of appeal filed by the appellant in proceeding 2979 of 2024 be struck out;
- (b)proceeding 2979 of 2024 be summarily dismissed;
- (c)the appellant must pay the respective costs of the proceeding of the first and second respondents, including their respective costs of their applications for summary dismissal.
BODDICE JA: I agree.
WILSON J: I agree.
BOND JA: The orders of the court are:
- (1)The notice of appeal filed by the appellant in proceeding 2979 of 2024 be struck out.
- (2)Proceeding 2979 of 2024 be summarily dismissed.
- (3)The appellant pay the respective costs of the proceeding of the first and second respondents (including their respective costs of their applications for summary dismissal).
Adjourn the court.