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  4. Sky 5 Pty Ltd (In liq) v The Chief Executive, Office of Fair Trading Department of Justice and Attorney General - [2015] QCAT 470

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Sky 5 Pty Ltd (In liq) v The Chief Executive, Office of Fair Trading Department of Justice and Attorney General[2015] QCAT 470

Sky 5 Pty Ltd (In liq) v The Chief Executive, Office of Fair Trading Department of Justice and Attorney General[2015] QCAT 470

CITATION:

David Hambleton as joint and several liquidator of Sky 5 Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v The Chief Executive, Office of Fair Trading Department of Justice and Attorney General & Anor [2015] QCAT 470

PARTIES:

David Hambleton as joint and several liquidator of Sky 5 Pty Ltd (in liquidation)

(Applicant)

 

v

 

The Chief Executive Office of Fair Trading, Department of Justice and Attorney General

(First Respondent)

Stan Tuxford

(Second Respondent)

APPLICATION NUMBER:

GAR243-13

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters

HEARING DATE:

10 March 2015

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Allen

DELIVERED ON:

19 November 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS MADE:

  1. The application for an extension of time is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

PROPERTY AGENTS AND MOTOR DEALERS – claim against claim fund – request for extension of time – whether Tribunal satisfied that it is appropriate to be grant extension – where long delay between happening of event – where claims previously made by applicant failed.

Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) ss 10, 470, 472, 473, 488, 492 and 511

Queensland Civil  and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ss 6, 7 and 61

Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General v Campaigntrack Victoria Pty Ltd [2015] QCATA 61

Kuku Djungan Aboriginal Corporation v Christensen (1993) 2QR 663

Hoffman v The Queensland Local Government Superannuation Board (1994) 1QR 369

Crime and Misconduct Commission v Chapman [2011] QCAT 229

David Hambleton as joint and several Liquidator of Sky 5 Pty Ltd and Anor v Hutchinson (No1) [2012] QCATA 89

APPEARANCES:

APPLICANT:

Mr R Dickson of counsel for the Applicant

RESPONDENT:

Mr J Horton of counsel for the Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    Mr Hambleton wishes to make an application to claim against the claim fund under the now repealed Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld). The claim fund enables parties who have suffered financial loss as a result of a particular event involving a contravention by in this case, a real estate agent of one of a list of sections of the PAMD Act[1] to obtain payment up to a limit of $200,000 from the fund.

