R v OAA[2024] QCA 70

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

7. [7]
   Counts 1-6 were each particularised as occurring on a date unknown between 1 July 1987 and 31 January 1988 during the agency camp. Counts 1-3 were further particularised as occurring on the first night at the camp and counts 4-6 were particularised as occurring on the second night at the camp. Each of counts 7-9 was particularised as occurring on a date unknown between 1 January and 31 December 1988 when the complainant was attending a road safety course. Count 7 was based on an allegation that the appellant procured the complainant to masturbate his penis. Count 8 alleged that the appellant inserted his penis into the complainant’s mouth. Count 9 was particularised that the appellant held the complainant’s head, as he masturbated next to her face. Each of counts 10 and 11 was particularised as occurring on date unknown between 1 May and 31 August 1988 at the skating rink disco. Each of counts 12 and 13 was particularised as occurring on a date unknown between 1 January and 31 May 1989 at the family home and was described as the first time that the appellant had respectively licked the complainant’s vagina and attempted to rape her by pushing his penis against her vagina whilst in the family home.
8. [8]
   The offence of maintaining a sexual relationship with a child (count 14) was particularised as being committed between 3 July 1989 and 21 November 1995. Each of counts 15 and 16 was particularised as occurring between 22 November 1989 and 21 November 1990 and linked to the incident that was described as the “Milo time”. Each of counts 17 and 18 was particularised as occurring on a date unknown between 1 January 1991 and 31 December 1992 at Mount Low. Count 19 was particularised as occurring on a date unknown between 1 and 31 August 1993 during a trip to Cairns. Count 20 was particularised as occurring on a date unknown between 1 January 1993 and 21 November 1994. Count 21 was also particularised as occurring on a date unknown between 1 January 1993 and 21 November 1994.
9. [9]
   The relationship between the appellant and the complainant’s mother ended when the complainant was about 14 years old. It was an admitted fact at the trial that the appellant married his new partner (the new partner) in October 1994.

The complaints about the appellant’s conduct

10. [10]
    The complainant made a complaint about the appellant’s conduct towards her when she was 16 years old. The statement is dated 11 June 1996 (exhibit 7). The statement dealt with the complainant’s specific allegations that were the subject of counts 15 and 16 and count 19 and was read out to the jury as a s 93A statement on the basis that the complainant was a special witness.
11. [11]
    The police interviewed the appellant on 21 June 1996. The audio-visual recording of the appellant’s interview was played for the jury (exhibit 9). The appellant denied the allegations of sexual offending that were put to him based on the complainant’s statement. The appellant was not charged as a result of the complainant’s statement to the police in June 1996.
12. [12]
    The complainant made further complaints to the police in January 2020 which resulted in the appellant’s being charged with the offences on the indictment. The complainant provided a lengthy statement to the police dated 23 November 2021.

The trial

13. [13]
    The complainant gave evidence over three days. English is not the complainant’s first language. She speaks Kriol which she explained as Torres Strait broken English. It is apparent from the transcript that it was difficult for the complainant to give evidence on the matters that were the subject of the trial and she required several breaks. She tended to give evidence in general terms about the nature and frequency of the appellant’s offending against her and had difficulty in focusing on the appellant’s conduct that related to each specific occasion that was particularised by the prosecution.
14. [14]
    The complainant gave evidence of attending a bush camp organised by the agency when she was eight years old which she went on with the appellant’s niece (the niece) who was a couple of years older than her. The complainant could not remember the location of the camp or in which school holidays it took place. She said that she and the niece shared a tent. Counts 1-3 which were respectively indecent treatment by the insertion of the appellant’s fingers into the complainant’s vagina, attempted rape when the appellant pushed his penis against the complainant’s vagina more than once and indecent treatment by the appellant masturbating whilst leaning over her were said by the complainant to have been committed by the appellant when the niece was out of the tent on the first night of the camp. The complainant’s evidence was that the same type of offending was committed on the second night of the camp (counts 4-6) in the same sequence but that the niece remained in the tent and was not awake.
15. [15]
    The complainant was specific in her evidence as to when the road safety course incidents occurred. She produced the certificate from that course dated 12 November 1990 (exhibit 5) which was inconsistent with the period particularised for each of counts 7-9 relating to the road safety course.
16. [16]
    It was apparent at the conclusion of the complainant’s evidence in chief that she had not given evidence in support of counts 7, 9, 10 and 20. That is why those counts were discontinued at the conclusion of the prosecution case. The complainant did give evidence of the conduct of the appellant at the road safety course that was particularised for count 8. The complainant said the appellant kept her on the bus that had collected the children for the road safety course, grabbed the back of her head and pushed it into his penis to show her how to give him oral sex. The trial judge refused to allow the prosecution to amend count 8 to extend the period during which it was alleged the conduct at the road safety course occurred until 13 November 1990 to conform with the complainant’s evidence because the particularised dates had been longstanding. The prosecution therefore discontinued count 8 but relied on the complainant’s evidence of being forced to perform oral sex on the appellant at the time of the road safety course as an uncharged act that proved the appellant had a sexual interest in the complainant and was prepared to act on it.
17. [17]
    The complainant identified that the skating rink disco incident (that was the subject of count 11) took place when she “was 11 going on 12” and that it occurred after the road safety course incident. As count 11 had been particularised as occurring on a date unknown between 1 May and 31 August 1988 when the complainant was nine years old and the complainant identified the road safety course as taking place in November 1990 by reference to exhibit 5, the complainant’s evidence about the timing of the skating rink disco incident was inconsistent with count 11, as particularised. The complainant gave evidence that the appellant turned up at the skating rink in his blue Ford Laser at the end of the night and asked if the complainant and her four cousins wanted a lift home. The complainant said that he drove the others home first and then asked the complainant to drive the car. She said that he put his hands down her jeans. The complainant’s evidence was then in general terms:

