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TTI v Director General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General[2017] QCAT 57
TTI v Director General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General[2017] QCAT 57
CITATION: | TTI v Director General, Department of Justice and Attorney General [2017] QCAT 57 |
PARTIES: | TTI (Applicant) v Director General, Department of Justice and Attorney General (Respondent) |
APPLICATION NUMBER: | CML163-16 |
MATTER TYPE: | Children's matters |
HEARING DATE: | 3 February 2017 |
HEARD AT: | Townsville |
DECISION OF: | Member Pennell |
DELIVERED ON: | 24 February 2017 |
DELIVERED AT: | Townsville |
ORDERS MADE: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | CHILDREN'S MATTER – BLUE CARD – REVIEW OF NEGATIVE NOTICE – review of a decision to issue a negative notice – conviction for assaulting own child – assault occasioning bodily harm – not a serious offence or disqualifying offence – positive notice required as condition of employment – employment not related to care of children – whether exceptional circumstances exist – whether risk to children sufficiently negated – whether it is in the best interests of children to issue a positive notice NON PUBLICATION – identity of Applicant – identity of witnesses – identity of child victim – confidential information disclosed – whether in the interests of justice – discretion to be exercised when making a non-publication order Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 – s 5, s 6, s 221, s 226(2), s 353, s 354 and s 360. Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 – s 20(1), s 20(2), s 24, s 66(1), s 66(2)(d) and s 66(3). Criminal Code 1899 – s 1, s 280 and s 339. Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, s 12. Queensland Parliament Hansard, 14 November 2000 at p. 4391. Second reading of the Children Services Tribunal Bill; Commission for Children and Young People Bill. Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Maher & Anor [2004] QCA 492. Briginshaw v Briginshaw & Anor (1938) 60 CLR 336. Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Storrs [2011] QCATA 28. Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v FGC [2011] QCATA 291. Re Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd’s Patent Extension Petitions [1983] VR 1. Perry and Browns Patents (1930) 48 RPC 200. Kent v Wilson [2000] VSC 98. S and Chief Executive Officer, Department for Community Development [2007] WASAT 222. Chief Executive Officer, Department for Child Protection v Scott [No 2] [2008] WASCA 171. Grindrod v Chief Executive Officer, Department for Community Development [2008] WASAT 289. R v Terry [1955] VLR 114. |
APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATIONS: | |
APPLICANT: RESPONDENT: | Self represented. Ms H Marunda, Government Legal Officer. |
REASONS FOR DECISION:
Introduction
- [1]The Applicant is aged 46. He is employed as a Trades Assistant by a local government authority (“the Council”). The Applicant lodged with the Respondent an application for a Blue Card. The purpose for which he requires a Blue Card is employment related.
- [2]The Respondent is the Director General, Department of Justice and Attorney General. The Respondent’s functions include the administration of the scheme under the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (“Working with Children Act”) for the screening of people employed, or proposed to be employed in certain child related employment; and people carrying on, or proposing to carry on certain child related businesses.
Review Jurisdiction
- [3]The decision under review is whether the Applicant's case is an exceptional case[1] displacing the presumption under section 221 of the Working with Children Act that a positive notice should be issued to the Applicant. An object of that Act is to promote and protect the rights, interests and wellbeing of children in Queensland.[2]
- [4]The principle under which the Working with Children Act must be administered is that every child is entitled to be cared for in a way that protects the child from harm and promotes the child's wellbeing.[3] A child-related employment decision must be reviewed under the principle that the welfare and best interests of the child are paramount.[4]
- [5]A person affected by a decision of the Respondent may apply to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) for a review of that decision.[5] The Tribunal must then hear and decide the review by way of a fresh hearing on the merits of the application.[6] The question for the Tribunal to decide is whether an exceptional case exists bearing in mind the gravity of the consequences involved.[7] In reaching a decision, the Tribunal need only weigh up the competing facts and apply the balance of probabilities principle. Neither party bears the onus in determining whether an exceptional case exists.[8]
- [6]The purpose of the review hearing is to produce the correct and preferable decision[9] and in carrying out that function, the Tribunal may either confirm or amend the decision; or set aside the decision and substitute its own decision; or set aside the decision and return the matter for reconsideration to the decision maker for the decision, with the directions the Tribunal considers appropriate.[10]
Non-Publication Order
- [7]The Applicant has been convicted of assaulting his own son. Because of the nature and sensitivity of this matter, along with the sensitive nature of the material provided by Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services (“the child safety agency”), consideration should be given to de-identifying the Applicant, the witnesses and the locality of where those individuals live.
