Ritson v Ryan[2024] QCA 236

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. [1]
   MULLINS P:  I agree with Cooper J.
2. [2]
   FREEBURN J:  I also agree with Cooper J.
3. [3]
   COOPER J:  The appellant (Mr Ritson) seeks leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge to dismiss an application for judicial review of two decisions made by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT).^[1]  The QCAT decisions were made in a minor civil dispute proceeding numbered MCDO2024/16 which Mr Ritson commenced against the first respondent (Mr Ryan) in October 2016 (QCAT Proceeding).
4. [4]
   The decision under appeal was made on an application brought by the third respondent, the Attorney-General for the State of Queensland, as intervener.  The basis for that application was that, in circumstances where Mr Ritson was an undischarged bankrupt, the right to apply for judicial review of the QCAT decisions was properly characterised as property which had vested in Mr Ritson’s trustees in bankruptcy (Trustees) pursuant to s 116 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and Mr Ritson lacked standing to bring the application for judicial review.  The primary judge accepted those arguments.^[2]
5. [5]
   If granted leave, Mr Ritson proposes to advance grounds of appeal arguing that the primary judge erred by:

   1. finding that the right to bring the application for judicial review is “property divisible amongst the creditors of the bankrupt” within the meaning of s 116(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act (ground 1);
   2. finding that a $20,000 payment which Mr Ritson received from the Defence Abuse Reparation Scheme (Reparation Payment), and which (on Mr Ritson’s case) was used to purchase the choses in action which founded the QCAT Proceeding, is not “protected money” within the meaning of ss 116(2)(n) and 116(3) of the Bankruptcy Act (ground 2);
   3. not accepting Mr Ritson’s evidence that he used the Reparation Payment to purchase the choses in action which were the subject of the QCAT Proceeding (ground 3);
   4. finding that an order made by Halley J in the Federal Court of Australia (Federal Court Order), which suspended the operation of the sequestration order against Mr Ritson’s estate to the extent necessary for him to prosecute the QCAT Proceeding, does not extend to the application for judicial review (ground 4);
   5. failing to address four arguments Mr Ritson advanced in response to the dismissal application brought by the third respondent (ground 5).
6. [6]
   For the reasons which follow, none of the proposed grounds of appeal have been made out.  Mr Ritson has not demonstrated error in the reasoning of the primary judge.  In those circumstances, there would be no utility in granting leave to appeal.  The application for leave to appeal should be dismissed.

Background to the judicial review application

7. [7]
   In the QCAT Proceeding, Mr Ritson claimed that: four people had paid fees to Mr Ryan for courses which would prepare them to undertake pilot aptitude tests; Mr Ryan did not provide any services in exchange for those course fees; and, the four people were entitled to repayment of the course fees as a debt.  Mr Ritson brought the QCAT Proceeding as the assignee of the chose in action from each of the four people who had paid the course fees without receiving any services from Mr Ryan.
8. [8]
   On 12 August 2021, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made a sequestration order against Mr Ritson’s estate.^[3]
9. [9]
   Mr Ritson appealed against the making of the sequestration order and applied for proceedings under it to be stayed pending the determination of his appeal.  In that context, Mr Ritson wrote to his Trustees and noted that the QCAT Proceeding was stayed until the Trustees made an election to prosecute or discontinue it.  He advised the Trustees that if they did not elect to prosecute the QCAT Proceeding he would press his application to stay proceedings under the sequestration order pending the determination of his appeal.  The Trustees responded by informing Mr Ritson that their intention was to discontinue the QCAT Proceeding because, in their opinion, it was not commercially sound to prosecute it further.
10. [10]
    On 24 September 2021, Halley J made the Federal Court Order which relevantly provided:

“The operation of the sequestration order made against the estate of [Mr Ritson] on 12 August 2021 be suspended to the extent necessary to permit the appellant to prosecute the [QCAT Proceeding].”

