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Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski[2017] QCAT 146

Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski[2017] QCAT 146

CITATION:

Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski & Anor [2017] QCAT 146

PARTIES:

Officer JGB

(Applicant)

v

Deputy Commissioner Stephen Gollschewski

Crime and Corruption Commission

(Respondents)

APPLICATION NUMBER:

OCR176-15

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

HEARING DATE:

8 February 2017

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Howard

DELIVERED ON:

5 May 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS MADE:

  1. The decision of Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski about sanction is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

POLICE – INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION – DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSAL FOR MISCONDUCT – QUEENSLAND – Sanction – where substantiated acts of misconduct include acts of domestic violence; threats to kill another person; improper behaviour towards wife and more junior officers in presence of wife; without official purpose accessing confidential information from police database – whether regard should be given to Deputy Commissioner’s reasons for decision – where not all of the same matters substantiated on review – whether principle  adopted in sentencing when criminal conviction on two or more counts applicable – where mitigating circumstances relied upon – whether the misconduct meets community expectations of a serving member of the police service –  whether dismissal should be suspended

Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), s 219A, s 291L

Police Service (Discipline) Regulations 1990 (Qld), reg 3

Aldrich v Ross (2001) 2 Qd R 235

Braunberger v Assistant Commissioner Les Hopkins [2014] QCATA 320

Chapman v Crime & Misconduct Commission & Rynders [2012] QCATA 016

Compton v Deputy Commissioner Ian Stewart Queensland Police Service [2010] QCAT 384

Crime and Corruption Commission v Deputy Commissioner Pointing; O'Sullivan v Deputy Commissioner Pointing [2016] QCAT 510

Crime and Corruption Commission v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski  & Majewski (No 2) [2014] QCAT 488

Crime and Misconduct Commission v Acting Deputy Commissioner Barron & Alexander [2014] QCAT 241

Crime & Misconduct Commission v Swindells & Gardiner [2010[ QCAT 490

DA v Deputy Commissioner Stewart [2011] QCAT 102

DA v Deputy Commissioner Stewart (No 2) [2013] QCATA 162

Deputy Commissioner Stewart v Dark [2012] QCA 228

Flegg v Crime & Misconduct Commission [2014] QCA 42

Hardcastle v Commissioner of Police (1984) 53 ALR 593

O'Brien v Assistant Commissioner Gollschweski [2014] QCATA 148

McKenzie v Acting Commissioner Wright [2011] QCATA 309

Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski and Anor [2016] QCAT 348

Officer TXS v Acting Deputy Commissioner McCallum [2011] QCAT 739

Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397

Ryan v R (1982) 149 CLR 1

Scott v Assistant Commissioner Peter Martin [2015] QCAT 423

Stirling v Legal Services Commissioner [2013] VSCA 374

Tolsher v Commissioner of Police Ian Stewart (No 2) [2013] QCAT 590

APPEARANCES:

APPLICANT:

Mr M Black of Counsel, instructed by Gilshenan and Luton appeared for Officer GJB

FIRST RESPONDENT:

Mr JW Merrell of Counsel, instructed by the Queensland Police Service Legal Unit, appeared for Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski

SECOND RESPONDENT:

Ms S Harbidge, in-house lawyer for the Crime & Corruption Commission

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    Officer JGB was a senior constable in the Queensland Police Service (‘QPS’). On 11 September 2015, Deputy Commissioner Stephen Gollschewski (‘the Deputy Commissioner’) decided that a disciplinary charge (Matter One) brought against Officer JGB was substantiated. He dismissed Officer JGB from the QPS.
  2. [2]
    Officer JGB applied to the Tribunal for review of substantiation and sanction. I decided the review in relation to matters of substantiation on 26 September 2016,[1] setting aside some allegations (including some allegations of domestic violence) that the Deputy Commissioner had found substantiated.
  3. [3]
    I now determine the review on sanction. In summary, the Deputy Commissioner submits that the sanction of dismissal imposed by him is the correct and preferable decision, irrespective that some aspects of substantiation were set aside on review. Officer JGB submits, in essence, that in the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion afresh on sanction, the correct and preferable decision is a global sanction of demotion from Senior Constable 2.9 to Constable 1.6 for a period of 12 months. In the alternative, if the Tribunal is minded to confirm dismissal, he argues that the dismissal ought be suspended.
  4. [4]
    For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that the sanction of dismissal is the correct and preferable decision, and that suspension is not appropriate. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner’s decision on sanction is confirmed.

The conduct charged and substantiated

  1. [5]
    My reasons for decision about substantiation are published as Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski and Anor[2] (JGB). However, it is useful here to again set out some details.
  2. [6]
    The disciplinary charge against Officer JGB was that between 4 October 2009 and 3 November 2012, his conduct was improper in a number of respects. The Deputy Commissioner found all aspects of the conduct substantiated, and with exceptions referred to in the following paragraphs, to be misconduct. Some aspects of the decision on substantiation were not challenged on review.
  3. [7]
    Matter One (a), alleged that he had committed a number of acts of domestic violence against his spouse, ALB, between 4 October 2009 and 3 November 2012. The particulars were as follows:
  • [Dot point 1] You were married to ALB on 21 November 1998;
  • [Dot point 2] On one occasion in approximately October 2010, when visiting family in Melbourne, following her request for your mobile phone you became aggressive toward ALB and caused bruising to her left arm and upper body;
  • [Dot point 3] On one occasion between November 2010 and March 2011 at your home at XXXXX you became aggressive toward ALB, grabbing her around the throat, lifting her off the ground, firming your grip around her throat, stating “I could kill you now”;
  • [Dot point 4] On occasions between November 2010 and March 2011 at your home at XXXXX you became aggressive toward ALB pushing her down onto the leather couch in the family/kitchen room;
  • [Dot point 5] On occasions between November 2010 and March 2011 at your home at XXXXX you caused damage to walls in the master bedroom and hallway next to the master bedroom;
  • [Dot point 6] On one occasion between November 2010 and March 2011 at your home at XXXXX you threw a glass of water over ALB while she was lying in bed;
  • [Dot point 7] On one occasion in approximately October 2011 at your home at XXXXX, you became angry and smashed a disco ball before knocking over the bar stool on which ALB was sitting causing her to fall to the ground;
  • [Dot point 8] On 14 February 2012 at your home at XXXXX you caused damage to the master bedroom door and a bedroom wall;
  • [Dot point 9] On 15 February 2012 at your home at XXXXX you threw orange juice on ALB;
  • [Dot point 10] On 15 February 2012 at your home at XXXXX you referred to ALB as a “slut” to your children;
  • [Dot point 11] On 15 February 2012 at your home at XXXXX you put your arm around ALB’s neck, lifter her up off the ground and then pushed her down onto the floor and placed pressure on her chest with one foot, while wearing shoes; and
  • [Dot point 12] On 15 February 2012, following your departure, Senior Constables Boswell, Batten, Oliphant and Everding attended at the address whereby Senior Constable Boswell then completed an application for a domestic violence protection order nominating ALB as the aggrieved spouse and you as the respondent spouse.
  1. [8]
    In the review, Officer JGB successfully challenged some of the particulars. He also sought a finding that matter One (a) was not substantiated. He admitted particulars 1, 8 and 12. Officer JGB also admitted parts of dot points 7 and 11. Although admitted, dot points 1 and 12 are not conduct alleged against Officer JGB.
  2. [9]
    I found the following substantiated:
    1. Matter One (a), dot point 7 (in part) – On one occasion in approximately October 2011 at Officer JGB’s home he became angry and smashed a disco ball;[3]
    2. Matter One (a), dot point 8 – That on 14 February 2012, at Officer JGB’s home, he caused damage to the master bedroom door and a bedroom wall;[4]
    3. Matter One (a), dot point 10 – That on 15 February 2012, at Officer JGB’s home, he referred to his then wife as a ‘slut’ to his children;[5]
    4. Matter One (a), dot point 11 – That on 15 February 2012, at Officer JGB’s home, he executed a police style takedown on his then wife resulting in her being on the floor, and placed one foot on her chest, while he was wearing shoes.[6]
  3. [10]
    I found that the particulars specified in Matter 1(a), dot points 2 to 6 and 9 were not substantiated. Further, I found Matter 1(a) was substantiated as misconduct.
  4. [11]
    The Deputy Commissioner’s decision that Matters 1(b) and One (c) were substantiated and were misconduct was not challenged on review by Officer JGB. Matters One (b) and (c) are as follows:

Matter One (b) that Officer JGB made abusive and threatening phone calls to DC

[12] The particulars specified in the charge are as follows:

a) On 14 February 2012 you contacted [DC] by phone and identified yourself as a police officer;

b) On 14 February 2012 you intimidated and threatened [DC] by stating “I know a lot of bad people”, “Watch your back”, “You don’t want to run into me down an alley way”, “Watch yourself in carparks” and “No shut up you little cunt I’m speaking now”;

c) On 14 February 2012 on more than one occasion you threatened to kill [DC] by stating, “I’m going to kill you”;

d) On 14 February 2012 you called [DC] “a little cunt”;

e) On 15 February 2012 you re-contacted [DC] by phone and intimidated and threatened him by stating “You’ve destroyed my family. You should still watch your back”; and

f) On 15 February 2012 you called [DC] a “cunt”.