“And he would be then fingering my vagina and touching himself to masturbate himself in front of me, and he - - -

As he’s masturbating himself, has he done anything to you? Has he got you to do anything?---Always. Always. Yeah. So perform – he’d get me to give him a head job, vice versa.”

18. [18]
    There was then a short break in the trial and when the complainant resumed her evidence, she was asked again about the occasion of the skating rink disco and this time she said she was in the passenger seat leaning over to his seat when she performed oral sex on him and she said “I bent his penis… On this occasion, I got out and ran home”. It emerged in cross-examination that the complainant did not mention in her 2021 statement in relation to the skating rink disco incident that she bent the appellant’s penis.
19. [19]
    The complainant could remember the appellant coming to live in the family home when she was 10 years old. She said the appellant would try to grope her or touch her in passing and would talk “dirty”. She gave evidence of the first time that he offended against her when she was asleep and woke up when he was licking her vagina (count 12). She said that he stood up and was standing over her when he “rolled his penis around [her] vagina” (count 13). The only other evidence the complainant gave relevant to count 13 was that the appellant’s penis was erect and she did not know whether he ejaculated or not.
20. [20]
    The complainant gave evidence of another incident when her mother was at bingo, when she was woken by the appellant rubbing her legs and he put his fingers inside her vagina (count 15) and made her masturbate his penis (count 16). The complainant stated that the appellant then walked to the kitchen and called out to the complainant to come to the kitchen where he was mixing a Milo paste in a cup and put his erect penis in the Milo and asked the complainant to lick it off which she refused to do. (There was no allegation of offending conduct as a result of this request by the appellant but the description “Milo time” was used to particularise the timing of counts 15 and 16 as the complainant said that offending was immediately followed on the same evening by this request.)
21. [21]
    The complainant said that there were occasions when the appellant would pick her up from school before school finished to take her to various places. There was a time that he took her to a house at Mount Low. The complainant went inside the house at the appellant’s request. He masturbated himself in her presence (count 17). The complainant then described that the appellant pushed her back on the couch, took off her shorts and was trying to push his erect penis into her vagina and he ejaculated around the lips of her vagina after he pulled out his penis (count 18).
22. [22]
    The complainant gave evidence of an occasion when the appellant drove her to Cairns in the blue Ford Laser to visit her father and the niece was also in the car. She said that on the way to Cairns, she was in the back seat and the niece was in the front seat. The complainant was lying down on the back seat and woke up to the appellant’s hand inside her shorts when he touched her vagina (count 19). The complainant said that the niece was asleep when that happened.