History of the claims

  1. [2]
    The claim relates to events, which occurred in 2006 and 2007 involving deposits paid in respect of contracts entered by various individuals with Sky 1 Pty Ltd and Sky 5 Pty Ltd for the purchase of land at an estate known as Waverly View Estate. Mr Tuxford, a real estate agent and Mr Hutchinson, a director of the Sky companies were involved in all of the transactions. The contracts did not reach completion and the companies were unable to return the deposits to the disappointed purchasers. This was due to the deposits not being held in a trust account and the funds having been withdrawn from the accounts they were paid into and disbursed prior to any entitlement to do so arising in the seller.
  2. [3]
    Mr Hambleton in his role as liquidator of Sky 5 Pty Ltd assisted the purchasers to file proofs of debt in respect of the deposits with the company and then to make claims against the claim fund. The claims against the fund were made in Mr Hambleton’s name as liquidator and the individual purchasers were not joined as parties until the matters were heard by the Tribunal. 
  3. [4]
    During the course of the investigation by the Chief Executive and the Tribunal proceedings Sky 5 Pty ltd came into funds and three distributions were made to the individual purchasers from the company in respect of their proofs of debt. The matters were heard and the learned Tribunal Member found that the actions of Mr Tuxford and Mr Hutchinson constituted an event and the purchasers and the company had suffered financial loss as a result of the happening of the event. The company was not able to recover as the Tribunal held that the company would not have suffered any loss but for the actions of Mr Hutchinson. The amount of loss allowed to the purchasers was in each case the deposit paid by them less the amount of the three distributions paid to them from funds held by Mr Hambleton. Mr Tuxford was made responsible to reimburse the clam fund in respect of the monies ordered to be paid. These decisions were made in 2011.
  4. [5]
    Mr Hambleton appealed those decisions and the Appeals were heard by Judicial Member Brabazon QC. The grounds of appeal were that Mr Hambleton should have received the full amount of the deposit that each of the purchasers had paid without deduction for the three distributions made in the course of the liquidation. The purchaser’s would receive the difference between the amount they were entitled to for their deposits and the amount of the dividend and the liquidator would retain the balance for distribution to other unsecured creditors. Judicial Member Brabazon QC dismissed the appeals in 2012 confirming that the claims should be paid to the individual purchasers to the extent of their financial loss after allowing for the amounts paid to them by Mr Hambleton.
  5. [6]
    While Judicial Member Brabazon QC accepted that the company and its directors and agents are separate entities so that the reprehensible conduct of those individuals should not be attributed to the company, he found the deposits had not become the property of Sky 5. He held that a deposit, intended to be held in a trust account, is the beneficial property of the purchaser until settlement. Its disappearance was a financial loss for the purchaser, not Sky 5. Sky 5 was never entitled to the money. He went on to say, what Sky 5 lost was the opportunity to complete the contracts. He had earlier said, when it was submitted on behalf of Mr Hambleton that the full amount of the various claims should be paid out, with no deduction for the amount of the dividends already paid; “(the last submission can be dismissed - it cannot be accepted)”.
  6. [7]
    Mr Hambleton filed appeals in the Court of Appeal against the decisions of Judicial Member Brabazon QC in 2012. Ultimately, those appeals were withdrawn in 2013. It is said this was on the basis that the argument that the loss suffered by the company was the payment of the dividends had not been raised before Judicial Member Brabazon QC and could then not constitute an error of law.
  7. [8]
    Mr Hambleton then filed applications with the Chief Executive on 8 April 2013 in respect of the financial losses suffered by the company, Sky 5 Pty Ltd as a result of paying out the interim dividends to each of the purchasers.
  8. [9]
    The Chief Executive notified Mr Hambleton on 24 April 2013 that a review of the claims indicated that the financial loss currently claimed was included in previous claims and that the new claims allege the same events, by the same parties that have already been determined. That as these matters have already been determined by courts of competent jurisdiction your file has been closed and no further action will be taken on the new claim.
  9. [10]
    Further correspondence was sent by the Chief Executive to Mr Hambleton’s solicitors on 28 May 2013. Separate correspondence  was sent in respect of each of the claims in accordance with the details listed below:-

Purchaser’s Name

Date of Event

Date became aware of financial loss

Angus McDonald

22 June 2007

9 May 2008

John Maddock

14 February 2007

12 May 2008

Scoot White and Agnes Foo

19 October 2007

9 May 2008

Stephane Nijskens

22 February 2007

23 May 2008

Digital Data Systems

18 July 2007

12 May 2008

Gurbunder and Karanjeet Guraya

19 June 2007

12 May 2008

Realeaf Pty Ltd

28 November 2007

12 May 2008

Francis Rashu

12 May 2007

12 May 2008

  1. [11]
    The letters were each date stamped as being received on 30 May 2013. Mr Hambleton filed applications for extension of time in respect of the claims on 13 June 2013.

