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Munt v Queensland Law Society Inc[2015] QCAT 451

Munt v Queensland Law Society Inc[2015] QCAT 451

CITATION:

Munt v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [2015] QCAT 451

PARTIES:

Nigel Francis Munt

(Applicant)

 

v

 

Queensland Law Society Incorporated

(Respondent)

APPLICATION NUMBER:

OCR174-15

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

HEARING DATE:

29 September 2015

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Justice Thomas, President

DELIVERED ON:

6 October 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS MADE:

  1. The application to stay the decision of the Queensland Law Society of 2 September 2015 is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – PRACTISING CERTIFICATES – where Queensland Law Society cancelled applicant’s practising certificate due to drug offence convictions – where applicant has applied for review of that decision – where applicant applied for stay of the decision until review is determined – where applicant not subject to disciplinary proceedings – whether to stay the operation of the reviewable decision pending the review

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 s 22

Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1996) 70 ALJR 306

Carrie v Department of Communities [2010] QCATA 15

Deputy Commissioner Stewart v Kennedy [2011] QCATA 254

King v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [2012] QCAT 489

Legal Services Board v McGrath (No 2) [2010] 29 VR 235.

Legal Services Commissioner v Baker (No 1) [2005] QCA 482

Legal Services Commissioner v CBD [2012] QCA 69

Legal Services Commissioner v Madden [2008] QCA 52

In the matter for admission as a legal practitioner by MCF [2015] QCA 154

New South Wales Bar Association v Stevens [2003] NSWCA 95

Quinn v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [2012] QCAT 274

Robb and Anor v The Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory unreported, Federal Court, No. ACT G34 of 1996, 21 June 1996

Ziems v Prothonothary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279

APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):

APPLICANT:

Mr Peter Davis QC

RESPONDENT:

Mr Malcolm Hinton

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    Mr Munt applies for a stay of the operation of a decision made by the Queensland Law Society on 2 September 2015 cancelling his Practising Certificate.

Background facts

  1. [2]
    From the affidavit of Mr Munt and the Information Notice dated 2 September 2015 from the Queensland Law Society it seems the following facts are common ground.
  2. [3]
    Prior to Mr Munt’s drug addiction he was a successful and generous practitioner.  He has always been a good and devoted father.[1]
  3. [4]
    In 2006, Mr Munt formed a relationship with Vicki Taylor.  At the time, unknown to Mr Munt, she was a substantial user of methylamphetamine.[2]
  4. [5]
    Ms Taylor had previously been in a relationship with Mr Cant (a convicted criminal). Mr Cant was in prison.[3]
  5. [6]
    Upon his release from prison in 2011, Mr Cant moved to live with Mr Munt and Ms Taylor.[4]
  6. [7]
    At the instigation of Mr Cant, Mr Munt became addicted to methylamphetamine.[5] 
  7. [8]
    In order to secure drugs for Ms Taylor and himself, Mr Munt became involved in Mr Cant’s illicit drug business.[6]
  8. [9]
    Mr Munt did not become involved in the illicit activities for personal financial gain, but to ensure a flow of methylamphetamine to Ms Taylor and himself.[7]
  9. [10]
    The convictions for supply were for small amounts to be consumed immediately by Ms Taylor and Mr Munt except for one larger quantity, valued at $10,000.00, which, it was accepted, was for use by Ms Taylor and Mr Munt.  There were other uncharged supplies. The conduct which lead to the convictions lasted over a period of 12 months less 20 days.[8]
  10. [11]
    Before the conviction there was a minor criminal history. Mr Munt had no record of disciplinary matters in the course of legal practice.[9]
  11. [12]
    Mr Munt’s drug addiction was triggered by his personal situation, his relationships with Ms Taylor and Mr Cant, and financial and farming pressures.[10]
  12. [13]
    Mr Munt has always been a good and devoted father.  He has been remorseful for his offences and the hurt that he has caused others, particularly his daughters.[11]
  13. [14]
    Mr Munt has rehabilitated.  There is a low risk of reoffending.  The only appreciable circumstance in which Mr Munt might offend is if the substance misuse reactivates.[12]  This is more likely if he remains with Ms Taylor. None of the offending involved the practice of the law.  Mr Munt is not a danger to client’s interests.[13]
  14. [15]
    Mr Munt does not pose any threat to client’s interests and no client interest was harmed at the relevant time.  The offences have no nexus with the legal practice.  Mr Munt’s judgment, at the time, was addled by addiction to methylamphetamine and the chaotic social structure in which he was involved, including his relationship with Ms Taylor and Mr Cant.[14]
  15. [16]
    Mr Munt has rehabilitated himself and his substance abuse is in sustained remission.[15]
  16. [17]
    Mr Munt made a timely plea.  He suffers considerable remorse for his offences and the damage they did to others including his children.  He has re-established social connections which existed prior to his meeting Ms Taylor and these should be of benefit in times of future stress.[16]