- [8]The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act (“the QCAT Act”) provides the Tribunal with the discretionary power to make a non-publication order prohibiting the publication of the contents of any document or thing produced, or evidence given, or information that might enable a person who appeared before the Tribunal to be identified.[11] The Tribunal also has the discretion to use its initiative and make a non-publication order.[12] It is noted that at the hearing of this matter, the Respondent was supportive of the proposition that the identity of the Applicant and the witnesses should be protected.
- [9]Having regard to the circumstances of this application, the Tribunal is satisfied that a non-publication order is necessary to avoid the publication of confidential information whose publication would be contrary to the public interest.[13]
Background to application
- [10]The Applicant has never held a Blue Card. A condition of his employment with the Council is that he must have one. This is because the Council own, operate and maintain three child daycare facilities. The nature of his employment requires him to occasionally visit those childcare facilities to undertake periodic maintenance. It is not the case that he has children in his care during his employment, but rather the nature of his employment requires him to attend those childcare facilities from time to time.
- [11]The Applicant’s application is to review the Respondent’s decision to issue him a negative notice. Upon receipt of his application, the Respondent undertook a criminal history check with the Queensland Police Service, which ultimately showed that the Applicant was recorded as being convicted of assaulting his son in 2012. The child suffered bodily harm[14] during that assault.[15]
- [12]Because of that criminal history, the Respondent determined that it would not be in the best interests of children for the Applicant to be issued with a positive notice and a Blue Card. A negative notice was issued.[16] he Respondent was directed by the Tribunal[17] to reconsider the decision to issue the Applicant with a negative notice. That reconsideration was to take place following the receipt of any additional evidence and statements provided by the Applicant. Upon reconsideration, the Respondent maintained the position that it was an exceptional case and the negative notice should remain in place.
- [13]With regards to the Applicant’s antecedents, he is a father to two children. His son is now aged 17. In 2009, he and his former wife separated. They put into place a shared care parenting arrangement for their children. Shortly after they separated, the child safety agency was notified about the Applicant inflicting physical punishment on his son. Insufficient or limited information was available to the child safety agency at that time to undertake any investigation. The incident was recorded as a child concern report.[18]
- [14]In April – May 2011, the child safety agency received a second report about the Applicant physically disciplining his son. The report indicated that the Applicant punched the child in the arm. Neither the police or the child safety agency took any action, apart from giving the Applicant a warning about his method of discipline.[19]
- [15]In March 2012, further information was received by the child safety agency about the Applicant again physically disciplining his son. On this occasion, the child presented with bruising on his arm and back, which the child said was caused by the Applicant punching him. When the Applicant was interviewed by the police about the allegations, he admitted that he inflicted punishment on his son by punching him three times.[20] It would seem from the information available, the catalyst for the discipline was the child’s behaviour.[21] The Applicant was charged with assaulting his son and thereby causing him bodily harm (“AOBH”). He pleaded guilty and was fined $300. No conviction was recorded.[22]
The Applicant’s evidence
- [16]The Applicant said that since birth, his son was a bit of a handful. He was a child that hated being told what to do. Just telling him to do something was a task. He rarely obeyed the instructions given to him by his parents. Recently the child has been diagnosed with ADHD, which would have contributed to his behaviours. The Applicant told the Tribunal that his son is now aged 17 and he lives with the Applicant. The child attended the Tribunal with the Applicant and was prepared to speak to the Tribunal in support of his father.[23]
- [17]With regards to the child safety agency’s material where it is suggested that he improperly punished the child in 2009, the Applicant said that this was the very first time that he became aware of the 2009 allegations. In regards to the allegations relating to the 2011 incident, the Applicant conceded that the information was correct.
- [18]Similarly, with the 2012 incident, the Applicant said that the information was correct. The child told the investigators that on the day of the assault, he went home and went to his bedroom. He said that he then started to throw all his stuff everywhere in his bedroom. His father came into the bedroom and struck him.
Supporting Evidence
- [19]The Applicant called two witnesses to give evidence in support of his case. They were PJ and TLE. PJ is the Applicant’s current partner and TLE is his former wife.