The legislative framework

  1. [12]
    The requirements about the relevant time limits are to be found in ss 472 and 473 of the then PAMD Act.  Section 472(2) of the Act states that a person may make a claim within the earlier of 1 year after the person becomes aware that the person has suffered financial loss because of the happening of an event and 3 years after the happening of the event, that caused the person’s financial loss. Clearly, based on that criteria the above claims are out of time.
  2. [13]
    If a claim is not made within the time allowed under s 472 the Chief Executive must in accordance with s 473(5) of the Act give the person a notice stating that the claim is out of time and the person may apply to the Tribunal, within 14 days after being given the notice, for an extension of time.
  3. [14]
    The Chief Executive’s initial response to Mr Hambleton on 24 April 2013 does not comply with the requirements of s 473 in that it did not advise him that the application was out of time and did not include the required notice. It was not until the correspondence that the Chief Executive sent on 28 May 2013 that the s 473 requirements were complied with.
  4. [15]
    This correspondence was received by Mr Hambleton’s lawyers on 30 May 2013 and the application for an extension were filed in the Tribunal on 13 June 2013. The Chief Executive submits that the applications for extension of time were not filed within 14 days of 28 May 2013, which is the date they were sent to Mr Hambleton. Having regard to the terms of s 473, the application must be made within 14 days of being given the notice. The Tribunal is satisfied that the operative date is 30 May 2013 and therefore the applications for extension of time were filed within the 14 day period. This is reflected in the decision of Judicial Member Brabazon QC discussed below at [17].
  5. [16]
    While the applications for claims against the fund filed by Mr Hambleton on 8 April 2013 noted that the Respondent, that is the person who contravened the PAMD Act, was Mr Stanley Tuxford, the respondent to the application for an extension of time was the Chief Executive. The Tribunal joined Stan Tuxford as a respondent on 4 September 2013 and directed that the following questions of law were to be determined by oral hearing:
    1. Is the Chief Executive a proper Respondent to the application?
    2. Is the Applicant able to proceed against the Chief Executive and/or Mr Tuxford, having regard to s 511 of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000? 
  6. [17]
    Judicial Member Brabazon QC considered the questions, in particular having regard to whether or not the application for an extension of time was out of time itself as a result of Mr Tuxford not being named as a respondent and determined the questions as follows:
    1. The Chief Executive, Department of Justice & Attorney General is a proper respondent to Mr Hambleton’s application, and
    2. The applicant is able to proceed against the Chief Executive and Mr Tuxford having regard to s 511 of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000.
  7. [18]
    The submissions in regard to the exercise of the Tribunals discretion to extend time in this application have been based to a large extend on s 61 of the QCAT Act, which gives the Tribunal general power to extend time in regard to the start of a proceeding fixed by the QCAT Act or an enabling Act. This power is subject to a requirement that the Tribunal cannot exercise the power if to do so would cause prejudice or damage, which is not able to be remedied by an appropriate order for costs or damages.
  8. [19]
    The QCAT Act has provisions which deal with its relationship with enabling Acts, that is acts which give the Tribunal jurisdiction. The PAMDA is an enabling Act as it gives the Tribunal jurisdiction to decide claims against the fund in accordance with s 476 and 488 of the PAMDA. An enabling Act conferring original jurisdiction as is the case here will generally state the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, which may add to, otherwise vary, or exclude functions in this Act[2].  If this occurs, the modifying provisions prevail over the provisions of the QCAT Act, to the extent of any inconsistency[3].
  9. [20]
    As mentioned above s 511 of the PAMDA deals with extensions of time and sets out that the Tribunal may extend time if it is satisfied of various matters. The first of which is that the application is made with the period set out in s 473(5), that is 14 days. Further, that it is appropriate to extend time having regard to-
    1. The reasons for not making the claim or seeking the review within the time allowed; and
    2. The application generally; and
    3. For a claim. The relative hardship that an extension of time or a refusal to extend time would place on the claimant or respondent[4]. (The Tribunal notes that the word respondent is defined for the purposes of this chapter of PAMDA as the person or persons whose actions are alleged to have given rise to the claim[5].); and
    4. The justice of the matter generally.
  10. [21]
    The Appeals Tribunal in Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General v Campaigntrack Victoria Pty ltd [2015] QCATA 61 determined that s 61 of the QCAT Act could not be used to extend the time within which an application for an extension of time may be lodged and that the Chief executive is a proper respondent for the purposes of an application to the Tribunal to extend time under s 511 of PAMDA. The Tribunal in that case noted that “one object of the PAMDA is consumer protection. Campaigntrack describes it as beneficial legislation. That does not mean that parliament intended the claim fund to be open to protracted claims processes.”
  11. [22]
    The decision in Campaigntrack was handed down after the hearing of this application and the parties were given an opportunity to make submissions.  Counsel for Mr Hambleton acknowledged that the effect of the decision was that the Tribunal’s power to extend time is contained in s 511 of the PAMD Act. That the decision supports that the Chief Executive is a proper respondent.  That in this case the application for an extension was found by Judicial Member Brabazon to have been filed within the 14 day period and so that part of the decision does not apply here. The Campaigntrack decision is under further appeal and it would be unsafe to rely on it apart from the different factual issues in regard to whether the application was filed in time. The provisions of s 511(1)(b) of PAMD Act allow the Tribunal to consider the same matters that it would under s 61 of the QCAT Act because the four categories in s 511(1)(b) are quite wide and which include “the justice of the matter generally”. Therefore, Campaigntrack does not adversely affect Mr Hambleton’s position.
  12. [23]
    The Chief Executive submitted in relation to the Campaigntrack decision that s 61 of the QCAT Act cannot apply to Mr Hambleton’s extension application  and the legislative purpose of the PAMD Act and the claim fund does not advance Mr Hambleton’s case. The words in s 511(1) render it a mandatory, substantive precondition to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to extend time that s 61 QCAT Act cannot alter or it is a modifying provision which takes precedence over s 61 of the QCAT Act. While consumer protection is one of the purposes of the PMADA Act, this does not mean the claim fund should be open to protracted claims processes. While the decision is under appeal in accordance with s 152 of the QCAT Act it still remains in force.
  13. [24]
    Clearly, s 511 of the PAMD Act is inconsistent with s 61 of the QCAT Act as it has more requirements, which must be satisfied before an order can be made. The relationship between s 473(5), which requires the Chief Commissioner to give the applicant  the notice that the claim is out of time and that an application may be made to the Tribunal within 14 days, and the requirement of s 511(1) that the Tribunal be satisfied that the application for an extension of time is made within the period set out in s 473(5)(b) goes to show that it is under s 511 that the Tribunal is to exercise power to extend time. The Tribunal must therefore determine the application for the extension of time in accordance with s 511 of the PAMD Act.
  14. [25]
    I agree that on the basis of the Campaigntrack decision the Chief Executive is a proper respondent to the application for an extension of time and confirm in this case that the application for an extension of time was filed within the 14 day period and so that part of the requirements of s 511 have been met.