Relationship with Ms Taylor

  1. [18]
    Mr Munt has taken issue with the factual premise asserted by the Queensland Law Society that Mr Munt continues to be in a relationship with Ms Taylor, and that the effect of this relationship is to increase his likelihood of reoffending because of risks associated with falling back into drug abuse.
  2. [19]
    The position taken by the Queensland Law Society is understandable as, around the time of the sentencing, it seems Mr Munt was in a continuing relationship with Ms Taylor and that information was available to the Queensland Law Society.
  3. [20]
    In Mr Munt’s affidavit sworn 21 September 2015, he deposes to the fact that in March 2015 Ms Taylor and their children moved to the Sunshine Coast and he has had minimal contact with her since that time.  He says he and Ms Taylor have an agreement as to access to the children and payment of school fees and financial report.  In coming to a separation with Ms Taylor, Mr Munt followed his psychiatrist’s advice to have as little to do with Ms Taylor as possible. Mr Munt does not have any ongoing contact with her, save as is necessary for children access issues only.[17] 

Assertions in the Information Notice

  1. [21]
    In the Information Notice dated 2 September 2015, the Queensland Law Society notified Mr Munt as follows.
  2. [22]
    The offences to which he had pleaded guilty on 8 April 2015 were incompatible with the integrity which must mark those held out by the Society as fit to practice as a legal professional.[18]
  3. [23]
    A sentence of imprisonment was imposed and fully suspended.  Whilst Mr Munt is under a suspended sentence he cannot be a person of good fame and character.[19]
  4. [24]
    Mr Munt engaged in legal practice at the time of the offences and held a Practising Certificate.  He was in the grip of methylamphetamine addiction whilst engaging in legal practice and engaged in the criminal conduct for almost 12 months.  He committed offences other than those for which he was charged.[20] 
  5. [25]
    There is a continuing risk to Mr Munt arising as a result of his remaining in a relationship with Ms Taylor.[21]  This assertion was based upon the information in the possession of the Society (which dated from the time of the sentencing).

Discussion

  1. [26]
    The ultimate role of the Tribunal will be to review the decision made by the Queensland Law Society on 2 September 2015 to cancel Mr Munt’s Practicing Certificate.
  2. [27]
    Pending that review, Mr Munt applies for a stay of the operation of the decision made by the Queensland Law Society on 2 September 2015, cancelling his Practising Certificate.
  3. [28]
    As to a stay, so far as is relevant, s 22 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (QCAT Act) provides:
  1. (3)
    The tribunal may, on application of a party or on its own initiative, make an order staying the operation of a reviewable decision if a proceeding for the review of the decision has started under this Act.
  2. (4)
    The tribunal may make an order under subsection (3) only if it considers the order is desirable after having regard to the following –
  1. (a)
    the interests of any person whose interests may be affected by the making of the order or the order not being made;
  2. (b)
    any submission made to the tribunal by the decision-maker for the reviewable decision;
  3. (c)
    the public interest.
  1. [29]
    No particular criteria are specified as governing the exercise of the discretion. As has previously been said by Wilson J and Hon James Thomas AM QC, Member, standard curial principles and procedures will apply.[22]
  2. [30]
    Before granting a stay, the Tribunal must take into account the applicant’s prospects of success in the review proceedings.
  3. [31]
    As to the question of the prospects of success, the applicant must demonstrate that there is an arguable case. The focus of the Tribunal is to make a preliminary assessment of the strength of a case, bearing in mind, of course, that the proceedings are at an early stage and it is impossible to undertake a detailed assessment of prospects.
  1. [32]
    The Queensland Law Society has asserted that “while you serve a suspended sentence for such offences you cannot be a person of good fame and character”.[23]
  2. [33]
    Mr Munt disputes this assertion and refers to the decisions in Legal Services Commissioner v CBD[24] and In the matter for admission as a legal practitioner by MCF.[25]
  3. [34]
    In Legal Services Commissioner v CBD the Commissioner argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider that, at the time of the hearing before the Tribunal, the operational period of the respondent’s suspended sentence had not expired.  The Commissioner submitted that it was “inconceivable that a Court would … find that an applicant who is still serving a suspended sentence of imprisonment was of current good fame and character”.[26]
  4. [35]
    During the course of argument, counsel for the Commissioner abandoned that submission and in this respect Muir JA observed:

