Ward v Legal Services Commission
[2025] QCA 171
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- Unreported Judgment
- Ward v Legal Services Commission[2025] QCA 171
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Ward v Legal Services Commission[2025] QCA 171
Ward v Legal Services Commission[2025] QCA 171
[2025] QCA 171
COURT OF APPEAL
BODDICE JA
BROWN JA
BLEBY AJA
Appeal No 1309 of 2025
SC No 12253 of 2024
HEIDI WARD Applicant
v
LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION Respondent
BRISBANE
MONDAY, 15 SEPTEMBER 2025
JUDGMENT
BROWN JA: The applicant, Ms Ward, seeks an extension of time to appeal a decision of Justice Crowley granting an interim injunction under section 703, subsection (4) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (LPA) in the terms outlined in the order of 24 September 2024, which, in simplified terms, restrained Ms Ward from engaging in legal practice in the State of Queensland, representing or advertising that she is entitled to engage in legal practice and requesting or receiving considerations for the provision of legal services. The Legal Services Commissioner alleges that Ms Ward has engaged in the provision of such services contrary to section 24, subsection (1) and section 25, subsection (1) of the LPA. That matter has not been finally determined.
Ms Ward’s application for an extension of time was filed on 31 March 2025, more than five months out of time, the appeal period being 28 days after the decision. An appeal can only be made outside that time by an order of the Court of Appeal under rule 748 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). Ms Ward has not filed an application applying for an extension of time but has raised the need for an extension in her affidavit. The Legal Services Commissioner has indicated it is willing to treat that indication in her affidavit as an informal application. On this occasion only, the court is also willing to do so. To the extent that Ms Ward has, in her latest written submissions, sought to contend that the Legal Services Commissioner has proceeded on the basis that leave was granted, that is contrary to the Legal Service Commissioner’s submissions.
In considering whether to grant an extension of time within which to bring the appeal, the court considers a number of matters, conveniently summarised by Justice Fraser in Quinn v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QCA 354 at [7]. First, the length of time between when the appeal should have been filed and when the application for an extension of time is sought. Secondly, whether there is an acceptable explanation for the delay. Thirdly, any prejudice to the respondent arising out of the delay; and finally, the merits of the appeal. In considering the merits of the appeal, it is relevant that the applicant seeks an extension of time to appeal an interlocutory order of the court. In the case of matters involving practice and procedure, this court will generally only interfere to overturn a decision of that kind if there is shown to be an error and the decision appealed from will work a substantial injustice to one of the parties: see Yao v Fang [2025] QCA 86 at [55].
In her affidavit, the applicant offers, by way of explanation for delay, that it took her a great deal of time and due diligence to absorb the legislation and the elements of an injunction and that she also decided to seek to strike out the complaint of the Legal Services Commissioner, which was unsuccessful on 21 March 2025. While one can understand the difficulties experienced by a self-represented litigant, Ms Ward’s explanation as to her reasons for delay is not a satisfactory one, particularly where she has delayed seeking an extension of time while she pursued another application.
The Legal Services Commissioner does not suggest that it has suffered any prejudice due to the delay.
As to the merits raised by the proposed grounds of appeal, Ms Ward seeks to challenge that her conduct constituted “engaging in legal practice” under the LPA and further contends that regulatory action was unnecessary. She contends that there is no serious question to be tried and contends there is no risk of irreparable harm. Her contentions also include that, in terms of the balance of convenience that prevention of her acting as a McKenzie’s friend or educator may cause harm to those that cannot access information. She raises a further contention that public interest was ignored by the primary judge.
The Legal Services Commissioner, however, contends that the proposed appeal is unmeritorious and lacks utility because the primary proceeding is ready to be listed for final hearing as the parties have filed their evidence and submissions.
No final determination was made by the primary judge in granting an interim injunction pursuant to section 703, subsection (4) of the LPA. The primary judge carefully considered the meaning of “engage in legal practice” and whether there was a serious question to be tried and where the balance of convenience lies. He took into account that the applicant’s brochure stated explicitly that she was not a lawyer. His Honour carefully considered the evidence that was put before him and considered both the definition of “engage in legal practice” in the schedule of the LPA and the decision of Cornall v Nagle [1995] 2 VR 188. He did not finally determine the issues before him. In reaching the view that there was a serious question to be tried, his Honour stated:
“I am satisfied that there is a prima facie case. I make plain again I am not deciding whether there has been contravention. That is not the test and not the requirement at this stage, but it does appear to me, particularly from the advertisement, that there is a potential for ongoing assistance to be provided. It has been advertised. The respondent, in terms of providing legal advice or legal assistance, has shown a willingness to provide legal assistance to others.”
His Honour considered that the balance of convenience favoured the granting of the interim injunctive relief as “it would be to do no more than what is otherwise prohibited by the Act for a person who is not an Australian legal practitioner.”
There is no demonstrable legal error in the primary judge’s decision, nor in the exercise of his Honour’s discretion. Moreover, there is no identifiable substantial injustice that has been suffered by Ms Ward, even if there was a demonstrable error.
The injunction to which Ms Ward is subject merely restrains her from doing that which she is prohibited from doing under the LPA, given she is not an Australian legal practitioner within the meaning of the Act, namely it prohibits her from engaging in legal practice or advertising or representing that she is entitled to engage in legal practice or receiving consideration for the provision of legal services. Whether her conduct relied upon by the Legal Services Commissioner has in fact contravened the LPA is not a matter which will be determined until the final hearing. The fact that no final determination has been made whether she has contravened the LPA demonstrates there is no utility in granting the extension of time.
Ms Ward may raise the substantive matters outlined in her proposed appeal in the final hearing as to whether a permanent injunction should be granted, insofar as they are relevant.
In all of the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the applicant has demonstrated that an extension of time to appeal should be granted. I consider that the application for leave for an extension of time to appeal should therefore be refused.
BODDICE JA: I agree.
BLEBY AJA: I agree.
BODDICE JA: In the circumstances, you said you would not be asking for costs.
MS FEENEY: That’s correct, your Honour.
BODDICE JA: The orders of the Court are:
- The application for leave for an extension of time to appeal is refused.
- There be no order as to costs.
MS FEENEY: Thank you, your Honour. May I ask an – a housekeeping question. Will your Honours be publishing the decision?
BODDICE JA: We will, once the transcript comes and it has been ‑ ‑ ‑
MS FEENEY: Thank you.
BODDICE JA: ‑ ‑ ‑ revised. And, yes, it will be published.
MS FEENEY: Thank you, your Honours. It’s simply a question of whether we ask for a copy of the transcript ‑ ‑ ‑
BODDICE JA: Yes.
MS FEENEY: ‑ ‑ ‑ or ‑ ‑ ‑
BODDICE JA: Certainly. Yes. Adjourn the court.