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Medical Board of Australia v Wong[2015] QCAT 439

Medical Board of Australia v Wong[2015] QCAT 439

CITATION:

Medical Board of Australia v Wong [2015] QCAT 439

PARTIES:

Medical Board of Australia

(Applicant)

 

v

 

Kevin Robert Wong

(Respondent)

APPLICATION NUMBER:

OCR142-14

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

HEARING DATE:

25 August 2015

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Judge Alexander Horneman-Wren SC, Deputy President

Assisted by:

Dr Eileen Burkett

Dr Brian Kable

Ms Amara Bains

DELIVERED ON:

16 September 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS MADE:

  1. Dr Kevin Wong has an Impairment.
  2. The parties are to propose conditions to be imposed on Dr Kevin Wong’s registration.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS – MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS – DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – where registrant charged with counts of sexual assault – where registrant declared of unsound mind under Mental Health Act 2000 and forensic order imposed – whether registrant has impairment – whether registrant has engaged in misconduct – whether registrant’s registration should be cancelled – where registrant found to be impaired – where conditions imposed upon registrant’s registration

STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION AND PROVISIONS – whether a prohibition under section 281(1)(b) of the Mental Health Act 2000 extends to disciplinary proceedings in the Tribunal as referred under the National Law – where prohibition not sufficiently broad to extend to these proceedings

Acts Interpretation Act 1954

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2014 (Qld), s 3

Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), s 497

Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld), s 281

A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society NSW [2003] 216 CLR 253.

Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 QdR 474.

Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Ardalich [2005] SASC 478.

Medical Board of Queensland v DAP [2008] QCA 44.

NSW Bar Association v Butland [2008] NSWADT 120.

Pharmacy Board of Australia v Jattan [2015] QCAT 294.

Rich v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129.

White v White (1949] 2 All E.R. 399.

APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):

APPLICANT:

Mr C Wilson instructed by Rogers Barnes & Green.

RESPONDENT:

Mr G Diehm QC instructed by K & L Gates.

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    On 1 July 2014 the Medical Board of Australia referred a disciplinary proceeding to the Tribunal in which it alleged that Dr Kevin Robert Wong had behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (National Law). 

Dr Wong and the Conduct Referred

  1. [2]
    Dr Wong has been registered as a medical practitioner in Queensland since 1985.  His registration has been suspended, it would seem, since about 24 August 2012 when he informed the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency that he was voluntarily, immediately ceasing practice. 
  2. [3]
    That voluntary cessation of practice followed Dr Wong having been charged, also in August 2012, with 27 counts of sexual assault in relation to 19 complainants.  All but 1 of the complainants were patients of Dr Wong.  The other was an employee of the practice in which he worked.
  3. [4]
    The assaults on the patients occurred during consultations with Dr Wong which occurred between 1 June 2012 and 21 August 2012. The assault on the employee occurred at the practice on or about 1 August 2012. 
  4. [5]
    The Board sets out the conduct which constituted each of the sexual assaults in 24 “charges” in its referral.  The Board also sets out a 25th charge relating to an assault on the mother of a 16 month old child on or about 21 August 2012, which occurred when the mother had sought treatment for the child from Dr Wong.  The assault the subject of this 25th charge was not conduct for which Dr Wong was charged criminally. 
  5. [6]
    In its referral the Board alleged that by engaging the conduct set out in one or any of the 25 charges in the referral, Dr Wong behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct or, alternatively, unprofessional conduct as each of those terms are defined under the National Law. 
  6. [7]
    At the commencement of the hearing the Board was given leave to amend the referral to allege also that Dr Wong has an impairment as that term is defined under the National Law.
  7. [8]
    The inclusion, by amendment, of this allegation reflects that under s 196(1) of the National Law, one of the decisions which the Tribunal may make after hearing a matter about a registered health practitioner referred to it, is that the practitioner has an impairment.  It appears from the legislation that such a decision would be open to the Tribunal even if an allegation of impairment were not made in the referral. 
  8. [9]
    The amendment was not, in any event, opposed by Dr Wong because he not only concedes that a decision of impairment is able to be made under s 196(1), he contends that it is the only decision which should be made.

Proceedings in the Mental Health Court

  1. [10]
    Having been charged in August 2012 with numerous counts of sexual assault arising from his conduct which is now the subject of charges 1 to 24 in the referral, Dr Wong’s legal representatives referred his mental condition to the Mental Health Court under the Mental Health Act 2000.  That reference was determined by the Mental Health Court on 6 November 2013.
  2. [11]
    The Court found, and declared, that at the time of each of the alleged offences Dr Wong was suffering from unsoundness of mind as defined in Schedule 10 to the Mental Health Act.  A forensic order was imposed upon Dr Wong by the Court.  That forensic order, in an amended form, remains in place.

Prohibition of these proceedings – s 281(1)(b) Mental Health Act 2000

  1. [12]
    Mr Deihm QC who appeared for Dr Wong submitted that, to the extent the conduct complained of was the subject of the criminal proceedings, that is charges 1 to 24 inclusive in the referral, the bringing of these proceedings was, and is, prohibited following the order of the Mental Health Court.  That prohibition is said to arise by operation of s 281(1)(b) of the Mental Health Act. 
  2. [13]
    Section 281(1)(b) provides:

“If the Mental Health Court decides a person charged with an offence was of unsound mind when the alleged offence was committed –

  1. (a)
     proceedings against the person for the offence are discontinued; and
  1. (b)
     further proceedings must not be taken against the person for the act or omission constituting the offence.”
  1. [14]
    A proceeding is defined in the dictionary of the Mental Health Act to mean:

“Proceeding means –

  1. (a)
     for a provision relating to the Mental Health Court – a proceeding in the Court; or
  1. (b)
     for a provision relating to the Tribunal – a proceeding in the Tribunal.”
  1. [15]
    Mr Deihm QC submitted that this is plainly a limited definition which does not extend to the kinds of proceedings contemplated by s 281.  With respect, that must be correct.
  2. [16]
    Mr Deihm QC then submits that recourse should be had to s 36 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 and the definition of proceeding in Schedule 1 to that Act.  It defines proceeding to mean:

“Proceeding means a legal or other action or proceeding.”

  1. [17]
    It is then submitted that that definition is broad enough to incorporate proceedings before this Tribunal.
  2. [18]
    For Dr Wong he submits that:

“8.  …the proceedings before this Tribunal seek to impose a penalty upon the respondent for the acts or omissions which constituted the offences for which he was found to have been of unsound mind when they were committed.