“There could be no inflexible principle that a person serving a suspended sentence was necessarily, by that fact alone, not of good fame and character and thus not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.”[27]

  1. [36]
    In MCF, in a joint judgment the Court of Appeal observed that similar logic applied.  The Court of Appeal said:

“Indeed, just as the Court is required to look behind the convictions that have been recorded against the applicant’s name, the Court must also look behind the statutory consequences of those convictions as part of an overall assessment as to whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to be admitted as a legal practitioner.”[28]

  1. [37]
    The objection taken by Mr Munt is well founded.  It is not the case that, as a general principle, a person cannot be a person of good fame and character whilst serving a suspended sentence.
  2. [38]
    The Court of Appeal in MCF observed that it has long been accepted as necessary in most cases to look behind the conviction for an offence to consider what Fullagar J described in Ziems v Prothonothary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales as the “real facts of the case”.[29] 
  3. [39]
    In the context of a decision whether a person should be struck off the roll, Warren CJ observed that consideration must be had to the extent and circumstances of the offending in question, its relationship to the offender’s professional life, and the behaviour of the offender before, during and after the legal processes.[30]  An analysis of the behaviour after the legal processes will include what steps the offender has taken to rehabilitate himself or herself, including any treatment obtained with respect to any medical condition that may have contributed.[31] 
  4. [40]
    The assessment of whether the practitioner is a fit and proper person is determined as at the time of the review hearing and not the time of the conduct.
  5. [41]
    In this case, as already outlined, the position seems to be that:
    1. Prior to the addiction, Mr Munt was a successful and generous practitioner with no previous disciplinary complaints and no relevant criminal history.
    2. Mr Munt’s drug addiction was triggered by his personal situation, his relationships with Ms Taylor and Mr Cant, and his financial and farming pressures.
    3. Mr Munt became involved in the conduct not for personal gain, but to ensure a flow of methylamphetamine to Ms Taylor and himself.
    4. The conduct was not associated with Mr Munt’s legal practice.
    5. After Mr Munt was arrested he sought treatment from medical advisors including a Dr Matthews.
    6. Mr Munt says he stopped using drugs almost immediately upon his arrest but has been demonstrably abstinent since 1 November 2012.  A total of 114 urine screens have been performed between that date and 24 February 2015 (an average of 1 per week).
    7. The testing regime enabled him to continue working as a solicitor whilst on bail and up to the cancellation of his Practicing Certificate.
    8. Dr Matthews assesses the defendant’s prognosis as “on the whole quite good” and the risk of reoffending as “low”.[32]
    9. Dr Matthews observes “it is difficult to see him relapsing into a reoffending behaviour, particularly with the social supports he has now re-engaged in”.
    10. Mr Munt’s addiction is now in full remission. His prognosis is positive. Mr Munt does not pose any threat to the interests of his clients.
  6. [42]
    Whilst it is inappropriate, and in fact not now possible, to express any concluded view as to the ultimate prospects, my conclusion is that there is a sufficiently arguable case.
  7. [43]
    Having considered the prospects of success in the review proceedings, the Tribunal must consider the effect of a stay on those proceedings, and whether irremediable harm may be suffered if a stay is not granted.[33]
  8. [44]
    In addition, the applicant must demonstrate that the balance of advantage and disadvantage favours the grant of the stay.[34]
  9. [45]
    As to the question of disadvantage, considerations of the interests of any person whose interest might be affected by the making of the order or the order not being made,[35] and the public interest,[36] are relevant.
  10. [46]
    In the Outline of Submissions on Behalf of the Applicant, Mr Munt refers to the fact that he is impecunious and his livelihood depends upon having a practising certificate, and that this prejudice to him cannot be overcome.[37]
  11. [47]
    In his affidavit sworn 21 September 2015, Mr Munt says that a period of absence from practice until the final decision regarding his practising certificate will only prejudice his clients and cause unreasonable financial harm to him.[38] As to his clients, he says that the Principal of the legal practice in which he has been working, Ms Kuys, has taken responsibility for the criminal matters he was handling.[39]
  12. [48]
    There is no suggestion that the appeal will be rendered nugatory if the stay is not granted.
  13. [49]
    In cases concerning professional misconduct, the protection of the public is the paramount consideration.  As was said by Finn J in Robb and Anor v The Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory:[40]