23. [23]
    The complainant was asked whether she recalled the specific occasion when the appellant had picked her up from basketball training. She said that he would be waiting in his car to give her a lift home and he would try “the same approach and assaulting or masturbating himself, trying to get me to drive the car” (count 21). When she was asked whether he got her to do anything when he was masturbating himself, she described masturbating him and being forced to give him oral sex before being dropped home.
24. [24]
    Apart from the evidence directed to the specific counts, the complainant referred in general terms to many occasions when the appellant would have the complainant perform oral sex on him or he would use his tongue to lick her vagina. Without linking the appellant’s conduct to any specific occasion, the complainant stated that most of the time when she was picked up from basketball by the appellant, he would expose himself, masturbate, “talk dirty” as if the complainant were his partner, and try to kiss her and touch her body. The complainant explained that the appellant would take her driving two or three times per week from the time when she was eight years old until she was 15 years old. She said she was given money by the appellant to masturbate the appellant and perform oral sex on him.
25. [25]
    The complainant went to live with an aunt in the Northern Territory in or around 1995. When she was in the Northern Territory, the appellant would telephone her once a week. The complainant returned to Townsville in 1996 with her boyfriend (the boyfriend). The complainant told the boyfriend in 1995 that she had been abused sexually by the appellant and she disclosed the offending to her mother at the family home before being taken to the police station on 11 June 1996.
26. [26]
    The complainant was cross-examined extensively. The complainant denied that her allegations against the appellant were “a pack of lies”.
27. [27]
    The complainant conceded that there had been no allegations in her 1996 statement about the camp, road safety course and skating rink incidents all of which were agency activities. It was put to the complainant that she made those allegations only after she became aware that there was compensation available, if she could link the agency’s involvement with the abuse she alleged against the appellant. The complainant responded:

“I’m here to get justice for the abuse that I have been subjected to by that man sitting behind you … I’m not here about money. I’m here to get justice back for me for what that man did [to me] as a kid.”

28. [28]
    Preliminary complaint evidence was given by the boyfriend as follows. They met around 1993. Their relationship ended in 1997. In 1995, the complainant and the boyfriend who were living in the Northern Territory flew to Townsville and stayed at the family home. The boyfriend met the appellant about a week after they arrived. On other occasions, the appellant visited the family home and the complainant left with him. The complainant told the boyfriend that the appellant had been touching her when she was little and she had forgotten all about things. She said when they returned to Townsville, she started remembering things and told the boyfriend that the appellant was paying her off, because she remembered something he did to her. The boyfriend clarified with the complainant that the appellant had touched her vagina. The boyfriend had seen the appellant give money to the complainant. After six months, the complainant and the boyfriend returned to the Northern Territory.

29. [29]
    The complainant’s mother gave preliminary complaint evidence as follows. The complainant came into her room about 8.30 pm on 6 June 1996 and said words to the effect that she had been molested by the appellant. The complainant’s mother could not recall the complainant’s exact words. The next day the complainant’s mother questioned the complainant about what had happened and the complainant’s mother made notes of the conversation. The complainant’s mother still had those notes at the time of the trial and was given leave to refer to them as she gave her evidence. The complainant told her mother of an incident that occurred after her mother had gone to bingo. The complainant told her that she was sleeping on her mother’s bed, when the appellant came in, lay down beside her and started to touch her private parts. The complainant also said that the appellant put Milo on his private parts and wanted her to eat it off and she said no. The complainant also said that the appellant let her drive his car and he would try and touch her on the leg and he would masturbate while the complainant drove. The complainant also told her mother that when she was in the Northern Territory, the appellant would ring her constantly and “talk dirty”. The complainant told her mother that on a trip to Cairns, he put his fingers in the complainant’s vagina.
30. [30]
    The preliminary complaint evidence, particularly of the mother, was largely supportive of the complainant’s credibility in relation to her evidence of being sexually offended against by the appellant.
31. [31]
    The ambit of the questioning of the appellant by the police in 1996 was confined, as it was only the specific incidents that were the subject of counts 15, 16 and 19 that were dealt with in the complainant’s 1996 statement. He denied these allegations. The appellant in his record of interview accepted that he continued to have contact with the complainant after his relationship with her mother ended which was when the complainant was 13 or 14 years old, including picking her up after school. He also said that he helped out the complainant and her mother financially after his relationship with the mother ended. The appellant accepted that he drove the complainant to Cairns on one occasion but that it was a trip up and they drove straight back, as he was driving his brother’s truck to move some of his goods back to Townsville. Later in the interview, he described driving the complainant and her friend A to Cairns and back the next day where the complainant and A swapped between sitting in the front and back of the car. When the complainant was in the Northern Territory, the appellant would telephone her twice per week and send her money. The appellant said that the money he sent her was to be repaid. The appellant denied generally any interference with the complainant in any way whatsoever. Despite the appellant’s denials, there was some support in the appellant’s record of interview for aspects of the complainant’s evidence and, particularly, his habit of picking the complainant up after school, even though his relationship with the complainant’s mother had ended.
32. [32]
    The appellant did not give evidence at the trial but called evidence from one of the founding members of the agency, an office employee of the agency who worked there between 1987 and 1994, the niece who spent time with the complainant when the appellant was in the relationship with the complainant’s mother, the new partner who had also worked at the agency and the appellant’s sister. Apart from the niece, the evidence adduced from the appellant’s witnesses was largely peripheral. The niece denied ever going on a camping trip with the complainant and denied ever travelling to Cairns with her.