PJ’s evidence
- [20]PJ is employed as a Teacher’s Aide and has been in a relationship with the Applicant since 2012, although they do not live together. She has two children, now aged 18 and 16. PJ told the Tribunal that in the years that she has known the Applicant, he has always been a kind and loving natured person. She also said that the Applicant had moved on from the past incident involving his son, which happened many years previously and he has learnt from his actions with regards to how best to deal with difficult situations.
- [21]The Applicant had never shown any hostility towards her or her two children. Not at any stage of their relationship has she seen any behaviour by the Applicant towards his own children which concerned her, and nor has she witnessed him inflicting physical discipline upon any child. She is aware of the Applicant’s court appearance for assaulting his own son because it happened shortly after their relationship commenced.
TLE evidence[24]
- [22]TLE told the Tribunal that although she and the Applicant are divorced, they are still very good friends. They have two children from their marriage. She said that for the past 18 months, their son has been staying with the Applicant on a full-time care basis. Their daughter stays with the Applicant each weekend.
- [23]She said that apart from the incident between the Applicant and their son in 2012, there has never been any concerns raised about his parenting. When cross-examined by the Respondent, she discussed the circumstances surrounding the Applicant being charged with assaulting their son.
- [24]Their son had behavioural problems. He was difficult to manage as a child growing up. His behavioural problems were not confined to the family home, he was at times suspended from school because he misbehaved. During their marriage, she never saw the Applicant physically discipline the children. He usually sent them to their room, or spoke to them about their behaviour. Even after the child safety agency raised with her the concerns of the Applicant physically disciplining their son, she was not concerned about this because she knew that what happened was out of character for the Applicant.
What is an “exceptional case”?
- [25]Although the term “exceptional case” is not defined in the Working with Children Act, it has been the subject of prior discussion in many jurisdictions, including the Tribunal’s appeal jurisdiction. The term is said to be a question of fact and degree to be decided in each individual case.
- [26]Regard must be given to the context of the legislation, along with the intent, purpose and design of that legislation for the protection of children.[25] A frequently cited definition of exceptional case arises out of the judgment of Luxmoore J in Re Perry and Brown's Patents (1930) 48 RPC 200. Attention should be paid to the warning given in that case where Luxmoore J said that it would be most unwise to lay down any general rule about what an exceptional case is. Discretion should be used and each case should be considered on its own facts.[26]
- [27]That term exceptional was also discussed in Kent v Wilson [2000] VSC 98. In that case, reference was made to the definition of exceptional as meaning unusual, special, out of the ordinary course.[27] In deciding whether there is an exceptional case in regard to the Applicant in these proceedings, consideration must be given to all the circumstances, and regard must be taken of when the offence was committed, the nature of the Applicant’s offending behaviour, its relevance to his current or future employment, if the offence involved children; and anything else reasonably considered relevant to the assessment of the Applicant’s eligibility.[28]
Test to be applied
- [28]The Applicant was charged with AOBH. He was convicted and fined $300, but no conviction was recorded.[29] That offence is not a disqualifying offence or a serious offence as defined in the Working with Children Act. Accordingly, a positive notice must be issued unless it is an exceptional case and it would not be in the best interests of children for the Applicant to be issued with a positive notice.[30]
- [29]It is a matter of discretion whether a case is exceptional, and that is to be determined by looking at the circumstances of each individual case. What constitutes an exceptional case is a question of fact and degree.[31] The facts must be examined in the light of the intention of the Working with Children Act. Each case must be judged on its own merits, and it would be wrong and undesirable to attempt to define in the abstract what the relevant factors are.[32]
- [30]
- (i)The Applicant’s conviction for AOBH. There is no suggestion that prior to this conviction he had any previous criminal history or was adversely recorded by the police. The court in convicting him exercised its discretion to not record a conviction. Since then, he has not been convicted of any offence.
- (ii)AOBH is not a disqualifying offence or a serious offence as defined in the Working with Children Act.
- (iii)The offence was committed in 2012, some five years ago.
- (iv)The nature of the offence, and its relevance to his employment, or carrying on a business that involves or may involve children. The nature of the offence was the Applicant assaulting his 12 year old son. The assault caused bruising. Nothing suggests that the Applicant carries on a business that may or may not involve children. The only relevance to the Applicant’s employment is that his employer owns and operates daycare facilities and he may be required from time to time to carry out maintenance at any of those facilities.