  1. [12]
    Officer JGB says that the behaviour occurred in the context that he had been consuming alcohol when he found Facebook messages, which led him to believe that ALB may be having an affair with DC.

1.2 Matter One (c) without official purpose related to the performance of his duties, Officer JGB accessed confidential Queensland Police Service information

[14] The particulars specified are as follows: you access (sic) the Queensland Police Service QPRIME Computer System and conducted searches and accessed information in relation to:

i) [GM] on 5 October 2009, 9 March 2010, 5 October 2010, 24 August 2010, 20 September 2010, 27 September 2010, 22 February 2011, 1 November 2011 and 24 November 2011;

ii) [AM] on 7 January 2010;

iii) [DC] on 17 February 2012, 20 February 2012, 27 March 2012, 22 April 2012 and 14 July 2012;

iv) [PW] on 29 April 2011 and 5 January 2012;

v) [AW] on 26 December 2011;

vi) [EL] on 30 September 2010, 1 October 2010, 18 October 2010, 14 April 2011, 24 September 2011, 23 October 2010, 30 January 2012 and 1 March 2012;

vii) [SL] on 31 January 2010, 18 October 2010, 26 January 2011 and 1 May 2012;

viii) [GB] on 11 October 2012 and 2 November 2012;

ix) [WA] on 23 November 2011, 17 November 2011, 19 December 2011, 28 December 2011 and 14 July 2012;

x) [MD] on 14 July 2012;

xi) [HD] on 14 July 2012;

xii) [WY] on 31 January 2010; and

xiii) [ALB] on 25 July 2012.

  1. [13]
    Officer JGB admitted the conduct in Matter One (c), but had submitted to the Deputy Commissioner that he did not engage in it for an unlawful purpose or for personal gain. He further submitted that he looked at the records for ‘curiosity sake.’[7] They included the records of ALB and a variety of family members and close friends (including, ALB’s mother and step-father, JGB’s former sister-in-law, his nephew, ALB’s best friend),[8] as well as, EL and SL (a couple with whom he and ALB had a partner swap arrangement in place for about one year prior to separation); and DC, who was the subject of the threats made by Officer JGB in Matter One (b).
  2. [14]
    Matter One (d) alleged that Officer JGB failed to treat ALB, Constable Murat Oztan and Constable Darko Radanovic with respect and dignity. The following particulars were alleged:
  • On 8 May 2012 you and your spouse separately called for police to attend at XXXXX, the home in which only ALB was now residing;
  • On the arrival of Constable Murat Oztan and Constable Darko Radovanovic you informed them that you were a police officer, told them about your marital separation and that “(t)hrough it all but she’s just being a cunt mate and she’s just fucking, just a fucking lying cunt and she’ll say and do whatever she can to fucking manipulate people” in relation to ALB;
  • You stated to the two officers that you were only there to collect property which was mainly paperwork;
  • While looking at documents stated in an intimidating manner to ALB in the presence of two officer, “Now that I’m here I might just move back in ALB. You’ve got no right to kick me out”… “Maybe just put it all back in the file there ‘cause we both live here now’”;
  • While in the house grabbed paperwork out of ALB’s hand and slammed it onto the table, frightening ALB and causing Constable Murat Oztan to physically move you away from her;
  • Used your physical size, height and body language in a way that was indicative of “shaping up” to Constable Murat Oztan causing both officers to anticipate a physical outburst from you;
  • Were warned by Constable Murat Oztan that you may be handcuffed if you did not calm down; and
  • Stated, “Mate that, that psycho bitch right” to Constable Murat Oztan and Constable Darko Radvanovic [sic] in the presence of ALB.
  1. [15]
    Although Officer JGB admitted the particulars, he disputed that it was misconduct, seeking a finding that it was unsubstantiated, or in the alternative was a breach of discipline. I found that it was substantiated as misconduct.
  2. [16]
    Matter One (e) alleged that Officer JGB failed to demonstrate appropriate dignity and respect to the Court, Magistrate Ehrich and other persons in attendance at the Court on 30 May 2012. I found Matter One (e) was  unsubstantiated.
  3. [17]
    Matter One (f) alleged that Officer JGB had conducted unauthorised investigations regarding an application for a domestic violence protection order. I found Matter One (f) was unsubstantiated.
  4. [18]
    The conduct in Matters One (h) (using QPS email to send personal external emails and use of QPS facsimile machine to send personal facsimile) and (j) (submitting an application for recreation leave when 2 days related to sick leave) were found substantiated by the Deputy Commissioner and found to be breaches of discipline. They were not the subject of review.

The purpose of police disciplinary proceedings

  1. [19]
    The purpose of police disciplinary proceedings in Queensland encompasses deterrence, protection of the public,[9] maintenance of proper standards,[10] and promoting and maintaining public confidence in the police service.[11] The sanction imposed must signify the disapproval with which the conduct is viewed.[12] It plays a role in specific (in respect of the officer concerned) and general (in respect of other officers) deterrence.[13]
  2. [20]
    As the High Court has said, the effectiveness of police in protecting the public relies upon public confidence in the integrity of its members, and internal discipline is the primary means of ensuring individuals do not jeopardise public confidence.[14]
  3. [21]
    The Appeal Tribunal has held that if the Tribunal has the same views of the facts and inferences as the decision-maker, then due regard may be given to the decision-maker’s views about what is necessary for the maintenance of discipline within the police service.[15] Nevertheless, on review, the decision about the sanction to be imposed is to be made by the Tribunal in the independent exercise of its discretion.[16] It brings the public perspective to bear on the disciplinary process.[17]
  4. [22]
    The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act) provides for the Tribunal’s functions in a review proceeding.[18] The Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) (CCC Act) sets out QCAT’s powers.[19] The CCC Act includes specific power for QCAT to suspend a sanction if it considers it appropriate to do so in the circumstances.[20]

The Deputy Commissioner’s reasons for decision

  1. [23]
    The Deputy Commissioner submits that his reasons for decision about sanction remain relevant and should be given due regard by the Tribunal, even though some aspects of substantiation of the disciplinary charge were set aside by the Tribunal. He submits that they embody relevant statements of principle about current community expectations regarding conduct of officers and the unacceptability of serious acts of misconduct involving domestic violence and other directly related conduct that should be given due respect.[21]
  2. [24]
    In particular, he refers to his statements, as follows:

In ……(Officer TXS v Acting Deputy Commissioner Colin McCallum [2011] QCAT 739), it was held that acts of domestic violence and the duties of a police officer are irreconcilable. With your further acts of misconduct in threatening police officers and members of the judiciary I believe these are destructive of your authority as a police officer and will be seen as eroding public confidence when appropriate action is not taken.

This view is strengthened in the decision in the matter of Wadham v Deputy Commissioner Ian Stewart Queensland Police Service [2010] QCAT, (sic) where it was held where the nature of the conduct is so serious as to erode public confidence then dismissal is an appropriate sanction. I believe your ongoing conduct where you behave inappropriately on another three occasions, clearly impacts on your status as a police officer and demonstrates a risk of further misconduct.

I do consider dismissal appropriate having consideration of your conduct and specific circumstances surrounding your behaviour. Unlike Constable Walker who had minimum service, you were at the rank of Senior Constable and were far more experienced. Consequently, the most appropriate sanction for Matter 1 is dismissal. Physical violence against your then wife is inexcusable, considering it had occurred on more than one occasion. Added to this conduct, is the manner in which you behaved in the Court and interacted with fellow police officers, who were simply doing “their job”. You have also made threats and inappropriately accessed information. Your conduct was to a certain extent ongoing, it was not just a one off incident. Your judgement was clearly affected for some time. Consequently, I find from all the material there is a valid reason for dismissal and I believe that it is just, reasonable and not harsh under the circumstances.

Following from this decision, I have also given consideration to suspension of the sanction imposed. Ultimately, I must decide whether the nature of your conduct was such that, notwithstanding your previous record and other mitigating factors, your sanction should be suspended.

I note the views of Hon W J Carter, Q.C., in his review of the Police Service Disciplinary Process where in his ‘Report to Chairman, Criminal Justice Commission and Commissioner of Police Re: Disciplinary Audit; June 1996 he says:

“…Inappropriate use of (Section 12) … significantly downgrades the disciplinary process. In my view the excessive use of the power to suspend (sanctions) involves a misuse of, and a misconception concerning the proper exercise of discretion which is implicit in (Section) 10. The operative provision in (Section) 12(1) is ‘the officer may suspend’ nor will or will generally suspend. The suspension of a disciplinary sanction … ought to be a relatively rare occurrence and resorted to only in appropriate cases where a proper exercise of discretion can justify it”.

I have considered the comments of Mr. R J Silver, Misconduct Tribunal Member in Morier’s Case [TA No.1 of 2003] that the purpose of police misconduct proceedings is not compromised by considering the perspective given by the Court in Gillan (1991) 54 A Crim R 475. Mr. Silver stated that in Gillan’s case, the Court said that it was wrong to regard a suspended sentence as no punishment at all.

From this case, I also accept Mr Silver’s comments that, “An order suspending a sanction … does not necessarily impact negatively on valued principles such as deterrence, the efficiency and reputation of the Police Service or the maintenance of standards.”

I am strongly of the opinion, having consideration for all relevant circumstances the suspension of your dismissal is not suitable. None more important is your conduct, which clearly demonstrates your unsuitability to be a police officer. Your actions do not warrant what is accepted as a second chance. I do not believe that your actions are such that the suspension of this sanction is warranted. Members of the Queensland Police Service who commit serious acts of domestic violence, simply cannot remain police officers.