“…this is not the usual instance of civil litigation in which the question is whether a reason is there to hold a successful party out of the benefit of a judgment…until the appeal is heard. [The] “reason” must be considered, not in the context of a judgment giving a benefit to a litigant, but rather as one designedly made to protect both the public and the reputation of the profession”.

  1. [50]
    The significance of the aspect of public interest was referred to by Kirby J when he said that a stay in the operation of laws designed to protect the public, such as deregistration of a professional lawyer, are in a different class from cases involving no more that the suspension of the operation of orders affecting two private litigants only.[41]
  2. [51]
    The applicant must show a cogent and compelling reason for a stay. It is a matter of balancing the legal practitioner’s interest in practicing in the profession and so deriving income from it, and the public interest. In cases involving legal practitioners and the right to practice, the factors which would justify a stay must be such as to outweigh the public interest, which is to be afforded particular significance.[42]
  3. [52]
    Finn J opined that the prejudice to a practitioner in not being able to practice until an appeal is heard, is not a reason of sufficient cogency to justify a stay.
  4. [53]
    In Legal Services Commissioner V Baker (No 1),[43] the Court of Appeal (Chesterman J as his Honour then was, with whom McMurdo P and Helman J agreed) adopted strong statements made in earlier cases,[44] indicating that the Queensland Court of Appeal would follow them.  In particular, Chesterman J observed:

It should be accepted that an applicant for a stay of a recommendation that his name be removed from the roll of legal practitioners should show a cogent reason for the stay, and he will not do so merely by showing that he will be unable to practice his profession until his appeal is heard and allowed. Every practitioner who is suspended from practice or whose name is removed from the roll suffers that prejudice but it is clearly not right that a stay is, or should be, granted as a matter of course. Something more must be shown than ‘prejudice’ of this kind. The additional factors which would justify a stay must be such as outweigh the public interest in having unfit practitioners debarred from practice. That interest is to be afforded particular significance. This point was made in Robb and approved in Stevens. It poses a problem for the respondent because the ground he advances for the stay is what might be called ‘the common one’: his inability to practise pending the appeal. No other ground was identified and that one is, on the authorities, insufficient.[45]

