R v GBT; ex parte Attorney-General
[2025] QCA 157
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- R v GBT; ex parte Attorney-General[2025] QCA 157
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R v GBT; ex parte Attorney-General[2025] QCA 157
R v GBT; ex parte Attorney-General[2025] QCA 157
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | R v GBT; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2025] QCA 157 |
PARTIES: | R v GBT (respondent) EX PARTE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF QUEENSLAND (appellant) |
FILE NO/S: | CA No 3 of 2025 DC No 52 of 2024 DC No 53 of 2024 DC No 54 of 2024 |
DIVISION: | Court of Appeal |
PROCEEDING: | Sentence Appeal by Attorney-General (Qld) |
ORIGINATING COURT: | Childrens Court at Maroochydore – Date of Sentence: 5 December 2024 (Long SC DCJ) |
DELIVERED ON: | 29 August 2025 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 14 August 2025 |
JUDGES: | Mullins P and Boddice and Bradley JJA |
ORDER: | Appeal dismissed. |
CATCHWORDS: | CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the respondent, a child, pleaded guilty to one count of receiving tainted property with a circumstance of aggravation (count 1), two counts of unlawfully using a motor vehicle in the night (counts 2 and 3) and one count of dangerous operation of a vehicle causing deaths and grievous bodily harm whilst excessively speeding (count 4) – where the child was sentenced to an effective head sentence of 6 years’ detention with an order that the child be released after serving 60 per cent of the detention period – where the appellant contends that the sentence of 6 years’ detention for count 4 was manifestly inadequate as the child’s offending on that count fell into the worst category warranting the maximum sentence of 7 years’ detention – whether the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) R v BZZ & AZY; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2025] QCA 89, cited R v Patrick (a pseudonym); Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2020) 3 QR 578; [2020] QCA 51, cited |
COUNSEL: | C M Cook for the appellant E D Whitton for the respondent |
SOLICITORS: | Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the appellant Legal Aid Queensland for the respondent |
- [1]THE COURT: The Attorney-General of Queensland appeals against the sentence imposed on the respondent, a child, on 5 December 2024.
- [2]On that date, the child was sentenced to an effective head sentence of 6 years’ detention with an order that the child be released after serving 60 per cent of the detention period.
- [3]The Attorney-General appeals on the sole ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate. The Attorney-General contends that the sentence of 6 years’ detention for count 4 was manifestly inadequate as the child’s offending on that count fell into the worst category warranting the maximum sentence of 7 years’ detention. An argument advanced by the Attorney-General in the written submissions that the sentence was also inadequate because of the reduction of the period in actual detention from 70 per cent to 60 per cent was subsumed by the Attorney-General’s main contention that the maximum penalty should have been imposed for count 4.
Indictments
- [4]On 18 November 2024, the child pleaded guilty to four counts on one indictment, two counts on an ex officio indictment and one summary charge.
- [5]The four count indictment contained one count of receiving tainted property with a circumstance of aggravation (count 1), two counts of unlawfully using a motor vehicle in the night (counts 2 and 3) and one count of dangerous operation of a vehicle causing deaths and grievous bodily harm whilst excessively speeding (count 4).
- [6]The ex officio indictment contained one count of unlawfully using of a motor vehicle (count 1) and one count of stealing (count 2).
- [7]The summary charge was driving a motor vehicle without a licence.
- [8]The child was sentenced to 6 years’ detention with a conviction recorded, for count 4 on the indictment, 18 months’ detention, with a conviction recorded, for count 3 on that indictment and lesser concurrent periods of detention, with no conviction recorded, for counts 1 and 2 on that indictment and the counts on the ex officio indictment. The child was reprimanded for the summary charge.
Facts
- [9]All of the offences were committed in April 2023, when the child was aged 13 years and had no prior court history.
- [10]Counts 1 and 2 on the indictment were committed on 19 April 2023. On that day, food, keys and a motor vehicle were stolen from a residence. The vehicle was found the following day. It had sustained considerable damage. Forensic evidence linked the child to the vehicle and property.