The summing up

33. [33]
    The trial judge gave the directions required by the nature and multiplicity of historical sexual offences. There is no challenge on the appeal to any of the directions.
34. [34]
    The trial judge directed the jury they were entitled to consider the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the discontinuance by the prosecution of five counts on the indictment was capable of affecting their assessment of the credibility of the complainant.
35. [35]
    The trial judge explained to the jury that the charges had been framed in accordance with the law that applied at the relevant time particularised for the charge and that was why the commencement date for the period particularised for count 14 was 3 July 1989 which was the date on which the charge of maintaining a sexual relationship with a child under 16 became an offence.
36. [36]
    The jury were provided by the trial judge with a handout that dealt with the elements of the offences. In relation to the acts relied on by the prosecution capable of constituting the relevant offences of a sexual nature for the purpose of establishing the first element of count 14, if the jury were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the elements of the relevant offences, the handout set out the prosecution’s case as to the acts relied on as follows:

“The [appellant] did an act defined as an offence of a sexual nature in relation to the complainant on three or more occasions. In this case the prosecution relies on the offences in counts 15, 16, 18 & 19 as offences of a sexual nature.

The prosecution also relies on the following acts which are capable of constituting offences of a sexual nature:

• He touched [the complainant’s] breast/s (Indecent treatment of a child under 16);
• He touched [the complainant’s] vagina (Indecent treatment of a child under 16 – e.g. Count 19);
• He touched [the complainant’s] buttocks (Indecent treatment of a child under 16);
• He procured [the complainant] to masturbate his penis (Indecent treatment of a child under 16 (procure) – e.g. Count 16);
• He inserted his penis into [the complainant’s] mouth (Indecent treatment of a child under 16);
• He licked the inside and outside of [the complainant’s] vulva/vagina (Indecent treatment of a child under 16);
• He inserted his finger/s into [the complainant’s] vulva/vagina (Indecent treatment of a child under 16 – e.g. Count 15);
• He attempted to insert his penis into [the complainant’s] vulva/vagina, without her consent (Attempted rape);
• He inserted his penis into [the complainant’s] vulva/vagina, without her consent. (Rape – e.g. Count 18).

The acts relied upon are capable of constituting the relevant offences of a sexual nature if you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the elements of the particular offences.

If the prosecution has proved that the [appellant] did an act on three or more occasions, it does not matter that the dates or exact circumstances of those occasions are not disclosed by the evidence.

Before you can be satisfied of this element, you must all agree as to the same three or more offences.

If you cannot be satisfied of the same three or more occasions, the charge of maintaining has not been established.”

37. [37]
    The jury were directed that the circumstance of aggravation of count 14 of rape was based solely on count 18 and, if they found the appellant not guilty of the charge of rape in count 18, they could not find him guilty of the allegation in the circumstance of aggravation for count 14 that he raped the complainant, but they could find the appellant guilty of the offence of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with the child under 16 based on the other allegations.
38. [38]
    The trial judge emphasised to the jury that for the purpose of proving count 14, they could not have regard to any offence that pre-dated the commencement of the period particularised for the maintaining offence of 3 July 1989.
39. [39]
    In relation to count 21 the trial judge emphasised to the jury that the act particularised was the appellant masturbating in the complainant’s presence. Count 21 had been particularised as the specific time that the complainant ran out of the car when the appellant masturbated in her presence. The evidence that the complainant gave of this incident departed from the particularisation of the incident, as the complainant also seemed to say that the appellant got her to masturbate him and forced her to give him oral sex before she got out of the car. The trial judge gave the following warnings to the jury in dealing with count 21:

“Now I emphasise here, members of the jury, that the act particularised is the [appellant] masturbating in the complainant’s presence, and by doing that the charge is alleged as the [appellant] wilfully and unlawfully exposing the child to an indecent act committed by himself. So the other things that are mentioned by the complainant on this occasion cannot be substituted for the alleged act in the indictment. You can see that when the Crown was asking the complainant to refer to a specific occasion, they are trying to relate the evidence to one specific occasion for you to concentrate on in considering your verdict.