The reasons for not making the claim within the time allowed

  1. [26]
    For the Tribunal to determine whether or not it is appropriate to extend time considerations must be given to the other matters set out in s 511 of the PAMD Act, which are set out above. The first of them is the reasons for not making the claim or seeking the review within the time allowed. On its face, it appears there is a very large gap between when the events occurred and the date of the claims. What must be remembered though is that Mr Hambleton made claims against the claims fund within time in respect of all these matters in 2009 in respect of the deposits paid by the various purchasers as set out above. Following the original decision in 2011 he appealed to the Appeals Tribunal. Following that decision in 2012 he appealed to the Court of Appeal and raised as a ground that the Appeal Tribunal did not consider whether the amount paid by way of dividend constituted a financial loss to the company.
  2. [27]
    The Chief executive submitted that this ground had not been raised as a ground in the appeal to the Appeal Tribunal and that was accepted by the Court of Appeal. The appeal was then discontinued.
  3. [28]
    Following that, the present applications were made to the Chief Executive in April 2013. The present application is a claim in respect of the financial loss “equivalent to amounts paid as dividends to the various purchasers”. Clearly once Mr Hambleton’s avenues of appeal had been exhausted in respect of the original claims he determined to bring the new claim. He himself makes the point that the claim has been fully investigated as it it is on the same facts as the original claims which had been determined in respect of the deposits.
  4. [29]
    The Chief Executive submits that there has been no satisfactory explanation for the delay and while it has not been clearly articulated the course of the applications through the Tribunal show that the reason for the delay is that it was only after the Court of Appeal application had been finalised that the necessity for this claim arose.
  5. [30]
    It cannot be said that the Chief Executive could be surprised by this claim as he has known for many years that Mr Hambleton was seeking an amount from the fund equivalent to the amount which has been paid out by him to the purchasers by way of dividend and the Chief Executive has all of the background information before him in regard to the involvement of a relevant person, Mr Tuxford and the events, the payment and disappearance of the various deposits.