  1. [54]
    The issue of showing a cogent and compelling reason for a stay has been considered further in recent years.
  2. [55]
    In Legal Services Commissioner v Madden,[46] Mr Madden appealed from a decision of the Legal Practice Tribunal removing his name from the roll and sought a stay from Fraser JA. Fraser JA considered that, because of the fact that Mr Madden was a sole practitioner in a small country town, there would be particular prejudice to him and to his many elderly clients which would be substantial. Thus a stay was granted under extensive restrictions.
  3. [56]
    The imposition of such conditions was sufficiently effective to mitigate damage to the integrity of the disciplinary processes and so outweigh the public interest. Mr Madden was able to establish a sufficiently cogent reason, beyond merely showing that he would be unable to practice and derive an income.
  4. [57]
    In Quinn v Queensland Law Society,[47] the Queensland Law Society had resolved to cancel Mr Quinn’s practising certificate. The application for stay relied upon the fact that Mr Quinn was, without a practising certificate, unable to work in his profession and derive income from it. Wilson J noted that trial dates could be offered within six months and, relying upon the decision in Legal Services Commissioner v Baker (No 1), refused the order.
  5. [58]
    In King v Queensland Law Society Incorporated,[48] the Law Society refused to renew Ms King’s practising certificate. A supervisor had been appointed to Ms King’s legal practice, Ms King had been made bankrupt and was also subject to unresolved investigations. In seeking a stay, Ms King pointed to factors which included the need for her to support herself and her children, and also the fact that she was acting in three matters which were due to go to trial in the following three months which involved complex issues and clients who have received psychiatric treatment. According to Ms King, if she could not continue to act, these matters would be adjourned for a long time.
  6. [59]
    In refusing the stay, Wilson J distinguished Madden’s case. He found that the risk to the practitioner’s clients was not so compelling as the tangible and serious consequences found and relied upon by Fraser JA.
  7. [60]
    In the current circumstances, losing the right to practice is not a cogent and compelling reason. The factor other than losing the right to practice relates to Mr Munt’s clients. As to that factor, the clients would have been clients of Ms Kuys firm and it seems that Ms Kuys has assumed conduct of the matters.
  8. [61]
    Mr Davis QC, on behalf of Mr Munt, submitted that the circumstances which must be considered in the task of balancing private interests of the practitioner against the public interest are not confined to those which deal with the impact which follows from the cancellation of the practising certificate, but rather include all circumstances associated with the case.[49]
  9. [62]
    He submits that too close an examination of the circumstances in which the discretion to grant a stay has been exercised in earlier cases leads unnecessarily to a narrowing of what is clearly a broad discretion. He submits that special circumstances in this case would include factors such as that Mr Munt has been practising blemish-free for 3 years, and that there has been total rehabilitation.
  10. [63]
    The discretion is a broad one. Circumstances such as those mentioned by Mr Davis QC are certainly relevant. However, the primary factors which are most relevant to the exercise of the discretion as to whether to grant a stay must necessarily be those concerning the impact and effect of the action which is sought to be stayed. For example, such factors will be relevant to whether the practitioner can point to any factor beyond the consequence which is likely to happen in many cases (described by Chesterman J as ‘the common one’), namely, that the practitioner is prevented from carrying on a legal practice and deriving an income from it.
  11. [64]
    In a broad sense, factors which have been identified as being of significance include; the seriousness of the misconduct, the likely prejudice to public confidence in the integrity of the disciplinary process, the reputation of the profession if the practitioner is granted a stay, the means available to mitigate that prejudice and the expedition with which the review can be heard.[50]
  12. [65]
    As to these factors, the misconduct was serious. The offences are serious offences as defined in the Legal Profession Act 2007. There was also criminal conduct which was admitted, but not subject to charges. Public confidence in the integrity of the disciplinary process will be maintained only in circumstances where sufficiently cogent and compelling factors exist to warrant a stay being granted. The Tribunal is able to offer hearing dates to the parties so that this matter can be resolved expeditiously. Dates are available over the next two months. On that basis prejudice will be minimised. In this context the expedition with which the matter can be heard operates against the stay being granted as it mitigates the prejudice.

Disposition

  1. [66]
    In the circumstances, whilst I am satisfied that Mr Munt has a sufficiently arguable case on review, I am not satisfied that there are sufficiently cogent and compelling factors which warrant a stay being granted.
  2. [67]
    In conjunction with the parties, the tribunal will fix a timetable which will minimise delay and so mitigate any prejudice.

Footnotes

[1]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xxi. 

[2]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xi.

[3]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xi.

[4]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015. , page 3 of 17, paragraph xi.

[5]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xii.

[6]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xv 

Affidavit of Nigel Francis Munt sworn 21 September, paragraph 36.

[7]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xv. 

[8]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xvi.

[9]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xviii.

[10]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xx. 

[11]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xxi. 

[12]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xxii. 

[13]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 4 of 17, paragraph xxiv. 

[14]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 5 of 17, paragraph xxvii. 

[15]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 5 of 17, paragraph xxvii. 

[16]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 5 of 17, paragraph xxvii. 

[17]Affidavit of Nigel Francis Munt sworn 21 September 2015, paragraphs 61 and 73(vii).

[18]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, paragraph 26.

[19]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, paragraph 26.

[20]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, paragraph 26.

[21]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, paragraphs 23 and 28.

[22]Carrie v Department of Communities [2010] QCATA 15 (per Wilson J); Deputy Commissioner Stewart v Kennedy [2011] QCATA 254 (per Hon James Thomas AM QC, Member).

[23]Information Notice from the Queensland Law Society dated 2 September 2015, page 3 of 17, paragraph xxvi. 