  1. It is plain that subparagraph (b) is intended to be broader in its application than merely prohibiting the recharging of the respondent with the original offences charged.  It extends to prohibiting the bringing of any proceedings seeking to impose a penalty, because of his having committed the same acts as that with respect to which he was charged.”
  1. [19]
    In support of the submission that these are proceedings which “seek to impose a penalty” upon the respondent, Rich v Australian Securities and Investment Commission[1] is cited.  Rich establishes that relief granted in a proceeding may bear several characters; it may operate protectively of the public, but at the same time operate as a penalty upon the person against whom the relief is sought.[2]  For that reason, attempting to distinguish between proceedings on the basis they are either “protective” or “punitive” is not possible or useful.[3]
  2. [20]
    In Rich, the Commission had brought proceedings in a NSW Supreme Court in which it sought three particular forms of relief: declarations under s 131(7)(E) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that the appellants, former directors of One.Tel Ltd, had contravened s 180(1) of the Corporations Act (itself a civil penalty provision); compensation orders pursuant to s 131(7)(H)(1) of the Corporations Act; and disqualification orders pursuant to ss 206C and 206E of that Act disqualifying each of the directors from managing a corporation for a period considered appropriate by the Court.  The Commission was expressly conferred power to apply for each form of relief.[4] 
  3. [21]
    Such proceedings may rightly be described as proceedings which seek to impose a penalty.
  4. [22]
    By contrast, as was observed in Pharmacy Board of Australia v Jattan,[5] under Part 8, Division 12 of the National Law the Board does not bring an application to the Tribunal seeking any particular relief; penal or otherwise.  It refers, relevantly, a matter about a registered health practitioner in respect of which the Board reasonably believes that the practitioner has behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct.[6]  It is only after hearing the matter referred and reaching a conclusion about the practitioner,[7] that the form of any action which the Tribunal is empowered to take will be considered by the Tribunal.[8] 
  5. [23]
    One conclusion which the Tribunal may reach after having heard the matter referred is that the practitioner has an impairment.[9]  As referred to above, that conclusion may be reached by the Tribunal notwithstanding that what was referred by the Board was a matter relating to conduct which it believed constituted professional misconduct.  Indeed, that is the very course which Dr Wong submits ought be followed by the Tribunal in this case; at least in respect of charge 25 of the referral which he does not contend is prohibited by s 281(1)(b) of the Mental Health Act.
  6. [24]
    These matters illustrate the difference between proceedings such as these and those considered in Rich.  It is a distinction which, in my view, would caution against these proceedings being too readily described as proceedings seeking to impose a penalty in the sense considered in Rich.
  7. [25]
    In any event, even if these proceedings were appropriately described in that way, the submission in paragraph 9 of Dr Wong’s written submissions set out above should not be accepted.  Whilst that submission refers to the prohibition in s 281(1)(b) extending to “the bringing of any proceeding seeking to impose a penalty”, those words underlined would also operate to limit the proceedings prohibited by s 281(1)(b).  However, they are words of limitation which do not appear in the text of s 281(1)(b).
  8. [26]
    If section 281(1)(b) is sufficiently broad to extend to these proceedings, then it would also be equally sufficiently broad to extend to other civil proceedings taken against the person for the act or omission constituting the offence.  Such proceedings would extend, for example, in an appropriate case, to proceedings brought for battery or negligence. 
  9. [27]
    In my view, s 281(1)(b) does not extend to prohibit such proceedings. 
  10. [28]
    In Carrier v Bonham[10] McPherson JA, with whom McMurdo P expressed general agreement and with whom Moynihan J also agreed, held that the principal under Roman Law and the legal systems of continental Europe derived from it, that a person of unsound mind is not legally liable for his wrongs, “has no place in our law”.[11]  His Honour said:

“Unsoundness of mind is not a normal condition in most people, and it is not a stage of development through which all humanity is destined to pass. There is no such thing as a "normal" condition of unsound mind in those who suffer that affliction. It comes in different varieties and different shades or degrees. For that reason it would be impossible to devise a standard by which the tortious liability of such persons could be judged as a class. As Baron Bramwell once said, insanity is a misfortune and not a privilege. It attracts human sympathy but not, at least in the case of negligence, immunity under the law of civil wrongs.”[12]

  1. [29]
    McMurdo P in expressing her general agreement with the reasons of McPherson JA did so in the context of having expressly considered an analogue provision to s 281(1)(b) of the Mental Health Act.  Her Honour said at [2]:

“The criminal law recognises that a person is not criminally responsible for acts or omissions done without capacity because of mental illness or mental disability.”

  1. [30]
    Her Honour cited s 27 of the Criminal Code and the Mental Health Act 1974, Part 4.  The latter, at the relevant time, contained s 35A,[13] which provided, relevantly:

“Where pursuant to s 33(1) the Mental Health Tribunal has found that a person charged with an offence was, at the time the alleged offence was committed, suffering from unsoundness of mind… then … proceedings against the person –

  1. (a)
     shall, in the case of a finding of unsoundness of mind, be discontinued and further proceedings shall not be taken against him in respect of the act or omission constituting the offence to which the discontinued proceeding is related.”
  1. [31]
    In my view, s 35A(a) of the Mental Health Act 1974 was to the same effect, and would operate no more narrowly than, s 281(1)(b) of the Mental Health Act 2000.
  2. [32]
    Having noted the effect of the criminal law in that regard though, the President continued:[14]

There is initial attraction in the view taken by some academics that, as for criminal wrongs, those suffering from a diagnosed mental illness affecting their capacity, like children, should not be liable for their civil wrongs. See for example, in Trindade and Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia, the learned authors note:

"Children are not and are not expected to be as responsible as adults. Adults who are suddenly attacked by illness or bees can be forgiven because and to the extent that they have no chance to exercise responsible control over their actions. On this basis the insane should be excused too, unless we see insanity as some sort of wages of sin."

The courts have taken a different view. Denning LJ considered this interesting question in White v White:

"In my opinion, both on principle and authority, the effect of insanity is to be regarded differently in the civil courts from what it is in the criminal courts. …

… innocent third persons may have been injured by the sufferer. He may have made contracts and broken them, or he may have committed civil wrongs … If he is a man of wealth or is insured, are not the injured persons to be compensated from his estate? If the matter were free from authority I would say that they clearly are. …

I venture to think that the authorities support these views. In the case of ordinary contracts it is settled law that a person of unsound mind is liable on his contract unless the other party, at the time of the making of the contract, was aware of his incapacity… in the case of torts such as trespass and assault it is also settled that a person of unsound mind is responsible for wrongful conduct committed by him before he was known by the injured person to be of unsound mind, even though it has since become apparent that such conduct was influenced by mental disease which was unrecognised at the time, and this is so even if the mental disease was such that he did not know what he was doing or what he was doing was wrong. The reason is that the civil courts are concerned, not to punish him, but to give redress to the person he has injured.”