I note that you have not been stood down or suspended from duty and accept you have been performing duties within Police Commissions, as a result of the discipline investigation. However this relocation is a risk management strategy resulting from your actions. I accept your submissions you have been performing duties within Police Communications and have dealt with domestic violence incidents. And despite the time period, your continued work within our organisation and action taken by yourself to improve your situation, as Deputy Commissioner, I hold the view it is untenable for any member of our organisation to continue in any role after allegations of serious domestic violence are substantiated.

The community expects more from their police, as do I and your actions simply are unacceptable. Your conduct is discordant with your duties as a constable of police. You have clearly demonstrated a course of conduct that does not support you continuing as a member of the Queensland Police Service.

In relation to Matter 1, having carefully considered all relevant matters, including your conduct, the matters raised in mitigation and the previous sanctions for such matters, I do not believe that suspension is appropriate, under certain circumstances. This sanction of dismissal will also act as a deterrent to others of the Service and clearly demonstrate to the community that your actions are not acceptable.

  1. [25]
    Officer JGB submits that the Deputy Commissioner’s original decision and his views are of no assistance to the Tribunal, because the Tribunal must now determine sanction based on an entirely different factual matrix. He points out that, unlike QCAT, the Deputy Commissioner had found substantiated some ongoing incidents of domestic violence since 2010, as well as Matter One (e) and Matter One (f).

Mitigating factors relied upon by Officer JGB

  1. [26]
    Officer JGB submits that a number of circumstances must be considered in mitigation of the seriousness of the misconduct.  In summary, the circumstances raised, and the Deputy Commissioner’s submissions in response, are as follows:
    1. Out of character conduct: Officer JGB submits that he is remorseful and accepts that he failed himself, ALB, his children, the QPS and the community. However, he says it was an aberration, that he now has insight and the capacity for self-reflection. (Apart from the conduct relevant to matter One (c), relating to accessing confidential information), he submits that the misconduct arose during a ‘particularly difficult’ marriage break-down and ongoing family law dispute.[22] On his behalf, it was submitted that the acts occurred primarily over two days, 14 and 15 February 2012. His submissions to the Deputy Commissioner also acknowledge that it occurred in the context of excessive alcohol use at the time, said to arise out of the circumstances, at that time and contributing to his poor decision-making.[23] Officer JGB submits that in the absence of a prior, or subsequent, history of similar conduct, his actions may properly be considered ‘out-of character.’[24]

The Deputy Commissioner submits that Officer JGB’s true character was fully revealed in the misconduct, even if it may largely have occurred over a short time. He submits that the available evidence does not suggest that the stress attributed by Officer JGB to the marriage breakdown, or his excessive alcohol consumption, occurred in the context of any diagnosed medical condition.[25] He relies upon the principle expressed by Muir J in Deputy Commissioner Stewart v Dark (Dark), as follows :[26]

[35] The fact that the conduct occurred when the respondent was suffering from stress may engender some understanding of his conduct and sympathy for him, but it does not bear strongly on the conclusions capable of being drawn about his character and integrity. The great majority of people behave with propriety and integrity in the absence of stress, adversity or temptation. However, it is often when a person is tested by such conditions and circumstances that his or her character is fully revealed. Police officers are commonly placed in situations of considerable stress and may also be subjected to strong temptation from time to time. The expectation of the QPS and the public is that officers will resist any such temptation and will continue to behave with due propriety regardless of stress. 

The Deputy Commissioner further submits that the commission of acts of domestic violence are incompatible with an officer’s ongoing performance of duty as a police officer and that as the alcohol use has not been the subject of diagnosis or treatment, it is reasonable to infer that it could have been controlled.

Officer JGB submits in response that Muir J’s words do not embody a ‘principle’ as such. Further, he points out that officers must also uphold traffic legislation, yet a drink-driving charge does not, of itself, result in dismissal of an officer. Similarly, assault is a common ground for disciplinary charges but there is no fixed principle that the officer can never be a police officer again. He submits that the misconduct does not of itself demonstrate an irretrievable flaw in character.

Instead, he submits that in disciplinary proceedings, an officer can demonstrate that his character has developed and changed. He says the correct approach is to consider whether the officer has so broken confidence that he can no longer be a serving officer.

It is useful to observe that Muir J’s comments in Dark were made in the following context:

[33] It may that not every act of dishonesty in a police officer’s private life will constitute misconduct. The nature of the act and the circumstances in which it took place must be considered with a view to determining whether the conduct reveals such a lack of integrity or want of character as to substantially erode the trust and confidence that the officer’s colleagues and/or members of the public are entitled to repose in him or her.[27]

Further, Muir J further said, ‘The fact that the conduct occurred against the background of a bitter matrimonial dispute may serve to explain the behaviour, but can hardly excuse it.’[28]

  1. Off-duty conduct: Other than Matter One (c), the misconduct occurred when Officer JGB was off-duty. He submits that on-duty conduct is generally considered more serious.[29] That said, at hearing, Counsel for Officer JGB clarified that it was not contended that his misconduct substantiated as domestic violence is less serious because it is off-duty conduct. Rather, he urges the Tribunal to consider the steps taken by Officer JGB to ensure that the public could have confidence in him as a police officer.

The Deputy Commissioner submits that off-duty domestic violence is very serious misconduct, because (as I discussed in the substantiation decision),[30] of the significant role of police officers in the administration of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DV Act). 

  1. Early admissions of the misconduct: Other than calling ALB a ‘slut’ to the children (although he admitted calling her a ‘slut,’ Officer JGB denied calling her a ‘slut’ to the children), Officer JGB admitted the  conduct at an early stage and expressed his remorse.[31] Early acceptance of a charge has been considered by QCAT as an indication of ‘honesty and remorse, and a willingness to face up to obligations’, which ‘can be very significant and influential factors’.[32] 

The Deputy Commissioner submits in response that the early admissions about the allegations did not extend to acknowledgement that Matter One (a) was substantiated, nor that the conduct in Matter One (d) was misconduct. Officer JGB had submitted that the allegations in Matter One (d) were not capable of constituting misconduct.[33] In any event, he submits that Officer JGB cannot now explain away his conduct by saying he is remorseful (or has undertaken rehabilitation).[34]

  1. Good work record: Officer JGB acknowledges some 17 complaints[35] against him (5 were unsubstantiated or a formal complaint not made; 4 resulted in managerial guidance; he was reprimanded for misconduct involving plagiarism; the others relate to these disciplinary proceedings). He submits that his employment record is good, relying upon citations and a letter of appreciation,[36] and the confidence expressed in him by superior officers.[37] He contrasts his record of no previous serious disciplinary action, with the record of the officer disciplined by dismissal in TXS v Acting Deputy Commissioner McCallum,[38] where the officer had previously been the subject of a suspended dismissal.

The Deputy Commissioner submits that, as was said in effect by the Appeal Tribunal in Crime & Corruption Commission v Queensland Police Service and Anor[39] (Francis), it would be surprising if his conduct while awaiting the outcome of disciplinary action was not good.[40] He submits the time for introspection was at the time of the events, so his subsequent work record should be given little weight.

  1. Substantial delay: In Crime and Misconduct Commission v Swindells & Gardiner,[41] the Tribunal said that delay ‘affords the opportunity to assess what the officer has learned from the salutary experience of these disciplinary proceedings.’[42] Here, Officer JGB continued as a police officer for some 3 years after the last act of misconduct before he was dismissed, including dealing with domestic violence incidents. He says this is an implicit expression of confidence in him by his superiors.[43] He also provides letters of support.

The Deputy Commissioner submits that his conduct after the misconduct is irrelevant: and that it would be surprising, in light of the disciplinary charges if he behaved otherwise. He submits that the time for introspection was at the time of the events.

  1. Community investment in his training: Officer JGB was a serving police officer, (who had progressed to the top pay-point level for a senior constable during his service in Queensland) for over 10 years from 2005 until 2015 when he was dismissed. He also served as a police officer in Victoria for some 4 years prior to his Queensland service. Relying upon the Tribunal’s decision in Crime and Corruption Commission v QPS and Francis,[44] he submits that there is considerable community value in the investment in his training and development as an officer.

The Deputy Commissioner submits that for this investment to represent a mitigating factor, it must be, in the circumstances, an investment which has value to the community. The Appeal Tribunal has previously held that there must be more than the fact of the investment for it to constitute an ‘investment with value to the public and its confidence in the QPS.’[45]

  1. Self-motivated seeking of professional assistance: Officer JGB sought professional assistance in dealing with his issues from his past relationship and previous unhealthy use of alcohol.[46] He submits that he and his former wife were subsequently able to establish an amicable relationship. He submits that this, combined with his subsequent good work conduct, demonstrates his character and ability to uphold the values and principles of the QPS.

As above, the Deputy Commissioner submits that the conduct is not explained away by Officer JGB having sought rehabilitation.[47] The Deputy Commissioner again submits that the time for introspection was at the time of the conduct.

