Storry v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General
[2025] QCA 132
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- Storry v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General[2025] QCA 132
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Storry v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General[2025] QCA 132
Storry v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General[2025] QCA 132
[2025] QCA 132
COURT OF APPEAL | |
BOWSKILL CJ BROWN JA BRADLEY JA | |
Appeal No 16434 of 2024 QCAT No 189 of 2024 | |
VENETIA LOUISE STORRY | Applicant |
v | |
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL | First Respondent |
THE EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN ANTHONY STORRY | Second Respondent |
KEITH GRAHAM NORMAN | Third Respondent |
JACLYNNE STEAD NORMAN | Fourth Respondent |
BRISBANE | |
TUESDAY, 22 JULY 2025 |
|
JUDGMENT |
BOWSKILL CJ: The applicant, Ms Storry, applies for leave to appeal two separate decisions.
The first is a decision of the QCAT appeal tribunal, constituted by Senior Member Fitzpatrick, which was made on 20 November 2024. The reasons were provided on 2 May 2025. Under s 150 of the QCAT Act 2009, an appeal against a decision of the appeal tribunal may be made only on a question of law and only if a party obtains this Court’s leave to appeal.
The second is a decision of a judge of appeal, Justice Mullins, made on 25 November 2024 striking out an application by Ms Storry to re-open various earlier proceedings in this Court as an abuse of process. Ms Storry asks this Court to vary or discharge the order made by Justice Mullins under s 44(4) of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991.
There is no arguable basis on which to challenge the decision of the appeal tribunal on any question of law. The decision concerned an application filed by Ms Storry on 25 June 2024 seeking to extend the time to file an application for leave to appeal a decision made by the tribunal in December 2021 and three other decisions made in May 2022. That application was refused taking into account the substantial delay (of more than two years in relation to the later decisions and even longer in relation to the December 2021 decision), the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay, the apparent lack of merit in the proposed appeals, the likelihood of prejudice to the other parties and the interests of justice. The tribunal member applied the correct principles to the question she was required to determine. No error of law has been identified.
In the oral submissions made today by Ms Storry in support of her application for leave, she emphasises, and seeks to characterise as an error of law, that the Senior Member did not hear from all the claimants in respect of the matter of prejudice; further, she seeks to challenge the Senior Member’s conclusion as to the satisfactoriness or otherwise of the explanations for delay; Ms Storry also contends that it was an error of law for the member not to consider the merits of the claims in the manner that Ms Storry submits she should have; and she also contends that the member made an error of law as to her standing, having regard to s 116(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
One of the difficulties that is apparent from all of the material, including the further submissions made today, is that it seems Ms Storry has a misconception about what the Senior Member was deciding in that decision, which was limited to a decision about whether to give an extension of time in which to appeal after substantial delay. There is also a misconception involved as to what is relevant for this Court to decide. As I have said, no error of law has been identified in the decision of the tribunal member. It would not be appropriate to grant leave to appeal this decision.
There is also no basis on which to challenge the order made by Justice Mullins striking out Ms Storry’s re-opening application. One of the previous proceedings Ms Storry sought to re-open was an application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal a decision of a judicial member of QCAT more than 11 months out of time. That was proceeding CA 5381 of 2023. The QCAT decision sought to be appealed was a decision refusing to summarily dismiss disciplinary proceedings which had been brought against Ms Storry and her company. This Court dismissed the application, noting that there had been no satisfactory explanation for the delay, but in any event because the disciplinary proceedings were plainly unsuitable for summary resolution and so it could not be said the tribunal had made any error (see [2024] QCA 22). The other proceedings sought to be re-opened are even earlier. They are proceedings CA 8237 of 2020 and 13106 of 2021. Ms Storry seemingly previously tried to do the same thing, in the context of proceeding CA 5381 of 2023, and was unsuccessful (see [2024] QCA 22 at paragraphs 26 to 27).
The reasons given by Justice Mullins on 25 November 2024 clearly support the conclusion that the re-opening application was misconceived, lacked any rational foundation and was an abuse of process. It was properly struck out.
It is noted that the applicant has filed three applications seeking the same relief in respect of these two decisions, that is the applications filed on 13 December 2024, 14 May 2025 and 25 June 2025. I would dismiss each of the applications for leave to appeal both decisions, with costs.
BROWN JA: I agree with the reasons and orders proposed by the Chief Justice.
BRADLEY JA: I also agree.
BOWSKILL CJ: Accordingly, the order of the Court is that each of the applications for leave to appeal both decisions is dismissed, with costs.