- [11]Counts 3 and 4 and the two counts on the ex officio indictment, were all committed on 30 April 2023. That afternoon the child was picked up from his residential care facility by juvenile co-offenders in a stolen vehicle. He was a passenger in the vehicle (count 1, ex officio indictment) when it was filled with petrol, without paying for that petrol (count 2, ex officio indictment).
- [12]Later that evening, the child and his juvenile co-offenders stole a motor vehicle from a residence (commencement of count 3). Thereafter, the child dangerously operated the stolen vehicle for approximately 30 minutes. His juvenile peers were present. They subsequently left the vehicle, fearing for their lives, due to his manner of driving.
- [13]Over the next hour, the child drove that vehicle dangerously. He crossed double white lines, did not maintain a safe distance from other road users and used excessive speed over a distance of many kilometres. This protracted period of dangerous driving only stopped when the child struck the rear of another vehicle, causing it to rotate clockwise into the path of another oncoming vehicle. The vehicle struck by the child contained three occupants. Two were killed and the third sustained grievous bodily harm. The sole occupant of the other vehicle was also killed.
- [14]Witnesses variously described the child as “driving like an idiot” and driving “very fast”. Witnesses estimated the child’s vehicle travelling at between 180 and 200 kilometres per hour, shortly prior to the collision.
- [15]Analysis of the scene revealed that the child’s vehicle had continued approximately 114 metres from the site of the initial impact down the roadway, before colliding with a large tree. All vehicles suffered extensive damage.
- [16]Immediately after the collision, witnesses reported that the child was lying on the ground outside the driver’s side door. He began to cry and reported his leg hurt. Others attended to assist the occupants of the other vehicles. Two occupants were declared dead at the scene. A further occupant died during transportation to hospital. The surviving occupant remained in hospital for some 16 days. That person sustained significant brain injuries, chest and abdominal injuries and a fractured left leg. Those injuries required significant and protracted medical care and may result in life long cognitive deficits.
- [17]When police approached the child at the scene, he provided his name, made admissions to crawling out of the stolen vehicle after the collision, and gave a brief version of having hit the back of a vehicle, before travelling in the direction of the tree and slamming on the brakes. The child told police that he waited for them to arrive and that there was “no point in me running”.
- [18]The child was taken to the watchhouse. Whilst there, he told a Youth Justice team leader that he had been driving “mad and angrily” and as “[he] was going 200 km/hr, [he] smacked into the back of a car. Their car spun out” [1] before his vehicle crashed into a tree. The child described it as a “dumb thing to do”.
Sentencing remarks
- [19]The sentencing judge recorded that the child had pleaded guilty to offences committed on two separate occasions, over a period of approximately a fortnight, when aged 13 years. At the time of sentencing, he was approaching his 15th birthday.
- [20]The sentencing judge also recorded that the child was being sentenced having regard to circumstances involving another occasion of driving stolen vehicles which were not permitted to be considered to be part of his juvenile criminal history, but were of relevance, having regard to the contents of a pre-sentence report containing Dr Hatzipetrou’s assessments. That conduct meant that the child’s particularly serious and dominating offence of the dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing the deaths of three people and grievous bodily harm to another, could not be regarded as totally aberrant isolated behaviour.
- [21]The sentencing judge recorded that having regard to those circumstances, that conduct could not be given the weight sought in the Crown’s submissions, to support a contention that the child should be sentenced for the dangerous operation of the motor vehicle offence causing deaths and grievous bodily harm, as being offending in the worst category of its type. The sentencing judge recorded that even if a different conclusion was to be reached in respect of the weight of that material, having regard to the child’s particularly young age as a juvenile offender and what would still be the absence of a prior offending history, it would not, in any event, be appropriate to reason in that way.
- [22]The sentencing judge further recorded that having regard to all of the circumstances, the appropriate sentence was one that reflected the totality of his offending, in accordance with the applicable principles under the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld).