Comparable decisions

  1. [27]
    Although every case must be considered on its own facts and merits, the Appeal Tribunal has said there is a need for consistency and reasonable comparability in respect of sanction.[48] The parties referred me to a variety of decisions which they relied upon as comparable in some way. Some relate only to discrete aspects of Officer JGB’s misconduct. The decisions are discussed in the following paragraphs. Where ascertainable from the decision, I have referred to the date/s at which the conduct occurred and the date of the decisions concerned. 
  2. [28]
    Decided in 2013, in DA v Deputy Commissioner Stewart (No 2),[49] (DA No 2) there were three aspects to the misconduct. The officer had breached a protection order under the DV Act. In that case, there was no actual or threatened violence to the officer’s spouse or to property. (The breaches related to prohibited contact via three messages to the officer’s spouse. The first requested that she tell the children he loved them; the second told his spouse to ‘get fucked’; and the third responded to a message she sent to him.) He has also lied when he told a supervising officer that he had not accessed his estranged wife’s email account; and provided false and misleading information in a statutory declaration to his estranged wife. He had a diagnosed adjustment disorder. He was sanctioned globally for his misconduct and suspended for 18 months.
  3. [29]
    Officer JGB submits that the Tribunal was particularly influenced by the substantiated dishonesty of DA in lying to a supervising officer. The Deputy Commissioner submits that Officer JGB’s misconduct is far more serious, and he did not have a diagnosed mental health condition.
  4. [30]
    Although decided in 2013, the disciplinary proceedings in DA (No 2), arose out of events which occurred in 2007 and 2008, and which were the subject of disciplinary charges brought at some time between 2008, and the disciplinary hearing conducted by, then Deputy Commissioner Stewart, commencing in 2009 and completing on 2 February 2010.[50] The review process and appeals to the Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal, and subsequent remission to the Appeal Tribunal, finally culminated in the decision in DA (No 2). The Appeal Tribunal accepted that the misconduct occurred in a context of DA’s wife having embarked upon a campaign to attack him. Although his dishonesty was considered serious, his suicidality/diagnosed mental health condition was accepted as relevant, even though it was not an excuse.
  5. [31]
    Officer JGB’s submissions to the Deputy Commissioner referred to a 2010 decision of Crime & Misconduct Commission v Swindells & Gardiner[51]  (Swindells & Gardiner). Disciplinary charges were substantiated against Officer Gardiner for use of excessive force on some six persons in custody and enticing a person in custody to fight with him between July and September 2004. The parties agreed that dismissal was the appropriate sanction, but that the dismissal should be suspended for 3 years.
  6. [32]
    The Tribunal’s decision followed the protracted course of the disciplinary action some 6 years later. The Tribunal found that Officer Gardiner had abused the intrusive powers conferred on police, but accepted that on some occasions, some level of force was justified. He was a relatively junior constable at the time. Available medical evidence indicated that the conduct was the emotionally immature response to frequent and persistent personal abuse and threats towards him by persons in custody. There had been no complaints against him in the 6 years after the events. The Tribunal accepted that dismissal was the appropriate sanction, and that in the circumstances, suspension was appropriate on the condition that Officer Gardiner undertake further treatment and counselling during the three year suspension period. 
  7. [33]
    Officer JGB says that the 2011 decision in McKenzie v Acting Commissioner Wright[52] (McKenzie) is instructive. A sergeant was demoted to senior constable for one year for a 2008 act of excessive and inappropriate physical violence in a private context against a person (also a police officer) with whom he had previously been in a sexual relationship. He detained her by grabbing her around the wrist, forcing her face down on a bed with his knees in her back, pulling her hands back and handcuffing her and applying a neck restraint manoeuvre. She suffered injuries, including bruising, haematoma, tenderness and a fractured eye socket. The Appeal Tribunal indicated in that matter, that misconduct in the course of duty is usually more concerning to the public that private behaviour.[53]
  8. [34]
    Officer JGB submits that the substantiated charge in Matter One (a) would warrant a similar sanction (demotion from senior constable 2.9 to constable 1.6 for one year), because the misconduct, although over several days was closely connected and his misconduct did not cause the types of injuries sustained in McKenzie. The Deputy Commissioner submits that McKenzie did not involve the same number of acts of domestic violence as Officer JGB and nor did it involve the other misconduct in Matters One (b), (c) and (d).
  9. [35]
    I observe that the disciplinary charge in McKenzie was not framed as domestic violence. Officer JGB nevertheless submits that the substance of the allegations must be considered and that in substance the allegations are of domestic violence. That said, domestic violence was not the charge and the misconduct was not considered/discussed in either the review decision or the Appeal Tribunal’s reasons for decision as constituting domestic violence. It does not appear that a domestic violence application was made. Therefore, the ramifications for public confidence having regard to the role of police officers in administering the DV Act was not considered or discussed in the tribunal’s decision.
  10. [36]
    The Deputy Commissioner places reliance on the 2011 decision in Officer TXS v Acting Deputy Commissioner McCallum.[54] It concerned misconduct in 2010 by an officer who unlawfully entered the home of her former de facto spouse; wrestled with, punched and choked her former partner; head butted and attempted to punch another occupant; punched five holes in the wall and smashed items by throwing them on the ground. Again, the disciplinary charges were not framed as domestic violence as such. Officer TXS was dismissed. McKenzie was distinguished by the Tribunal on that basis of ‘the degree of enraged and sustained violence against two persons with the aggravation of wilful property damage.’[55] Suspension of the dismissal was considered, but rejected by the Tribunal, ultimately having regard to the incompatibility of the conduct with the role of a police officer.[56] The Tribunal gave weight to the Deputy Commissioner’s views in considering possible suspension,[57] including, a degree of calculation in the officer’s behaviour[58] and the officer’s previous disciplinary sanction of suspended dismissal imposed in 2006.[59]
  11. [37]
    The Deputy Commissioner submits that Officer TXS is a relevant comparator case. He submits that while Officer JGB’s misconduct involved only one instance of physical violence towards ALB, he also caused property damage in a manner found by the Tribunal as was likely to cause significant fear and apprehension in ALB.[60] Further, he argues, Matters One (b), (c) and (d) were directly related to the domestic violence in Matter One (a). He submits that the conduct of Officer JGB has the same character/nature as the conduct in Officer TXS and consequently impacts on his ability to perform the role of a police officer for the community. Also, he submits that in Officer TXS, the dismissal was imposed despite some mitigating factors that are not present here; namely, the officer was prescribed medication as a result of the effects on her of the relationship breakdown and that she had omitted to take it in the days before the incident; she had shown remorse and attempted restitution; and she had admitted the allegations. She had also undergone psychological counselling; and had favourable references. 
  12. [38]
    Officer JGB submits that his misconduct is less serious misconduct than in Officer TXS.
  13. [39]
    Officer JGB refers to a 2013 decision of Watson-Paul v Acting Assistant Commissioner Dunn.[61] In 2007, Mr Watson-Paul, an intoxicated off-duty officer entered a police station and made derogatory comments and used obscene language towards other officers. When police attempted to detain him, he used abusive language. A considerable struggle ensued before he could be subdued. Disciplinary action was taken. He was demoted for 12 months, but the sanction suspended for 24 months. The decision does not identify his rank and pay-point.
  14. [40]
    Officer JGB submits that his conduct in Matter One (b) was less serious than Mr Watson-Paul’s, because Mr Watson-Paul’s actions were directed to a number of people and he arrest resisted. Officer JGB submits that a 1 or 2 pay-point reduction for 12 months would be the appropriate sanction for Matter One (b). The Deputy Commissioner submits that this decision does not assist the Tribunal here, because the other acts of misconduct cannot be disregarded. He further argues that, unlike here, in Watson-Paul there were no threats made of physical violence and no threats to kill another person.
  15. [41]
    In relation to accessing confidential QPRIME information without an official purpose, I was referred to the decisions in Frazer v Assistant Commissioner Condon,[62] (Frazer), Crime and Corruption Commission v Barron & Miers,[63] (Miers), and Podlich v Superintendent Paul Wilson.[64] Podlich is a 2003 decision, involving a senior sergeant who accessed confidential records was reprimanded. Expectations have moved on since then: the decision is unhelpful and it is not further discussed.
  16. [42]
    In Frazer, a recent 2016 decision, a senior constable with 28 years of policing experience had accessed confidential information on 34 occasions over a six-month period and released information to third parties. He also (mis)used a police vehicle as a taxi for friends and was absent from duty on 3 occasions. He was globally sanctioned with a reduction of 4 pay-points (on an ongoing basis). In the decision from early 2015 of Miers, an officer inducted in late 2009 had accessed confidential information (on about 13 occasions) from the QPRIME database on various dates between December 2011 and January 2013 (some 14 months) and disclosed information to two third parties. The constable was reduced one pay point for 6 months, although the Tribunal said it would have imposed a 12 month reduction if not for the community service already performed by the officer under the original sanction.
  17. [43]
    Referring to Matter One (c), Officer JGB submits that although he accessed confidential information over a protracted period, he did not disclose the confidential information to anyone. His submission to the Deputy Commissioner was to the effect that he accessed the information out of curiosity. He submits that here a six month suspension would be an appropriate sanction for Matter One (c).
  18. [44]
    In relation to Matter One (d), Officer JGB submits that Watson-Paul may provide some guidance, suggesting that Mr Watson-Paul was more aggressive and threatening and physically resisted arrest. He submits that a 1 or 2 pay-point reduction for 12 months would be appropriate for Matter 1(d) alone.

Assessment of sanction: is the criminal law sentencing principle in Ryan v R relevant?