When you are considering your verdict on any particular charge, you can only be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt if you are satisfied of a specific occasion where that alleged act occurred. In other words, if the complainant was saying a certain type of act occurred on multiple occasions, without relating it to a specific occasion, then that generalised allegation cannot be the subject of a conviction.

…

The complainant was being asked about a specific occasion, and then went on to describe things that happened perhaps somewhat generally, but it’s for you to determine whether you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that on this particularised occasion when the complainant says that she ran from the car, that there was an act of the defendant masturbating in her presence, and therefore wilfully and unlawfully exposing her to an indecent act by himself.”

40. [40]
    The trial judge gave a direction in accordance with s 132BA of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) to deal with the significant forensic disadvantage to the appellant as a result of the delay in the bringing of the charges and in particular that the appellant lost the ability to obtain employment records including dates of employment and work rosters at the agency, the agency’s vehicle log books and what activities the complainant was enrolled for with the agency with the consequence that the evidence relied upon by the prosecution could not be tested as fully as it otherwise might have been. The trial judge also noted that:

“The complainant’s inability to recall precise details of the circumstances surrounding the incidents makes it difficult for the [appellant] to throw doubt on her evidence by pointing to circumstances which may contradict the complainant. Had the [appellant] learned of the allegations much earlier, he may have been able to recall relevant details which could have been used by his counsel in cross-examination of the complainant.”

Unreasonable verdicts based on inconsistent verdicts

41. [41]
    A statement of general propositions relating to inconsistent verdicts is found in the joint judgment of Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ in MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348 at 366-368. Even though the appellant relies on the jury’s failure to reach verdicts on counts 1-6, 13 and 18 and the circumstance of aggravation for count 14 to demonstrate that the guilty verdicts were unreasonable, it should be noted, as explained in R v DAL [2005] QCA 281 at [22]-[27] by Keane JA (with whom McMurdo P agreed), the failure by a jury to agree on verdicts should not necessarily be equated with a verdict of acquittal for the purpose of applying the propositions in MacKenzie, as there can be reasons for a jury’s failure to agree on a charge or charges that do not undermine the verdicts of guilty on other charges. As was pointed out in DAL at [22] the distinction between a failure to agree and an acquittal may be important “because of what each of those two different outcomes says about the jury’s deliberations”.
42. [42]
    The oral submissions of Mr Jackson of counsel on behalf of the appellant were specific in linking the acquittal on count 11 to a doubt that the jury must have had that the complainant’s statement about the incidents involving agency activities was fabricated in order for her to access the redress scheme, because the conduct was alleged to have been committed by the appellant whilst employed by the agency. The appellant argued that support for this link between the acquittal on count 11 and the potential to access the redress scheme was found in the fact that the jury was hung on counts 1-6 which were also alleged to have been committed by the appellant whilst employed by the agency and the fact that counts 7-9 which were discontinued during the trial were also concerned with conduct alleged against the appellant as an employee of the agency.
43. [43]
    The complainant strongly denied the allegation that was put to her in cross- examination that she only made those complaints in respect of the agency camp, the road safety course and the skating rink disco, because they enabled her to link the agency with her abuse. The significant flaw with the argument based on linking the acquittals with the outcomes with respect to counts 1-9 is the appellant’s assumption that the acquittals reflected an inherent concern about the complainant’s credibility when there were other explanations in the circumstances of the trial that may have affected the jury’s failure to agree on counts 1-6. As the earliest instances of the complainant’s allegations, the significant forensic disadvantage direction was particularly relevant to counts 1-6. In addition, the jury had been expressly instructed that the discontinuance by the prosecution of five counts (which included counts 7-9) was a factor to consider in assessing the credibility of the complainant.