11. [11]
    In making the Federal Court Order, Halley J accepted that at least one of Mr Ritson’s grounds for appealing the sequestration order was arguable or had some rational prospect of success.  Further, Halley J considered that, given the Trustees’ intention to discontinue the QCAT Proceeding, the balance of convenience favoured the suspension of the sequestration order to the extent necessary to permit Mr Ritson to maintain that proceeding.^[4]
12. [12]
    The first QCAT decision for which Mr Ritson sought judicial review was made on 21 October 2021.  By that decision, Adjudicator Katter dismissed the QCAT Proceeding on the basis that the four assignors of the choses in action against Mr Ryan did not have a sufficient connection to Queensland to engage QCAT’s jurisdiction and Mr Ritson (as the assignee of the choses in action) had no right to commence any proceeding against Mr Ryan in QCAT.^[5]  Mr Ritson applied for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the QCAT Proceeding.
13. [13]
    In the meantime, Mr Ritson’s appeal against the sequestration order was dismissed.^[6]  In its reasons for dismissing that appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court observed that, by reason of s 37(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, the Federal Court does not have power to suspend the operation of a sequestration order.^[7]  Despite this observation, the Federal Court Order was not set aside.
14. [14]
    The second QCAT decision for which Mr Ritson sought judicial review was made on 13 July 2023.  Judicial Member McGill SC dismissed Mr Ritson’s application for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the QCAT Proceeding by Adjudicator Katter.^[8]  Although Judicial Member McGill SC considered that Mr Ritson had an arguable ground of appeal, he concluded that the right of appeal against the dismissal of a money claim was property which had vested in the Trustees.  Accordingly, Mr Ritson was not competent to bring an application for leave to appeal.  Further, the application for leave to appeal (and any subsequent appeal) was a new proceeding which was separate from the QCAT Proceeding and so did not fall within the terms of the Federal Court Order.
15. [15]
    On 10 October 2023, Mr Ritson filed his application for review of the QCAT decisions under s 43 of the JRA.

The primary judge’s decision

16. [16]
    The primary judge identified the issues in dispute on the third respondent’s application as: (i) whether Mr Ritson’s application for judicial review of the QCAT decisions is property which vested in the Trustees upon the making of the sequestration order; (ii) whether the debt the subject of the QCAT Proceeding is property which vested in the Trustees; and (iii) whether the Federal Court Order permitted Mr Ritson to bring his application for judicial review of the QCAT decisions.
17. [17]
    On the first issue, after reviewing the relevant statutory provisions and authorities, the primary judge concluded that Mr Ritson’s application for judicial review took its character from the underlying claims which were the subject of the QCAT Proceeding.  If those underlying claims are properly characterised as property which vested in the Trustees, then so too is Mr Ritson’s application for judicial review.
18. [18]
    On the second issue, the primary judge addressed Mr Ritson’s argument that, because he purchased the choses in action which were the subject of the QCAT Proceeding using the Reparation Payment, s 116(2)(n) of the Bankruptcy Act applied to exempt his claims against Mr Ryan from the operation of s 116(1).  That exemption applies where property is purchased with “protected money” which is defined to include, relevantly, damages or compensation for personal injury or wrong done to the bankrupt – see ss 116(2)(g) and 116(2D) of the Bankruptcy Act.  The primary judge gave two reasons for rejecting Mr Ritson’s argument that he had used “protected money” to purchase the choses in action.
19. [19]
    First, the primary judge did not accept that the Reparation Payment was “damages or compensation” within the meaning of s 116(2)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act.  Properly construed, that provision applies to damages or compensation which a bankrupt recovers in an action for personal injury or wrong.  Further, the Commonwealth Parliament has determined that particular payments which do not fall within this description are nevertheless exempt from the operation of s 116(1) of the Bankruptcy Act.  Examples include payments made under the National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Abuse Act 2018 – see s 116(2)(ga) – and payments made under the Territories Stolen Generations Redress Scheme – see s 116(2)(gb).  No similar determination was made in respect of payments made under the Defence Abuse Reparation Scheme.
20. [20]
    Secondly, the primary judge was not satisfied on the evidence before him that Mr Ritson in fact used the Reparation Payment to purchase the choses in action against Mr Ryan.
21. [21]
    On the third issue, the primary judge rejected Mr Ritson’s argument that the inclusion of the words “to the extent necessary” in the Federal Court Order meant that it should be construed as extending to his application for judicial review of the QCAT decisions.  His Honour determined that the scope of the Federal Court Order was limited to permitting Mr Ritson to pursue the QCAT Proceeding itself.
22. [22]
    Having decided each of those three issues against Mr Ritson, the primary judge concluded that he did not have standing to bring the application for judicial review of the QCAT decisions and, on that basis, accepted that it was not appropriate for that application to continue.