- [23]After setting out the circumstances of the offences, the sentencing judge recorded that the impact of the child’s offending, was to have directly caused the deaths of three people and lasting life-long physical and emotional consequences to a fourth person. The sentencing judge accepted that having regard to the grave consequences of that offending, there could be no doubt that there needed to be particular denunciation and the imposition of a punishment which had some condign effect to deter not only the child, but others, from similarly dangerous conduct in offending generally.
- [24]After referring to the sentencing principles, the sentencing judge found that no sentence, other than detention, was appropriate. The sentencing judge recorded that whilst comparable authorities[2] attempted to provide some yardsticks and guidance as to the appropriate parameters for the detention order, it was necessary to have regard to the fact that the sentences in those cases were imposed before amendments to Youth Justice Principle 18 and when the imposition of detention orders and the length of the detention was the subject of a provision more favourable to juveniles. There were also differences in the nature and circumstances of the offending in those comparable authorities.
- [25]The sentencing judge found that whilst the objective factors relevant to the child’s offending were clearly grave, there was also a need to have regard to the subjective considerations as to his personal circumstances, including the prejudicial nature of his upbringing, including exposure to some significant domestic violence and the opinion of Dr Hatzipetrou that contributing factors to the offending, included problems with self-regulation, evidence of cognitive impairments in the area of working memory, verbal comprehension and information processing speed and a likelihood of impairment in the ability to solve and form rational decisions, with the child’s abilities to form reasonable judgements in major dilemmas being inconsistent with his chronological age and normative peer group. The child also had long-standing problems with impulsivity which were further exacerbated by the child having suffered a traumatic head injury at one point. Dr Hatzipetrou also opined that the child’s anti-social attitudes and propensity for rule-violating behaviours, represented a disposition for criminal offending and transgressions of societal rules and that as those attitudes and behaviours had not been actively treated, the child’s risk of offending was likely to persist.
- [26]The sentencing judge recorded that Dr Hatzipetrou had observed that current materials and reports indicated that the child, since being remanded in Youth Detention, had maintained regular school attendance and participated in prescribed programs and had also engaged with a psychologist/counsellor.
- [27]After recording that Dr Hatzipetrou had noted that given the child’s age and personal history, there was a requirement for intensive support and supervision on an ongoing basis, not only in detention, but also upon transition into the community, the sentencing judge found:
“These are recognised factors to be taken into account and, potentially, on the one hand, indicating a moderation of the punitive and deterrent aspects of the sentence to be imposed on you. But also, perhaps, on the other hand are capable of indicating a sense of risk for the future, in terms of resistance to change and risk of reoffending. Here, that is the context for the debate that was engaged with Dr Hatzipetrou, particularly in the evidence he provided to the Court. Whilst as Dr Hatzipetrou identified and explained in knowing that as matters stand and with those prejudicial factors, at this stage, only being partly addressed and as he noted, presenting barriers to your rehabilitation or prospects thereof, an appropriate present assessment of risk of violent reoffending was noted to be, at least, moderate to high and of general recidivism, high. However, as Dr Hatzipetrou went on to explain, consistently with the principles I have noted to be applied by this Court under the Youth Justice Act, that in contrast to dealing with adult offenders and potentially ingrained characteristics, account must be had to what may be expected as to a process of maturation and development, in emotional, social and physical senses, particularly in the context of what had been identified as ongoing needs for interventions including continued involvement in education, as is now occurring whilst you are in detention and exposure to prosocial influences, which was, otherwise, noted to be a challenge whilst in detention.
Notwithstanding the need for the horrendous consequences of your egregious offending on the 30th of April 2023 to be properly reflected in your sentence, in these circumstances and having regard, as the Court must, to your age and the limited extent of your past exposure to interventions and particularly those that might be expected to be associated with supervisory orders, the balance here should favour some moderation of approach. Including having regard to your particularly young age as you offended and your young age now, what I have noted is your cooperation at the scene of your tragic offending and the frankness that you later displayed in discussion with the officer from Youth Justice. And noting the cooperation that has occurred and facilitation at the course of dealing with these matters by the earliest possible entry of guilty pleas in respect of the first presented indictment and, of course, in respect of the ex officio indictment that came before the Court more recently. And as representing your acceptance of responsibility for this offending.