  1. [45]
    Officer JGB submits that in determining sanction it is appropriate for the Tribunal to consider each charge separately as well as the totality of the conduct. He submits that the Tribunal should adopt, as a useful guide, the principle discussed by Brennan J in Ryan v R:[65]

When an accused person is convicted on two or more counts regularly joined, the trial judge is entitled to assess an appropriate overall sentence having regard to the entire course of criminal conduct which constitutes the several elements of the offences of which the accused is convicted. If the offences are founded on the same facts, it is necessary to ensure that the appropriate penalty for the same act or omission is not imposed twice; if the offences are part of a series, the entirety of the criminal conduct of the same or similar character, rather than the several acts or omissions constituting the separate offences, may determine the appropriate overall sentence to be imposed. In pronouncing sentence, however, the trial judge imposes separate sentences in respect of the several offences of which the accused has been convicted, effecting the appropriate overall sentence by adjusting the severity of the separate sentences and, when custodial sentences are imposed, by ordering that they be served either concurrently or cumulatively.

  1. [46]
    The principle was adopted in disciplinary proceedings by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Stirling v Legal Services Commissioner.[66] In essence, the Victorian Supreme Court, referring to Ryan, observed that it is easier to assess whether a penalty or a sanction is manifestly excessive or inadequate when sentence is pronounced on each count. Further, it commented that adherence to the rule prevents conduct from one charge from being used as an aggravating factor in assessing the penalty for another.
  2. [47]
    The disciplinary charge against Officer JGB, although it is described as Matter One, in substance, Officer JGB says, consists of a series of charges. Officer JGB submits that none of the acts of misconduct considered alone would render dismissal appropriate. Notwithstanding this submission, Officer JGB’s ultimate submission is that adopting the approach in Ryan v R is merely a ‘double-check,’ and that the proper course is to assess sanction based on the totality of the misconduct.
  3. [48]
    The Deputy Commissioner was unaware of any Queensland authority in which the approach had been followed in disciplinary proceedings. However, on the basis that ultimately it is the totality of the conduct which is assessed for sanction, in principle, he raised no objection to a ‘double-check’ being done in the manner suggested by Officer JGB’s counsel.
  4. [49]
    The principle in Ryan was developed in criminal proceedings, where there are multiple criminal charges. It does not appear to have been broadly adopted in disciplinary proceedings. More particularly, (unlike other general principles, such as the general principle of ‘the need for parity between co-offenders’ which has been recognised as analogous in criminal and disciplinary proceedings for reasons of ‘comparability and proportionality’ [67]), it appears it has not been adopted in Queensland.
  5. [50]
    I do not consider the principle in Ryan particularly helpful. A single sanction is appropriate for one substantiated charge.[68] Also, in police disciplinary proceedings, there is a point at which misconduct is incompatible with ongoing service because trust and confidence is so broken. This concept is not relevant in the criminal law sentencing context. Accordingly, I do not consider it appropriate to adopt the approach or principle in Ryan v R.

Current community attitudes and expectations concerning domestic violence and police misconduct

  1. [51]
    Whereas it was entirely inappropriate, it is unfortunately the case that in years gone by, there was a tacit tolerance of violence in the home, both by the public and other authorities including police officers. It was common to ‘to turn a blind eye.’ That is not the case now. Community attitudes and expectations have evolved and changed. Domestic violence is now thoroughly condemned by the community generally, which recognises it as deplorable and entirely unacceptable. There is no longer any tolerance.
  2. [52]
    Both parties concede that community expectations and attitudes about police officers’ conduct,[69] including their responses to domestic violence, have changed significantly over recent years. Indeed, they agree that attitudes to domestic violence have changed significantly over the period since the commission of the acts of domestic violence that are substantiated against Officer JGB. Expectations of police officers in administering the DV Act are high. The Deputy Commissioner submits that the Tribunal is entitled to take judicial notice of current attitudes.
  3. [53]
    For Officer JGB, there is no submission that current expectations are not relevant and should not be taken into account in determining sanction, even though they have progressed significantly since commission of the misconduct to be sanctioned. However, he submits that the events must be seen in the context of a long relationship (of some 13 years), coming to an acrimonious end. He says that of itself, the misconduct does not indicate such a flaw in character as to warrant dismissal, in the same way that disciplinary charges amounting to assault and drink-driving are not inherently considered to do so.
  4. [54]
    It seems to me that there are significant differences in considering use of excessive physical violence in the performance of an officer’s duties, as opposed to committing acts of domestic violence. It is undoubtedly anticipated that in performing active policing duties, circumstances may arise when persons who resist arrest or respond to or target police with violence may legitimately have to be subdued or contained by use of force by officers.
  5. [55]
    It is not the use of force per se which results in disciplinary charges, but the use of excessive or unnecessary force. That is, force is used, in circumstances that it is not warranted;[70] to a greater degree than is appropriate in the particular circumstances;[71] or is applied other than in accordance with internal police guidelines.[72] Whether misconduct involving use of unnecessary or excessive force is sufficient to warrant dismissal is a matter of degree having regard to the circumstances in each case. In some circumstances it has not been whereas in others it has been.[73] In some circumstances, dismissal has been suspended.[74]
  6. [56]
    In relation to drink-driving, an off-duty conviction (for a low-range conviction when the officer mistakenly, but honestly thought he/she was under the limit) might result in a sanction which, while demonstrating any breach of the drink-driving laws is misconduct, acknowledges that the misconduct is not a deliberate flouting of the laws which officers must uphold and administer. However, as the degree of personal culpability of the officer increases, so does the sanction.[75] Again, there is a question of degree to be assessed.
  7. [57]
    As a general proposition, the public expects that police officers will not perpetrate acts of domestic violence. This proposition is generally consistent with the tenor of the Deputy Commissioner’s comments in his reasons for decision, which exemplify the change in community attitudes, and may be a general expression of current expectations of QPS concerning domestic violence, at least where there had been direct physical violence. It must be remembered that in JGB’s case, the Deputy Commissioner had found substantiated numerous acts of direct physical violence towards ALB and property, (in addition to those substantiated by me on review). He referred to TXS in which acts of physical violence to persons and property had occurred. It is plain, from the later discussion in his reasons, that he considered where direct physical domestic violence against a spouse was substantiated, at least if it occurred more than once, that was incompatible with ongoing service.
  8. [58]
    Committing acts of domestic violence is inconsistent with the responsibility of police officers in the administration of the DV Act. Also, it may be difficult to accept that an officer could be mistaken about whether he or she is committing an act of domestic violence, because of their training and knowledge.
  9. [59]
    As I said in my decision made on substantiation about Officer JGB’s disciplinary charge:[76]

[102] Police officers play a significant role in the administration of the Domestic Violence Act. For example, they attend domestic violence incidents, support victims of domestic violence by making applications for DVPOs, and charge and prosecute persons who breach DVPOs. Therefore, allegations of domestic violence committed by an officer are very serious allegations.

  1. [60]
    That said, the definition of domestic violence in the DV Act is broad, encompassing verbal, emotional, psychological and financial abuse, as well as physical violence. Because of the role of police officers in the administration of the DV Act, the public reposes trust, and is entitled to have  the utmost confidence, in serving officers to ensure that all reports of domestic violence are treated with the seriousness they deserve. For the public and the QPS to have confidence in its officers to do so effectively, officers must hold, and through their conduct demonstrate, a personal belief in the unacceptability of domestic violence and a commitment to respond appropriately. If they do not, the confidence of the public in the ability and commitment of the QPS generally to respond appropriately to the scourge of domestic violence is significantly undermined.
  2. [61]
    As I have observed, the Deputy Commissioner’s comments in his reasons for decision were not made in the context of acts of non-physical domestic violence only, although his submissions may appear to suggest that there may be a general principle. In any event, I do not need to determine whether there is, (or could be), any general principle that commission of any act/s of substantiated domestic violence not involving physical violence is incompatible with ongoing service as a police officer. The actual misconduct must be sanctioned in any given disciplinary matter. There is potential for a vast range of possible acts of domestic violence which do not involve physical violence, to which a question of degree might be applied). That said, I observe that, in light of current expectations, the commission of any act/s of domestic violence by a police officer, would likely be considered very serious misconduct, irrespective of the existence of any such general principle.
  3. [62]
    I have found that Officer JGB committed several acts of physical violence (against ALB and property), as well as several other substantiated acts of serious misconduct as discussed earlier. All of the misconduct must be considered in imposing a global sanction, not only the acts of domestic violence.

What is the appropriate sanction for Officer JGB’s misconduct?