Consideration

Ground 1

23. [23]
    Mr Ritson advances arguments about the nature of the right to apply for judicial review and whether that right comes within the ordinary legal meaning of the term “property”.  He submits that the right conferred by the JRA – to apply for a statutory order of review under s 20(1) or for a prerogative order under s 44 – does not have the usual characteristics of property.  It is nothing more than the right to bring the relevant application and have that application heard according to law.  The discretionary nature of the relief which might be available to an applicant under the JRA means that the right is not capable of assignment to or assumption by a third party.  He also relies on the principle that prerogative relief of the type sought in his application for judicial review is not wholly personal to the party applying for such relief, but inheres in the legal system itself.
24. [24]
    These submissions do not demonstrate error by the primary judge.  The relevant question is not whether the right to apply for judicial review is property according to general concepts.  It is whether that right is property within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.^[9]
25. [25]
    Upon the making of a sequestration order, “the property of the bankrupt” vests in the Official Trustee or the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate pursuant to s 58 of the Bankruptcy Act.
26. [26]
    The terms “property” and “the property of the bankrupt” are both defined in s 5(1) of the Bankruptcy Act.
27. [27]
    “Property” means “real or personal property of every description, whether situate in Australia or elsewhere, and includes any estate, interest or profit, whether present or future, vested or contingent, arising out of or incident to any such real or personal property”.
28. [28]
    “The property of the bankrupt” means:

1. “(i)
   the property divisible among the bankrupt’s creditors; and

2. any rights and powers in relation to that property that would have been exercisable by the bankrupt if he or she had not become a bankrupt.”

29. [29]
    Property divisible among the bankrupt’s creditors is then identified in s 116(1).  Subject to specific exemptions set out in s 116(2), it relevantly includes:

1. “(a)
   all property that belonged to, or was vested in, a bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy, or has been acquired or is acquired by him or her, or has devolved or devolves on him or her, after the commencement of the bankruptcy and before his or her discharge; and

1. (b)
   the capacity to exercise, and to take proceedings for exercising all such powers in, over or in respect of property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his or her own benefit at the commencement of the bankruptcy or at any time after the commencement of the bankruptcy and before his or her discharge; …”

30. [30]
    As Gray J (with whom Bleby J agreed) observed in Cirillo v Citicorp Australia Ltd,^[10] the classes of assets or rights which are vested by the operation of s 58 in the Official Trustee or the trustee of a bankrupt’s estate are wider than the common law concepts of choses in action and property.  The definitions set out above also catch rights of action which are not themselves choses in action and the incidents and fruits of those rights.
31. [31]
    Understood in that way, the definitions of “property” and the “property of the bankrupt” are sufficiently broad to include the right to apply for judicial review of a decision under JRA.  In the circumstances of the present case, where Mr Ritson sought to set aside the decision to dismiss the QCAT Proceeding and the dismissal of the application for leave to appeal that decision, the right to apply for judicial review is properly characterised as an incident to the choses in action which were the subject of the QCAT Proceeding.  Unless exempted under s 116(2), that property vested in the Trustees as soon as it devolved on Mr Ritson.  This outcome reflects the well-established principle that “a bankrupt has no right to bring or prosecute proceedings to protect, enhance or add to the property of which he has been divested on bankruptcy.”^[11]
32. [32]
    This principle has been applied to rights of appeal.  An appeal takes its character from the underlying cause of action which is the subject of the decision appealed from.^[12]  If an appeal relates to property that vested in the trustee upon bankruptcy, or to a claim by the bankrupt for money or property that would on recovery vest in the trustee, then the right to appeal is vested in the trustee.^[13]
33. [33]
    The principle has also been applied to the right to apply for orders in the nature of prerogative relief, even though the purpose of such relief is not simply the vindication of a personal interest of the applicant but the vindication of the law itself.^[14]  As is the case with an appeal, an action for prerogative relief takes its character in part from the character of the rights sought to be vindicated in the proceedings in which the orders were made which are the subject of the prerogative relief sought.^[15]
34. [34]
    In the present case, Mr Ritson’s application for judicial review took its character from the character of the rights he sought to vindicate in the QCAT Proceeding.  The right to bring that application vested in the Trustees, if it was not exempted by s 116(2) of the Bankruptcy Act.  The primary judge’s conclusion on that issue was correct.