  1. [33]
    In my view, if s 281(1)(b) would not extend to prohibit such civil proceedings, it would also not extend to prohibit these proceedings. 
  2. [34]
    The better construction of s 281(1)(b), in my opinion, is that it relates to further criminal proceedings for the acts or omissions constituting the offence.
  3. [35]
    Section 281 is located within Chapter 7 of the Mental Health Act.  Chapter 7, part 4, relevantly, applies if there is reasonable cause to believe a person alleged to have committed an indictable offence was mentally ill at the time.[15]  The matter of the person’s mental condition relating to the offence may be referred to the Mental Health Court.[16]  Upon reference being made the proceedings for the offence alleged to have been committed are suspended.[17]  On hearing the reference the Mental Health Court must decide whether the person was of unsound mind when the alleged offence was committed.[18]
  4. [36]
    It is in that context that s 281(1)(a) provides that if the Mental Health Court finds that the person charged with the offence was of unsound mind when the alleged offence was committed, the proceedings against the person for that offence are discontinued and that, by s 281(1)(b), no further proceedings must be taken against the person for the act or omission constituting the offence.  It is very much a context of criminal proceedings.
  5. [37]
    In my view, construing the prohibition in s 281(1)(b) to further criminal proceedings is supported by the Explanatory Memorandum to the Mental Health Bill 2000.  That memorandum states that the Bill will provide for the expert determination of criminal responsibility for people with mental illness charged with criminal offences.  The note to clause 281 of the Bill said:

“Clause 281 provides that if a person is found of unsound mind at the time of the offence proceedings for the offence are discontinued and further proceedings cannot be taken against the person for the offence unless the person elects, under part 8, to be brought to trial.”

  1. [38]
    In so far as that note to clause 281 suggests that only the original offence cannot be recharged, it must be accepted that the prohibition in s 281(1)(b) would also extend to any other criminal offence arising from the acts or omission.
  2. [39]
    For these reasons, s 281(1)(b) does not prohibit the bringing of these proceedings in respect of charges 1 to 24 in the reference.

Impairment

  1. [40]
    Both the Board and Dr Wong submit that the Tribunal should find that Dr Wong has an impairment.  Clearly, such a finding should be made.
  2. [41]
    Dr Wong suffers from schizophrenia of long standing.  He first became unwell because of this illness in 1998.  The following summary of his early illness and the involvement of the then Medical Board of Queensland is taken from the Statement of Agreed Facts.
  3. [42]
    As a result of a letter from Dr Wong voluntarily surrendering his practice rights and prescribing rights for a period of 30 days from 23 May 1998 and information provided by Dr Paul Stenberg in a report dated 26 May 1998, the Medical Board of Queensland commissioned a health assessment of Dr Wong by Dr Donald Grant and appointed a committee of assessors under s 30D of the then Medical Act 1939 to hold an inquiry into the eligibility of Dr Wong to remain registered as a medical practitioner.
  4. [43]
    On 14 August 1998, the Committee of assessors held an inquiry and considered the report dated 26 May 1998 of Dr Stenberg and a report dated 20 July 1998 of Dr Grant.  The committee of assessors subsequently provided a report to the Medical Board of Queensland.
  5. [44]
    On 13 October 1998 the Medical Board considered the report of the committee of assessors and determined to impose conditions on the registration of Dr Wong.  Those conditions included that Dr Wong attend for treatment by a psychiatrist of his choice, at a frequency to be determined by the treating doctor, and that he authorise the treating psychiatrist to inform the Board of termination of treatment or if there was any significant change in health status.  The conditions also required Dr Wong to continue taking medication as prescribed by the treating psychiatrist. 
  6. [45]
    On 13 October 1998 the committee of assessors conducted a further inquiry and provided a further report to the Medical Board of Queensland.  On 23 December 1998 the Medical Board of Queensland considered the further report and determined that Dr Wong was fit to remain registered as a medical practitioner subject to the imposition of fresh conditions on his registration.  Again, those conditions included that he attend for treatment by a psychiatrist and that he authorise the treating psychiatrist to provide the Board with a brief report on his status every 3 months, and to notify the Board if Dr Wong terminated treatment or if there was any significant change in his health status.  The conditions also required him to continue taking his medication as prescribed by the treating psychiatrist and that he attend for review by the Board nominated psychiatrist on a 3 monthly basis. 
  7. [46]
    On 14 March 2001 Dr Wong provided a written undertaking to the Medical Board of Queensland that he would nominate a clinical mentor with whom he would have contact, initially once a month, and then as required by the Board. 
  8. [47]
    On 27 March 2001 the Board amended the conditions on Dr Wong’s registration to operate in conjunction with that undertaking.  Under those revised conditions, however, Dr Wong was still required to attend for treatment by a psychiatrist of his choice at a frequency determined by that treating doctor and to authorise the treating psychiatrist to provide the Board with reports every 3 months and to notify the Board if Dr Wong terminated treatment or if there was a significant change in his health status.  The revised conditions still required Dr Wong to continue taking medication as prescribed by the treating psychiatrist and to attend for review by the Board nominated psychiatrist, but only as requested by the Board.  The condition requiring Dr Wong to attend for treatment by a psychiatrist of his choice was amended on 27 November 2001 to remove the requirement for 3 monthly reporting by the treating psychiatrist.  The conditions otherwise remained unchanged.
  9. [48]
    Dr Wong was generally compliant with the conditions and his undertaking throughout the period during which they were in place.
  10. [49]
    On 23 September 2003 the Medical Board of Queensland determined to remove the conditions from Dr Wong’s registration and to discharge him from the Board’s health assessment and monitoring program.
  11. [50]
    In a report dated 20 June 2015 Dr Scott Harden, a psychiatrist who assessed Dr Wong on behalf of the Board, records that Dr Wong was away from work for approximately 18 months following his becoming unwell in 1998.  He was treated by a psychiatrist, Dr Stenberg, who he continued to see until approximately 2001 when his treatment was transferred to Dr Warlow.  Dr Wong saw Dr Warlow for treatment between approximately 2001 and 2008.  The history, as recorded in Dr Doctor Harden’s report, includes that in 2003 or 2004 Dr Wong had seriously considered suicide.  He decided not to a suicide and never told his treating practitioners about his thoughts because he was “too scared”.  In respect of that time, he was able to describe depressed mood but no clear psychotic symptoms. 
  12. [51]
    Dr Wong did not see anybody for treatment in the period between approximately 2008 and the offences in 2012.  He told Dr Harden that he stopped seeing Dr Warlow during that period as no further appointments had been made.  He said that Dr Warlow would usually make the appointments, not himself.  In the past, Dr Warlow had said to him to the effect “see you in a year’s time” and he had been reviewed yearly by Dr Warlow between 2002 and 2008.  Dr Wong expressed to Dr Harden that he was surprised that no further appointment had been made but that he took no further action himself.
  13. [52]
    After his relapse and his offences in 2012 Dr Wong saw Dr Warlow for a time and then moved his treatment to Dr Perce Tucker, another private psychiatrist.  Dr Wong also commenced seeing Dr Schneider, a public sector psychiatrist.
  14. [53]
    In respect of his most recent relapse preceding the offending conduct in 2012, Dr Wong told Dr Harden that in approximately December 2011 he had developed the idea in his head that he was well and did not need his medication.  On reflection he thought this was an abnormal thought, it was not that he considered that he had been well for a long time and might not need the medication, and it was not that he was concerned about side effects. It was more that he had thoughts with an abnormal emotional tone that said to him that he was well.  Dr Wong told Dr Harden that the belief was illogical and unjustified at the time and was held to a very strong degree.
  15. [54]
    He told Dr Harden that, on reflection, this should have been a sign to him that he was not well and that he should have increased his medication dose and made an appointment to see his psychiatrist urgently.  He said, however, that he believed that he was well.  In retrospect he noted also that his sleep was disturbed and that he was restless, starting to spend more and had a decreased appetite.  He said that those symptoms had been associated with all of his previous psychotic relapses. 
  16. [55]
    He told Dr Harden that, on further reflection, in all of his prior psychotic episodes he had believed that he was well and did not need medication.  This had happened in 2000 and he had had a relapse at that time.  Dr Wong reported that he had been living with his wife, also a medical practitioner, who he worked with at the time of the relapse.  She had noticed his sleep disturbance, appetite disturbance and increased spending from about April 2012. 
  17. [56]
    As to his current treatment, Dr Wong reported that he was seeing Dr Tucker every 6 to 8 weeks, Dr Schneider every 3 months, and a general practitioner 2 to 3 months.  He reported a good working relationship with Dr Tucker as his main treating psychiatrist.
  18. [57]
    He was taking palieperidone 12 milligrams in the morning, desvenlafaxine 150 milligrams in the morning, melatonin 3 milligrams at night and diazepam 2 milligrams for sleep occasionally. 
  19. [58]
    Dr Harden provides the following diagnostic opinion:

“Dr Wong has a long standing psychotic illness, most likely schizophrenia, with a sever initial psychotic episode resulting in hospitalisation, a long period of follow up and some minor relapses and a severe relapse in 2012 associated with delusional beliefs, some mood features and other psychotic symptoms including possible sexual disinhibition resulting in 27 charges of indecent assault against 17 female patients and a female staff member.

Dr Wong is an otherwise an (sic) experienced general practitioner with no forensic or substance use difficulties and a temperament described in numerous psychiatrist reports as being somewhat obsessional and anxious by nature.

He received a mental health defence and was placed on a forensic order.  He has been compliant with regular follow up with his new treating psychiatrist Dr Tucker for more than 2 years at this date.  He has continued to be compliant with medication over this period.  He continues to see the public sector mental health services and Dr Schneider for supervision of his forensic order.

He has now been well for at least 12 to 18 months and has good insight into his illness and the need for treatment.  He also has good understanding of the needs for caution in any potential return to practice and the requirement for lifelong treatment of his psychotic illness.

He has a reasonable level of social support with an intact marriage and an adult child.

The material available suggests in a pattern recorded over quite a number of years that if his anti-psychotic medication is discontinued he very rapidly starts to develop mood and then psychotic symptoms.  He then rapidly improves with restarting of his medication.”

  1. [59]
    Dr Harden opined that Dr Wong will require lifelong treatment with anti-psychotic medication and lifelong follow up by a specialist psychiatrist to treat his chronic schizophrenia.
  2. [60]
    Dr Harden expressed the opinion that at the time of his assessment of Dr Wong, Dr Wong was fit to practice the profession of medicine competently and safely, albeit in a graduated and limited way under supervision.  He did not have active psychotic symptoms and had no active symptoms of psychosis for a prolonged period of time.  Dr Harden described him as having a good treatment alliance with Dr Tucker and good insight into his need for treatment and need to comply with it.  He did not appear to have any cognitive deficits that would impair his practice.
  3. [61]
    As to the likelihood of Dr Wong suffering another deterioration of his mental condition and behaving in a similar manner to the conduct of 2012, Dr Harden opined that if Dr Wong were to stop taking his anti-psychotic medication he would suffer a psychotic relapse quite quickly.  Dr Harden was of the view that Dr Wong required particularly close monitoring of his mental state because it appeared that Dr Wong’s belief that he is well leads him to ceasing his medication and follow up and that this may well be psychotic in origin and a product of his illness.  Therefore, the early features of a psychotic relapse in Dr Wong appear to be likely to cause him to cease his treatment thereby exacerbating any such early relapse and delaying appropriate treatment and recovery.
  4. [62]
    Dr Harden was of the view that Dr Wong’s illness was at a point where his plan to return to medical practice in a graduated fashion could occur safely and competently.  Dr Harden made some recommendations about how best that might occur.
  5. [63]
    There are also in evidence a number of reports from Dr Perce Tucker, Dr Wong’s current treating psychiatrist. 
  6. [64]
    In a report dated 10 February 2014 Dr Tucker states that he had seen Dr Wong on 14 occasions since 8 April 2013.  He said that Dr Wong was then making a good sustained recovery from his schizophrenic illness and that he was fully compliant with all aspects of his treatment including medication.  He describes Dr Wong as having good insight and judgment with good cognition and social behaviour.  He also refers to Dr Wong understanding the nature of his illness and the need to continue treatment indefinitely.  At that time, Dr Tucker expressed the opinion that with ongoing treatment Dr Wong would be able to return to medical practice within 6-12 months on the condition that he participated in a graduated return to work program and continued treatment indefinitely.
  7. [65]
    In a further report dated 11 March 2014 Dr Tucker described Dr Wong as having good, sensible, insightful talk and plans.  Of his past relapse, Dr Tucker says that he believes that Dr Wong stopped his medications because of eroding insight within incipient psychosis and that he always behaved properly and ethically when well. 
  8. [66]
    On 30 April 2014 Dr Tucker reported that Dr Wong was fully compliant with treatment including counselling and medication.  He opined that Dr Wong was not a danger to others or himself and noted that Dr Wong was happy to continue to see him and his general practitioner indefinitely. 
  9. [67]
    In a more detailed report dated 27 May 2014, Dr Tucker says:

Dr Wong first developed this illness in 1996.[19]  It was treated affectively (sic) with good control of symptoms although he has often had problems with unwanted effects of anti-psychotic medications over the years necessitating several changes.