The application generally

  1. [31]
    When considering the application generally the Tribunal has regard to the merits of the substantive application[6] or as Judicial Member Thomas described it, “the strength of the case the Applicant wishes to bring”[7]. In this case, the financial loss claimed is the amount that Mr Hambleton has paid to the various deposit holders as dividends consequent upon them filing proofs of debt in the liquidation of the company, which have been accepted by him.
  2. [32]
    He stated in his application that “he had called for proof of debts and received them from the deposit holders. He was therefore required to rule upon whether they each had a valid claim against the company. Although their loss was a result of Tuxford’s failure/ inability to return the deposit they paid (for which he had been found guilty), as Sky5 was the vendor under the contracts of sale I determined that Sky5 was also liable for the loss of the deposits. He then proceeded to lodge claims against the claim fund believing that as Sky 5 had accepted liability for the lost deposits it has the same rights of recovery under the fund as the deposit payers would have had. Whilst those claims were being considered he paid three dividends to the deposit payers. Which he says is proof that Sky 5 had accepted liability for the deposits as vendor under the contracts”.
  3. [33]
    The decision of the Appeals Tribunal was to the effect that the only party who had suffered loss in regard to the deposits was the purchasers “as a deposit intended to be held in a trust account, is the beneficial property of the purchaser until settlement[8]. The loss Mr Hambleton now claims is the dividends paid by him as liquidator to the deposit holders. The Chief Executive submits that this is a rearguing of the previous matters and is subject to the doctrine of Res Judicata, that is that once the Tribunal has given its decision in regard to issues in dispute the parties cannot resurrect the old issues in new proceedings. This application has the flavour of an attempt to do so as the only difference here would appear to be the characterisation of Mr Hambleton’s claim as being for the amount of the dividend itself, which is for the amount of the deposit returned to the purchaser by the company, and not for the deposits or any part of them.
  4. [34]
    The question then is, is there a sufficient nexus to enliven the Act. A person may make a claim in accordance with s 470 of the PAMD Act if the person suffers financial loss because of the happening of any of the following events, which involve contraventions of the Act by a relevant person. The nexus was clearly established where Mr Tuxford as agent was found to have misapplied or misappropriated the purchasers deposit monies.
  5. [35]
    How does the acts of the liquidator, Mr Hambleton as set out above in considering and accepting a proof of debt and paying dividends to the creditors constitute a finalise loss. Mr Hambleton submits that there is a financial loss because other creditors of the company have not received as much in dividends as they would have if the claim of Mr Hambleton were allowed and the dividends paid to the purchasers were reimbursed by the claim fund. He has not though provided any details about those creditors. It is also clear from the investigation report that the company received funds in the amount of $510,000 from Land Equity Ltd when it agreed to take back the contracts for the land, which was on-sold to the purchasers whose deposits had been lost. Therefore, the funds from which the dividends had been paid to the purchasers had some connection to the contracts, which failed.
  6. [36]
    It must also be noted that the amount of the entitlement of the original purchasers against the fund is subject to deduction for any amount the Tribunal considers the claimant might reasonably have received or recovered if not for the claimant’s neglect or default[9]. It was then incumbent on the purchasers to prove against the company. Once they had done that, the amount of their entitlement was then reduced by the amount they received by way of dividend[10]. That is exactly what occurred and the fund made up the amount of the purchasers loss less the dividend. Mr Hambleton is now trying to claim the amount, which the claim fund has said that the purchasers were not entitled to, as his entitlement.
  7. [37]
    Mr Horton for the Chief Executive submitted at the hearing that the loss now claimed by Mr Hambleton was as a result of dividends required to be paid as a result of company law and that Mr Hambleton could only act in accordance with his duties at law to make distribution of company property. Similarly submissions were also raised on behalf of the Chief Executive in the appeal to the Court of Appeal. That is they were not a financial loss as a result of the happening of an event.
  8. [38]
    On its face Mr Hambleton made a conscious decision to accept the claims of the disappointed purchasers and to pay them dividends in the liquidation of the company. He did this at the same time he was bringing applications for payment from the claim fund and may have thought that he would receive funds from the claim fund to reimburse the company for the dividends. This ultimately proved not to be the case in regard to the original claims.
  9. [39]
    The only difference between these applications and the previous applications is that Mr Hambleton is now characterising the dividends themselves as a financial loss. Mr Hambleton has said that all of the investigation work has been done. Having regard to the requirement that the applicant demonstrate financial loss as a result of the happening of an event and the payment of the dividends being a voluntary act of Mr Hambleton I consider that the applications have limited merit.