[24][2012] QCA 69.

[25][2015] QCA 154.

[26]Legal Services Commissioner v CBD [2012] QCA 69 at [17].

[27]Legal Services Commissioner v CBD [2012] QCA 69 at [23].

[28]In the matter for admission as a legal practitioner by MCF [2015] QCA 154 at [21].

[29]Ziems v Prothonothary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279 at [8].

[30]Legal Services Board v McGrath (No 2) [2010] 29 VR 235.

[31]In the matter for admission as a legal practitioner by MCF [2015] QCA 154 at [10].

[32]Report by Dr Matthews dated 23 March 2015.

[33]King v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [2012] QCAT 489 at [12].

[34]Deputy Commissioner Stewart v Kennedy [2011] QCATA 254 at [14].

[35]QCAT Act s 22(4)(a).

[36]QCAT Act s 22(4)(c).

[37]      Outline of Submissions on behalf of the applicant dated 29 September 2015, paragraph 49.

[38]Paragraph 71.

[39]Paragraph 59.

[40]Unreported, Federal Court, No. ACT G34 of 1996, 21 June 1996.

[41]        Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1996) 70 ALJR 306.

[42]Legal Services Commissioner v Baker (No 1) [2005] QCA 482 at [28] per Chesterman J.

[43]        [2005] QCA 482.

[44]      New South Wales Bar Association v Stevens [2003] NSWCA 95, Robb and Anor v The Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory unreported, Federal Court, No. ACT G34 of 1996, 21 June 1996.

[45]Legal Services Commissioner v Baker (No 1) 2 QdR 107 at 117, 118 paragraph [28].

[46]        [2008] QCA 52.

[47][2012] QCAT 274.

[48][2012] QCAT 489.

[49]Transcript of proceedings dated 29 September 2015, page 50.

[50]Robb and Anor v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory unreported, Federal Court, No. ACT G34 of 1996, 21 June 1996.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Nigel Francis Munt v Queensland Law Society Inc

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Munt v Queensland Law Society Inc

  • MNC:

    [2015] QCAT 451

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Thomas P

  • Date:

    06 Oct 2015

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1996) 70 ALJR 306
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1996) 70 ALJR 306
Cite 2 - (1996) 70 ALJR 306
Carrie v Department of Communities (Housing and Homelessness Services) [2010] QCATA 15
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCATA 15
Cite 2 - [2010] QCATA 15
Deputy Commissioner Stewart v Kennedy [2011] QCATA 254
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCATA 254
Cite 2 - [2011] QCATA 254
Cite 3 - [2011] QCATA 254
King v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [2012] QCAT 489
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QCAT 489
Cite 2 - [2012] QCAT 489
Cite 3 - [2012] QCAT 489
Legal Services Board v McGrath (No 2) [2010] 29 VR 235
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] 29 VR 235
Cite 2 - [2010] 29 VR 235
Legal Services Commissioner v Baker (No 1)[2006] 2 Qd R 107; [2005] QCA 482
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 482
Cite 2 - [2005] QCA 482
Cite 3 - [2005] QCA 482
Legal Services Commissioner v CBD [2012] QCA 69
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QCA 69
Cite 2 - [2012] QCA 69
Cite 3 - [2012] QCA 69
Cite 4 - [2012] QCA 69
Legal Services Commissioner v Madden [2008] QCA 52
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] QCA 52
Cite 2 - [2008] QCA 52
New South Wales Bar Association v Stevens [2003] NSWCA 95
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] NSWCA 95
Cite 2 - [2003] NSWCA 95
Quinn v Queensland Law Society [2012] QCAT 274
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QCAT 274
Cite 2 - [2012] QCAT 274
Re MCF [2015] QCA 154
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QCA 154
Cite 2 - [2015] QCA 154
Cite 3 - [2015] QCA 154
Cite 4 - [2015] QCA 154
Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of N.S.W. (1957) 97 CLR 279
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1957) 97 CLR 279
Cite 2 - (1957) 97 CLR 279

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Aufai t/as Little Hearts Family Day Care Service v Queensland Department of Education [2020] QCAT 3871 citation
Currie v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2019] QCAT 512 citations
Uysal v Queensland Building And Construction Commission [2016] QCAT 3672 citations
Willmott v Carless [2021] QCATA 1321 citation
1

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