Since 1996 and 2011 he has relapsed on 2 occasions.  On these occasions the recurrence of psychosis was associated with cessation of anti-psychotic medication by Dr Wong and not on the advice of his doctors.  After the second relapse Dr Wong realized, at the time, that he needed to stay on the anti-psychotic treatment which had proved very useful and effective – allowing him to return to a normal life.

However, despite this, he did not see his psychiatrist Dr J Warlow after 8 January 2008 and subsequently he gradually developed a severe psychotic illness again through 2012.

Because he had been previously aware of the consequences of stopping his medication and he made no attempt to consult with any doctor – general practitioner or psychiatrist, about this, there is little doubt that Dr Wong was developing a recurrence of his psychotic illness with erosion of insight and judgment.  That is, he falsely believed that he was well and did not need the treatment, despite early warning signs such as disturbed sleep and concentration.

Dr Wong last saw his then psychiatrist Dr J Warlow on 8 January 2008.  He says that no follow up appointment was made and Dr Warlow told him to stay on his medication “long term”.  Usually after such an illness is followed by 2 relapses, sufferers must stay on medication very long term or permanently with monitoring for efficacy and side effects such as akathisia obesity, tardive dyskinesia etc… some or most of this can be done by a GP if the person’s illness is well controlled and he or she is in a stable condition.  However, in this case there was no clear follow up and monitoring plan and arrangement by any doctor.

It is worth noting that Dr Wong now has a psychiatrist and GP (Dr Lionel Lee) who follow him up closely.

  1. [68]
    Dr Tucker again reported on 24 September 2014.  He stated that Dr Wong had made an excellent sustained recovery from his schizophrenic illness with full treatment compliance.  He described this as a remarkably robust result given the stress Dr Wong had experienced with legal issues, Mental Health Court hearing, AHPRA matters, loss of occupation, financial concerns and uncertainty about his future career.  Dr Tucker expressed the opinion that all of the accumulated medical evidence indicated that Dr Wong would be able to return to medical practice with treatment, and under supervision if required, initially on a part time basis, sometime in 2015.
  2. [69]
    On 21 January 2015 Dr Tucker reported Dr Wong as being well enough to commence a graduated return to work program, working with and under the supervision of an experienced senior GP colleague who he identified as Dr Norris Chern.  He opined that Dr Wong could start on 6 April 2015 beginning with two mornings a week.  If his performance was satisfactory this could be increased by a half day per month to a maximum of 3 full days per week.
  3. [70]
    Most recently, on 20 August 2015, Dr Tucker reported as follows:

Dr Wong continues to see me on a regular basis and attends all appointments promptly.  He is fully compliant with all aspects of treatment and continues to maintain good stable, mental and physical health with no evidence of any psychotic symptoms. 

Overall he has done very well, with good tolerance and medication.  Dr Wong has clearly and repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to attend and comply with treatment indefinitely – and we have established a sound useful therapeutic alliance.

Dr Wong has maintained and updated his medical knowledge and skills with regular attendance at professional lectures, meetings etc.

Dr Wong has made good, sensible, and safe plans for a supervised graduated return to appropriate general practice.

Under the above mentioned circumstances, Dr Wong does not, and is not likely to represent, a risk to the community or himself.  He is capable of good medical practice in the future.

  1. [71]
    “Impairment” is defined in the National Law to mean:

Impairment, in relation to a person, means the person has a physical or mental impairment, disability, condition or disorder (including substance abuse or dependence) that detrimentally effects or is likely to detrimentally affect –

  1. (a)
     for a registered health practitioner… the persons capacity to practice the profession.
  1. [72]
    The expression “that detrimentally effects or is likely to affect… the person’s capacity to practice the profession” must extend to impairments, disabilities, conditions or disorders which, as here, when controlled by treatment result in there being no immediate detrimental affect on the practitioner’s capacity.  Where the practitioner suffers from an underlying impairment, disability, condition or disorder which in the absence of treatment would, or would be likely to, detrimentally affect the person’s capacity to practice, that person may have an impairment for the purposes of the National Law.  A person, for example, with ongoing substance dependence does not cease to have an impairment when sober or abstinent.
  2. [73]
    So too, as Dr Wong accepts, a person suffering from schizophrenia does not cease to have an impairment when treatment and medication results in the illness being controlled.
  3. [74]
    Here, the evidence concerning the ongoing nature of Dr Wong’s schizophrenia and the likelihood of a speedy relapse should his treatment and medication cease, clearly establish that he has an impairment within the meaning of that term in the National Law.

Professional misconduct

  1. [75]
    The Board does not seek a finding of professional misconduct,[20] although it submits that such a finding would be available because it says Dr Wong’s conduct satisfies the third limb of the definition of “professional misconduct” in the National Law.  That third limb is in the following terms:
  1. (c)
     conduct of the practitioner, whether occurring in connection with a practice of the Health Practitioner’s profession or not, that is inconsistent with the practitioner being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession.
  1. [76]
    It should be noted that in confining the potential for a finding of professional misconduct to that third limb, the Board no longer advances that Dr Wong has engaged in unprofessional conduct as alleged in the referral.  That, in my view, is important because the Board, although not pressing for a finding of professional misconduct, submits:

“A finding that a person is not a fit and proper person is, it is submitted, not dependant on findings of moral blameworthiness.  Mental illness does not prevent conduct which would otherwise amount to unprofessional conduct ceasing to be such, although it may be very relevant to the disciplinary measures imposed.” (emphasis added)

  1. [77]
    Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Ardalich[21] and Medical Board of Queensland v DAP[22] are cited in support.
  2. [78]
    In Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Ardalich, Percy ACJ with whom Duggan and Anderson JJ agreed, said at [43] to [47]:

 The practitioner's mental state, serious though it was, could not deflect the Tribunal from a finding that the charges of unprofessional conduct were made out once the objective facts were proved or admitted. What would otherwise amount to unprofessional conduct does not cease to be such, by reason of the existence of a mental illness on the part of the practitioner, which had the potential to establish a mental impairment defence under Part 8A of the CLCA.