The relative hardship to the applicant and respondent

  1. [40]
    I am also required to consider the relative hardship for the applicant and respondent. As noted having regard to the definition of respondent in the Act considerations in that regard are limited to any which may affect Mr Tuxford. Mr Dickson submitted that the company is a consumer for the purposes of the Act and the objects of the Act are to protect consumers[11]. That there is a substantial anomaly if the fund established under the PAMD Act as part of consumer protection has paid out in respect of the nine persons who have claimed the total of their losses less the dividends received and the general creditors of the company cannot have recourse against the fund for that differential, the dividends. It is also noted that the delay has worked against the company because interest cannot be claimed in accordance with s 492(5) of the PAMD Act.
  2. [41]
    Mr Horton submitted that while consumer protection is one of the objects of the Act this should not lead to the conclusion that Parliament intended for there to be open-ended opportunities to claim on the fund, as set out in the Campaigntrack decision.
  3. [42]
    I consider that the purchasers were required by the PAMD Act to take whatever steps they could to ameliorate their loss in accordance with s 492 of the Act, which they did. Mr Hambleton has accepted those claims and paid out the dividends and the claim fund has paid the actual financial loss of the purchasers, which is the amount of their deposit less the dividend. Those purchasers had every right to prove in the liquidation and receive payment. If the company had not had any funds then the claim fund would have paid out the whole of the lost deposits. There can be no anomaly or hardship to the general creditors where the process has occurred according to law.
  4. [43]
    In regard to Mr Tuxford, he did not participate in the first set of claims according to the investigation reports. The material shows that he was declared bankrupt on 12 November 2012 and his trustee in bankruptcy has chosen not to participate in the application[12]. If the extension of time were to be allowed then ultimately Mr Tuxford may have been named as the person liable for the claimant’s loss[13]. Considering that Mr Tuxford did not participate in the first set of claims and he has been declared bankrupt, it is difficult to see any hardship, which may apply to him.
  5. [44]
    While there is no hardship to Mr Tuxford having regard to my analysis of the claims there is also no real hardship to the applicant as the claim has little merit.