Ground 2

35. [35]
    By letter dated 31 July 2014 from the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Mr Ritson received confirmation that he qualified for the Reparation Payment.^[16]  That letter stated that the assessor had applied the test of plausibility, which meant considering whether Mr Ritson’s allegations of abuse had the appearance of reasonableness and, on that basis, was satisfied that he suffered abuse at HMAS Kuttabul, that the abuse included workplace bullying and harassment, and that this abuse qualified him for a payment of $15,000.  The letter further informed Mr Ritson that the assessor applied the test of plausibility as to whether there was mismanagement by Defence in relation to the abuse and was satisfied that Mr Ritson qualified for a payment of $5,000 on that account.
36. [36]
    Mr Ritson relies on the content of that letter to submit that he received the Reparation Payment pursuant to a right to recover damages or compensation for a personal injury or wrong done to him such that, pursuant to s 116(2)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act, the Reparation Payment did not form part of the property divisible amongst his creditors.  On that basis he submits that the Reparation Payment was “exempt money” and therefore “protected money” (as those terms are defined in s 116(2D) of the Bankruptcy Act), which he used to purchase the choses in action which founded the QCAT Proceeding.  Consequently, by reason of the operation of ss 116(2)(n) and 116(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, those choses in action were also exempted from the property divisible amongst his creditors.
37. [37]
    It is common ground that, if damages or compensation for a personal injury or wrong done to a bankrupt is used to pay for or acquire property, then the property so acquired would be exempted from the property divisible amongst the bankrupt’s creditors and remain vested in the bankrupt upon the making of a sequestration order.  The issue raised by ground 2 is whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the Reparation Payment was not “damages or compensation” within the meaning of s 116(2)(g).
38. [38]
    The exemption in s 116(2)(g) reflects the long-standing distinction drawn between person and property under the common law of bankruptcy.  It will apply in circumstances where the damages or compensation recovered by the bankrupt have been “estimated by immediate reference to pain felt by the bankrupt in respect of his mind, body or character and without reference to his rights of property.”^[17]
39. [39]
    As the third respondent submits, the Reparation Payment was made by the Commonwealth in recognition that Mr Ritson had plausibly suffered workplace bullying and harassment whilst employed by Defence, and that abuse was mismanaged.  However, there is no indication in the letter from the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce that the amount of the Reparation Payment was estimated by immediate reference to pain felt by Mr Ritson in respect of his mind, body or character.
40. [40]
    Further, the broad construction which Mr Ritson seeks to place on s 116(2)(g) is inconsistent with the terms of ss 116(2)(ga) and 116(2)(gb), by which the legislature specifically exempted payments made under two identified redress schemes.^[18]  As the third respondent submits, if a payment made under those redress schemes fell within the meaning of “damages or compensation” in s 116(2)(g), there would have been no need to enact ss 116(2)(ga) or 116(2)(gb) in order to specifically exempt them.  The fact that the legislature chose to enact those provisions, and exempt payments from the two identified redress schemes from the operation of s 116(1), but did not do the same for payments from the Defence Abuse Reparation Scheme, is a strong contextual indicator that there was no intention to exempt payments from this latter scheme from the operation of s 116(1) of the Bankruptcy Act.
41. [41]
    There was no error in the primary judge’s conclusion that the Reparation Payment was not “damages or compensation” within the meaning of s 116(2)(g).