The disciplinary provisions of the Act which come into play upon a finding of unprofessional conduct reflect the interests of the public in ensuring that legal practitioners answer to the high standards of probity and competence which must be observed if the integrity of the administration of justice is to be preserved.

Mental illness of a practitioner which may cause or contribute towards his commission of acts constituting unprofessional conduct cannot excuse the conduct, but may be a mitigating circumstance in considering what disciplinary orders should be made.

I do not use the words "mitigating circumstance" in the sense in which they may be used in the context of the criminal sentencing process.

The primary function of disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the practitioner, but to protect the public and the administration of justice by ensuring that that practitioners live up to the high standards expected of them.

  1. [79]
    However, all of that was said in the context of charges under the Legal Practitioners Act 1982 (SA) in which “unprofessional conduct” was defined by s 5(1) to mean:

“Unprofessional conduct” in relation to a legal practitioner, means –

  1. (a)
      An offence of a dishonest or infamous nature committed by the legal practitioner in respect of which punishment by imprisonment is prescribed or authorised by law; or
  2. (b)
     Any conduct in the course of, or in connection with, practice by the legal practitioner that involves substantial or recurrent failure to meet the standard of conduct observed by competent legal practitioners of good repute.
  1. [80]
    Caution should be exercised in applying those observations of Percy ACJ to a case such as this in which the Board no longer alleges that Dr Wong engaged in unprofessional conduct, particularly of the kind described in s 5 of the Legal Practitioners Act, and in which it is alleged that professional misconduct arises only by operation of the third limb of the definition of that term in s 5 of the National Law.
  2. [81]
    Later, at [69], Percy ACJ continued, citing from A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society NSW:[23]

Although he was acquitted of the criminal charges by reason of mental incompetence, for the reasons which I have given, the practitioner's conduct in connection with those alleged offences was nonetheless capable of amounting to unprofessional conduct:

... even though conduct was not engaged in directly in the course of professional practice, it may be so connected to such practice as to amount to professional misconduct. Furthermore, even where it does not involve professional misconduct a person's behaviour may demonstrate qualities of a kind that require a conclusion that a person is not a fit and proper person to practise.

  1. [82]
    Those observations were made in the context of his Honour stating that other conduct of the practitioner for which he had been charged criminally, but acquitted by reason of mental incompetence, were nonetheless capable of amounting to unprofessional conduct.
  2. [83]
    In making that statement, his Honour must have been referring to unprofessional conduct at common law and the Supreme Court of South Australia’s inherent jurisdiction to discipline legal practitioners rather than a finding of unprofessional conduct as defined by the Act.[24]  Under the Legal Practitioners Act the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal having conducted an inquiry and being satisfied that a practitioner was guilty of unprofessional conduct could recommend that disciplinary proceedings be commenced against the practitioner in the Supreme Court.[25]  The powers of the Supreme Court in any disciplinary proceedings include the power to order that the name of the practitioner be struck off the roll.[26] That is a power exercisable by the Supreme Court in any disciplinary proceedings, whether commenced under s 89 of the Legal Practitioners Act or not.[27]  The Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction to discipline legal practitioners is expressly preserved.[28]
  3. [84]
    In this matter, the Tribunal’s focus must remain firmly fixed on the statutory definition of professional misconduct in the third limb.  That definition requires, in order for the Tribunal to find professional misconduct, that Dr Wong’s conduct is inconsistent with him being a fit and proper person to hold registration.  If the Tribunal were to find professional misconduct on that basis, then the cancellation of his registration would be almost inevitable.  Not cancelling a practitioner’s registration would seem inconsistent with having found his or her conduct to be inconsistent with him or her being a fit and proper person to hold registration.  This may be contrasted with cases in which there is a finding of professional misconduct on some basis, and the question then arises whether the practitioner is fit and proper to be or remain registered.
  4. [85]
    A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society NSW, although a case of the latter kind, emphasised in assessing fitness for practice “the importance that may attach to a consideration of the detailed subjective and objective circumstances of the offending behaviour”.[29]  In my view, applying that observation to this case and the third limb of the definition of professional misconduct in the National Law, requires consideration of whether Mr Wong’s offending conduct, when the detailed subjective and objective circumstances of it are taken into account, is inconsistent with him being a fit and proper person to hold registration. 
  5. [86]
    Approached in this way, I am of the opinion that his conduct is not inconsistent with him being a fit and proper person to hold registration.  Even if viewed at the time at which the offending conduct occurred, but with the benefit of an understanding of the circumstances which is now available, I would not conclude that his conduct was inconsistent with him being a fit and proper person to hold registration.  I would conclude that he was not then a fit and proper person to be engaged in practice; but that is not the test.
  6. [87]
    Even though his relapse was in the context of a deterioration in his condition, and an incorrect belief on his part that he was well and therefore did not need to maintain his medication, that belief itself is now known to have been a manifestation or function of his illness and, importantly in my view, a belief he formed at a time when he was not receiving ongoing psychiatric treatment. 
  7. [88]
    The evidence now clearly establishes, and Dr Wong now clearly accepts, that he has an ongoing, it would seem permanent, need for such psychiatric treatment.  However, that was not known or appreciated at the time of his relapse.  It was not known or appreciated not only by Dr Wong, but also it would seem by those involved in his treatment, particularly his then psychiatrist, Dr Warlow, who did not make arrangements for ongoing care.
  8. [89]
    When those details of the circumstances of his offending conduct are considered, it was not conduct inconsistent with him being a fit and proper person to hold registration, even at the time.
  9. [90]
    In NSW Bar Association v Butland[30] the NSW Administrative Decisions Tribunal observed at [39]:

Hence, the mental health of a legal practitioner answering a complaint of professional misconduct is likely to be relevant to forming a view as to whether the conduct would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by reputable and competent colleagues.  That is not to say, however, that any diagnosed mental or personality disorder will necessary excuse or exonerate a legal practitioner whose conduct would otherwise amount to professional misconduct.  Indeed, it might be anticipated that only those conditions which effectively deprive legal practitioners of the ability to control their actions would be likely to excuse what would otherwise be professional misconduct in the common law sense.  Moreover, conduct in those circumstances may well fall within the definition of professional misconduct in s 497(1)(b) of the Act if it would justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice as a result of his or her condition. (emphasis added)

  1. [91]
    Section 497(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) is in terms similar to the third limb of the definition of professional misconduct in the National Law being:

“Conduct of an Australian legal practitioner whether occurring in connection with the practice of law or occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.”