- (v)When convicted of the AOBH offence, the Applicant was not imprisoned. He was fined $300.
- [31]With regards to the remaining points, the considerations as provided within section 226(2)(b) – 226(2)(e) of the Working with Children Act do not apply in these proceedings. However, the Tribunal’s considerations are not merely confined to those points just mentioned. As determined by Philippides J in Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Maher & Anor [2004] QCA 492 at [42], the provisions of section 226(2) do –
“not expressly or impliedly confine the [Tribunal] to considering only the matters specified therein and there is no basis for construing the provision in such a restrictive manner”.
- [32]Philippides J also endorsed the approach of Fullagar J in Re Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd’s Patent Extension Petitions [1983] VR 1, in adopting the warning of Luxmore J in Perry and Browns Patents (1930) 48 RPC 200, that –
“…it would be most unwise to lay down any general rule with regard to what is an exceptional case. All these matters are matters of discretion”.[35]
Discussion
- [33]Along with the aged and the infirmed, children are the most vulnerable and dependent members of our society. The Applicant was convicted of AOBH. The assault took place when the child was in his care.
- [34]In Queensland, it is lawful for a parent to use by way of correction, discipline, management or control such force as is reasonable under the circumstances.[36] The term reasonable under the circumstances was best described by Sholl J in R v Terry [1955] VLR 114 where it was pointed out that there are strict limits to the right of a parent to inflict reasonable and moderate punishment on their child for the purpose of correcting the child in wrong behaviour. Whether an amount of punishment can be recognised as lawful will vary depending on the age, sex, the apparent physical stature of the child and the method or means the punishment was imposed.
- [35]It is apparent from the facts that the Applicant’s use of physical discipline was determined not to be reasonable under the circumstances and was sufficiently excessive to justify him being placed before a court on a criminal charge. That prosecution of the assault was vindicated when the Applicant pleaded guilty to the offence of AOBH. The Tribunal has not been provided with the sentencing remarks relating to the Applicant’s conviction. Notwithstanding that, the evidence placed before the Tribunal suggests that at the time the Applicant assaulted his son he was suffering from a significant amount of stress related to the breakdown of his marriage with his former wife, and the continued disruptive behaviour of his son. Although this may be an explanation for the events, it can in no way be an excuse for causing an injury to the child.
- [36]The material provided to the Tribunal from the child safety agency indicates that the child was at times troublesome. He was misbehaving and ill-treating his younger sister. The material also suggests that the incident for which the Applicant was convicted involved a culmination of three independent acts of physical discipline by him over a three year period. The most serious of the incidents happened in the 2012 incident where bruising was caused to the child.
- [37]Returning to why the Applicant requires a Blue Card. The nature of his employment with the Council is that he must be the holder of a Blue Card. If he does not hold a Blue Card, his employment status may change. The Respondent argues that prejudice or hardship to the Applicant are not relevant when determining whether a case is exceptional.[37]
- [38]In support of that argument, the Respondent relied upon the Western Australian Court of Appeal case of Chief Executive Officer, Department for Child Protection v Scott [No 2] [2008] WASCA 171 (“Scott’s case”). Scott’s case involved an appeal from orders made by the Deputy President of the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia (“the WASAT”).[38] The WASAT set aside the CEO’s decision and issued an assessment notice as provided under the legislation for that State.[39]
- [39]From 1980, Mr Scott had been training young athletes. He had achieved a degree of success and held relatively high qualifications as an athletics coach. In 2007, he received a negative notice under the Working with Children (Criminal Record Checking) Act 2004 (WA) which prevented him from carrying out child related work. The negative notice related to his convictions in 1977 and 1981. Because he wished to continue with his athletics training, he applied to the WASAT for a review of that decision.
- [40]Upon review, the WASAT examined Mr Scott’s convictions and considered whether it was relevant to child related employment. Although concluding that the convictions were relevant to child related employment, the WASAT considered that there had been no inappropriate conduct by him since the incident subject to his conviction in 1981.
- [41]The WASAT also looked favourably upon the passing of 26 years since the most recent conviction and the strong support he had from people associated with his athletics club. Having regard to those circumstances, the WASAT considered that a negative notice should not be issued because children were not likely to be at risk from continued contact with Mr Scott.
- [42]The Chief Executive Officer, Department for Community Development appealed the WASAT’s decision. The appeal was dismissed, however in doing so, the Appeal Court refused to suppress Mr Scott’s name.