Ground 3

42. [42]
    Mr Ritson bore the onus of establishing that the money he used to purchase the choses in action which founded the QCAT Proceeding was “protected money” and, on that basis, was exempt from the property divisible among his creditors.^[19]  This means that Mr Ritson bore the onus of proving that he used the Reparation Payment to purchase those choses in action.  To discharge that onus, he relied on an email which he sent to the Trustees on 27 November 2023, more than seven years after he had acquired the choses in action.^[20]  In the email, Mr Ritson stated that he had used the Reparation Payment to purchase the choses in action which founded the QCAT Proceeding.  He attached a copy of the letter of 31 July 2014 from the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce to the email.
43. [43]
    On this appeal, Mr Ritson submits that the Trustees did not dispute the assertion set out in his email.  The third respondent did not adduce any evidence to contradict the assertion and did not cross-examine him at the hearing.  The first time the third respondent disputed the assertion that he used the Reparation Payment to purchase the choses in action was in closing submissions.  In those circumstances, Mr Ritson submits that it was unfair for the primary judge to disbelieve the evidence he led concerning the source of the money used to purchase the choses in action because the rule in Browne v Dunn^[21] was not complied with and he was not otherwise given an opportunity to deal with a suggestion made only in closing submissions.^[22]
44. [44]
    This submission proceeds from a misunderstanding of the effect of the rule in Browne v Dunn.  That rule applies where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point and ought not be believed.  It does not apply to a submission that an applicant’s evidence is insufficient to make out a claim.^[23]
45. [45]
    The difficulty for Mr Ritson is that he did not swear to the truth of the fact that he used the Reparation Payment to purchase the choses in action.  Although he exhibited a copy of the email in which he made that statement to the Trustees, he did not verify the truth of that statement in the affidavit itself.  Understood in that way, the argument the third respondent made in closing submissions was not that Mr Ritson’s sworn evidence should not be believed.^[24]  Rather, the third respondent’s argument was that, in circumstances where Mr Ritson had not adduced sworn evidence about the source of the funds he used to purchase the choses in action and did not tender any primary documents capable of proving that the money he used to purchase the choses in action came from the Reparation Payment, there was an insufficient evidential basis for the primary judge to be satisfied of that fact.  In making that submission, the third respondent did not breach the rule in Browne v Dunn.
46. [46]
    As recently observed by a majority of the High Court in Wilmott v State of Queensland:^[25]

“… a court is not bound to accept uncontradicted evidence and the ‘facts proved must form a reasonable basis for a definite conclusion affirmatively drawn of the truth of which the tribunal of fact may reasonably be satisfied’.”

47. [47]
    Having regard to the state of the material relied upon by Mr Ritson, the primary judge’s conclusion that there was an insufficient evidentiary basis for him to be satisfied that Mr Ritson used the Reparation Payment to purchase the choses in action was an orthodox application of that principle.  There was no error in that conclusion.

Ground 4

48. [48]
    Mr Ritson submits that the application for judicial review of the QCAT decisions, being decisions made in the QCAT Proceeding, comes within the scope of what was contemplated when Halley J made the Federal Court Order because proceedings in a tribunal such as QCAT are subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of this court.  He argues that this interpretation of the Federal Court Order is both reasonable and consistent with the intention with which the order was made and would give effect to its terms.
49. [49]
    Those submissions cannot be accepted.  The terms of the Federal Court Order are clear on their face.  They suspended the operation of the sequestration order only to a limited extent: that is, “to the extent necessary to permit [Mr Ritson] to prosecute the [QCAT Proceeding].”  Pursuant to that suspension, Mr Ritson prosecuted the QCAT Proceeding.  That proceeding was dismissed and leave to appeal from that dismissal was refused.  Mr Ritson is dissatisfied with the QCAT decisions which led to that result.  That is no reason, however, to read the plain words of the Federal Court Order as extending the suspension of the sequestration order to permit Mr Ritson to now bring a separate proceeding seeking judicial review of the QCAT decisions.
50. [50]
    The context in which the Federal Court Order was made also tells against the broad interpretation which Mr Ritson advances.  That context, set out at [11] above, indicates that the purpose of the Federal Court Order was to ensure that the potential benefit available from a successful prosecution of the QCAT Proceeding would not be lost by Mr Ritson in the event that his appeal against the making of the sequestration order succeeded and the choses in action which founded the QCAT Proceeding re-vested in him.  As events transpired, Mr Ritson’s appeal against the sequestration order was dismissed and the choses in action remained vested in the Trustees.  In those circumstances, the interpretation which Mr Ritson advances goes far beyond the apparent purpose of the Federal Court Order.  There could be no useful purpose in suspending the operation of the sequestration order to permit Mr Ritson to seek judicial review of the QCAT decisions in circumstances where those decisions concern choses in action which remain vested in the Trustees.
51. [51]
    There was no error in the primary judge’s conclusion that the Federal Court Order did not permit Mr Ritson to bring his application for judicial review.