  1. [63]
    Officer JGB submits that having regard to the comparative cases and relevant mitigating circumstances, the appropriate overall sanction is demotion from Senior Constable 2.9 to Constable 1.6 for a period of 12 months. He says this would reflect the seriousness of, in order of seriousness, Matter One (a), One (b), One (d) and One (c). He says this would reflect the appropriate disapproval[77] and include substantial financial loss, humiliation and career set-back.[78]
  2. [64]
    The Deputy Commissioner submits that members of the public would not have trust or confidence in Officer JGB given the domestic violence and other related misconduct in which he has engaged. Further, he submits that his true character has been revealed and is inconsistent with his continued engagement as a police officer. The time for remorse, improved conduct and insight was at the time of the misconduct, instead he demonstrated that he does not have the necessary character and personal qualities.
  3. [65]
    Further, he submits that the mitigating factors relied upon should not result in disciplinary action other than dismissal, for similar reasons to those relied upon by the Appeal Tribunal in Francis. The Appeal Tribunal noted that in that case, although the officer had been cooperative in admitting some of the charges, (as here in Officer’s JGB’s case) he did not admit the more serious of them, and in respect of some, did not admit that the facts amounted to misconduct.[79] The Appeal Tribunal also said that it would be surprising in the face of continuing disciplinary proceedings and the spectre of dismissal, an officer did not get on with being a productive officer.[80] Also, the fact of the investment the public has in training an officer, does not make it an investment with value to the public and its confidence in the police service.[81]
  4. [66]
    I do not accept Officer JGB’s submission that the misconduct substantiated against him ‘arose out of’ an acrimonious marriage breakdown, or that it can reasonably be accepted as occurring ‘primarily over two days.’
  5. [67]
    To reiterate, Matter One (a) involved acts of domestic violence. On 15 February 2012 Officer JGB perpetrated acts of substantiated physical domestic violence against ALB, by way of the police-style take-down manoeuvre, and subsequent placement of his (shod) foot on her chest to exert power over and intimidate her.[82] He committed several acts of physical violence involving property damage to the disco ball and damage to the bedroom wall and door (at least some of which occurred in ALB’s presence) in October 2011 and in February 2012; and psychological abuse of name-calling (in the presence of both ALB and the children) on 15 February 2012. 
  6. [68]
    Having identified himself as a police officer, he threatened, on multiple occasions on 14 February 2012, to kill DC, whom he suspected of having an affair or involvement with his wife, and was otherwise abusive and threatening towards him in telephone calls over two days: Matter One (b).
  7. [69]
    Months after his February separation from ALB on 8 May 2012, he behaved as set out in Matter One (d). Once again after identifying himself as a police officer, he acted in an intimidating and frightening manner towards ALB, causing Constable Oztan to physically move him away from her, and then ‘shaping up’ to Constable Oztan who warned he may be handcuffed if he did not calm down, Officer JGB referring to ALB in a derogatory manner to the officers present while ALB was there.
  8. [70]
    Also, over an extended period of some 3 years, he accessed confidential records without an official purpose. In relation to DC, he accessed records for some months after he engaged in the threats and other conduct in Matter One (b).  He accessed ALB’s information some months after separation. He accessed the confidential of various other persons including EL and SL, without official reason on many other occasions.
  9. [71]
    Whereas I accept that serious substantiated incidents of domestic violence occurred on the two days surrounding separation, as did the threats to kill (and other misconduct) directed towards DC, property damage had also occurred, by way of smashing the disco ball in October 2011. Further, the improper and disgraceful behaviour towards ALB, Constable Oztan and Constable Radovanovich occurred in May 2012, some months after separation. The improper accessing of QPRIME occurred on many occasions over a lengthy 3 year period, including ALB and her immediate family members and best friend, DC, SL and EL’s records for months after separation.
  10. [72]
    Also, I consider it significant that in both One (b) and (d), JGB identified himself as a police officer to the other persons before performing the acts of misconduct. The use of the police-style take-down manoeuvre on ALB, as part of Matter One (a), on the day of separation to exert power over her and intimidate her is also significant.[83] These acts of misconduct intrinsically involve the improper use of his status, skills or authority as a police officer. He used his training as a means to intimidate ALB physically in using the take-down style manoeuvre. He used his status or authority again in identifying as a police officer to DC and the police constables before engaging in the particular acts involving them. His relative seniority to Constables Oztan and Radovanovic makes the acts involving them more serious, given that as a senior constable of significant experience, Officer JGB was in a position with some level of leadership responsibility for more junior officers, who may have been influenced to follow his lead as to acceptable conduct within the QPS.
  11. [73]
    Consistently, even though it is the least serious of the misconduct, in accessing confidential police records for his own interest over a lengthy time period, he again misused his status/authority as a police officer. Further, because of the large number of occasions on which he accessed information over some 3 years, this is far from minor misconduct.
  12. [74]
    Accordingly, I am satisfied that although the misconduct is varied in nature, each of Matters One (a), (b), (c) and (d) are serious transgressions. The Deputy Commissioner describes the misconduct as related. In my view, Matters One (a) and (b) are the most serious misconduct given the role of police officers in administering the DV Act and the criminal law. Matter One (d) is the next most serious. Having regard to the circumstances and nature of the misconduct, I consider that it is irrelevant that Matters One (a), (b) and (d) involved off-duty conduct.
  13. [75]
    Considering the nature of the misconduct, it is reasonable to accept that demonstrates a course of somewhat related conduct, as the Deputy Commissioner contends, given that One (a), (b) and (d) all involve threatening, violent or aggressive behaviour towards ALB (or in her presence), an associate of hers, DC, and other police officers in her presence. Matter One (c) is also  in some way related misconduct in that it includes many instances of accessing of the records of ALB’s family members, friends, or other persons he believed were connected to her and DC’s records.
  14. [76]
    That is not to say that I accept the misconduct ‘arises out of’ the separation as Officer JGB submits. The misconduct occurred over a significantly longer period in all than merely the events surrounding the period immediately before or after the separation. In any event, such events do not ‘arise out of’ separation. As discussed later, most persons who separate from their partners do not engage in such behaviour. They are far from an inevitable consequence of separation and I do not accept that they arise out of it.

The mitigating factors relied upon by Officer JGB

  1. [77]
    I have considered the mitigating factors relied upon by Officer JGB. Some are diminished by the circumstances that surround them. Ultimately, they are, in any event, overwhelmed by the seriousness of the misconduct.
  2. [78]
    I do not accept that the behaviour was out-of-character conduct. Although several of the substantiated acts of domestic violence and Matter One (b) occurred over a two-day period, as discussed above, the misconduct occurred over a more lengthy period. The incident involving the smashing of the disco ball occurred some 4 months beforehand in October 2011. The incident in Matter One (d), when Officer JGB acted in a manner frightening ALB in the presence of Officers Radanovic and Oztan and shaping up towards the latter, occurred some months after separation in May 2012. These events occurred over some 7 months, not two days. The events in Matter One (c), although less serious, they occurred over a 3 year period and include accessing the confidential information of DC, as well as ALB and her close associates, in the months after separation, but also involve many other similar transgressions. 
  3. [79]
    Further, I am not satisfied, that as JGB submits, that this was a particularly difficult marriage breakdown. No doubt, stress and difficulty accompanies any marriage breakdown. That is not an excuse for misconduct, even though in some circumstances, it may be a context that engenders some sympathy.  Statistically speaking, it is reasonable to infer that many police officers experience marriage breakdown and separation while serving. The public has a right to expect that they will continue to behave appropriately irrespective of personal stress during separation. Further, unlike the situations in some other cases discussed earlier, Officer JGB did not develop a diagnosed psychiatric condition which may have been considered relevant, despite not providing an excuse.
  4. [80]
    Officer JGB says that the words of Muir J in Dark that are relied upon by the Deputy Commissioner do not embody a principle (that is, to the effect that when tested, the true character of the person is revealed).  That said, I do not need to decide whether it is or is not a principle. The nature and circumstances of particular acts of misconduct must be considered to determine sanction. He concedes that the Tribunal must determine whether the misconduct so erodes the trust and confidence placed in an officer by the community and the service, that confidence in the officer is broken such that he cannot continue to serve. I am satisfied, for the reasons discussed throughout, that as the Deputy Commissioner submits, Officer JGB’s acts of misconduct are such as to significantly erode trust and confidence such that Officer JGB cannot continue in the role of police officer.
  5. [81]
    (Even if I am wrong, and the behaviour may properly be considered out-of-character behaviour, because trust has been so eroded, the sanction imposed would be unchanged).
  6. [82]
    Although the more serious misconduct occurred while officer JGB was off-duty, the nature and circumstances of his improper conduct, including committing acts of domestic violence and making threats to kill a person, and general misuse of his status, skills and authority as an officer,  particularly in relation to Matters One (b) and (d), renders those aspects very serious misconduct by an officer.
  7. [83]
    I acknowledge early admissions by Officer JGB of a significant number of the allegations, although while denying that Matter One (a) was substantiated and denying that Matter One (d) could amount to misconduct. Although the Tribunal has sometimes considered this may be a significant factor in demonstrating remorse and a willingness to face up to obligations, it is diminished here as a mitigating factor because of his denials, as identified earlier concerning Matter One (a) and Matter One (d).
  8. [84]
    I accept that Officer JGB, after appointment in January 2005, progressed to the highest level as a Senior Constable, Pay Point  9 and that he had only one other less serious substantiated incident of misconduct, which attracted a reprimand only. He provided work and personal references and emails acknowledging good work.
  9. [85]
    I am satisfied that Officer JGB’s good work record after the issues arose concerning the misconduct deserves no weight. It would be surprising if he behaved differently in light of the pending misconduct charges. In relation to his prior work history, I note that the actions involved in Matter One (c), although less serious than Matter One (a), (b) and (d), date back to 2009 commencing only some 4 years after he was employed by QPS. Even then, because he came to the QPS following previous Victorian police service he was hardly an inexperienced officer. Prior to this current disciplinary action there was another incident of substantiated misconduct. The commencement of acts amounting to misconduct by way of that earlier substantiated misconduct and the acts from 2009 onwards as specified in Matter One (c), earlier in his service, diminishes the mitigating effect of his ‘prior’ ‘good’ work record to some extent.
  10. [86]
    There has been some delay in finalisation of the charges. However, it is overwhelmed by the seriousness of the improper conduct. Further, the community’s long-term investment in his training is significantly diminished if, after some 15 years of service, I accepted on his own his own submissions that it is appropriate to significantly demote him, (even for some period), to the rank of constable—a junior officer. This necessarily diminishes the value of the community’s investment.  
  11. [87]
    Officer JGB submits that he has been rehabilitated, having sought professional assistance. However, it is apparent that he did not recognise the need for it until well after the need had arisen. Further, it was sought in the context of facing disciplinary proceedings, again arguably diminishing the mitigating value of it. I accept generally, as the Deputy Commissioner submits, that the time for reflection or introspection was at the time. In any event, the seriousness of the misconduct overwhelms this consideration.