- [43]In regard to these proceedings, the Respondent relied upon the comments made by Buss JA[40] in Scott’s case where reference was made to –
“The Act does not have a punitive or disciplinary purpose even though, in its application or implementation, the civil rights of applicants who are issued with a negative notice will be affected adversely and, in some circumstances, those applicants with, for example, non-conviction charges may suffer serious or even irretrievable damage to their reputations or a significant diminution in their earning capacity. That the issuing of a negative notice may have an adverse impact on the applicant is not, however, a factor which the CEO is obliged or entitled to take into account”.
- [44]The Respondent also drew the Tribunal’s attention to the case of Grindrod v Chief Executive Officer, Department for Community Development [2008] WASAT 289 (“Grindrod’s case”). In relying upon Grindrod’s case, the Respondent said that if a case is exceptional due to identified risk factors, any benefit which might flow to children by having access to the Applicant’s knowledge, experience or flair in working with children is of no relevance.[41] It is not necessary to dwell on the circumstances outline in Grindrod’s case as the facts are not on point to these proceedings. Although, Grindrod’s case did reference Scott’s case so far as the examination of character witnesses and the principle relating to the future risk to children if a positive notice was issued to a person involved in child related employment.[42]
- [45]An observation of the Working with Children Act is that the protection of children is paramount. The legislative intention of the Act was explained to the Queensland Parliament by the then Minister for Families, Youth and Community Hon A M Bligh during the second reading of the Children Services Tribunal Bill; Commission for Children and Young People Bill as –
“This Bill is not about denying employers options to employ people who would be good at the job. It is about putting gates around employment to protect children. It is not about punishing people twice; it is about protecting children from future abuse”.[43]
- [46]The questions that should be addressed in this matter are whether, having regard to all the evidence placed before it, is the Tribunal satisfied of a risk of repetition of the Applicant’s offending; and, is the risk of harm to children sufficiently negatived so that it could be concluded that a positive notice would not harm the best interests of children. In answering those questions, a complete analysis is required of all the circumstances relating to the Applicant. The determination reached from that analysis should then be balanced against the principle that the welfare and best interests of a child are paramount.[44]
- [47]In arriving at an answer to those questions, the Tribunal is satisfied that notwithstanding the Applicant’s conviction and the facts which led to that conviction, the circumstances of his offending are characterised by the absence of distinguishing features or marked qualities that would give rise to any concern for the issuing of a positive notice.
- [48]Apart from assaulting of his own son in 2012, there is no other evidence or other facts before the Tribunal to support any proposition that the Applicant poses an appreciable or unacceptable risk to children. The Tribunal accepts and is satisfied that the Applicant has expressed remorse for assaulting his son and that he acknowledges his wrongdoing. Both he and his son have a loving and close relationship. The child is permanently in his care and they currently live together in the same residence.
- [49]The Applicant has adopted strategies to enable him to deal with stressful situations involving his child, or in that fact, any child. The Tribunal accepts and acknowledges that the Applicant has developed significant insight into his past behaviour. Although it can never be assumed that there is no risk of him reoffending, all the evidence points towards any risk being categorised as a very low risk.
Conclusion
- [50]A positive notice is unconditional and fully transferable. The holder of a Blue Card is allowed unsupervised and unfettered access to children in a range of regulated activities. Transferability of the Blue Card from one occupation to another is a consideration that the Tribunal must give to the application.
- [51]On that point, the Tribunal can only act on the information or evidence placed before it. On that point, there is no information or evidence to suggest that the Applicant intends to cease working for his employer in the foreseeable future. He is a Trades Assistant. His employment status with the local Council is such that he is required to periodically carry out maintenance at those Council owned daycare facilities. The evidence does not suggest that the Applicant is engaging, or intends in the future to engage in a more involved child related employment.
- [52]To issue a negative notice to the Applicant, the Tribunal must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that this matter is an exceptional case. The correct test to apply is that if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is an exceptional case in which it would not be in the interests of children for a positive notice to be issued to the Applicant, the Tribunal must issue a negative notice.[45]
- [53]The Respondent argued that the risk factors identified in the proceedings render the case an exceptional one, such that it would not be in the best interests of children and young people for the Applicant to be issued with a positive notice and a Blue Card.[46] Previous reference has made to the cases of Scott and Grindrod as to the examination of character witnesses and those matters which constitute relevant considerations as to whether a negative notice should be issued to the Applicant, and the degree of any future risk to children if the Applicant were to be engaged in child related employment.[47] Earlier comment was also made that it is a matter of discretion whether a case is exceptional, and that is to be determined by looking at the circumstances of each individual case. What constitutes an exceptional case is a question of fact and degree.[48] The facts must be examined in the light of the intention of the Working with Children Act and each case must be judged on its own merits.