Ground 5

52. [52]
    By this ground, Mr Ritson submits that the primary judge erred by failing to address four arguments advanced against the dismissal of his judicial review application and, in doing so, denied him natural justice.  The four arguments were that:

    1. the right to bring the application for judicial review does not fall within the definition of “property” in s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act and did not pass to the Trustees;
    2. the Trustees are unable to meet the description of a person who is “aggrieved” by the QCAT decisions or whose “interests are, or would be, adversely affected in or by the matter to which the application relates” in s 20 and s 44 of the JRA, such that the Trustees have no standing to apply for judicial review of those decisions;
    3. the right of appeal to QCAT does not fall within the definition of “property” in s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act and did not pass to the Trustees;
    4. alternatively, the suspension of the sequestration order necessarily extended to the operation of s 58 and s 116 of the Bankruptcy Act insofar as those provision concern the right of appeal to stop it from vesting in the Trustees.
53. [53]
    Mr Ritson’s submission that the primary judge did not address the first of these arguments is incorrect.  The primary judge considered and rejected that argument in determining the first two issues against Mr Ritson (see [16]-[20] above).  In considering the first of those issues, the primary judge adverted to the definition of “property” under s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act,^[26] as well as relevant authorities which considered the meaning of that term.^[27]  As already observed, the primary judge concluded that the right to bring the application for judicial review took its character from the underlying choses in action which were the subject of the QCAT Proceeding.  For the reasons already addressed under ground 1, that conclusion was correct.  The primary judge then determined that those choses in action were not exempt from vesting in the Trustees, meaning that the right to apply for judicial review of the QCAT decisions also vested in the Trustees.  Again, for the reasons set out above addressing grounds 2 to 4, there was no error in that conclusion.
54. [54]
    As to the remaining three arguments, it is important to observe that, in reaching the conclusion that Mr Ritson did not have standing to bring the application for judicial review of the QCAT decisions, it was not necessary for the primary judge to deal with every argument that Mr Ritson raised or to set out reasons explaining why each argument was not accepted.^[28]
55. [55]
    The rejection of the second argument set out at [52](b) was the inevitable result of the primary judge’s conclusion that the right to apply for judicial review of the QCAT decisions vested in the Trustees.  The fact that the primary judge did not say this expressly does not mean that Mr Ritson was denied natural justice.  The bases upon which the primary judge considered and decided that central issue were clearly set out in his Honour’s reasons.  That reasoning makes it clear why the primary judge rejected this second argument.
56. [56]
    The third and fourth arguments set out at [52](c) and [52](d) go to the merits of the decision of Judicial Member McGill SC to refuse Mr Ritson leave to appeal the dismissal of the QCAT Proceeding.  Those arguments are irrelevant to any judicial review of that decision and, more relevantly, to the primary judge’s consideration of whether it was appropriate for Mr Ritson’s application for judicial review to continue in circumstances where Mr Ritson lacked standing to bring that application.  In any event, both arguments are without substance.  The third argument must be rejected because, for the reasons already set out under grounds 1 to 4, the right of appeal to QCAT took its character from the underlying choses in action which were the subject of the QCAT Proceeding and, in circumstances where those choses in action were not exempt from vesting in the Trustees, the right of appeal to QCAT also vested in the Trustees.  The fourth argument must be rejected because, as explained when addressing ground 4, in circumstances where Mr Ritson’s appeal against the making of the sequestration order had been dismissed before Judicial Member McGill SC refused leave to appeal the dismissal of the QCAT Proceeding, there could be no useful purpose in suspending the operation of the sequestration order to permit Mr Ritson to seek leave to appeal or to prosecute an appeal of the dismissal of the QCAT Proceeding where it concerned choses in action which remained vested in the Trustees.  The primary judge did not deny Mr Ritson natural justice by not addressing these arguments in his reasons.

Conclusion

57. [57]
    The question to be addressed in deciding whether leave to appeal should be granted is whether the circumstances of this particular case warrant the grant of leave.^[29]  For the reasons set out above, if leave was to be granted, all of the proposed grounds of appeal would fail.  In those circumstances, the grant of leave is not warranted.  I would order that the application for leave to appeal be dismissed.