Comparable Cases

  1. [88]
    As discussed earlier, I consider it is inappropriate to adopt the Ryan v R approach to double-checking sanction. It is artificial to look at Matter One (a), (b), (c) and (d) in isolation from one another. It is the totality of the conduct which must be sanctioned. Therefore, although I have considered the decisions and the parties submissions about them, many of the ‘comparable cases’ involving only one or some similar aspects of somewhat similar conduct are not especially helpful.
  2. [89]
    Further, I make the following observations about the submissions concerning the cases. Officer JGB says his conduct in Matter One (b) was less serious than the conduct in Watson-Paul. I disagree. I consider threats to kill another person and threats of physical violence made by Officer JGB, who had identified as a police officer, considerably more serious than making derogatory comments (and using obscene/abusive language), although I acknowledge that Mr Watson-Paul also struggled during attempts to subdue him.
  3. [90]
    Officer JGB accessed QPRIME records without official purpose some 37 separate occasions between October 2009 and November 2012. The records accessed included, on one occasion, ALB’s (some months post-separation), DC’s (the person who was the subject of the misconduct in Matter One (b), on 5 occasions between February and July 2012, after making the threats); and SL and EL, a couple with whom Officer JGB and ALB had a ‘partner swap’ arrangement.  He did it as a matter of curiosity for his personal interest.
  4. [91]
    Unlike in Miers, (and more akin to Frazer), Officer JGB was an experienced officer with almost 10 years experience (having regard to both his service in Queensland and his previous experience interstate as a police officer) when the conduct began. He also accessed the records for non-official purposes on a significantly larger number of occasions than Mr Frazer and over a lengthy some 3 year period, far longer than the period concerned in either Frazer or Miers. If it was relevant, I would not accept that for Matter One (c) alone, a 6 months reduction of 1 pay-point was an appropriate sanction.  In any event, it must been seen in the context of all of the substantiated misconduct against Officer JGB, not considered in isolation, in imposing sanction.
  5. [92]
    In relation to Officer JGB’s reliance on Watson-Paul in respect of Matter One (d), I have found a course of conduct and that Matter One (d) is related to the other substantiated misconduct, most particularly in Matter One (a) and (b). I do not accept that it should be considered alone, and must be considered in the context of his overall misconduct. Viewed in this context, it is considerably more serious than the one-off event involving Mr Watson-Paul.
  6. [93]
    I discussed earlier, my reasons for concluding that most of the decisions relied upon as comparable or providing some assistance in relation to aspects of the misconduct are unhelpful. However, two decisions, in particular, require further comment. I am not satisfied that as Officer JGB suggests, McKenzie, decided in 2011 (about events which occurred in 2008) is comparable. Although the conduct was very serious, it was a one-off event, not a course of conduct, as is the case here. Also, it concerns events which were not framed in the disciplinary charge, or even considered, in the context of domestic violence and the role of the police service in administering the DV legislation. That may be some reflection, perhaps, of QPS and community expectations at the time. In any event, community attitudes, as discussed earlier, have since evolved considerably.
  7. [94]
    Having said that, some changing of attitudes at that time was demonstrated in that, a differently constituted Tribunal considered acts of misconduct (which were not framed as the acts of domestic violence as such, rather as acts of breaking and entering, assault and property damage, in the disciplinary charges) to be acts of domestic violence, in 2011 in Officer TXS. The Tribunal’s findings about the seriousness of acts of domestic violence committed by a police officer as expressed in Officer TXS, are more in keeping with current prevailing community views and expectations. They are consistent with my comments about the seriousness of misconduct involving the commission of acts of domestic violence. Again, I observe, that the tribunal there was considering substantiated physical violence.

Conclusions

  1. [95]
    For the QPS to effectively play its role in administering the DV Act and the criminal law in accordance with community and QPS expectations, the public is entitled to have, and indeed must have, confidence that officers will not commit acts of domestic violence, such as those committed by Officer JGB or make threats to kill other persons. The deliberate and improper use of Officer JGB’s status, skills and authority as an officer (in perpetrating off-duty acts of misconduct by way of exerting power over and intimidating his wife; making the threats against DC; and in the context of the events involving Constables Oztan and Radovanovic, which makes those events more serious than they might otherwise be) is entirely inconsistent with the public’s expectations of an officer. The long-standing misuse of QPRIME to access confidential records on many occasions without an official purpose is also an abuse of official power or status. The period over which the misuse occurred and the large number of occasions on which it occurred, make the accessing of confidential records, significantly more serious than it might otherwise have been.
  2. [96]
    For the reasons explained throughout, I am satisfied that JGB’s overall misconduct demonstrates that he has so eroded the trust and confidence of the community and the QPS that he cannot continue to serve as an officer and that the purposes of discipline cannot be achieved in these circumstances by means other than the dismissal of Officer JGB.

Should the dismissal be suspended?

  1. [97]
    As Officer JGB submits, the Court of Appeal has held that special or exceptional circumstances are not required before a suspended sanction may be ordered: it is sanction which may be compared to a suspended sentence of imprisonment.[84]
  2. [98]
    However, I have concluded that Officer JGB’s overall misconduct is sufficiently serious that a suspension is not compatible with the maintenance of proper standards and confidence in the police service. The mitigating factors do not support or justify a suspension of the sanction in these circumstances. They are inadequate to offset the seriousness of the conduct. Suspension would not achieve the purposes of discipline, including deterrence of other officers. Officer JGB cannot continue to serve as an officer.
  3. [99]
    I am not satisfied that the dismissal should be suspended.

Orders

  1. [100]
    In light of my conclusions, the decision of the Deputy Commissioner on sanction is the correct and preferable decision.
  2. [101]
    Accordingly, I make orders confirming it.

Non-publication order

  1. [102]
    In my earlier decision on substantiation, I made a non-publication order. These reasons for decision are de-identified in compliance with the order.

Footnotes

[1]Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski and Anor [2016] QCAT 348.

[2][2016] QCAT 348.

[3]Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski and Anor [2016] QCAT 348, paras [162] – [174].

[4]Ibid, paras [175] – [179].

[5]Ibid, paras [189] – [193].

[6]Ibid, paras [194] – [206].

[7]Exhibit 1, Part A, p 42.

[8]Exhibit 1, Part A, p 4 and Part B, pp 382-384.

[9]Aldrich v Ross [2001] 2 Qd R 235, 247; see also CCC Act s 219A and Police Service (Discipline) Regulations 1990, reg 3.

[10]Hardcastle v Commissioner of Police (1984) 53 ALR 593, 597; see also CCC Act s 219A and Police Service (Discipline) Regulations 1990, reg 3.

[11]Aldrich v Ross [2001] 2 Qd R 235, 247.

[12]Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397; Queensland Police Service v Compton (No 2) [2011] QCATA 246, [25].

[13]Ibid.

[14]Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397, 412.

[15]Chapman v Crime & Misconduct Commission & Rynders [2012] QCATA 016, at [41-42]. See also, Aldrich v Ross [2001] 2 Qd R 235, at 257-258, per Thomas J.

[16]Compton v Deputy Commissioner Ian Stewart Queensland Police Service [2010] QCAT 384, at [31].

[17]Aldrich v Ross [2001] 2 Qd R 235, at [257-258]. See also, Tolsher v Commissioner of Police Ian Stewart (No 2) [2013] QCAT 590 at [15].

[18]QCAT Act, s 24.

[19]CCC Act, Division 4.

[20]CCC Act, s 219L.

[21]Submissions of the Deputy Commissioner filed 31 October 2016, at [90-92].

[22]Submissions of Officer JGB filed 28 November 2016, paragraph 39(a).

[23]Exhibit 1, Part A, pp 34, 84, 95.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Submissions of Deputy Commissioner, paras [111-115].

[26][2012] QCA 228, at [33].

[27]Ibid, at [35].

[28]Ibid, at [34].

[29]Submissions of Officer JGB filed 28 November 2016, paragraph 39(b), relying upon Hetherington v Assistant Commissioner of Queensland Police Service [2011] QCAT 83, [13] and McKenzie v Acting Assistant Commissioner Tony Wright [2011] QCATA 309, [31].

[30][2016] QCAT 348, [102].

[31]Exhibit 1, Part A, page 35 and Submissions of Officer JGB filed 28 November 2016, para 39(c).

[32]McKenzie v Acting Assistant Commissioner Tony Wright [2011] QCATA 309, [24].

[33]See [2016] QCAT 348, [6, 213-214] for my summary of the submissions made by Officer JGB.