- [54]Overall, the strengths, merits and protective factors in favour of the Applicant outweigh the relevant risks relied upon by the Respondent. The Tribunal is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that an exceptional case exists as the circumstances of this matter do not make the Applicant’s position unusual, special or out of the ordinary.
- [55]In conclusion, the Tribunal is satisfied that the correct and preferable decision is to set aside the Respondent’s decision.
Orders
- [56]The Orders of the Tribunal are that –
- The decision of the Director General, Department of Justice and Attorney General dated 9 June 2016 to issue a negative notice to the Applicant is set aside.
- Pursuant to section 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, the Tribunal prohibits the publication of the names of the Applicant and any witnesses appearing for the Applicant.
Footnotes
[1]Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), s 353.
[2]Ibid, s 5.
[3]Ibid, s 6.
[4]Ibid, s 360.
[5]Ibid, ss 353 – 354.
[6]Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, s 20(2).
[7]Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Maher & Anor [2004] QCA 492 at [30] citing the test prescribed in Briginshaw v Briginshaw & Anor (1938) 60 CLR 336.
[8]Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Storrs [2011] QCATA 28.
[9]Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, s 20(1).
[10]Ibid, s 24.
[11]Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, s 66(1).
[12]Ibid, s 66(3).
[13]Ibid, s 66(2)(d).
[14]Criminal Code Act 1899, s 1. Bodily harm is defined as meaning “any bodily injury which interferes with health or comfort”.
[15]Ibid, s 339.
[16]Negative Notice issued on 9 June 2016.
[17]Directions of Tribunal Member Dr. Cullen arising out of a Compulsory Conference on 19/08/2016.
[18]Exhibit 2 at pages 1 – 3.
[19]Ibid, at pages 7 – 42.
[20]Ibid, at pages 43 – 63.
[21]Respondent’s Reasons at page 7 – Queensland Police Service Court Brief (QP9).
[22]Date of conviction was 18 April 2012.
[23]The child’s evidence was not taken by the Tribunal.
[24]Exhibit 3. TLE’s written statement.
[25]Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v FGC [2011] QCATA 291 at 31 (citing Kent v Wilson [2000] VSC 98 per Hedigan J at [22]).
[26]Re Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd’s Patent Extension Petitions [1983] 1 VR 1 per Fullager J.
[27]Kent v Wilson [2000] VSC 98 at paragraph [22].
[28]Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000, s 226(2).
[29]Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, s 12. A court may exercise a discretion to record of not record a conviction.
[30]Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000, s. 221.
[31]Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Maher & Anon [2004] QCA 492.
[32]Kent v Wilson [2000] VSC 98 at [22].
[33]Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Maher & Anor [2004] QCA 492 at [34] per Philippides J.
[34]Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening Act) 2000, s 226(2).
[35]Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Maher & Anor [2004] QCA 492 at [34].
[36]Criminal Code 1899, s 280.
[37]Exhibit 4. Respondent’s written submissions at paragraph 18.
[38]Chief Executive Officer, Department for Child Protection v Scott [No 2] [2008] WASCA 171 was first reported in the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia as S and Chief Executive Officer, Department for Community Development [2007] WASAT 222.
[39]Working with Children (Criminal Records Checking) Act 2004 (WA).
[40]Chief Executive Officer, Department for Child Protection v Scott [No 2] [2008] WASCA 171 at [109].
[41]Grindrod v Chief Executive Officer, Department for Community Development [2008] WASAT 289 at paragraph [33].
[42]Ibid, at paragraph [32].
[43]Queensland Parliament Hansard, 14 November 2000 at p. 4391.
[44]Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), s 6(a).
[45]Ibid, s 221(2).
[46]Exhibit 4. Respondent’s written submissions at paragraph 38.
[47]Grindrod v Chief Executive Officer, Department for Community Development [2008] WASAT 289 at paragraph [32].
[48]Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Maher & Anon [2004] QCA 492.