  1. [92]
    Whilst I respectfully agree with the observations of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal concerning s 497(1)(b), and would apply them in an appropriate case to the third limb, this is not such a case.  In my view, the medical evidence does not justify a finding that Dr Wong is not a fit and proper person to engage in medical practice “as a result of his condition.”
  2. [93]
    Dr Wong has not engaged in professional misconduct as defined under the third limb of the definition of that term in the National Law.

Should Dr Wong’s registration be cancelled?

  1. [94]
    In my view, the Board’s submission that having found Dr Wong to have an impairment, the Tribunal should cancel his registration, must be rejected.
  2. [95]
    In its written submissions the Board “contends that the risks associated with any relapse by the respondent preclude the respondent from returning to the practice of medicine”.  In that regard, it submits that Dr Wong’s “relapse in 2012 provides a stark illustration of the risks to which members of the public would be exposed in the event that his proposed return to practice is sanctioned by the Tribunal.”
  3. [96]
    It points to Dr Harden’s evidence that it is Dr Wong’s condition which gives rise to the belief that he no longer requires treatment or medication, that this has occurred in the past, and that Dr Wong has “previously deliberately deceived others as to whether he remained on his medication”.
  4. [97]
    There are several reasons why these submissions should be rejected. 
  5. [98]
    First, the submissions unduly focus upon the wrong risk and ignore the most relevant risk.  The risks associated with any relapse are relevant considerations, however, those risks cannot be considered or assessed in isolation from the risk of any relapse actually occurring. That is the more relevant risk. The medical evidence establishes that that risk is minimal.  The mere fact that Dr Wong relapsed in the past does not establish, of itself, a risk or probability that he will again relapse in the future.  Nor does the fact that his forming a misguided belief that he no longer requires treatment is caused by his condition itself establish that such a belief will be formed and acted upon in the future. 
  6. [99]
    That previous relapse occurred in the circumstances which have been addressed earlier in these reasons.  They were not the circumstances which presently exist.  They did not include ongoing psychiatric and general medical support.  They did not include the insight into his illness and the need for ongoing treatment and medication which Dr Wong has now developed.
  7. [100]
    Secondly, It is also a submission which wholly ignores the medical evidence of his present capacity to practice, particularly that of the Board’s own expert, Dr Harden, who is of the opinion that Dr Wong could now safely and competently return to medical practice in a graduated fashion in a new general practice with other practitioners.
  8. [101]
    The Board submits that even close and careful monitoring cannot ensure public safety.  In absolute terms, that may be so.  But to the extent that it is so, the same might be said of any impaired practitioner; or indeed of any unimpaired practitioner.  Again, the Board points to past events without any real attention being given to present circumstances.
  9. [102]
    It contends that the first stated objective in s 3(2)(a) of the National Law is to provide for the protection of the public.  That is not strictly accurate. 
  10. [103]
    The relevant object of the National Law is to establish a national registration and accreditation scheme for the registration of health practitioners.[31]  By s 3(2)(a) it is an object of that registration and accreditation scheme to provide for the protection of the public by ensuring that only health practitioners who are suitably trained and qualified to practice in a competent and ethical manner are registered.  It is also a guiding principle of the national scheme that restrictions on practice of the health profession are to be imposed under the scheme only if it is necessary to ensure health services are provided safely and are of an appropriate standard.[32] 
  11. [104]
    As part of that scheme the National Law clearly contemplates that health practitioners who have impairments may continue to practice, albeit with appropriate conditions.
  12. [105]
    Indeed, the National Law establishes as one of the functions of each National Board, at that board’s discretion, to provide financial or other support for health programs for registered health practitioners.[33]  Such health programs are defined to mean programs providing education, prevention, early intervention, treatment or rehabilitation services related to physical or mental impairments, disabilities, conditions or disorders, including substance abuse or dependence.[34] 
  13. [106]
    In my view, Dr Wong is suitably trained and qualified to practice in a competent and ethical manner, albeit subject to conditions.  Thus the objective of the national scheme to provide for the protection of the public by ensuring that only health practitioners so trained and qualified are registered, is met.
  14. [107]
    The Board submits that ongoing registration represents that Dr Wong is fit and proper to practice medicine.  So it does. But the Board says that it does not consider that Dr Wong is such a person.  That may be the view of the Board.  It is not a view I share.  It is not a view consistent with the evidence.
  15. [108]
    The Board submits that it is Dr Wong’s psychiatric condition which precludes him from the safe practice of medicine.  No evidentiary foundation for that submission is cited.  I do not consider that there is one.  The expert evidence, most importantly that of Dr Harden called in the Board’s own case, is to the contrary.
  16. [109]
    The Board, properly, raises the issue of the preservation of public confidence in the profession, and the profession’s reputation and public standing.  The Board submits that “the public is unable to have confidence in a practitioner who has both a history of aberrant behaviour when his congenital psychiatric condition is manifest in relapse, and a very high degree of probability that such a relapse will occur again in the future.” 
  17. [110]
    This submission is based upon a false premise.  There is simply no evidence to support the contention that there is “a very high degree of probability” that Dr Wong will relapse in the future.  I accept that the evidence establishes that were he to cease treatment and medication there is a very high degree of probability that he will relapse; but that is a very different issue.
  18. [111]
    The evidence clearly establishes that Dr Wong now has good insight into his ongoing need for treatment and medication to avoid relapse.  Such insight provides, of itself, a strong motivation to continue treatment and medication.  A man may suffer from a potentially lethal disease; but one which is controlled by medication.  The understanding that there is a high probability that he may die if he ceases taking his medication provides pretty strong motivation to continue to do so and to avoid that result. 
  19. [112]
    The Board referred to the judgment of Keane JA (as his Honour then was) in Medical Board of Queensland v DAP where, at [26], the following was said:

It may be that the respondent is not morally culpable for the consequences of his organic brain disorder, but the Act is concerned with whether the respondent is entitled to the confidence of the public, not whether he is forfeited that confidence through moral blameworthiness.  An eye surgeon who suffers seriously from uncontrolled Parkinson’s disease may be unfit to practice as an eye surgeon even though he or she is morally blameless.  To the extent that, as Tribunal found, the respondent’s “condition explains his conduct”, the persistent nature of his condition suggests that the respondent’s unacceptable conduct will persist too.