The justice of the matter generally

  1. [45]
    When considering the justice of the matter generally, Mr Horton has submitted that the wider public interest should be considered in accordance with the Hoffman and Kuku decisions and that there is no wider public interest that might benefit from the extension. That is having regard to the factors raised on behalf of Mr Hambleton about the company being a consumer and the anomalous treatment of its general creditors. He states that it is not a question of construing the legislation in a manner beneficial to consumers but in applying the well-established principles to the facts.  Mr Dickson in reply submitted that the public interest is relevant, as the fund is not performing its consumer protection function.
  2. [46]
    The wider public interest must connote some benefit that can be obtained from the application proceeding in terms of it leading to a clarification of the interpretation of the legislation. That has not been raised on behalf of Mr Hambleton. What was raised was that if the matter is not allowed to continue then the fund will not be fulfilling its purpose as the company is a consumer and it has suffered a loss. There are limits in regard to all matters after which claims cannot be entertained with the purpose of ensuring that that there are finality of claims. The resources of the Chief Executive and the claim fund are subject to those limits and even if a claim had some merit, there would need to be a good explanation before an extension of time would be granted especially where there was such a long delay as in this case.

Summary

  1. [47]
    Here the Tribunal can understand the delay in terms of Mr Hambleton exhausting his avenues of appeal in respect of the original claims. Considering the application itself the Tribunal considers that Mr Hambleton has not shown he would have a claim of sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time. The claim relates to amounts paid by Mr Hambleton to creditors of the company upon acceptance by him of their individual claims. He states himself that the company was liable in respect of the claims. This does not suggest financial loss but part of the orderly liquidation of the company. In terms of relative hardship, there can be no hardship where the claim in respect of the company would not be successful. There is also no evidence that the justice of the matter makes it appropriate to extend time.
  2. [48]
    Therefore while I am satisfied that the application for the extension of time was made within time in accordance with s 473(5) I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to extend time and the application to extend time is refused.

Footnotes

[1] Section 470 of the PAMDA.

[2] Section 6(3) of the QCAT Act.

[3] Section 7(2) of the QCAT Act.

[4] Section 511(1)(b) of the PAMDA.

[5] Section 474(1) of the PAMDA.

[6] Kuku Djungan Aboriginal Corporation v Christensen (1993) 2QR 663 at 665 and Hoffman v The Queensland Local Government Superannuation Board (1994) 1QR 369 at 372.

[7]Crime and Misconduct Commission v Chapman [2011] QCAT 229 at [9].

[8] David Hambleton as joint and several Liquidator of Sky 5 Pty Ltd and Anor v Hutchinson (No1) [2012] QCATA 89 at 26.

[9] Section 492(1)(b) of the PAMD Act.

[10] Section 492(1)(a) of the PAMD Act.

[11] Section 10 of the PAMD Act.

[12] Exhibit 2.

[13] Section 488(3)(c) of the PAMD Act.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    David Hambleton as joint and several liquidator of Sky 5 Pty Ltd (In liq) v The Chief Executive, Office of Fair Trading Department of Justice and Attorney General and Stan Tuxford

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Sky 5 Pty Ltd (In liq) v The Chief Executive, Office of Fair Trading Department of Justice and Attorney General

  • MNC:

    [2015] QCAT 470

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Member Allen

  • Date:

    19 Nov 2015

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General v Campaigntrack Victoria Pty Ltd [2015] QCATA 61
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QCATA 61
Cite 2 - [2015] QCATA 61
Crime and Misconduct Commission v Chapman & Anor [2011] QCAT 229
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCAT 229
Cite 2 - [2011] QCAT 229
David Hambleton as joint and several Liquidator of Sky 5 Pty Ltd and Anor v Hutchinson (No 1) [2012] QCATA 89
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QCATA 89
Cite 2 - [2012] QCATA 89
Hoffmann v Queensland Local Government Superannuation Board [1994] 1 Qd R 369
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1994] 1 Qd R 369
Cite 2 - [1994] 1 Qd R 369
Kuku Djungan Aboriginal Corporation v Christensen[1993] 2 Qd R 663; [1992] QSC 417
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1993] 2 Qd R 663
Cite 2 - [1993] 2 Qd R 663

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Tran v Turner [2023] QCAT 2903 citations
1

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