I am not so sure that it is necessary to examine the different indications as to your sense of remorse or insight. Because, again, as explained by Dr Hatzipetrou, those things are constrained by your circumstances, your age and, again are matters that can be expected to be assisted by you gaining age and maturation and involvement in interventions. In particular, the matters that I have just mentioned, in my view, warrant some reduction of the portion of your sentence for which you are required to be kept in detention before release under a supervised release order.
Before leaving the principles to be applied, what I have just described, it seems to me, is entirely consistent with what was described in dealing with R v Patrick in the Court of Appeal and particularly in reference to those Youth Justice Principles, as I have noted to remain applicable in dealing with you, in respect of requirements that a Judge deal with a child in a way that gives an opportunity to develop in a responsible, beneficial and socially accepted way and in a way that allows the child to be reintegrated into the community. Such considerations were described as commanding a sentencing Judge to do what can be done to increase the prospects of diverting the child from the potentially damaging effects of punishment, towards education, the learning of self-discipline, the nurturing of an appreciation and an acceptance of social standards and in due course, successful reintegration with the community.”[3]
Consideration
- [28]The principles applicable to an appeal by the Attorney-General are well settled and not in dispute. The burden is on the Attorney-General to persuade the Court that an error has occurred, that a more severe sentence is appropriate and that the residual discretion ought not to apply.[4] Where, as here, the sole ground is that the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate, the question is whether, by reason of extreme leniency, an error of principle can be inferred.[5]
- [29]The Attorney-General submits that a misapplication of principle can be inferred because the child’s offending fell into the worst category of that type of offending, warranting the imposition of the maximum penalty of 7 years’ detention. It is submitted that a sentence less than that maximum constitutes the imposition of a sentence that was “unreasonable or plainly unjust”.
- [30]Whilst the child’s dangerous driving extended over a protracted period, involved multiple instances of dangerous manoeuvring and excessive speed and ultimately only ceased when the vehicle driven by the child collided with the rear of a vehicle, with catastrophic consequences for the occupants of that vehicle and an oncoming vehicle, a consideration of all of the circumstances, and the relevant Youth Justice sentencing principles, supports a conclusion that the sentence imposed for the child’s offending fell within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. It was neither unreasonable, nor plainly unjust.
- [31]First, although the child’s appalling, protracted period of dangerous driving may be said to approach the worst category of that type of offending, there are significant mitigating factors warranting a sentence less than the maximum period of detention. The child was only 13 years of age, had no prior court history (although the manner of driving could not be said to be totally aberrant behaviour), and whilst in youth detention, had shown positive engagement with schooling, programs and a counsellor. Having regard to the child’s extreme youth and Dr Hatzipetrou’s opinion as to changes that will likely take place as the child ages, a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion warranted favourable consideration of these mitigating factors, as supportive of a prospect of rehabilitation in the future.
- [32]Second, the child entered pleas of guilty. Those pleas of guilty had utility. They saved the surviving occupant, that person’s family and the families of the deceased occupants from the trauma of a trial. The child was to be afforded the benefit of his cooperation with the administration of justice, evidenced by those pleas of guilty.
- [33]Once regard is had to those factors, there is no proper basis upon which to conclude that the child’s offending was of a nature where imposition of a sentence of detention for the maximum period, was the only appropriate sentence.
- [34]Further, the sentence of 6 years’ detention was a significant sentence. Such a sentence appropriately recognised the need for denunciation and deterrence. It cannot be said that the sentence allowed the significant mitigating factors to overwhelm the importance of deterrence, both generally and personally.
Conclusion
- [35]There is no basis upon which to conclude that there was error warranting intervention, on an appeal by the Attorney-General.
Orders
- [36]The Court orders:
- Appeal dismissed.