  1. [113]
    The example given by his Honour is telling.  One can readily understand why a person who suffers seriously from uncontrolled Parkinson’s disease may be unfit to practice eye surgery.  However, it is the fact that the disease is uncontrolled that renders the person unfit.  That is not this case.  Here Dr Wong’s condition is controlled, and one can have confidence on the evidence that it will remain so.  It is not, to adopt the words of Keane JA, a case in which the persistent nature of his condition suggests that his unacceptable conduct will persist too. 
  2. [114]
    There is another important consideration which lends confidence in Dr Wong continuing to undergo treatment and take medication.  He is, a least for the time being, subject to a forensic order under the Mental Health Act which requires him to do so.  He will also be subject to conditions upon his registration requiring him to do so. He has a past history of compliance with conditions.
  3. [115]
    I do not accept that there is any proper basis for the cancellation of Dr Wong’s registration.

Conditions

  1. [116]
    It is clear that conditions should be imposed upon Dr Wong’s registration. These conditions would, necessarily, require him to continue with his treatment and medication. They should include mechanisms by which adherence to his treatment and medication regime ca be monitored and confirmed.  He has, in general terms, proposed some based upon the observations and recommendations of Dr Harden in his report.
  2. [117]
    The parties will be directed to consult with a view to formulating appropriate conditions to be proposed to the Tribunal.  If agreement is reached, a draft of the conditions proposed and joint submissions should be filed.  If agreement is unable to be reached, each party should propose separate drafts together with supporting submissions.  That should be done within 7 days of the publication of these reasons.

Footnotes

[1]  (2004) 220 CLR 129.

[2]  Ibid at [35] and [37].

[3]  Ibid at [30].

[4]  Ibid at [1], [11] and [12].

[5]  [2015] QCAT 294 at [45].

[6]  S 193(1)(a)(i) National Law.

[7]  S 196(1) National Law.

[8]  S 196(2) National Law.

[9]  S 196(1)(b)(iv) National Law.

[10]  [2002] 1 QdR 474.

[11]  Ibid at [28] – [29].

[12]  Ibid at [35].

[13]  Introduced by s 28 of the Mental Health Act, Criminal Code and Health Act Amendment Act 1984, Act number 66 of 1984.

[14]  At [4] – [5].

[15]   S 256(a) Mental Health Act 2000.

[16]  S 257.

[17]  S 259.

[18]  S 267(1)(a).

[19]  It is reported elsewhere as 1998.

[20]  For his part, Dr Wong seeks a finding that he has not engaged in professional misconduct.

[21]  [2005] SASC 478.

[22]  [2008] QCA 44.

[23]  [2003] 216 CLR 253 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ at 267.

[24]A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales was a case concerning the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to discipline lawyers, not statutory jurisdiction: see Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ at [20]. So too were the cases cited by their Honours: Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279; NSW Bar Association v Cummins (2001) NSWLR 279 of [50]; In Re Davis (1947) 75 CLR 409, Starke J at 419, Dixon J at 423 and Williams J at 429. 

[25]  S 82(6)(iv) Legal Practitioners Act 1982 (SA).

[26]  S 89(2)(d).

[27]  S 89(2).

[28]  S 89(3).

[29]  (2004) 216 CLR 253 at [22].

[30]  [2008] NSWADT 120.

[31]  S 3(1)(a) National Law.

[32]  S 3(3)(c) National Law.

[33]  S 35(1)(n) National Law.

[34]  S 5.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Medical Board of Australia v Kevin Robert Wong

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Medical Board of Australia v Wong

  • MNC:

    [2015] QCAT 439

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Horneman-Wren DP

  • Date:

    16 Sep 2015

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
A Solicitor v Council of Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2004) 216 CLR 253
Carrier v Bonham[2002] 1 Qd R 474; [2001] QCA 234
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2002] 1 Qd R 474
Cite 2 - [2002] 1 Qd R 474
Cite 3 - [2002] 1 Qd R 474
Cite 4 - [2002] 1 Qd R 474
In Re Davis (1947) 75 CLR 409
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1947) 75 CLR 409
Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Ardalich (2005) SASC 478
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) SASC 478
Cite 2 - (2005) SASC 478
Medical Board of Queensland v DAP [2008] QCA 44
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] QCA 44
Cite 2 - [2008] QCA 44
NSW Bar Association v Butland [2008] NSWADT 120
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] NSWADT 120
Cite 2 - [2008] NSWADT 120
NSW Bar Association v Cummins (2001) NSWLR 279
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) NSWLR 279
Pharmacy Board of Australia v Jattan [2015] QCAT 294
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QCAT 294
Cite 2 - [2015] QCAT 294
Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2004) 220 CLR 129
Cite 2 - (2004) 220 CLR 129
Cite 3 - (2004) 220 CLR 129
Cite 4 - (2004) 220 CLR 129
Cite 5 - (2004) 220 CLR 129
Solicitor A v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2003) 216 CLR 253
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 216 CLR 253
Cite 2 - (2003) 216 CLR 253
White v White [1949] 2 All E.R. 399
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1949] 2 All E.R. 399
Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of N.S.W. (1957) 97 CLR 279
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1957) 97 CLR 279

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
BMS v Pharmacy Board of Australia [2021] QCAT 3692 citations
Health Ombudsman v Fletcher [2021] QCAT 42 citations
Health Ombudsman v Le [2020] QCAT 1701 citation
Health Ombudsman v MKL [2022] QCAT 1312 citations
Health Ombudsman v Sharman [2020] QCAT 2241 citation
HSK v Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia [2018] QCAT 4182 citations
LCK v Health Ombudsman [2020] QCAT 3162 citations
Medical Board of Australia v Sadeghi [2025] QCAT 1632 citations
Medical Board of Australia v Wong [2017] QCA 424 citations
Medical Board of Australia v Wong [2016] QCAT 1124 citations
Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v KMW [2025] QCAT 1052 citations
Pharmacy Board of Australia v Amurao [2025] QCAT 1002 citations
Pharmacy Board of Australia v CJR [2023] QCAT 5612 citations
WSS v Medical Board of Australia [2021] QCAT 53 citations
1

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