[34]Submissions of the Deputy Commissioner filed 31 October 2016, at [119].

[35]Exhibit 1, Part A, pages 9-13, 95-96.

[36]Exhibit 1, Part A, pages 9-13.

[37]Exhibit 1, Part A, pages 99-130.

[38][2011] QCAT 739.

[39][2015] QCATA 15.

[40][2015] QCATA 15, [43].

[41][2010] QCAT 490.

[42]Ibid, [24].

[43]Submissions of Officer JGB, para 39(e).

[44][2015] QCATA 15, [46].

[45][2015] QCATA 15, [49].

[46] Exhibit 1, Part A, pages 34, 84, 95 and Submissions of Officer JGB filed 28 November 2016, para 39(g).

[47]Submissions of Deputy Commissioner filed 31 October 2016, para [119].

[48]O'Brien v Assistant Commissioner Gollschewski [2014] QCATA 148, at [48].

[49][2013] QCATA 162.

[50]DA v Deputy Commissioner Stewart [2011] QCAT 102.

[51][2010] QCAT 490.

[52][2011] QCATA 309.

[53]Ibid, at [55].

[54][2011] QCAT 739.

[55]Ibid, at [48].

[56]Ibid, at [53].

[57]Ibid.

[58]Ibid, at [51].

[59]Ibid, at [50].

[60]Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski and Anor [2016] QCAT 348, at [173].

[61][2013] QCATA 245.

[62][2016] QCAT 271.

[63][2015] QCAT 96.

[64]Misconduct Tribunal 10/2003. 

[65](1982) 149 CLR 1, at p 23.

[66][2013] VSCA 374.

[67]For example, see Braunberger v Assistant Commissioner Les Hopkins [2014] QCATA 320, at [62]-[63]. offenders.

[68]Tolsher v Commissioner of Police Ian Stewart (No 2) [2013] QCAT 590.

[69]Consistently with the Tribunal’s findings in, for example, CCC v Deputy Commissioner Pointing; O'Sullivan v Deputy Commissioner Pointing [2016] QCAT 510, at [103].

[70]For example, Crime and Corruption Commission v Deputy Commissioner Pointing; O'Sullivan v Deputy Commissioner Pointing [2016] QCAT 510.

[71]For example, Crime and Misconduct Commission v Acting Deputy Commissioner Barron & Alexander [2014] QCAT 241.

[72]For example, Crime and Corruption Commission v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski  & Majewski (No 2) [2014] QCAT 488.

[73]For example, in TXS v Acting Deputy Commissioner McCallum [2011] QCAT 739, although the misconduct involved some other aspects in addition to use of force and the use of force there was considered by the Tribunal to be domestic violence even though the charge was not framed as domestic violence.

[74]For example, Crime and Misconduct Commission v Acting Deputy Commissioner Barron & Alexander [2014] QCAT 241; and Swindells & Gardiner.

[75]For example, O'Brien v Assistant Commissioner Gollschweski [2014] QCATA 148.

[76]Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski and Anor [2016] QCAT 348, at [102].

[77]CCC v QPS & Francis [2015] QCATA 15, at [27].

[78]For example, Scott v Assistant Commissioner Peter Martin [2015] QCAT 423, at [52].

[79]CCC v QPS & Francis [2015] QCATA 15, at [32-34].

[80]Ibid, at [39-43].

[81]Ibid, at [49].

[82]Ibid, at [205].

[83]Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski and Anor [2016] QCAT 348, at [204-206].

[84]Flegg v Crime & Misconduct Commission [2014] QCA 42, at [26]-[27].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski and Crime and Corruption Commission

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski

  • MNC:

    [2017] QCAT 146

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Member Howard

  • Date:

    05 May 2017

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Aldrich v Boulton[2001] 2 Qd R 235; [2000] QCA 501
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] 2 Qd R 235
Cite 2 - [2001] 2 Qd R 235
Cite 3 - [2001] 2 Qd R 235
Cite 4 - [2001] 2 Qd R 235
Cite 5 - [2001] 2 Qd R 235
Braunberger v Assistant Commissioner Les Hopkins [2014] QCATA 320
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCATA 320
Cite 2 - [2014] QCATA 320
Chapman v Crime and Misconduct Commission & Rynders [2012] QCATA 16
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QCATA 16
Cite 2 - [2012] QCATA 16
Compton v Deputy Commissioner Ian Stewart Queensland Police Service [2010] QCAT 384
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCAT 384
Cite 2 - [2010] QCAT 384
Court in Gillan (1991) 54 A Crim R 475
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1991) 54 A Crim R 475
Crime & Corruption Commission v Deputy Commissioner Pointing; O'Sullivan v Deputy Commissioner Pointing [2016] QCAT 510
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCAT 510
Cite 2 - [2016] QCAT 510
Cite 3 - [2016] QCAT 510
Crime and Corruption Commission v Acting Deputy Commissioner Barron [2015] QCAT 96
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QCAT 96
Crime and Corruption Commission v Deputy Commissioner Stephan Gollschewski & Anor (No 2) [2014] QCAT 488
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCAT 488
Cite 2 - [2014] QCAT 488
Crime and Corruption Commission v Queensland Police Service and anor [2015] QCATA 15
9 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QCATA 15
Cite 2 - [2015] QCATA 15
Cite 3 - [2015] QCATA 15
Cite 4 - [2015] QCATA 15
Cite 5 - [2015] QCATA 15
Cite 6 - [2015] QCATA 15
Cite 7 - [2015] QCATA 15
Cite 8 - [2015] QCATA 15
Cite 9 - [2015] QCATA 15
Crime and Misconduct Commission v Acting Deputy Commissioner Barron & Alexander [2014] QCAT 241
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCAT 241
Cite 2 - [2014] QCAT 241
Cite 3 - [2014] QCAT 241
Crime and Misconduct Commission v Swindells & Gardiner [2010] QCAT 490
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCAT 490
Cite 2 - [2010] QCAT 490
Cite 3 - [2010] QCAT 490
Cite 4 - [2010] QCAT 490
DA v Deputy Commissioner Stewart [2011] QCAT 102
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCAT 102
Cite 2 - [2011] QCAT 102
DA v Deputy Commissioner Stewart (No 2) [2013] QCATA 162
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCATA 162
Cite 2 - [2013] QCATA 162
Deputy Commissioner Stewart v Dark [2012] QCA 228
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QCA 228
Cite 2 - [2012] QCA 228
Cite 3 - [2012] QCA 228
Cite 4 - [2012] QCA 228
Flegg v Crime and Misconduct Commission [2014] QCA 42
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCA 42
Cite 2 - [2014] QCA 42
Frazer v Assistant Commissioner Michael James Condon [2016] QCAT 271
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCAT 271
Hardcastle v Commissioner of Police (1984) 53 ALR 593
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 53 ALR 593
Cite 2 - (1984) 53 ALR 593
McKenzie v Acting Assistant Commissioner Wright [2011] QCATA 309
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCATA 309
Cite 2 - [2011] QCATA 309
Cite 3 - [2011] QCATA 309
Cite 4 - [2011] QCATA 309
Cite 5 - [2011] QCATA 309
O'Brien v Assistant Commissioner Stephen Gollschewski, Queensland Police Service [2014] QCATA 148
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QCATA 148
Cite 2 - [2014] QCATA 148
Cite 3 - [2014] QCATA 148
Officer JGB v Deputy Commissioner Gollschewski and Anor [2016] QCAT 348
12 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCAT 348
Cite 2 - [2016] QCAT 348
Cite 3 - [2016] QCAT 348
Cite 4 - [2016] QCAT 348
Cite 5 - [2016] QCAT 348
Cite 6 - [2016] QCAT 348
Cite 7 - [2016] QCAT 348
Cite 8 - [2016] QCAT 348
Cite 9 - [2016] QCAT 348
Cite 10 - [2016] QCAT 348
Cite 11 - [2016] QCAT 348
Cite 12 - [2016] QCAT 348
Officer TXS v Acting Deputy Commissioner Colin McCallum [2011] QCAT 739
9 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCAT 739
Cite 2 - [2011] QCAT 739
Cite 3 - [2011] QCAT 739
Cite 4 - [2011] QCAT 739
Cite 5 - [2011] QCAT 739
Cite 6 - [2011] QCAT 739
Cite 7 - [2011] QCAT 739
Cite 8 - [2011] QCAT 739
Cite 9 - [2011] QCAT 739
PME [2011] QCAT 83
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCAT 83
Police Service Board v Morris & Martin (1985) 156 CLR 397
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1985) 156 CLR 397
Cite 2 - (1985) 156 CLR 397
Cite 3 - (1985) 156 CLR 397
Queensland Police Service v Compton (No 2) [2011] QCATA 246
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCATA 246
Ryan v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1982) 149 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (1982) 149 CLR 1
Scott v Assistant Commissioner Martin [2015] QCAT 423
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QCAT 423
Cite 2 - [2015] QCAT 423
Stirling v Legal Services Commissioner [2013] VSCA 374
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] VSCA 374
Cite 2 - [2013] VSCA 374
Tolsher v Commissioner of Police Ian Stewart (No 2) [2013] QCAT 590
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCAT 590
Cite 2 - [2013] QCAT 590
Cite 3 - [2013] QCAT 590
Watson-Paul v Acting Assistant Commisioner Kerry Dunn [2013] QCATA 245
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCATA 245

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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