44. [44]
    In any case, the main focus of this ground of appeal in the circumstances of this trial must be on whether the verdicts of acquittal on counts 11 and 21 were inconsistent with the convictions on counts 12, 14-17 and 19.
45. [45]
    The acquittal on count 11 is explicable by the discrepancy in the timing of the skating rink disco incident between the complainant’s evidence and the period particularised in the charge and also that there seemed to have been confusion in the complainant’s evidence between the incidents that were respectively the subject of counts 11 and 21. Count 11 had been particularised as an occasion of the appellant inserting his penis into the complainant’s mouth. It was count 21 that was particularised as the time the complainant ran from the car (after the appellant had masturbated in the complainant’s presence). The complainant gave evidence in respect of the skating rink disco incident that she ran from the car but also said that occurred when she gave her evidence in relation to count 21.
46. [46]
    The acquittal on count 21 reflects the directions given by the trial judge on the evidence of the complainant that was in general terms about the appellant’s misconduct towards the complainant when she was in his vehicle, rather than the specific incident that had been particularised for count 21 that was an occasion when the appellant masturbated himself in front of her in the vehicle and that she then ran from the car.
47. [47]
    Each of counts 12, 15, 16, 17 and 19 were convictions for specific incidents which were clearly identified in the complainant’s evidence. The extent of the evidence on counts 15, 16 and 19 was greater in that they were the specific incidents that were identified in the complainant’s 1996 statement. The conviction on count 12 is explicable, because the complainant could identify the incident as the first time that the appellant performed oral sex on her in the family home. Even though the attempted rape that was the subject of count 13 was identified by the complainant as taking place on the same occasion as the conduct that was subject of count 12, the jury’s failure to agree on count 13 is explicable by the very little detail that the complainant gave of the attempted rape in her evidence that, after the appellant woke her up when he was licking her vagina, he stood up and, while he was standing over her, he “rolled his penis around [her] vagina”. Even though the incident that was the subject of count 17 was not referred to in the 1996 statement, the complainant had no difficulty in giving relatively detailed evidence of the appellant masturbating in front of her at the Mount Low house.
48. [48]
    The conviction on count 14 reflects the convictions of guilty on counts 15, 16 and 19 which were relied on by the prosecution as offences of a sexual nature for the purpose of the proof of count 14 and the compelling general evidence given by the complainant of repetitive sexual offending against her by the appellant, particularly when she was in a vehicle with him. The conviction on count 14 without the circumstance of aggravation reflects the jury’s failure to agree on count 18 and shows the jury followed the judge’s directions that the jury could only find the appellant guilty of the circumstance of aggravation for count 14 if the jury convicted him of count 18.

49. [49]
    The appellant’s argument that there were inconsistent verdicts depended on a conclusion that the likely explanation of the acquittals on counts 11 and 21 was the jury’s inherent concern about the complainant’s credibility. As the above analysis shows, there were good reasons for the acquittals by reference to the discrepancy in the complainant’s evidence about the timing of the skating rink disco incident, the confusion in the complainant’s evidence between the incidents that were the subject of counts 11 and 21 and the complainant’s giving general evidence of what would occur between the appellant and her in his vehicle rather than the specific incident that had been particularised for count 21. Those reasons did not necessarily affect the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence for the specific incidents where the complainant linked the offending to a specific occasion and there was no confusion about the timing of the incident, as was shown by the convictions for counts 12, 14-17 and 19. In the circumstances of this trial, the acquittals on counts 11 and 21 stand logically and reasonably with the convictions for counts 12, 14-17 and 19. Those verdicts of guilty were not unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence by reason of the acquittals on counts 11 and 21.

Order

50. [50]
    The order which should be made is: Appeal dismissed.
51. [51]
    BODDICE JA: I agree with Mullins P that the appeal should be dismissed.
52. [52]
    The acquittals on counts 11 and 21 do not convey that the jury had an inherent concern as to the complainant’s credibility and reliability.
53. [53]
    Those acquittals are consistent with the jury complying with the judge’s directions to give careful consideration to each of the counts, in circumstances where there was differing specificity in the complainant’s evidence about individual counts.
54. [54]
    Those acquittals stand logically and reasonably with the convictions for counts 12, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 19.
55. [55]
    I agree with the order proposed by Mullins P.
56. [56]
    WILLIAMS J: I have read the reasons of Mullins P and agree with those reasons and the proposed order.